NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
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54 SUCTH ANNUAL REPORT OF <strong>NATIONAL</strong> <strong>LABOR</strong> <strong>RELATIONS</strong> <strong>BOARD</strong><br />
tressed by a second organization," formed to provide the plan with a<br />
rank and file membership in order to combat more effectively the<br />
outside union.<br />
E. INVESTIGATION AND CERTIFICATION' OF REPRESENTATIVES<br />
Section 9 (c) of the Act provides that—<br />
Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation<br />
of employees, the Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the<br />
parties, in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been<br />
designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for<br />
an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding<br />
under section 10 (c) or otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees,<br />
or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives.<br />
By virtue of section 9 (a) of the Act, representatives designated<br />
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority<br />
of the employees in an appropriate unit are the exclusive representatives<br />
of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective<br />
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or<br />
other conditions of employment. For an employer to refuse to bargain<br />
collectively with such representatives is, by virtue of section 8<br />
(5), an unfair labor practice which the Board is empowered to prevent.<br />
When representatives have been selected by a majority of the employees<br />
in an appropriate bargaining unit, the employer's duty to<br />
bargain is clear. Frequently, however, a bona fide doubt may exist<br />
as to whether or not a majority of the employees in an appropriate<br />
unit have selected such representatives. Until resolved, such uncertainty<br />
constitutes a formidable obstacle to the practice and procedure<br />
of collective bargaining. Section 9 (c) is designed to remove<br />
this obstacle by creating machinery for the determination of such<br />
representatives." As stated in segtion 9 (c), this investigatory power<br />
may be exercised in conjunction with a proceeding under section 10<br />
to determine whether an employer has committed an unfair labor<br />
practice, but the proceeding under section 9 (c) is separate and apart<br />
from proceedings involving unfair labor practices. Thus, a proceeding<br />
under section 9 (c) results merely in certification that a particular<br />
representative has been chosen by a majority of the employees in an<br />
appropriate unit, if such in fact is the case, and does not result in an<br />
order requiring the employer to cease and desist from an unfair labor<br />
practice or to take any affirmative action.<br />
tin-mill reorganization ; encouraged affiliation with the Plan by discrimination in regard<br />
to hire and tenure of employment and by other acts of interference, restraint, and coercion<br />
; and contributed further support to the Plan, in connection with its elections and<br />
other activities through the Bulletin, the Security League, and the Community League."<br />
6, With respect to the Security League [the labor organization formed to provide the<br />
Plan with a rank and file membership], the Board summarized its findin gs as follows<br />
"The respondent—acting through officials and other supervisory employees, employee<br />
representatives, and the Plan, the Tlulletin, the Community League, and affiliated banks—<br />
formed the Security League ; subsidized it by contributions, loans, free advertising,<br />
check-off, and donation of company time and property ; participated in the administration<br />
of the Security League ; aided it by solicitation, editorials, cartoons, and other coercive<br />
publicity in connection with a loyalty pledge, insi gnia, demonstrations, membershi p campaigns,<br />
and other league activities ; and encouraged membership in the Security League<br />
by numerous other acts of interference, restraint, coercion, and discrimination. The<br />
Security League, Including its various units, was a potent device, by which the respondent<br />
succored the Plan and frustrated the S. W. 0. C. Moreover, in view of the integral<br />
relationship between the Plan and the Security League, including its several units, it is<br />
clear that by virtue of the respondent's interference with, support, and domination of,<br />
the Plan, it has Interfered with, supported, and dominated the Security League."<br />
66 An investigation under sec. 9 (c) involves the determination of many questions which<br />
also arise in proceedings involving unfair labor practices, and are treated elsewhere.<br />
See sec. F, infra, as to what constitutes proof of majority ; sec. G, infra, concerning<br />
the appropriate unit ; and ch. VI, infra, on jurisdiction.