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Euromoney Interest Rates Survey 2011 is now live<br />

Click to participate: www.euromoney.com/rates2011<br />

Market Economics | Interest Rate Strategy | Forex Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

Market Outlook 2-3<br />

Fundamentals 4-17<br />

• US FOMC: Just Doing My Job 4-5<br />

• US: Wealth Fell as Stocks Tanked in 6-7<br />

Q2<br />

• ECB: QE through the Back Door? 8-9<br />

• Eurozone: Reality Bites 10-11<br />

• France: 2011 Budget to Push CPI Up 12-13<br />

• Norway: Cautious Approach 14-15<br />

• Japan: Tankan to Remain Upbeat 16-17<br />

Interest Rate Strategy 18-43<br />

• Global: The Debt/Equity Macro Trade 18<br />

• US: Belly of the Curve is Rich, but… 19-20<br />

• US: A Carry Trade with Extra<br />

21-22<br />

Potential<br />

• MBS: Remain Underweight, GNM 23<br />

CBRs Up<br />

• EUR: Outlook for the Curve 24<br />

• EUR: Re-Enter Flatteners on 5y/10y 25<br />

Segment<br />

• ECB Upcoming Tenders: How<br />

26<br />

Much?<br />

• EGBs: Market Update & Top Trade 27-28<br />

Ideas<br />

• EUR Covered Bonds: Market Update 29-30<br />

• GBP Curve Opportunities Update 31<br />

• Global Inflation Watch 32-35<br />

• Inflation: Bring QE to Europe! 36-37<br />

• Europe iTraxx Credit Indices 38-40<br />

• Technical Analysis 41-42<br />

• Trade Reviews 43<br />

FX Strategy 44-50<br />

• Liquidity-Driven FX Markets 44-47<br />

• Technical Strategy: NOKSEK to 48-49<br />

Extend Downtrend<br />

• Trading Positions 50<br />

Forecasts & Calendars 51-68<br />

• 1 Week Economic Calendar 51-53<br />

• Key Data Preview 54-62<br />

• 4 Week Calendar 63<br />

• Treasury & SAS Issuance 64-65<br />

• Central Bank Watch 66<br />

• Economic & Interest Rate Forecasts 67<br />

• FX Forecasts 68<br />

Contacts 69<br />

• The FOMC statement formalised the bias to ease laid<br />

out in Bernanke’s speech at Jackson Hole.<br />

• The failure to deliver on its dual mandate is prominent<br />

in Fed thinking. More of the same data-wise will open the<br />

door to balance sheet expansion – probably in November.<br />

• Yield curves are back in bull-flattening mode post-<br />

FOMC. New lows for yields will require further weakness in<br />

the data: we look for September’s ISM to fall sharply.<br />

• The Fed’s intentions and those of the ECB look<br />

increasingly divergent, though the latter’s bark may be<br />

worse than its bite. The latest PMI figures suggest the<br />

eurozone is fast losing growth momentum.<br />

• Demand from banks in the eurozone ‘periphery’ is likely<br />

to be strong at the upcoming 3-month ECB tender.<br />

• The JGB market has moved back into bull-flattening<br />

mode, in line with external developments. Volatility in<br />

super-longs has risen but demand should remain robust.<br />

• Global liquidity conditions will continue to drive<br />

currency markets. High-beta and commodity currencies<br />

remain in focus despite signs of softer global growth.<br />

• Elevated inflation is hindering the Bank of England from<br />

following the Fed’s route but there were baby steps<br />

towards more QE in this month’s MPC minutes.<br />

• Against this backdrop, we maintain our EUR/GBP long<br />

and GBP/AUD short positions.<br />

Market Views<br />

Current 1 Week 1 Month<br />

UST 10y T-note Yield (%) 2.52 ↔ ↔<br />

2y/10y Spread (bp) 209 ↔ ↔<br />

EGB 10y Bund Yield (%) 2.29 ↔ ↔<br />

2y/10y Spread (bp) 159 ↔ ↔<br />

JGB 10y JGB Yield (%) 1.04 ↔ ↔<br />

2y/10y Spread (bp) 90 ↔ ↔<br />

Forex EUR/USD 1.3341 ↑ ↓<br />

USD/JPY 84.33 ↓ ↔<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com<br />

IMPORTANT NOTICE. Please refer to important disclosures found at the end of<br />

this report. Some sections of this report have been written by our strategy teams<br />

(shown in blue). Such reports do not purport to be an exhaustive analysis and may<br />

be subject to conflicts of interest resulting from their interaction with sales and<br />

trading which could affect the objectivity of this report.


Market Outlook<br />

Fed opens the door to<br />

more stimulus…<br />

…as it fails to deliver on its<br />

mandated objectives<br />

The outcome of the FOMC meeting pretty much matched our expectations,<br />

with the Fed opening the door to “additional accommodation if needed” to<br />

“support the economic recovery” and “return inflation, over time, to levels<br />

consistent with its mandate”. This formalised the bias to ease which had<br />

been laid out in Chairman Bernanke’s speech at Jackson Hole.<br />

We had suggested prior to the FOMC meeting that failure to deliver on its<br />

dual mandate of price stability and maximum sustainable employment would<br />

figure prominently in the Fed’s thinking and so it proved. The change in the<br />

language in the statement with regard to inflation was particularly striking. To<br />

quote: "Measures of underlying inflation are currently at levels somewhat<br />

below those the Committee judges most consistent, over the longer run, with<br />

its mandate to promote maximum employment and price stability”.<br />

If the data continue to paint a picture of sub-par growth, the Fed will continue<br />

to fail to achieve its mandated objectives and additional accommodation will<br />

be required. The bar for action, therefore, is set low: more of the same will<br />

be sufficient to prompt the next phase of balance sheet expansion – which<br />

we continue to believe is most probable at the November FOMC meeting. A<br />

marked improvement in incoming data will be required to forestall the Fed<br />

taking such action.<br />

70<br />

65<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

US ISM: Downside Risk?<br />

Manufacturing ISM:<br />

New Orders less Inventories (RHS)<br />

ISM Manufacturing:<br />

Headline<br />

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

-15<br />

-20<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Weaker ISM to boost the<br />

case for action<br />

The next key staging post in the assessment of the data is the upcoming run<br />

of business surveys for September, including the ISM for manufacturing at<br />

the end of next week. Our expectation is for a downward surprise relative to<br />

market consensus expectations: we see the headline index forecast sliding<br />

to around 53, its lowest level since early 2009. The gap between the subindices<br />

for new orders and inventories, usually a good leading indicator of<br />

the ‘headline’ ISM index, is pointing to considerable downside potential for<br />

the latter (see chart).<br />

In between times, durable goods orders are likely to have fallen sharply in<br />

August, driven by a drop in aircraft orders. Stripping out the transport sector,<br />

we forecast that orders will rebound but the underlying trend in the ‘core’<br />

data remains weak, indicative of a slowdown in business investment – one of<br />

the better-performing areas of the economy recently.<br />

Ken Wattret 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

2<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


ECB on a different page…<br />

…but its bark may be<br />

worse than its bite<br />

BoE shifts towards<br />

additional QE<br />

Yield curves back in bullflattening<br />

mode, with<br />

upcoming data key<br />

High demand from banks<br />

at ECB’s 3-month op<br />

JGB market takes its lead<br />

from elsewhere; superlongs<br />

favoured<br />

Upward pressure on JPY,<br />

downward pressure on<br />

GBP<br />

The Fed’s intentions and those of the ECB look increasingly divergent. While<br />

the ECB’s decision to extend the full allotment procedure for all refinancing<br />

operations until year-end was sensible, it was accompanied in the August<br />

press conference by an assertion from President Trichet that the ECB is still<br />

“in the process of phasing out” its unconventional measures. This was then<br />

followed by comments from Governing Council members highlighting their<br />

discomfort with the “addiction” of some banks to ECB funding.<br />

Will the ECB’s bark be worse than its bite? Given the U-turns which the ECB<br />

has been forced to make before, this is our assumption. The most recent<br />

activity data in the eurozone – most notably the flash PMIs for September –<br />

also signal that the slowdown in growth is gathering momentum. Still, on the<br />

basis of what we hear from the ECB, the risk of a premature exit remains<br />

highest in the eurozone in our view.<br />

The Bank of England MPC, in contrast, seems to be taking some baby steps<br />

towards further easing. That Mr Sentance again voted for a rate rise earlier<br />

this month was not a surprise. But the MPC meeting minutes revealed a<br />

greater concern from more than one member about the increased risk of a<br />

hard landing for the UK economy. There is growing sympathy for further QE<br />

but this has not yet been sufficient to prompt a formal dissent in that<br />

direction.<br />

Unlike the Fed, the Bank of England has its hands tied by elevated inflation<br />

and the risk that this poses to inflation expectations. Our view has been that,<br />

by early 2011, more concrete signs that the downside risks to growth are<br />

materialising and the upside risks to inflation are not would open the door to<br />

additional QE. The MPC minutes, plus recent signs of a lurch downwards in<br />

UK activity, suggest even earlier action is possible.<br />

Yield curves are back in bull-flattening mode post-FOMC. The question is<br />

whether the FOMC statement was the trigger for a new bullish phase or if<br />

further evidence of a US and European slowdown is a precondition for a<br />

lasting rally. In the aftermath of the FOMC, it seems that ‘risk on’ is fizzling<br />

out, reflected in faltering equity markets.<br />

Upcoming data will be pivotal in this respect. Further evidence of slowing<br />

activity and a renewed deceleration in core inflation – both of which we<br />

expect – will be needed for yields to hit new lows.<br />

In the eurozone, keep an eye on the expiry of the ECB’s EUR 225bn of<br />

liquidity provided through 3mth, 6mth and 12mth tenders. Given the origin of<br />

demand at these tenders – mainly banks in the periphery – it is likely that<br />

demand at the 3mth tender at the end of the month will be high from this<br />

source. The upcoming operation will result in a decrease in liquidity but<br />

excess liquidity will persist for a while yet.<br />

The JGB market has moved back into bull-flattening mode, helped by market<br />

developments externally, with the 10-year JGB yield once again approaching<br />

the 1% level and the super-long sector also performing strongly. Volatility<br />

throughout the super-long sector has increased but investor demand is<br />

robust and we expect super-longs to continue to perform well.<br />

Global liquidity conditions will continue to drive currency markets. High beta<br />

and commodity currencies will remain in focus despite increasing signs that<br />

global growth is slowing.<br />

USD/JPY continues to drift lower with commercial JPY buying interest being<br />

the dominant flow. The credibility of Japanese authorities is again likely to be<br />

tested as expectations of Fed action add to pressure for further intervention.<br />

A strong JPY and weak stock prices are particularly unwelcome, given that<br />

the fiscal half-year closing is fast approaching.<br />

With the Bank of England becoming more inclined to further QE, we keep<br />

our EUR/GBP long and GBP/AUD short positions.<br />

Ken Wattret 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

3<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


US FOMC: Just Doing My Job<br />

• The FOMC delivered a statement at its<br />

September meeting that formalised a bias<br />

toward easing, largely as expected.<br />

Chart 1: Underlying Inflation “Somewhat<br />

Below” Fed’s Mandate<br />

• It cited its inflation mandate three times,<br />

noting that it is currently falling short.<br />

• We think this sets the bar low for further<br />

action. A failure to accelerate from the current<br />

sub-par growth environment will confirm<br />

something more pervasive than a soft patch and<br />

will lead to further balance sheet expansion as<br />

early as November.<br />

• By proceeding methodically, the FOMC is<br />

building credibility for its policy.<br />

The FOMC delivered a statement at its September<br />

meeting that codified a bias toward easing. The<br />

Committee cited its mandate three times in the<br />

statement, referencing inflation in particular. First, the<br />

statement indicated the Fed is falling short of its<br />

inflation mandate; second, it expressed confidence<br />

that the mandate will be reached over time; and third,<br />

it said the Committee might need to engage in policy<br />

easing in order to achieve the mandate. We think the<br />

take-away is that the data will need to materially<br />

improve from the current sub-par pace of growth to<br />

prevent the Fed from pulling the trigger on further<br />

easing and we continue to see the November FOMC<br />

meeting as the most likely time for the next phase of<br />

balance sheet expansion. The FOMC has no choice;<br />

it is just doing the job Congress mandated it to.<br />

The statement included only modest changes to the<br />

economic paragraph, noting that business<br />

investment is rising "less rapidly than earlier in the<br />

year" but also noting that bank lending continues to<br />

contract "but at a reduced rate”. Clearly, the pace of<br />

deleveraging is being factored into its outlook quite<br />

explicitly and the slower pace of credit contraction is<br />

being considered as a potential positive for growth.<br />

The FOMC continues to cite the slowing in the pace<br />

of hiring and growth, the gradual pace of<br />

improvement in household spending and its<br />

expectation that the economy will see a “a gradual<br />

return to higher levels of resource utilization in a<br />

context of price stability, although the pace of<br />

economic recovery is likely to be modest in the near<br />

term”.<br />

Meanwhile, it strengthened its concerns about<br />

deflationary pressures quite noticeably, saying<br />

"Measures of underlying inflation are currently at<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 2: Rates Falling on Slow Growth,<br />

Prospect of Policy Easing<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

levels somewhat below those the Committee judges<br />

most consistent, over the longer run, with its<br />

mandate to promote maximum employment and<br />

price stability”. In other words, as noted in the August<br />

FOMC statement, it is currently failing on its<br />

mandate. The statement goes on to say that inflation<br />

is likely to remain subdued for some time “before<br />

rising to levels the Committee considers consistent<br />

with its mandate”. While the Fed believes it will<br />

succeed in its mandate, the question is how it will do<br />

so. Either the economy will accelerate from here and<br />

resource slack will close over time through organic<br />

propulsion of economic growth or the FOMC will<br />

need to stimulate the economy further through the<br />

printing of more money to prevent a deflationary<br />

dynamic from taking hold. One way or another, the<br />

Fed will get the job done.<br />

The statement also included a new policy paragraph<br />

which indicated that “The Committee will continue to<br />

monitor the economic outlook and financial<br />

Julia Coronado 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

4<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


developments and is prepared to provide additional<br />

accommodation if needed to support the economic<br />

recovery and to return inflation, over time, to levels<br />

consistent with its mandate”. Here is the easing bias<br />

laid out in Chairman Bernanke’s Jackson Hole<br />

speech formalised in the FOMC statement.<br />

If the data continue to paint a picture of sub-par<br />

growth, the Fed will continue to fail in its mandates<br />

and additional accommodation will indeed be<br />

needed. The bar for action is therefore low; more of<br />

the same will likely lead to policy action in November.<br />

A material improvement in incoming data will be<br />

required to forestall such an easing.<br />

The Fed embarked on the path to policy easing in<br />

June with a more dovish than expected FOMC<br />

statement. This was followed by a discussion of<br />

policy options in July at the Semi-Annual Monetary<br />

Policy Testimony to Congress, a commitment to<br />

reinvest the roll-off from its mortgage portfolio at the<br />

August FOMC meeting, a frank step towards an<br />

easing bias at Jackson Hole and a formalisation of<br />

that bias by the Committee in September. This<br />

methodical progression has helped build credibility<br />

for further action without startling risky asset markets<br />

or scaring investors away from US securities.<br />

Should the data continue to suggest sub-par growth,<br />

it will become clear that the economy is not just in the<br />

midst of a temporary soft patch and the FOMC will<br />

move decisively to address deflationary risks. By<br />

tying policy actions more to its inflation than its<br />

employment mandate, the Fed is more likely to<br />

maintain credibility; monetary policy has a greater<br />

ability to prevent deflation than to lower the<br />

unemployment rate.<br />

Yet a focus on inflation also allows the FOMC to<br />

factor in the broad spectrum of economic and<br />

financial market conditions. For example, if the<br />

unemployment rate continues to rise, the downside<br />

risks to inflation intensify and the Fed can justify<br />

further policy action. We forecast the unemployment<br />

rate will rise to 9.8% in Q4 and the Fed will expand<br />

its balance sheet.<br />

Julia Coronado 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

5<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


US: Wealth Fell, Deleveraging Continued in Q2<br />

• The latest Flow of Funds accounts indicate<br />

that household wealth fell in Q2, largely in line<br />

with the decline in equity indexes.<br />

Chart 1: Net Worth Fell in Q2<br />

• Total domestic debt increased in the first<br />

half of the year as continued private sector<br />

deleveraging was more than offset by federal,<br />

state and local government borrowing.<br />

• Debt ratios have fallen significantly from<br />

their peaks at the beginning of 2008.<br />

Nevertheless, consumers remain cautious in<br />

their spending, focusing primarily on<br />

necessities.<br />

• The business sector data for Q2 indicate<br />

companies’ persistent caution with regard to<br />

investing in expansion or hiring more workers.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 2: Total Debt Rose as Governments<br />

Borrowed to Finance Deficits<br />

The Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts<br />

for Q2 2010 showed a drop in household net<br />

worth on the back of stock market declines<br />

Household net worth declined USD 1.52trn to USD<br />

53.5trn in Q2, driven mainly by capital losses on<br />

equity holdings. Meanwhile, real estate values picked<br />

up slightly in Q2 as tax incentives pushed house<br />

prices higher. Broad equity indexes dropped 11.4%<br />

in Q2 but have advanced 9.1% since then –<br />

suggesting net worth will increase in Q3. As shown in<br />

Chart 1, household net worth as a percent of<br />

disposable personal income declined for the first time<br />

since the troughs reached in Q1 2009 and is now<br />

back below levels seen in 1995 (before the start of<br />

the internet bubble in equity prices). The likelihood of<br />

house prices stagnating in H2 and the possibility of<br />

below-potential GDP growth in the coming quarters<br />

have interrupted the recovery in net worth and<br />

flattened the outlook for consumer spending.<br />

Private sector deleveraging continued in Q2 at<br />

roughly the same pace as the beginning of the<br />

year<br />

The data indicate that private sector deleveraging<br />

continued at a rapid pace in Q2. As shown in Chart<br />

2, expansion in public sector borrowing more than<br />

offset the contraction in private sector credit in Q1<br />

and Q2. Federal, state and local governments<br />

borrowed to finance their massive budget deficits.<br />

Household borrowing contracted 2.3% in Q2, an<br />

acceleration from the 1.7% fall in Q1 as both<br />

mortgage and consumer credit posted sizable<br />

declines. Non-financial corporations increased their<br />

borrowing by 3.8% in Q2 following a 5.2% rise in Q1<br />

2010 as firms tapped the bond market in size.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

However, the noncorporate sector reduced its<br />

borrowing by a similar amount and overall the<br />

business sector was neutral on aggregate borrowing.<br />

The financial sector continued to deleverage at a<br />

much faster pace than other sectors, with net<br />

borrowing declining 7.1% after a 7.5% drop the prior<br />

quarter (the pace of decline has nonetheless slowed<br />

from over 10% in 2009).<br />

Debt ratios have fallen significantly from their<br />

peaks at the beginning of 2008. Nevertheless,<br />

consumers remain cautious in their spending,<br />

focusing primarily on necessities<br />

Consumers continued to reduce their debt, largely by<br />

defaulting on their credit cards and mortgages. In<br />

fact, the quarterly government data on commercial<br />

banks suggest charge-off rates on credit cards<br />

reached their all-time highs in Q2, rising to 10.7% of<br />

banks’ average loan balance. The Federal Reserve<br />

Financial Obligation Ratio (FOR), which includes<br />

automobile lease payments, rental payments on<br />

tenant-occupied property, homeowners' insurance<br />

Yelena Shulyatyeva 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

6<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


and property tax payments, dropped to levels last<br />

seen in 2000. In the meantime, the ratio of total<br />

household debt to annual disposable personal<br />

income declined in Q2 to 1.2, below its peak of<br />

above 1.3 at the beginning of the last recession<br />

(Chart 3). Both measures suggest consumers<br />

improved their balance sheets and could be closer to<br />

returning to their previous spending habits. However,<br />

the Financial Obligation Ratio probably overstates<br />

the improvement as it assumes consumers can<br />

refinance all their debt at current low rates, which we<br />

know is not the case owing to tight credit and<br />

underwater mortgages. Indeed, recent surveys<br />

indicate consumer optimism remains at levels<br />

historically associated with recession (Chart 4).<br />

According to the latest Beige Book report,<br />

consumers’ “emphasis [is] on necessities and lowerpriced<br />

goods”. Given that equity and house prices<br />

are unlikely to appreciate much in the near term<br />

(indeed, we expect house prices to decline at least<br />

5% from current levels), we expect US consumers’<br />

cautious stance to continue until at least the end of<br />

2012. At that point, the deleveraging that has been<br />

weighing so heavily on growth will have progressed<br />

significantly further.<br />

The Flow of Funds data in Q2 for the nonfinancial<br />

corporate business sector show companies’<br />

persistent caution with regard to investing in<br />

expansion or hiring more workers<br />

Recent incoming data have confirmed that the<br />

recovery continues, although at a very moderate<br />

pace. Apart from consumers’ reluctance to spend,<br />

economic growth has been dampened by<br />

businesses’ reluctance to reinvest their fast-growing<br />

profits. The Q2 Flow of Funds data for the<br />

nonfinancial corporate business sector indicate that<br />

the ratio of liquid assets to short-term liabilities is little<br />

changed at 49.8%, down only slightly from 50.8% at<br />

the end of last year. Meanwhile, employment growth<br />

has slowed to a pace below that required to absorb<br />

population growth, also a reflection that businesses<br />

are loath to expand. In addition, the latest Beige<br />

Book report indicated that capacity utilisation remains<br />

below pre-recession levels. While we saw doubledigit<br />

growth in equipment and software investment<br />

earlier this year, “capital spending plans for<br />

manufacturers and firms in other industries generally<br />

indicate little change or modest increases in coming<br />

months”. While the longest recession since the Great<br />

Depression officially ended in June 2009 according<br />

to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the<br />

latest Flow of Funds accounts suggest businesses<br />

and consumers have yet to regain their confidence.<br />

We therefore see below-trend growth for another<br />

Chart 3: Debt Ratios Continued to Fall<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

The FOR includes automobile lease payments, rental payments on tenantoccupied<br />

property, homeowners' insurance and property tax payments.<br />

Chart 4: Consumers Remain Cautious<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 5: Companies Cautious to Invest<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

year as the most likely outcome even factoring in<br />

significant monetary stimulus. Monetary easing is<br />

expected to largely offset the drag on growth from<br />

fiscal tightening over the next two years and the pace<br />

of any acceleration in growth will be driven in large<br />

part by the state of the deleveraging cycle.<br />

Yelena Shulyatyeva 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

7<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


ECB: QE through the Back Door?<br />

• We suspect that the apparent contradiction<br />

between the phenomenon of wider peripheral<br />

spreads but good peripheral government<br />

auction results could be reconciled by local<br />

banks being the marginal buyers at auctions,<br />

with financing coming from the ECB.<br />

• While some of the effects of this are likely to<br />

be similar to that under QE, we would argue that<br />

this is not QE through the back door, not least<br />

because the scale will likely be small compared<br />

with QE proper.<br />

• Meeting a potential funding gap through<br />

commercial banks is less unpalatable to the<br />

ECB than the ECB buying peripheral debt on its<br />

own account and the EFSF looks as though it<br />

was not meant to be drawn upon. What is<br />

happening is the ‘least worst’ option.<br />

Chart 1: ECB Government Bond Purchases<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

Source: ECB<br />

ECB Purchases under the<br />

Securities Markets Programme (EURbn)<br />

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19<br />

Weeks from the Start of the Programme<br />

Chart 2: Portuguese and Irish 10y Bond<br />

Spreads to Bund (bp)<br />

• The practice may make the ECB’s exit<br />

strategy a bit trickier than otherwise<br />

There has rightly been a lot of attention about the<br />

Fed’s throwing the door open to QE in its latest<br />

statement. The market finally seems to have realised<br />

that the deflation warning bells are ringing (we’ve<br />

been banging on about the danger of this for nearly<br />

two years).<br />

But the ECB has eschewed QE and has only bought<br />

a small quantity of peripheral bonds (EUR 61.6bn in<br />

total, Chart 1) for explicitly fiscal/market stability<br />

reasons rather than as a monetary policy initiative.<br />

There is more than one way to skin a cat and there is<br />

more than one way to QE. Let’s examine what’s been<br />

happening.<br />

First, in the bond markets, Ireland’s 10y bond spread<br />

to bunds reached 408bp recently – well above its<br />

high of around 310bp in May. Portugal’s spread has<br />

gone to 396bp compared with a high of 385bp in May<br />

(Chart 2). This suggests rather a low level of demand<br />

for the debt of these countries (some investors have<br />

withdrawn from buying these countries’ debt, others<br />

have scaled back a lot after having been burnt). At<br />

the same time, the auctions for peripheral debt seem<br />

to have been going remarkably well, suggesting good<br />

demand.<br />

Simultaneous signs of poor demand for a country’s<br />

debt in the secondary market but good take-up at<br />

auctions seem in conflict. How to square the circle?<br />

One hypothesis is that the people buying in the<br />

auctions are not the same bunch as those holding<br />

the stock. In particular, there are strong suspicions<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

that a lot of bids in the auctions are coming from local<br />

banks. The portion of combined liabilities of the<br />

periphery (Greece, Ireland, and Portugal) funded with<br />

the central bank reached 10.1% in July. That<br />

compares with 7% in January and an average of<br />

1.8% between 2001 and 2007 (Chart 3). The lower<br />

volatility of the 5y CDS spread also supports this<br />

conclusion. The latest monetary statistics from the<br />

ECB relate to July and do not show the big increase<br />

in credit to governments that our hypothesis about<br />

the auctions would suggest. However, we put this<br />

down to local banks’ buying increased amounts of<br />

local debt being a relatively recent phenomenon.<br />

How are the banks financing these purchases?<br />

Probably by repoing the securities with the ECB. This<br />

is where the claim of QE by the back door comes in.<br />

If the ECB lends funds to banks and the banks use<br />

those to purchase govvies, isn’t this akin to QE by<br />

the back door or through an agent, rather than acting<br />

Paul Mortimer-Lee 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

8<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


directly to effect outright purchases as the Bank of<br />

England has done?<br />

We would argue, yes and no.<br />

On the yes side:<br />

• There is increased demand for govvies;<br />

• This is financed ultimately by an expansion of the<br />

central bank balance sheet (full allotment tenders<br />

give control of the size of the ECB’s balance<br />

sheet to the private sector);<br />

• Broad money supply rises as does narrow<br />

money; and<br />

• There should be a price effect on the govvies<br />

bought.<br />

On the no side:<br />

• The scale will be massively short of the scale of<br />

QE proper (13% of GDP in the UK’s case);<br />

• The exit for the central bank is easier – it does<br />

not have to sell debt but merely scale back<br />

money market assistance or alter its terms;<br />

• The risks faced by the central bank are smaller<br />

because the commercial banks’ capital is the first<br />

line of defence against markdowns in the values<br />

of government securities;<br />

• The motivation is not monetary easing (though<br />

the effect may be that) but fiscal support;<br />

• It is a less overt form of QE so its effects on<br />

asset markets and the exchange rate may be<br />

smaller; and<br />

• It targets portions of the EUR govvie market, not<br />

the whole of it and so is more akin to ‘credit<br />

easing’.<br />

Overall, while there are similarities to QE proper, we<br />

would see the scale and targeted nature of the<br />

operation as ruling out the operations being seen as<br />

QE proper.<br />

It has a number of implications:<br />

• It intertwines more closely the fate of the local<br />

banks and the government;<br />

• It reduces the appetite (low in the first place) for<br />

the EU institutions to allow restructuring by a<br />

sovereign as the ECB could suffer losses if the<br />

collateral was written down (only true if the bank<br />

pledging the collateral goes under, we admit);<br />

Chart 3: Liabilities Funded with Central Bank<br />

(% of Total)<br />

20<br />

18<br />

Gr<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

Irl<br />

6<br />

4<br />

Pt<br />

2<br />

Sp<br />

0<br />

Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

• It could risk crowding out private sector access to<br />

bank credit;<br />

• It may make the ECB’s exit from extraordinary<br />

measures a bit trickier as it would have to<br />

contemplate the effects on govvie markets as<br />

well as money markets of the exit;<br />

• When it comes to normalising rates some way<br />

down the road, govvie markets may not perform<br />

well, so the ECB would risk damaging the capital<br />

of banks in struggling peripheral countries – also<br />

giving it pause for thought.<br />

Should the ECB be happy to see its facilities being<br />

used in this way? We can speculate that it might not<br />

like the principle of it effectively financing<br />

governments through an agent. However, as long as<br />

the collateral requirements are being met, why<br />

should it worry? Its facilities are there to be used.<br />

This is one way credit and money supply can be<br />

boosted.<br />

Furthermore, what are the alternatives? If institutional<br />

demand falls short of supply, there could be a<br />

renewed crisis in sovereign markets. The ECB is<br />

reluctant to buy on its own account and the EFSF<br />

appears to us as an institution that the eurozone<br />

countries never want to be used. So local bank<br />

buying of govvie debt, while relatively unpalatable to<br />

the ECB, may be the least unpalatable practical<br />

proposition.<br />

Paul Mortimer-Lee 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

9<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Eurozone: Reality Bites<br />

• The slowdown in the manufacturing sector<br />

is gathering momentum, evident in both surveys<br />

and ‘hard’ activity data recently.<br />

• The latest PMI figures also showed weaker<br />

service sector activity, supporting our forecast<br />

of a marked slowdown in GDP growth.<br />

When global economic growth is slowing, there is<br />

often a period of uncertainty when, due to the lagged<br />

impact of this slowdown, the eurozone seems to be<br />

defying gravity – prompting speculation that it will be<br />

largely unaffected by the global downturn. This is<br />

usually followed by a reality check as the eurozone<br />

economy belatedly starts to weaken. The latter now<br />

seems to be occurring.<br />

Manufacturing loses momentum<br />

The eurozone 'flash' PMI figures for September came<br />

in much weaker than was initially expected, with the<br />

weakness broad based across sectors. The PMI for<br />

manufacturing dropped from 55.1 to 53.6, the fourth<br />

month in the past five to register a decline and the<br />

lowest level for the index since January.<br />

The sub-index of new orders fell from 55.3 to 52.8, its<br />

weakest level for a year and a long way down on the<br />

cycle peak of almost 60 in March this year. It is not<br />

just the surveys which are faltering. The m/m fall in<br />

industrial orders in July, of 2.4%, was the biggest<br />

since early 2009 i.e. in the aftermath of the collapse<br />

in activity post-Lehman. After a record-breaking 8%<br />

q/q surge in industrial orders in Q2, Q3’s<br />

performance will be much less impressive: an<br />

unchanged level of orders in the next two months<br />

would deliver a modest 0.5% q/q increase in Q3<br />

overall.<br />

The deterioration in the manufacturing PMI figures is<br />

already indicative of a pronounced slowdown in the<br />

y/y growth rate in actual orders (Chart 1) and the<br />

breakdown of the manufacturing PMI suggests that<br />

the weakness has further to go.<br />

When the PMI figures are released, we always keep<br />

a particularly close eye on the relationship between<br />

the sub-indices for new orders and stocks of finished<br />

goods. This can often be a good guide to the future<br />

path for the ‘headline’ PMI in the sector. In the US<br />

and UK, the differential between orders and stocks<br />

had fallen sharply in the past few months, pointing to<br />

a further deterioration in the ISM and CIPS surveys<br />

for manufacturing in the period ahead.<br />

Chart 1: Eurozone Orders & Manufacturing PMI<br />

65<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Manufacturing PMI:<br />

New Orders (Lagged 2Mths)<br />

Industrial Orders<br />

(% y/y, Smoothed RHS)<br />

Chart 2: Eurozone Manufacturing PMI Breakdown<br />

1.4 Manufacturing PMI:<br />

Ratio of New Orders to Stocks of Finished Goods<br />

1.3<br />

1.2<br />

1.1<br />

0.9<br />

0.9<br />

0.8<br />

0.7<br />

0.6<br />

0.5<br />

97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Manufacturing PMI: Headline (RHS)<br />

Chart 3: Eurozone Composite PMI & Growth<br />

65<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

Composite PMI:<br />

Output<br />

20<br />

98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

GDP % (q/q, RHS)<br />

The decline in the eurozone equivalent had, until the<br />

latest month’s data, been much less pronounced. We<br />

suspected that this was merely a result of lags and<br />

the September PMI data support our view: the orders<br />

to stocks ratio has fallen sharply, signalling further<br />

downward pressure on the PMI (Chart 2).<br />

15.0<br />

5.0<br />

-5.0<br />

-15.0<br />

-25.0<br />

-35.0<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

0.0<br />

-0.5<br />

-1.0<br />

-1.5<br />

-2.0<br />

-2.5<br />

-3.0<br />

Ken Wattret 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

10<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


<strong>Services</strong> also on the slide<br />

The ‘flash’ PMI for the eurozone service sector also<br />

fell much more sharply than expected in September,<br />

sliding from 55.9 to 53.6 – the weakest reading since<br />

February. The deterioration was particularly striking<br />

as the services PMI had fared comparatively well in<br />

the prior few months, supported by developments in<br />

the German economy. The new business sub-index<br />

slumped to 52.5, its lowest level since February.<br />

A rare bright spot in the data was the improvement in<br />

the expectations sub-index for services. It rose to its<br />

highest level since April but, as the improvement in<br />

August’s expectations sub-index did not translate into<br />

a pick-up in activity in the sector in September, we do<br />

not see the rise as very significant.<br />

Weaker H2<br />

The composite PMI’s output index merges activity in<br />

the manufacturing and service sectors and, with the<br />

exception of the period after the intensification of the<br />

financial crisis, it has been a decent real-time guide<br />

to eurozone growth trends.<br />

Having fallen in three of the four months to August,<br />

the composite PMI's output index declined again in<br />

September, to 53.8 from 56.2. This represents the<br />

biggest m/m fall since November 2008 at the height<br />

of the panic over the financial crisis. The current level<br />

of the index is indicative of q/q GDP growth in the<br />

eurozone of less than 0.5% (Chart 3): our forecasts<br />

for Q3 and Q4’s q/q growth rates in eurozone GDP<br />

are 0.5% and 0.3%, respectively, and we appear to<br />

be on track to hit those estimates.<br />

Germany not immune<br />

The star performer of the eurozone growth-wise has<br />

been Germany but there too the 'flash' PMI data fell<br />

much further than expected in September. The PMI<br />

for manufacturing fell from 58.2 to 55.3, its lowest<br />

level since January, with the new orders sub-index<br />

down from 57.6 to 53.0. This is the lowest level since<br />

July 2009 and is twelve points down on its cycle peak<br />

in March.<br />

The orders to stocks ratio of the manufacturing PMI<br />

in Germany also fell sharply, suggesting further falls<br />

in the PMI lie ahead (Chart 4). If past relationships<br />

hold, it suggests that the PMI for manufacturing will<br />

head towards the 50 expansion/contraction<br />

threshold.<br />

The services PMI for Germany, which had done very<br />

well recently, also lost more ground than expected in<br />

September, sliding to 54.6 from 57.2, a seven-month<br />

low. The composite PMI’s output index tumbled to<br />

54.8 from 58.4, indicative of a much reduced rate of<br />

growth in German GDP (Chart 5). The new business<br />

Chart 4: German Manufacturing PMI Breakdown<br />

1.4<br />

1.2<br />

1.0<br />

0.8<br />

0.6<br />

Manufacturing PMI:<br />

Ratio of New Orders to Stocks of Finished Goods<br />

Manufacturing PMI:<br />

Headline (RHS)<br />

0.4<br />

96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 5: German Composite PMI & Growth<br />

2.0<br />

1.0<br />

0.0<br />

-1.0<br />

-2.0<br />

-3.0<br />

-4.0<br />

98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Composite PMI:<br />

Output (RHS)<br />

GDP (% q/q)<br />

sub-index is down by almost five points in the last<br />

two months alone (to 52.6).<br />

One of the principal uncertainties over the German<br />

outlook has been the extent to which the slowdown in<br />

the manufacturing and export sectors would damage<br />

the improvement in domestic conditions. The latest<br />

PMI figures suggest that the service sector may not<br />

be so resilient. We will watch closely the upcoming<br />

Ifo business climate index for the retail sector which,<br />

like the services PMI, had performed surprisingly well<br />

over the summer months.<br />

Best of the rest<br />

September’s ‘flash’ composite output index in France<br />

was down by just one point relative to the August<br />

level, at a still elevated 58.5, helped by a rise in the<br />

manufacturing PMI to its strongest level since May. It<br />

remains indicative of solid growth, though other<br />

surveys are less robust, and we continue to expect a<br />

gradual slowing of GDP growth in France after the<br />

0.6% q/q increase in Q2.<br />

As usual, we will have to wait until early next month<br />

for the full national breakdown of the PMI data. Top<br />

of the list for scrutiny will be the data on the Spanish<br />

service sector. The PMI in that sector has already<br />

fallen back below 50, supporting our expectation of a<br />

double dip in Spain.<br />

65<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

70<br />

65<br />

60<br />

55<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

Ken Wattret 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

11<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


France: 2011 Budget to Push CPI Up<br />

• The 2011 budget will be presented next<br />

week. We expect the government to revise down<br />

its estimate of the 2010 deficit-to-GDP ratio, to a<br />

still-conservative 7.8% or so.<br />

• Measures aimed at reducing the deficit to<br />

6.0% of GDP next year will push inflation higher<br />

by between 0.16pp and 0.35pp, depending on<br />

the index.<br />

0.7<br />

0.6<br />

0.5<br />

0.4<br />

0.3<br />

0.2<br />

Contribution to<br />

Headline CPI<br />

Inflation (pp)<br />

Chart 1: Tobacco Prices<br />

Tobacco Price Index<br />

(2000 = 100, RHS)<br />

225<br />

200<br />

175<br />

150<br />

125<br />

100<br />

We now expect the public deficit to come in at 7.5%<br />

of GDP this year, the same as in 2009. Indeed, the<br />

government is likely to revise down the official target<br />

of 8.0% when it presents the 2011 budget next week.<br />

In order to reduce further the deficit next year, to<br />

6.0% of GDP, a number of new measures will be<br />

implemented either at the central government level<br />

(to cut the deficit to an expected EUR 96bn) or to<br />

social security. While some of these measures will<br />

result in higher inflation, the impact will vary<br />

considerably between indices.<br />

0.1<br />

0.0<br />

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Sources: Eurostat, INSEE, Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 2: Core HICP vs. Underlying CPI<br />

2.50<br />

2.25<br />

Underlying CPI (% y/y)<br />

Core HCPI (% y/y)<br />

2.00<br />

1.75<br />

1.50<br />

75<br />

50<br />

Duty increase…at least on tobacco<br />

The first measure is an increase in the duty on<br />

tobacco (a EUR0.30 hike on a packet of 20<br />

cigarettes). This should lead to a rise in retail tobacco<br />

prices of about 6%, similar to last year’s 5.7% when<br />

prices were raised in November. The date for the<br />

increase is still undecided, 4 October, 8 November or<br />

3 January being the most likely. The hike in duty will<br />

contribute 0.1pp to headline inflation (0.10pp to the<br />

domestic index, where tobacco has a 1.75%<br />

weighting and 0.11pp to the HICP, where the<br />

weighting is 1.91%), although the base effect will<br />

mitigate this impact; the date when it becomes<br />

effective may cause some short-term volatility.<br />

Other duties could also be increased, but this is not<br />

our base scenario. Diesel fuel would be next in line,<br />

in our view, with any rise likely to come on 1 January.<br />

VAT rules on communication services<br />

The government has said it aims to close tax<br />

loopholes in the amount of EUR 10bn in the 2011<br />

budget (with the financial impact being visible either<br />

in 2011 or 2012). Amongst these measures, some<br />

changes will affect VAT and thus inflation. The ISPs<br />

that currently offer triple-play services (phone,<br />

internet and cable TV, usually for EUR 29.90 a<br />

month) will have to apply the normal 19.6% VAT rate<br />

from January 2011. The 5.5% reduced VAT rate that<br />

applies to pay-TV (as a cultural service) will remain<br />

1.25<br />

1.00<br />

0.75<br />

0.50<br />

0.25<br />

0.00<br />

98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

VAT Cut<br />

(home repair)<br />

VAT Cut<br />

(restaurants)<br />

only for pure players. To date, the highly popular<br />

triple-play offers have been taxed half at the normal<br />

rate and half at the reduced rate, something the<br />

European Commission has complained about. The<br />

same applies for mobile phone contracts that include<br />

access to mobile TV as well as for the emerging<br />

quadruple-play (which also includes mobile phone<br />

service). This tax change will mechanically add<br />

6.26% to the price. Although the market is highly<br />

competitive, ISPs say they will pass on the VAT hike<br />

in the final bill (i.e. EUR 1.87/month). We estimate<br />

this will add 0.13pp to headline and ex-tobacco CPI<br />

inflation, a little more to HICP. Given that mobile<br />

phone operators (often the same players as the<br />

ISPs) also have to pay a new tax on antennae, they<br />

may raise prices a little more than the impact of the<br />

VAT hike alone would warrant.<br />

The VAT increase will also add some 0.20pp to core<br />

HICP. However, since the domestic underlying<br />

Dominique Barbet 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

12<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


inflation rate is calculated excluding taxes on<br />

consumption, the rise should have no impact on this<br />

measure of inflation (unless providers raise their<br />

prices beyond the VAT tax hike).<br />

Most other measures taken to reduce tax loopholes<br />

will affect household income tax, taxes on savings or<br />

social contributions – none of which are included in<br />

the CPI.<br />

Reducing the health care deficit…<br />

None of the measures included in the pension reform<br />

has a direct impact on inflation. The other major<br />

cause of the deficit is health care, since the share of<br />

health care in total household consumption is on the<br />

rise in France (as elsewhere). Health care costs<br />

amounted to EUR 2,724 per person last year, the<br />

bulk of which was financed by social security (75.5%,<br />

Chart 3). Public financing of health care amounts to<br />

6.5% of GDP.<br />

In order to reduce the social security deficit, further<br />

tightening of rules on health care reimbursement will<br />

be implemented next year, according to reports in the<br />

media. The changes should generate EUR 2.5bn in<br />

2011, which compares to a projected social security<br />

deficit of EUR 12bn for 2010. The economic<br />

slowdown has reduced the pace of increase in health<br />

care expenditure (as some people have cut back on<br />

poorly reimbursed, non-urgent spending such as<br />

dentistry or glasses).<br />

The prices of some goods (medicines) and services<br />

(especially biological tests and radiological<br />

examination) will be cut but the reductions will be<br />

partially offset by an increase in the standard price of<br />

a doctor's examination (from EUR 22 to EUR 23 on<br />

1 January 2011). Overall, the measures will push CPI<br />

inflation down by about 0.06pp. These measures will<br />

be implemented progressively over the course of<br />

2011, as has been the case this year.<br />

The share of standard health services reimbursed by<br />

social security (i.e. excluding hospital or care for<br />

chronic and severe diseases) will be reduced from<br />

70% to 69.5%. The share paid by private insurers will<br />

thus rise from 30% to 30.5%. It is likely that drugs<br />

which are currently reimbursed at 35% by social<br />

security will be reimbursed at 30% only. The HICP,<br />

unlike the CPI, does not capture the full price of<br />

health goods and services but only the proportion<br />

which is not reimbursed by social security. As a<br />

result, the HICP will not benefit as much from lower<br />

prices for health goods and services as the CPI (this<br />

is the main source of divergence between the two<br />

measures of inflation).<br />

Higher contribution rates for social security,<br />

especially for accidents and sickness that occur in<br />

13.8%<br />

Chart 3: Health Care Financing in 2009<br />

9.4%<br />

Source: Le Figaro<br />

1.3%<br />

75.5%<br />

State<br />

Soc. Sec.<br />

Priv. Ins.<br />

the workplace, will result in a EUR 0.8bn increase in<br />

receipts. This will come on top of the natural increase<br />

in social contributions paid by private companies;<br />

these should reach about EUR 3.0bn in 2011, up<br />

from about EUR 2.0bn this year on the back of<br />

increases in employment and wages.<br />

…will also increase the cost of private insurance<br />

A significant share of the social security savings will<br />

result in higher costs for private health insurers,<br />

which cover about 60% of the expenditure not<br />

reimbursed by the public system. However, this<br />

should be compensated by lower prices for some<br />

goods and services.<br />

Nevertheless, private insurance companies will have<br />

to raise their prices (partly paid by employers in large<br />

corporations). A favourable tax regime has been<br />

available for private health insurance, with most<br />

players taking advantage of it. This is one of the tax<br />

loopholes that will disappear in 2011, adding<br />

EUR 1.1bn to insurers’ fiscal burden (and to CADES<br />

income). Overall, private health insurers may have to<br />

hike their rates by 5-8% next year. This would add<br />

around 0.09pp to headline CPI (private health<br />

insurance has a 1.05% weighting in 2010 and this<br />

will rise over time), or 0.10pp to the HICP (where the<br />

weighting is 1.14%).<br />

Altogether, the new measures should result in a<br />

0.26pp contribution in headline CPI inflation in 2011,<br />

raising it from 1.13% to 1.39%. The increase should<br />

be limited to 0.16pp for ex-tobacco CPI, which would<br />

reach 1.32%. The fiscal impact on the headline HICP<br />

is more important at 0.35pp. The 1.5% harmonised<br />

inflation rate we expect would nevertheless be one<br />

tenth below that of the eurozone, which also<br />

incorporates the inflationary impact of fiscal policies<br />

in different countries and higher contribution of food<br />

prices.<br />

Hh<br />

Total:<br />

EUR 162.4bn<br />

Dominique Barbet 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

13<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Norway: Cautious Approach<br />

Chart 1: Policy Rates (%)<br />

• The Norges Bank kept its policy rate at<br />

2.00% at its September meeting, in line with<br />

market expectations.<br />

• The statement accompanying the decision<br />

had a slightly dovish tone compared to the last<br />

one, with inflation described as “low”.<br />

• In terms of external developments, the Bank<br />

flagged up weaker growth expectations for the<br />

US and eurozone.<br />

• We believe the chances of a rate increase in<br />

December have fallen. We now expect the next<br />

hike in Q1 2011.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 2: Real GDP (% y/y)<br />

Rates on hold<br />

The Norges Bank kept its policy rate at 2.00% at its<br />

September meeting, consistent with its projections<br />

back in June. The statement accompanying the<br />

decision had a slightly dovish tone compared to the<br />

one in August. In the opening paragraph, the Norges<br />

Bank acknowledged that inflation is low and although<br />

activity is increasing, there is “still some spare<br />

capacity in the economy”. The fact that interest rates<br />

are low in other advanced economies also motivated<br />

the Norges Bank to keep the policy rate unchanged<br />

this time round.<br />

Cautious on external developments<br />

In terms of external developments, although the<br />

Bank mentioned stronger than expected growth in its<br />

main trading partners in H1, it also noted that:<br />

• “growth prospects in the US have been lowered”;<br />

and<br />

• “slightly slower growth is also likely in the euro<br />

area ahead”.<br />

Uncertainty regarding the global economic outlook<br />

remains a cause of concern for the Norges Bank. In<br />

August, the statement merely stated that the outlook<br />

for the US economy is “more uncertain”. The recent<br />

assessment showed that the Norges Bank is more<br />

sure that growth will weaken in the US while its<br />

expectations for the eurozone are not so perky<br />

either.<br />

Lower rates justified<br />

One interesting addition to the statement was the<br />

Norges Bank’s assessment of household debt and<br />

house prices. It noted that “the low interest rate level<br />

in Norway has not triggered an increase in household<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

debt growth so far and the rise in house prices is<br />

moderate”. We believe this is one of the reasons the<br />

statement had a somewhat dovish tone compared to<br />

the previous release. Given they were singled out in<br />

the statement, developments in household debt and<br />

house prices will be important to watch, to help<br />

gauge the likely action of the Norges Bank in the<br />

coming months.<br />

In the in-depth assessment, there were also some<br />

interesting details. The Norges Bank noted that “new<br />

information may indicate that inflation in the coming<br />

months will be slightly lower than projected in June”.<br />

We believe this is a hint that a downward revision in<br />

the inflation forecasts will come in the new Monetary<br />

Policy Report in October. But in terms of the outlook<br />

for growth, the assessment was that “overall activity<br />

in the Norwegian economy seems to be expanding<br />

approximately in line with the projections” made three<br />

months ago.<br />

What next?<br />

Overall, although the Norges Bank once again noted<br />

that the interest rate should be “gradually brought<br />

Gizem Kara 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

14<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


closer to a more normal level” to guard against the<br />

risk of future financial imbalances, the statement did<br />

not give any hint that this is to be done soon. In its indepth<br />

assessment, where the Norges Bank laid out<br />

its arguments for why interest rates should be kept<br />

low, it said that expectations that interest rates in<br />

other countries will “remain low for a prolonged<br />

period” also “point in this direction”.<br />

Recent economic releases suggest growth will<br />

accelerate in the quarters ahead. Positive<br />

developments on the consumer side suggest a pickup<br />

in consumer spending in the coming quarters.<br />

Consumer confidence has continued to build and the<br />

downward trend in retail sales seems to have turned<br />

(Chart 3).<br />

On the production side, manufacturing output has<br />

strengthened. Still-loose financial and monetary<br />

conditions are supportive for investment and<br />

therefore production. Although a weak start to the<br />

year suggests contraction in overall investment in<br />

2010, we expect it to gradually increase in the<br />

second half of the year.<br />

Given the key policy rate is still low compared to<br />

what a ‘neutral’ rate should be in Norway, we expect<br />

further rate hikes. But, despite a more positive<br />

domestic outlook, the expected slowdown in the<br />

global economy will limit any acceleration in growth.<br />

We previously expected the next hike to be<br />

delivered, at the earliest, at the end of this year. Back<br />

in June, the Norges Bank’s quarterly policy rate<br />

projections suggested the next rate hike would come<br />

in December, with a 50% probability.<br />

Chart 3: Private Consumption & Retail Sales<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 4: Manufacturing Confidence & Mainland<br />

<strong>Investment</strong> (% y/y)<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Overall, the September statement was slightly more<br />

dovish than we had expected. Given moderate<br />

growth in Norway, our expectation of a slowdown in<br />

its main trading partners and policy rates likely<br />

remaining low for an extended period in the US,<br />

eurozone and UK, we believe the chances of a rate<br />

hike in December have fallen. We expect the next<br />

increase to come in Q1 2011.<br />

Gizem Kara 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

15<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Japan: Tankan to Remain Upbeat<br />

• The September Tankan will likely show that<br />

the corporate sector continued to recover in Q3,<br />

albeit at a slower pace than in Q2. We expect the<br />

current conditions DI of large manufacturers to<br />

rise by 6 points to 7, with that for large<br />

manufacturers picking up 4 points to -1.<br />

• Despite the pressure from the strong yen on<br />

margins, corporate profits probably continued<br />

to increase in Q3 due to the ongoing recovery in<br />

sales volume.<br />

• We expect capex plans (FY 2010) of large<br />

firms to be little changed, with projections of a<br />

3.0% increase for manufacturers (3.3% in June)<br />

and a 2.6% rise for non-manufacturers (2.4%).<br />

Capex is on the mend, but it is hard to expect<br />

businesses to adopt a more aggressive stance<br />

in the near term due to global uncertainties and<br />

yen appreciation.<br />

Improvement in business confidence continues<br />

The September Tankan, due out on Wednesday 29th,<br />

should show that business sentiment continued to<br />

improve, albeit at a slower tempo compared to the<br />

previous survey, with the current conditions diffusion<br />

index (DI) rising to 7 for large manufacturers (1 in the<br />

June survey), -1 for large non-manufacturers (-5), -14<br />

for small manufacturers (-18) and -23 for small nonmanufacturers<br />

(-26). The DI for the corporate sector<br />

as a whole should improve to -11 (-15).<br />

Neutralising strong yen<br />

With the yen having substantially appreciated since<br />

the last survey, attention will be on how much fallout<br />

the currency will have on business confidence this<br />

time around. Even after the intervention by the<br />

Japanese government, the dollar-yen rate is still<br />

running about 5 yen stronger than what firms, on<br />

average, had expected for the second half of FY<br />

2010 in the June survey. This naturally squeezes the<br />

earnings of exporters, inflicting particular damage on<br />

small manufacturers as they have less resistance to<br />

currency appreciation. Besides casting shadows over<br />

profit forecasts, it is also likely that the strong yen will<br />

adversely impact business spending plans to some<br />

degree, as the drop in share prices triggered by yen<br />

appreciation is eroding corporate sentiment.<br />

That said, manufacturers’ sales in Q3 likely<br />

continued to expand solidly, as exports carried on<br />

growing, and the termination of domestic subsidies<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

-10<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

-40<br />

-50<br />

-60<br />

-70<br />

Chart 1: Business conditions DI,<br />

Large Enterprises<br />

96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: BoJ, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Non-manufacturers<br />

Manufacturers<br />

*Q3 2010 figure is <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas' forecast.<br />

for buying eco-friendly cars triggered a rush in lastminute<br />

demand. (The yen on a real effective basis –<br />

an indicator of international competitiveness – is still<br />

weak compared with its average of the past 20<br />

years). We judge that corporate profits continued to<br />

grow in Q3 as sales growth more than offset the<br />

impact of the stronger yen on margins. Incidentally,<br />

manufacturers’ sentiment continued improving in the<br />

first half of 1995 when the yen was significantly<br />

stronger than it is now. Thus, while the rate of<br />

improvement in current conditions DI will likely be<br />

slower than that of the June Tankan, the direction<br />

should still be one of improvement, confirming that<br />

the recovery in the corporate sector is on track.<br />

Uncertainties to weigh on outlook<br />

Of course, there are still strong uncertainties about<br />

the direction of the global economy, to say nothing<br />

about the unstable FX market. In Japan, there are<br />

concerns about what might happen to the economy<br />

when the programmes stimulating consumer<br />

spending end, coupled with fears of policy paralysis<br />

owing to the chaotic political scene (divided Diet,<br />

disunity within the ruling DPJ). As all of these factors<br />

are negative for business sentiment, the DIs for<br />

future business conditions will likely be generally<br />

weak. But even if the DIs for future business<br />

conditions deteriorate, it does not necessarily follow<br />

that the actual Tankan in December will follow suit.<br />

Improvement in manufacturers’ mood slows<br />

As indicated above, we expect the squeeze on profits<br />

from yen appreciation will be the main reason why<br />

business sentiment of large manufactures will<br />

improve just 6 points compared to the very robust 15-<br />

Ryutaro Kono/ Hiroshi Shiraishi 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

16<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


point advance in the June Tankan. Production and<br />

sales likely expanded solidly in Q3. True, the<br />

production forecast index points to output growth in<br />

Q3 of just 0.2% q/q, well off the 1.5% q/q tempo<br />

posted in Q2 (and 7.0% q/q in Q1). However,<br />

distortions in the METI’s seasonally-adjusted data –<br />

both the production index and forecast index – cause<br />

readings to have an upward bias in Q4 and Q1 and a<br />

corresponding downward bias in Q2 and Q3.<br />

Excluding such distortions (using a seasonal factor<br />

that pre-dates the Lehman shock), our calculations<br />

suggest that production in Q2 expanded 3.7% q/q<br />

and the outturn for Q3 could be around 4% q/q.<br />

Non-manufacturing sentiment still on mend<br />

Among non-manufacturers, sectors that are direct<br />

beneficiaries of higher manufacturing output and<br />

shipments – such as transport and wholesale –<br />

should show signs of continued improvement in<br />

sentiment. Profits in these sectors should also benefit<br />

over the short term from the yen’s appreciation in<br />

terms of lower energy costs and reduced input prices.<br />

Sentiment should also continue improving in the<br />

retail trade and other consumption-related sectors<br />

thanks to (i) personal consumption remaining firm on<br />

the back of stimulative programmes: (ii) the steady<br />

recovery in household income; and (iii) the boost in<br />

real purchasing power from the strong yen. This<br />

summer’s record-breaking heat wave will probably<br />

not have much overall impact, as the weather was a<br />

boon to some areas but a bane to others. Meanwhile,<br />

sentiment might not improve for construction owing<br />

to the government’s cuts to public works expenditure.<br />

Spending plans largely unchanged from June<br />

We expect the FY 2010 capital spending plans to be<br />

little changed for large firms, namely a 3.0% increase<br />

for large manufacturers (3.3% in June) and a 2.6%<br />

increase for large non-manufacturers (2.4%). [Note:<br />

Comparisons here are with the June Tankan’s<br />

reference series under the new lease accounting<br />

standard that will become the official data series from<br />

the September 2010 Tankan.] Cuts in the spending<br />

plans of small manufacturers will likely be revised to<br />

-1.2% (-7.3% in June), while that of small nonmanufacturers<br />

should be revised to -25.0% (-30.8%).<br />

On an all-enterprises basis, spending plans should<br />

be marked up to a modest -0.9% (-2.3% in June).<br />

That said, upward revisions in the plans of small<br />

companies are normal as these firms do not usually<br />

draw up investment plans at the start of the fiscal<br />

year but gradually rachet their spending up as the<br />

year progresses. Although corporate profits continue<br />

to pick up, albeit at a slower pace, global<br />

uncertainties and the strong yen make it hard to<br />

Chart 2: Real Effective Exchange Rate, JPY<br />

(Sep.1985=100)<br />

180<br />

170<br />

160<br />

Average since 1990<br />

Strong yen<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

Weak yen<br />

60<br />

70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10<br />

Source: BoJ, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

Chart 3: Real Exports (2005=100)<br />

70<br />

04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: MOF, BoJ, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

expect businesses to adopt a more aggressive<br />

stance on capex in the near term.<br />

It is widely felt that the yen’s appreciation has made<br />

manufacturers curb domestic investment and focus<br />

more on beefing up/shifting production overseas.<br />

Certainly, that is one reason why investment<br />

continues to recover more slowly than corporate<br />

earnings. But expansion overseas is due more to the<br />

robustness of Asian economies than to the yen’s<br />

strength. Needed structural changes (termination of<br />

unprofitable production lines, shifting overseas etc.)<br />

that should have proceeded gradually were put on<br />

hold by the yen’s super-weak tone in 2006-2007. The<br />

correction of that super-weak tone now is prompting<br />

manufacturers to resume their suspended overseas<br />

expansion plans. Meanwhile, non-manufacturers<br />

have also given greater weight to investing overseas,<br />

especially in the emerging economies of Asia, due to<br />

the strength of overseas sales. Thus, there is little<br />

prospect that capex will become a key growth engine<br />

for a while.<br />

Ryutaro Kono/ Hiroshi Shiraishi 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

17<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Global: The Debt/Equity Macro Trade<br />

• Analysis of speculative positioning does not<br />

support a long equity / short bonds trade.<br />

• STRATEGY: Equity and debt performance is<br />

likely with rates frozen and unconventional<br />

policy in place.<br />

Chart 1: Speculative US Equity Positioning<br />

100000<br />

50000<br />

0<br />

-50000<br />

-100000<br />

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the "long equity /<br />

short bonds" trade is one of so-called smart money's<br />

big macro trades into year-end. Let's dig into the data<br />

to see what the facts are.<br />

Chart 1 shows the net positioning of non-commercial<br />

players (speculators) in futures and options on the<br />

S&P 500, Nasdaq-100 and Russell 2000. CFTC data<br />

tell us that specs are actually net short the big board<br />

and the Russell, while exposure in tech stocks is<br />

neutral. Note the negative trend in S&P positioning<br />

since 2008!<br />

Chart 2 gives us some clues as to non-commercial<br />

positioning in US government bonds (again, futures<br />

and options). Specs have recently gone net short 2y<br />

Notes, thus reversing the big 2009 roll-down<br />

strategy. On the other hand, we have neutral<br />

positioning in 10y Notes (from aggressive shorts at<br />

the start of this year) and slightly short positioning in<br />

Bonds (but again, big reversal from huge shorts in<br />

2009 and in Q1 2010).<br />

Analysis of speculative flows does not confirm either<br />

a current positioning in or a tendency towards a "long<br />

equity / short bonds" macro strategy. Of course,<br />

we're just looking at a limited window of the global<br />

investment spectrum. So, why the discussion about<br />

this macro trade? Look at Chart 3: not only has<br />

S&P's earnings yield outpaced 10y yields since 2002,<br />

but the gap has even widened during the crisis<br />

(currently, the S&P 500 generates a 6.85% yield on<br />

earnings, while 10y Notes yield about 2.60%). Some<br />

argue that on a risk/reward basis the equity trade<br />

does not make sense. In Chart 4, we show a longterm<br />

series of equity vol (VIX) and bond vol (realised<br />

6m weekly 10y US govt bonds). True, bond vol has<br />

dropped from the 2008/2009 excess, but equity vol<br />

has also dropped substantially, while still generating<br />

more yield than bonds.<br />

Conclusion: Do we really believe the Fed is going to<br />

kill stocks? Do we really believe the Fed is going to<br />

kill the Treasury? The answer is a double no. With<br />

rates frozen and unconventional policy in place, a<br />

period of equity and debt performance lies ahead.<br />

-150000<br />

S&P500 net spec positioning<br />

-200000<br />

Nasdaq100 net spec positioning<br />

-250000 Russell2000 net spec positioning<br />

-300000<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />

Source: CFTC<br />

Chart 2: Speculative US Govvie Positioning<br />

800000<br />

650000<br />

TY net spec positioning<br />

TU net spec positioning (RHS)<br />

US net spec positioning (RHS)<br />

250000<br />

150000<br />

500000<br />

50000<br />

350000<br />

200000<br />

-50000<br />

50000<br />

-150000<br />

-100000<br />

-250000<br />

-250000<br />

-400000<br />

-350000<br />

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />

Source: CFTC<br />

Chart 3: Equity vs Bond Valuation Measures<br />

11.0%<br />

10Y Treasury yield<br />

10.0%<br />

S&P500 earnings yield<br />

9.0%<br />

8.0%<br />

7.0%<br />

6.0%<br />

5.0%<br />

4.0%<br />

3.0%<br />

2.0%<br />

1.0%<br />

1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008<br />

180<br />

90<br />

160<br />

10Y TSY vol (6M, bp)<br />

VIX (%, RHS)<br />

80<br />

140<br />

70<br />

120<br />

60<br />

100<br />

50<br />

80<br />

40<br />

60<br />

30<br />

40<br />

20<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

0<br />

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2008<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Alessandro Tentori 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

18<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


US: Belly of the Curve is Rich, but…<br />

• The flattening rally extended the richness<br />

in the belly of the curve. As a result, 2s5s10s is<br />

at an all-time low while 10s30s is close to its<br />

steepest ever.<br />

• These valuations could become even more<br />

extended if rates briskly drop further but a<br />

correction should ensue once rates begin to<br />

stabilise as investors move out along the curve<br />

to grab yield.<br />

• STRATEGY: Once the rally shows signs of<br />

running out of steam, consider the following<br />

trades either in swap or Treasuries: (i) long the<br />

2s5s10s fly (short the belly) and (ii) 10s30s<br />

flattener. Alternatively, initiate conditional bullflatteners,<br />

struck OTM, to ensure that they kick<br />

in only if rates drop further and stay there.<br />

0.8<br />

0.6<br />

0.4<br />

0.2<br />

Chart 1: 2s5s10s Is at an All-Time Low, and<br />

10s30s (Almost) as Steep as Ever<br />

0<br />

-0.2<br />

-0.4<br />

Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

2s5s10s swap<br />

10s30s swap (RHS)<br />

Chart 2: The 5y Is Rich, but Not to the Same<br />

Extent as in August<br />

1.2<br />

1<br />

0.8<br />

0.6<br />

0.4<br />

0.2<br />

0<br />

-0.2<br />

The FOMC articulated its intention to provide further<br />

accommodation if needed, laying the groundwork for<br />

a new round of asset purchases. First, in anticipation<br />

of the Fed’s nod toward easing, and later in response<br />

to the confirmation of it, the Treasury market rallied,<br />

at times even in the face of stronger equities. With<br />

this rally, and the attendant flattening, the 5y rate has<br />

made a new low and the 10y is within shouting<br />

distance of one.<br />

bps<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

-10<br />

Current 6m ago 6w ago<br />

Cheap<br />

Rich<br />

The belly of the curve has come out as the clear<br />

outperformer in the rally, with 2s5s10s reaching a<br />

new all-time low (see Chart 1). However, despite all<br />

appearances, the belly has not eclipsed the wings to<br />

the same extent it did in the August rally. We say this<br />

because PCA indicates that the rich/cheap signals<br />

are nowhere near the levels seen at the time. For<br />

example the 5y, while rich on the curve, is only about<br />

12bp rich and the 10y actually looks fair (see Chart<br />

2), whereas six weeks ago they were rich by as<br />

much as 25bp and 10bp, respectively. Therefore, it<br />

would not be unprecedented for the 5y and 10y<br />

sectors to extend their valuations in the event of a<br />

further rally. In other words, if we get a brisk rally<br />

from here, there is the risk that 2s5s10s could<br />

tighten, and 5s10s as well as 10s30s could steepen<br />

further.<br />

So, what’s one to do? Our take on this is the<br />

following: 2s5s10s and 10s30s would start to<br />

“correct” once rates find a new (lower) range and<br />

begin to stabilise. This is because investors will likely<br />

extend out the curve in their search for yield once 5s<br />

runs out of juice, similar to what happened with 2s.<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 15y 20y 30y<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Table 1: Cost of Carry is Not Punitive in Long<br />

2s5s10s Fly and 5s10s/10s30s Flatteners<br />

SWAP TSY<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

2s5s10s 5s10s 10s30s<br />

1m -0.9 0.0 -0.8<br />

3m -1.5 0.6 -2.2<br />

6m -2.5 1.2 -4.5<br />

1m -0.7 -0.1 -0.9<br />

3m -2.5 -0.3 -2.5<br />

6m -5.2 -0.7 -5.1<br />

With the 5y Treasury yielding somewhere around<br />

1.3% already, we may not be too far from levels that<br />

would prompt this move out on the curve anyway.<br />

Indeed, the 5s10s curve has been flattening since<br />

last Friday. Given that 2s and to a lesser extent 5s<br />

Bulent Baygun 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

19<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


are more or less hitting a brick wall, 5s10s will dictate<br />

what happens with 2s5s10s, i.e. a flatter 5s10s will<br />

likely widen 2s5s10s.<br />

Applying a similar thought process, we expect the<br />

back end of the curve to flatten as rates settle down.<br />

Treasury 10s30s is trading at 118bp, some 6bp shy<br />

of the all-time high of 124bp in August. In swaps, the<br />

corresponding figures are 79bp (current) vs 89bp,<br />

respectively.<br />

Table 1 shows the carry of these positions. The<br />

2s5s10s fly and 10s30s flatteners carry negatively<br />

but not excessively so. For example, the Treasury<br />

10s30s has a 2bp cost of carry over three months.<br />

On the other hand, 5s10s has positive carry for<br />

Treasuries and negligible carry for swaps.<br />

So, just wait until rates settle down and then act?<br />

Easier said than done, we know. What should we<br />

take as the signal that the rally is running out of<br />

steam and a new range is being established?<br />

Unfortunately, there is no magic formula here. To<br />

circumvent that rather inconvenient challenge, we<br />

make these trades contingent on rates remaining low<br />

for some time (i.e. stability). More specifically, we<br />

recommend conditional bull-flatteners using receivers<br />

struck OTM, indeed below spot levels. This ensures<br />

that we get into the flatteners if rates drop further and<br />

stay there for some time. To state the obvious, the<br />

conditional trade does not protect against a<br />

steepening scenario at low rates.<br />

5s10s is trading at 103bp spot, and 99bp 3m forward<br />

as of this writing, indicating that the carry/rolldown<br />

effect is 4bp against a flattener. Furthermore, ATMF<br />

gamma vol on 10y tails is more expensive than 5y<br />

tails, and receiver skew on 10s is higher, which<br />

means that there is an additional cost to be paid for<br />

doing the trade in conditional form. As an example,<br />

let’s suppose we choose the 5y and 10y strikes 30bp<br />

below the forwards for a 3m bull-flattener. The<br />

breakeven in this case is about 4bp below the<br />

forwards, i.e. the curve has to flatten by 4bp relative<br />

to the current forwards (8bp in total, relative to spot)<br />

to recoup the premium paid upfront. This translates<br />

to a 5s10s spread of around 95bp. For reference, at<br />

the end of August, 5s10s traded in the 91-95bp area<br />

for a brief period once 5s stuck around their lows.<br />

In other words, the conditional flattener lends itself to<br />

the scenario we are depicting in which rates drop and<br />

stay low, establishing a new range and prompting<br />

duration extension trades.<br />

Bulent Baygun 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

20<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


US: A Carry Trade with Extra Potential<br />

• After the FOMC statement, the question<br />

arises once again about a Japan-like scenario.<br />

• We explore a carry trade with a few added<br />

kickers in case the swap and vol curves start<br />

to evolve the way they did during the<br />

beginning of Japan’s experience.<br />

• STRATEGY: Buy 4y1y vs selling 2y1y<br />

receivers, both 50bp OTM and equal notionals.<br />

Holding period is up to one year.<br />

As the front end continues to richen, the carry on<br />

offer keeps getting compressed. What should one<br />

do, since the latest FOMC statement reinforces the<br />

idea that this strategy can still be profitable?<br />

One approach would be to analyse various different<br />

long positions and hunt down the best carry or alpha.<br />

Another approach we explore here is to find a<br />

rolldown strategy that has a few added kickers in<br />

case the vol surface and swap curve start to evolve<br />

the way they did during the beginning of Japan’s<br />

experience.<br />

Rather than simply buying receivers, the trade is to<br />

buy 4y1y vs selling 2y1y receivers (both 50bp OTM,<br />

same notionals). This way, one can capitalise on<br />

the spread between these two forward rates and<br />

also the vol ratio, if we stay mired in the low rate<br />

environment for a while. As we show later, this is<br />

where we see the asymmetric risk that helps the<br />

trade when considering the beginning of Japan's<br />

experience.<br />

Table 1 shows the exact trade details and greeks.<br />

The current entry cost is 27.5c and after one year<br />

the position gains 40% (see Chart 1 for PnL<br />

profile). The rolldown is partly due to positive theta,<br />

but mainly due to the 2y1y leg having a steeper vol<br />

rolldown than the 4y1y. Chart 2 shows that the<br />

2y1y/4y1y vol ratio of around 90% drops sharply to<br />

70% after one year. In Japan, the ratio is 50%.<br />

Since the 4y1y rate is currently 10-20% more volatile<br />

than 2y1y, this makes the position trade like a long<br />

on the market since the 4y1y receiver leg will move<br />

more. Another feature which makes the trade<br />

directional is that the vol ratio tends to fall in a rally –<br />

helping the position – while rising in a selloff (see<br />

Chart 3 for relationship).<br />

250%<br />

200%<br />

150%<br />

100%<br />

50%<br />

0%<br />

Chart 1: PnL Profile Under Rate Shifts<br />

1y Holding<br />

Instantaneous<br />

-50%<br />

-75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75<br />

Change in 5y Rate (with beta-implied curve movement)<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 2: Sharp Rolldown in Vol Ratio over 1y<br />

140%<br />

130%<br />

120%<br />

110%<br />

100%<br />

90%<br />

80%<br />

70%<br />

2y1y over 4y1y USD Vol Ratio<br />

1y1y over 3y1y USD Vol Ratio<br />

60%<br />

Jan-06 Dec-06 Nov-07 Oct-08 Oct-09 Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 3: Vol Ratio has been Directional to Rates<br />

110%<br />

105%<br />

100%<br />

95%<br />

90%<br />

85%<br />

Jan-10 Feb-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

2y1y over 4y1y USD Vol Ratio<br />

4y1y USD Rate (right scale)<br />

5.0<br />

4.5<br />

4.0<br />

3.5<br />

3.0<br />

2.5<br />

2.0<br />

Suvrat Prakash 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

21<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


We are comfortable with the directional exposure<br />

given our bullish view into year-end, although one<br />

could buy less notional in 4y1y to account for this.<br />

We choose to use receivers rather than straddles<br />

because this helps the position trade ‘conditional’ on<br />

a scenario of low rates. The position would still be<br />

underwater in a near-term selloff, although the<br />

sensitivity of the position would drop. Finally, we<br />

choose to strike the receivers 50bp below the<br />

forwards so that after one year the strikes are closer<br />

to the forwards, making it easier from a liquidity<br />

standpoint to get out of the position.<br />

The additional features that make us favour this<br />

position stem from the asymmetric risks we see in<br />

the yield spread and relative realised vol between the<br />

two rates. Simply put, if we stay around these rate<br />

levels or go lower, then the closer forward rate<br />

runs out of room to rally and the further-out<br />

forward rate performs relatively better. Chart 4<br />

shows that the 2y1y/4y1y spread is near the top end<br />

of its historical range and so the risk from this<br />

perspective is tilted toward a tightening.<br />

The Japan experience (or at least the beginnings of<br />

it) can provide a useful historical perspective. The<br />

BoJ cut rates to 0% for the first time in 1999, after<br />

which the 1y1y rate soon bottomed out and traded<br />

sideways for several years. Meanwhile, the 3y1y rate<br />

continued to rally and the spread compressed (see<br />

Chart 5).<br />

Another way to look at it is from a vol performance<br />

perspective. While the 1y1y rate in Japan was<br />

trading sideways, the ratio of 3y1y realised vol over<br />

1y1y steadily picked up (see Chart 6).<br />

Chart 4: 2y1y/4y1y Rate Spread Near the Highs<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

2y1y vs 4y1y USD Rate Spread<br />

-50<br />

Jan-99 May-01 Sep-03 Jan-06 May-08 Sep-10<br />

Chart 5: After Japan Cut Rates to 0%, the 3y1y<br />

Continued to Rally While 1y1y Went Sideways…<br />

2.5<br />

2.0<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

0.0<br />

Jan-96 May-97 Sep-98 Feb-00 Jun-01 Nov-02<br />

2.5<br />

1y1y JPY Rate<br />

Spread of 1y1y/3y1y JPY Rates (right scale)<br />

Chart 6: …Meaning That 3y1y Realised Vol<br />

Vastly Outperformed 1y1y<br />

1y1y JPY Rate<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

600%<br />

2.0<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

3y1y Realized Vol over 1y1y<br />

Realized Vol (right scale)<br />

500%<br />

400%<br />

300%<br />

200%<br />

100%<br />

0.0<br />

Jan-96 May-97 Sep-98 Feb-00 Jun-01 Nov-02<br />

0%<br />

All Charts Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Table 1: Trade Details and Greeks<br />

Structure Strike Notional ($) PV ($) PV01 ($) Vega ($) Gamma ($) Theta ($)<br />

Sell 2y1y Rec F-50bp (100,000,000) (220,000) (3,854) (35,996) (251) 385<br />

Buy 4y1y Rec F-50bp 100,000,000 495,000 4,082 63,014 187 (348)<br />

Net 275,000 228 27,017 (64) 36<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Suvrat Prakash 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

22<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


MBS: Remain Underweight, GNM CBRs Up<br />

• Given our macro view of lower rates, we<br />

remain underweight mortgages as they are<br />

trading with shorter durations and are likely to<br />

underperform in a rally.<br />

• The August GNMA Delinquency Report<br />

showed that 30- and 60-day delinquencies were<br />

up, and CBRs increased dramatically for pools<br />

issued by BofA, Citi and GMAC.<br />

The direction of mortgage spreads continues to hinge<br />

on the rates market. Dollar price compression due to<br />

prepayment concerns keeps performance in check in<br />

a rally while a lack of substantial rate lock associated<br />

origination keeps prices from falling too much in a<br />

selloff. Given the statement from the Fed on<br />

Tuesday, which laid the groundwork for further<br />

liquidity easing, we remain bullish on the rates<br />

market. With that view, we also remain negative on<br />

mortgages.<br />

GNMA Delinquency Report<br />

The GNMA Delinquency report for August showed an<br />

increase in 60-day delinquencies for GNMAs across<br />

all products from 1.49 to 1.58; by issuer, we saw<br />

similar results. For instance, BofA 60 day<br />

delinquencies increased from 1.53% to 1.7%, Chase<br />

increased from 1.6% to 1.69%, Citi increased from<br />

1.66% to 1.74%, Wells increased from 1.1% to<br />

1.16%, GMAC increased from 2.22% to 2.34% and<br />

TBW increased from 5.03% to 5.24%. We also saw<br />

increases in 30-day delinquencies from 3.94% to<br />

4.11% across all products. The increases in 30- and<br />

60-day delinquencies are in line with our view that<br />

seasonals and home tax credit were behind the<br />

improved delinquencies earlier in the year; with the<br />

end of these effects, delinquencies have risen.<br />

Overall, 90+ day delinquencies declined from 1.27%<br />

to 1.18%, while CBRs increased from 4.02% to<br />

6.84%. The decline in 90+ day delinquencies and<br />

increase in CBRs was led by BofA, Citi and GMAC.<br />

BofA 90+ delinquencies declined from 1.09% to<br />

0.630% and CBRs increased from 0.06% to 10.52%,<br />

and that was one of the reasons why CPRs on BofA<br />

loans increased substantially in August in addition to<br />

borrowers responding to lower rates. We had<br />

mentioned in our most recent prepayment<br />

commentary that BofA CBRs had declined sharply in<br />

July and the significant increase in CPRs in August<br />

might be due to them catching up after taking a<br />

month off from buying out delinquent loans, and the<br />

delinquency report confirmed this assumption. Citi<br />

Chart 1: Empirical vs Trader Hedge Ratios to<br />

10y Swaps<br />

70%<br />

60%<br />

50%<br />

40%<br />

30%<br />

20%<br />

10%<br />

0%<br />

4.0s Empr 4.0s Trader 4.5s Empr 4.5s Trader<br />

5.0s Empr 5.0s Trader 5.5s Empr 5.5s Trader<br />

14-Jun-10 5-Jul-10 26-Jul-10 16-Aug-10 6-Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 2: 30,60 and 90+ Day Delinquencies by<br />

Issuer<br />

BOA CHASE CITI GMAC<br />

Wells<br />

30 60 90+ 30 60 90+ 30 60 90+ 30 60 90+ 30 60 90+<br />

Aug-10 4.28 1.70 0.63 4.89 1.69 0.77 4.60 1.74 0.86 4.66 2.34 5.46 3.22 1.16 0.16<br />

Jul-10 4.04 1.53 1.09 4.67 1.60 0.74 4.34 1.66 1.27 4.60 2.22 5.32 2.96 1.10 0.17<br />

Jun-10 4.24 1.52 0.59 4.78 1.54 0.79 4.36 1.62 1.23 4.72 2.15 5.28 3.10 1.13 0.19<br />

May-10 4.10 1.42 0.57 4.60 1.56 0.77 4.18 1.58 1.15 4.50 2.18 5.21 2.98 1.06 0.19<br />

Apr-10 3.59 1.34 0.56 3.83 1.44 2.20 3.68 1.43 1.12 4.01 1.89 5.14 2.55 0.96 0.19<br />

Mar-10 3.77 1.47 0.56 3.89 1.50 2.27 3.80 1.50 1.13 4.05 1.99 5.00 2.64 1.12 0.23<br />

Feb-10 4.13 1.64 1.12 4.46 1.66 2.53 4.61 1.76 1.25 4.33 2.06 4.93 3.08 1.28 0.27<br />

Jan-10 4.33 1.95 2.22 5.14 2.14 2.56 5.06 2.07 1.27 4.71 2.28 4.71 3.54 1.49 0.38<br />

Dec-09 4.36 1.96 1.72 5.00 2.16 2.40 4.67 2.00 1.32 4.55 2.21 4.40 3.41 1.54 0.64<br />

Nov-09 4.45 1.94 5.32 5.22 2.14 2.36 4.72 2.09 1.31 4.61 2.16 4.28 3.65 1.52 0.96<br />

Oct-09 3.91 1.83 4.87 5.01 2.17 2.16 4.33 2.14 5.71 4.23 2.08 3.87 3.42 1.51 1.27<br />

Sep-09 4.19 1.91 4.54 5.33 2.22 2.30 4.58 2.17 5.50 4.29 2.07 3.70 3.81 1.61 1.43<br />

Aug-09 4.15 1.81 4.61 5.66 2.16 2.16 4.50 2.09 5.29 4.47 1.98 3.30 3.76 1.53 1.86<br />

Jul-09 3.79 1.70 4.47 5.27 2.08 3.33 4.19 1.95 5.07 4.22 1.73 3.05 3.27 1.47 1.71<br />

Jun-09 4.08 1.74 4.45 6.11 1.99 2.75 4.44 1.98 4.84 4.26 1.74 2.86 3.64 1.42 1.59<br />

May-09 3.86 1.68 4.37 5.27 1.75 2.03 4.57 1.99 4.71 3.95 1.70 2.68 3.48 1.32 2.06<br />

Apr-09 3.67 1.64 4.21 4.89 1.61 1.35 4.24 1.92 4.49 3.61 1.59 2.53 3.15 1.27 2.57<br />

Mar-09 3.76 1.69 4.21 4.87 1.55 0.79 4.20 1.78 4.25 3.91 1.63 2.66 3.12 1.26 2.84<br />

Feb-09 4.25 1.83 4.34 5.37 1.70 0.90 4.59 2.07 4.33 4.06 1.77 2.70 3.42 1.46 3.11<br />

Jan-09 4.93 2.22 4.48 6.20 2.08 0.98 5.19 2.32 4.37 4.60 1.96 2.59 3.95 1.71 3.19<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

1 Month CBRs<br />

-<br />

50<br />

45<br />

40<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

Chart 3: CBRs by Issuer<br />

Aug-07 Feb-08 Aug-08 Feb-09 Aug-09 Feb-10 Aug-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

BOA<br />

CHASE<br />

CITI<br />

GMAC<br />

Wells<br />

90+ delinquencies declined from 1.27% to 0.86%,<br />

while CBRs increased from 6.6% to 12.25%. GMAC<br />

CBRs also saw a substantial increase from 3.97% to<br />

6.1%; however, their 90+ delinquencies remains<br />

above 5%, actually increasing from 5.32% to 5.46%.<br />

Olurotimi Ajibola / Anish Lohokare 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

23<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


EUR: Outlook for the Curve<br />

• The Fed has clearly opened the door for<br />

QEII. QEI was favourable for govvies and<br />

mortgages but also for equities as the liquidity<br />

bonanza supported risk appetite.<br />

Chart 1: QEI Supported Stocks and Bonds<br />

• Things are different this time, with<br />

significant implication for the curve – especially<br />

after the recent sell-off.<br />

• STRATEGY: Short the curve on the 5-10y<br />

segment.<br />

The prospect of more liquidity<br />

The latest FOMC statement made it clear: the Fed is<br />

on the verge of resuming quantitative easing. It is<br />

worth noting that when the Fed conducted QEI in<br />

2009, this allowed both bond and stock markets to<br />

perform well. Indeed, in addition to direct purchases<br />

of debt by the Fed, easier and larger liquidity<br />

supported risk appetite, boosting risky assets such<br />

as commodities and equities. One can therefore<br />

regard the prospect of QEII as providing firm support<br />

for all classes of assets. Of course, the size of<br />

purchases matters when it comes to the impact of<br />

QE. The Fed will have to buy a lot in order to bring<br />

about lower yields and tighter spreads. In the<br />

eurozone, the ECB is only extending non-standard<br />

conditions for tenders and continues to buy small<br />

quantities of sovereign bonds. But the outlook for<br />

coming months is that liquidity will remain ample.<br />

Big difference with 2009<br />

The backdrop for QEI was very different from the<br />

current one. When the Fed started purchases in<br />

2009, the economic outlook was for recovery and<br />

reflation. This is far from the current situation. Signs<br />

of pronounced weakness in the US economy are<br />

mounting, and the euro area is not protected against<br />

a slowdown. In addition, in both areas, the outlook for<br />

inflation is to the downside. Upcoming data should<br />

confirm that core inflation continues to ease. As a<br />

result, upcoming quantitative easing may be less<br />

favourable for riskier classes of assets, in particular<br />

stock markets. This will have major implications for<br />

the curve, particularly after the recent sell-off.<br />

The curve in coming weeks<br />

The strong rally that occurred during the first two<br />

months of summer was almost completely led by the<br />

back end of the curve. Strong receiving interest<br />

dominated, leading to lower long-term yields and a<br />

flatter curve. The sell-off that took place during the<br />

first half of September was more broadly based<br />

across the curve. Indeed, the short end suffered<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 2: Market Direction and the Curve<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

significantly, preventing the curve from resteepening<br />

strongly. The question is now whether or not the<br />

resumption of a bullish tone will trigger flattening<br />

pressures.<br />

The sell-off at the short end of the benchmark curve<br />

was linked to risk appetite, which favoured stocks<br />

and weighed on short-dated sovereign debt. Against<br />

this backdrop, if the bullish tone in EGBs goes along<br />

with solid equities, the curve will flatten from the 2y<br />

area as risk appetite will prevent the short end from<br />

rallying. But if upcoming data point to worsening<br />

economic conditions, stock markets will suffer and<br />

the short end will enjoy a decent rally as well. Near<br />

term, we consider the latter situation as more likely.<br />

As a result, we see the bullish tone developing along<br />

with flattening pressures starting only from the belly<br />

of the curve (5y area).<br />

Strategy: Short the curve on the 5-10y.<br />

Patrick Jacq 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

24<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


EUR: Re-Enter Flatteners on 5y/10y Segment<br />

• Eur 5y/10y segment is lagging red/green<br />

Euribor flattening.<br />

• RV inputs point to a spread on swaps in the<br />

mid-50s.<br />

• STRATEGY: We re-entered flatteners after<br />

the dovish FOMC meeting<br />

Eur 5y/10y segment is lagging Euribor red/green<br />

spreads<br />

Chart 1 shows Eur 5y/10y segment and 4 th / 8 th<br />

generic Euribor spread over the past decade. Not<br />

surprisingly – with the exception of some short<br />

periods of time – the series have moved very closely.<br />

However, with the richening of the belly of the Euro<br />

curve (see our desknote on Eur 2y/5y/10y swap fly),<br />

the Eur 5y/10y segment on swaps has dramatically<br />

lagged the flattening of red/green Euribor spreads<br />

materialised by the 4 th /8 th generic spread (the most<br />

correlated one).<br />

Chart 1: Eur 5y/10y Segment & Euribor 4 th /8 th<br />

Calendar Spread<br />

120<br />

100<br />

80<br />

60<br />

40<br />

20<br />

0<br />

-20<br />

Sep-99 Mar-01 Sep-02 Mar-04 Sep-05 Mar-07 Sep-08 Mar-10<br />

Eur 5y/10y spread<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

60<br />

40<br />

4th/8th generic Euribor spd (R.H.S)<br />

Chart 2: Eur 5y/10y Spread Hedged with<br />

4 th /8 th Euribor Spread<br />

Eur 5y/10y too steep<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

That lag is confirmed through the regression of Eur<br />

5y/10y segment versus red/green spreads gauged by<br />

the 4 th /8 th generic spread. Using that variable since<br />

1999, the regressed 5y/10y segment is trading<br />

almost 2.5 standard deviations above its long-run fair<br />

level, a gap not seen since June 2003!<br />

20<br />

0<br />

-20<br />

-40<br />

Eur 5y/10y too flat<br />

Conditional distribution strengthens traditional<br />

approach results<br />

The excessive steepness of the Euro 5y/10y<br />

segment is also highlighted by a non-parametric<br />

approach such as conditional distribution. Chart 3<br />

represents the distribution of the Euro swap segment<br />

conditional to red/green Euribor spread. The spread<br />

is trading on the far right of its distribution, quite far<br />

from the peak in the mid-50s.<br />

The main risk for Euro flatteners was a disappointing<br />

FOMC meeting on Tuesday. The outcome was<br />

ultimately quiet dovish but the flattening mainly<br />

focused on the 2y/5y segment the following day while<br />

5y/10y marginally moved.<br />

Strategy: We entered flatteners on Wednesday<br />

afternoon on 5y/10y futures at 77.5bp (ctds) targeting<br />

a 65bp level, which is equivalent to the 55/57 area on<br />

swaps. Pure RV players could play the box versus<br />

long Sep 11/Sep 12 Euribor (40k 5y/10y vs 25K<br />

Euribor).<br />

-60<br />

Sep-99 Mar-01 Sep-02 Mar-04 Sep-05 Mar-07 Sep-08 Mar-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 3: Distribution of Eur 5y/10y Spread<br />

versus Euribor 4 th /8 th Generic Spread<br />

0.05<br />

0.045<br />

0.04<br />

0.035<br />

0.03<br />

0.025<br />

0.02<br />

0.015<br />

0.01<br />

0.005<br />

EUR swap 5/10 with Euribor 4/8 between 33 & 43<br />

h= 2.947<br />

Peak at 54.9<br />

0<br />

-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Current level: 67.9<br />

Eric Oynoyan 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

25<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


ECB Upcoming Tenders: How Much?<br />

• EUR 225bn is expiring next week and there<br />

is good reason to think that liquidity will drop<br />

from current levels.<br />

• However, the sources of demand at tenders<br />

that expire next week point to significant roll,<br />

especially on the 3mth the ECB will conduct.<br />

• STRATEGY: Enter ER1-ER5 steepening<br />

position.<br />

Chart 1: Large Expiry Ahead<br />

1y MRO<br />

6m<br />

3m<br />

35.67<br />

1m<br />

19.08<br />

131.93 23.17<br />

153.77<br />

37.90<br />

96.94<br />

A very large expiry<br />

EUR 225bn is maturing next week: EUR 75.2bn from<br />

the second 1y tender the ECB carried out last year,<br />

EUR 17.9bn from the 6mth tender conducted in<br />

March and EUR 131.9bn from the 3mth tender<br />

conducted at the end of June. It is worth noting that<br />

the 3mth tender was conducted at the end of June<br />

and allowed banks to roll a significant part of the<br />

amount expiring from the first 1y tender<br />

(EUR442.2bn). The total amount expiring is very<br />

large and the current level of liquidity (EUR 591bn<br />

provided through the MRO and LTROs) is exposed<br />

to a decent decrease. However, looking at the source<br />

of demand at old tenders that expire next week, it<br />

seems that a large amount will be rolled.<br />

What can be expected for demand?<br />

A large part of the answer lies in the source of<br />

demand at the tenders that expire next week. The<br />

EUR 75.2bn 1y tender conducted in September 2009<br />

did not attract arbitrage as the 12mth eonia at that<br />

time was 0.69%, well below the refi rate. Demand<br />

therefore came largely from banks with little access<br />

to the market for long-term liquidity. It is reasonable<br />

to think that at least EUR 50bn will be rolled of the<br />

EUR 75.2bn expiring. When it comes to the EUR<br />

17.9bn from the 6mth tender (conducted at the start<br />

of April), it is interesting to note that liquidity provided<br />

in April 2010 with LTROs by the Bank of Greece to<br />

banks based in Greece increased by EUR 18bn. It is<br />

crystal clear that the EUR 17.9bn is in Greece and<br />

there is a good chance of seeing Greek banks rolling<br />

almost all the amount expiring. Finally, the bulk of<br />

next week’s expiry (EUR 131.9bn) comes from the<br />

3mth tender the ECB conducted on 1 July, the day of<br />

the expiry of the famous EUR 442.2bn tender. At that<br />

time, liquidity fell sharply as arbitrage disappeared,<br />

and demand for the 3mth came when the 3mth<br />

Euribor was at 0.78% and the 3mth eonia at 0.47%.<br />

Once again, it is worth noting that despite the fall in<br />

liquidity, the level of liquidity provided by the Bank of<br />

Greece in July thanks to the LTRO was unchanged<br />

17.88<br />

Maturity (days)<br />

75.24<br />

-20 0 20 40 60 80 100 120<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

from June. This means that Greek banks rolled the<br />

expiry of the 1y with the 3mth. LTROs in Ireland fell<br />

almost EUR 20bn in July from June after increasing<br />

by EUR 40bn in June 2009, suggesting that demand<br />

from Irish banks at the 3mth tender in July was a<br />

floor. Given the level of the 3mth Euribor and the<br />

3mth eonia starting on 30 September, respectively<br />

0.90% and 0.54%, it makes sense to see relatively<br />

firm demand as the cost of ECB liquidity is relatively<br />

cheaper than it was three months ago. Against this<br />

backdrop, we see a very large roll of the 3mth expiry,<br />

well above EUR 100bn. As a result, we expect total<br />

demand at next week’s tenders of around EUR<br />

190bn. Two ECB tenders will offer banks the<br />

opportunity to be allotted. The ECB will conduct a<br />

fine-tuning, short-term 6day tender to allow banks to<br />

find liquidity until the next MRO. Given the evolution<br />

of demand at the MRO over many weeks, it appears<br />

that demand for short-term liquidity is roughly stable<br />

in the EUR 150-155bn area. Needs for short-term<br />

liquidity are unlikely to increase next week and we<br />

therefore expect the 6day tender will attract only<br />

moderate demand. Demand at the 3mth will<br />

therefore be very strong.<br />

As a result, with no change in demand at the MRO,<br />

we expect demand for next week’s 3mth tender could<br />

be in the EUR 165bn area and demand at the 6day<br />

close to EUR 25bn. This would lead to a EUR 35bn<br />

drop in liquidity. Given the current level of excess<br />

liquidity, just below EUR 100bn, a drop of EUR 35bn<br />

should not lead to significant upward pressures on<br />

short-term rates. Moreover, the extension of nonstandard<br />

procedures for open market operations<br />

means that there is no rush for very short-term<br />

liquidity. Eonia should remain close to current lows.<br />

This may favour limited resteepening pressures<br />

beyond the 3mth area.<br />

Strategy: Enter ER1-ER5 steepening position.<br />

Patrick Jacq 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

26<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


EGBs: Market Update & Top Trade Ideas<br />

• Greece is outperforming across peripherals,<br />

Portugal and Ireland are breaking new wides<br />

while Spain and Italy are more resilient than in<br />

the past widening episodes.<br />

• This 3-speed Europe’s periphery has been<br />

with us for over a month now and could persist<br />

for the coming months.<br />

• STRATEGY: Italy remains our favourite pick<br />

among the eurozone periphery. We believe the<br />

Greek curve’s steepening could continue in the<br />

near term. On a risk/return framework, we find<br />

Irish Gilts more attractive than PGBs at current<br />

levels.<br />

The way peripheral Europe trades has changed<br />

fundamentally over the past few weeks. We are not<br />

used to seeing Greece outperforming versus the rest<br />

of the periphery while Ireland and Portugal are<br />

breaking new wides every day. For the first time,<br />

Greece is actually feeling the protection of the<br />

EU/IMF mechanism while the market’s focus has<br />

shifted towards the other two small peripheral<br />

countries, i.e. Ireland and Portugal. Spain has been<br />

trading like Italy since the release of the stress test<br />

results in July and this has led to a 3-speed periphery<br />

of (i) Greece, (ii) Portugal and Ireland and (iii) Italy<br />

and Spain. Chart 1 clearly illustrates this point,<br />

showing the changes in ASW since the beginning of<br />

September.<br />

Starting with Greece, the massive steepening move<br />

in 1/2s and 2/10s has continued in the last few<br />

weeks. The disbursement of the second tranche of<br />

the EU/IMF package has been a catalyst for the rally<br />

in the 2011 GGBs. Beyond that, some positive<br />

rhetoric from EU authorities and a bit of praise for the<br />

tough decisions and the degree of fiscal<br />

consolidation that the Greek government has<br />

achieved in the first eight months of the year have<br />

pushed Greek spreads lower. Of course, we have to<br />

treat this compression with a pinch of salt as it is<br />

taking place in very thin markets. It will take longer to<br />

convince investors that Greece can actually avoid<br />

default or restructuring. Irrespective of this, and in<br />

line with the IMF wording, Greece has made a strong<br />

start on its programme and has slowly started being<br />

rewarded for this in terms of spreads behaviour,<br />

especially at the front end. Chart 2 shows the change<br />

in Greek yields across the curve in September.<br />

Continuing with Ireland and Portugal, we saw a<br />

significant widening ahead of their auctions in the<br />

past week. A combination of negative sentiment<br />

Chart 1: 3-Speed Europe’s Periphery in Sep.<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

-150<br />

-200<br />

-250<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

ASW Changes of Peripheral Spread in September<br />

2y 5y 10y 30y<br />

Chart 2: The Steepening of the Greek Curve<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

GRE<br />

ITA<br />

SPA<br />

POR<br />

Chart 3: POR & IRE Underperformance in Sep.<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

-150<br />

-200<br />

-250<br />

-300<br />

-350<br />

-400<br />

-450<br />

3-<br />

2011<br />

8-<br />

2011<br />

Changes in ASW in September<br />

POR<br />

0<br />

2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

GGBs Yields Change in September<br />

2012 GGBs Following the Rally<br />

2011 GGBs Massive Rally<br />

5-<br />

2012<br />

5-<br />

2013<br />

1-<br />

2014<br />

8-<br />

2014<br />

8-<br />

2015<br />

Longer-end is more resilient to<br />

the compression move<br />

4-<br />

2017<br />

7-<br />

2018<br />

10-<br />

2019<br />

10-<br />

2022<br />

3-<br />

2026<br />

towards peripherals and the upcoming auctions<br />

amplified the usual pre-auction widening that we see<br />

in smaller peripherals. Chart 3 shows the widening<br />

and the flattening that we have seen on both Irish<br />

and Portuguese curves in September so far. 2013/14<br />

maturity bonds have suffered most of the widening<br />

while the longer end has been the most resilient.<br />

After the auction, we witnessed a short-lived<br />

correction in both countries but this was not enough<br />

to pare back the widening of the last weeks.<br />

IRE<br />

IRE<br />

9-<br />

2040<br />

Ioannis Sokos 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

27<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Next we compare Ireland and Portugal and try to<br />

identify the potential threats and opportunities in the<br />

coming months. Starting with the funding needs and<br />

issuance calendar in these countries, Ireland has<br />

already reached 2010’s funding needs and has<br />

actually started pre-funding for 2011. Despite that,<br />

NTMA officials have stated that there is no plan to<br />

skip an auction and thus we could have some more<br />

prefunding in the remainder of the year, most likely<br />

two more auctions (depending on market conditions).<br />

On the other hand, Portugal has completed 90% of<br />

its issuance target (EUR 19bn of EUR 21bn) and we<br />

expect another EUR 2bn before year-end. Hence,<br />

funding pressures will be limited in the remainder of<br />

the year while the main focus will be on the budget<br />

reports and the projections for 2011 funding needs.<br />

In terms of fiscal consolidation, Portugal appears to<br />

be on a weaker path. Chart 4 shows the Portuguese<br />

cash-basis budget balance, where the development<br />

has been disappointing so far according to our<br />

economists. Over the first eight months of this year,<br />

the deficit was EUR 0.5bn larger than over the same<br />

period last year. On the contrary, in Ireland, there<br />

have been many concerns lately with respect to the<br />

massive amount of government guaranteed bonds<br />

that mature in September. This has led to an<br />

acceleration of the widening of Irish spreads in<br />

combination with the developments on ANGIRI. We<br />

don’t think that these redemptions will cause any<br />

significant problem for the Irish banks and we expect<br />

some risk to be priced out of Irish Gilts once<br />

September has passed. The key statistic to watch in<br />

the near term will be the ECB liquidity absorbed by<br />

Irish banks, where we could see a spike in<br />

September’s data. This spike has already taken<br />

place in Portugal: as Chart 5 shows, the dependence<br />

of Portuguese banks on the ECB has exploded since<br />

April. This is a very worrying trend that could create<br />

more pressure on PGBs as the ECB’s exit strategy<br />

has already become a hot topic in the market.<br />

Chart 6 shows the Irish/Portuguese spreads in all<br />

sectors. The 2y IRE/POR spread has widened the<br />

most from August lows but remains the tightest<br />

sector versus the rest. An overshooting can be seen<br />

on the 5y sector but this is also affected by the fact<br />

that there has been no new 5y benchmark in 2010 in<br />

either country. When we look at the non-parametric<br />

conditional distribution of the 2y IRE/POR spread<br />

based on the latest trading range of the 10y spread,<br />

it is clear from Chart 6 (bottom) that 2y spreads are<br />

on the wide side.<br />

All in all, BTPs remain our favourite pick across the<br />

periphery. We prefer Irish Gilts to PGBs, especially<br />

after September and the end of the government<br />

guaranteed bond massive redemptions. However,<br />

Chart 4: Portugal – Cash-Basis Budget Balance<br />

0<br />

-2<br />

-4<br />

-6<br />

-8<br />

-10<br />

-12<br />

-14<br />

-16<br />

Cash Balance<br />

(EURbn)<br />

2010<br />

2009<br />

Consistent with the<br />

Year-End Target<br />

2007<br />

2006<br />

2008<br />

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 5: ECB Liquidity & Portuguese Banks<br />

60<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

5 5 5 5 5<br />

Jan-09<br />

Feb-09<br />

Mar-09<br />

Apr-09<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

MROs & LTROs<br />

May-09<br />

Bank of Portugal B/S<br />

11 9 9 9 11 12 16 15 15 15 18 36 40 49<br />

Jun-09<br />

Jul-09<br />

Aug-09<br />

Sep-09<br />

excessive volatility makes relative value trades look<br />

too risky as liquidity remains very thin.<br />

Oct-09<br />

Nov-09<br />

+175% Increase<br />

Chart 6: IRE/POR Spreads and Conditional<br />

Distribution of 2y Spreads on 10y Current<br />

Levels<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

-150<br />

-200<br />

Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10<br />

0.035<br />

0.03<br />

0.025<br />

0.02<br />

0.015<br />

0.01<br />

0.005<br />

0<br />

10y IRE/POR<br />

2y IRE/POR<br />

Dec-09<br />

Jan-10<br />

Feb-10<br />

Mar-10<br />

15y IRE/POR<br />

5y IRE/POR<br />

-80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Conditional Distribution of 2y IRE/POR Spreads on current<br />

range of 10y spreads<br />

Apr-10<br />

May-10<br />

Jun-10<br />

Jul-10<br />

At current level they<br />

are on the wide side<br />

Ioannis Sokos 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

28<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


EUR Covered Bonds: Market Update<br />

• Activity in the primary market has delivered<br />

several good signs: despite the end of the ECB<br />

CBPP, new EUR issuance has soared in<br />

September and the average size is back to<br />

almost EUR 1bn.<br />

• After an easing in ASW around July/August,<br />

mainly due to the summer lull, covered bonds in<br />

peripheral markets have re-widened since late<br />

August.<br />

• STRATEGY: 1) Underweight Irish and<br />

Portuguese covered bonds, which we expect to<br />

widen further; 2) overweight Spanish and Italian<br />

covered bonds which should start compressing<br />

again; and 3) PGB 4y is priced cheaper than<br />

Caixa Geral De Depositos Covered 4y (CXGD)!<br />

CXGD/PGB 4y and BKIR/GILT 5y ASW<br />

differentials should widen by at least 55bp and<br />

44bp respectively.<br />

Chart 1: New Issuance Soared in September<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

Nb. EUR Issues<br />

New EUR Supply (bn)<br />

Total EUR Supply incl. taps (bn)<br />

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, Bond Radar<br />

Chart 2: ASW have Re-Widened in Peripherals<br />

Since Late August<br />

350<br />

350<br />

The activity in the primary market has delivered<br />

several good signs. According to Bond Radar, 23<br />

new EUR covered bonds have been issued so far in<br />

September, bringing monthly supply to EUR 22.4bn,<br />

just EUR 5bn below the September 2009 level (Chart<br />

1). Given that i) Sep 2009 was actually the heaviest<br />

September supply and ii) Sep 2010 is close to those<br />

levels even without the ECB’s buying force, this is<br />

impressive and clearly demonstrates a significant reopening<br />

of the covered bond market despite the end<br />

of the ECB CBPP. Another positive development is<br />

the recent increase in the average size of new<br />

covered bonds. The latest had slumped to EUR<br />

700m in May from EUR 1-1.3bn over the past year,<br />

but is now almost back to EUR 1bn (EUR 974mn).<br />

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Spanish banks<br />

have been able to re-enter the primary market, slowly<br />

in July and August, and significantly this month with<br />

five new bonds totalling EUR 4.5bn. Italian banks<br />

have also been quite active in September with five<br />

new bonds amounting to EUR 4bn, their heaviest<br />

monthly supply so far this year.<br />

However, the situation is different in Ireland and<br />

Portugal where fiscal concerns and stress over Irish<br />

banks are preventing banks from tapping the market.<br />

Further, let’s remember that the latest Irish covered<br />

bond goes back to November last year while the<br />

latest Portuguese covered bond was issued in<br />

March.<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

Jan 10 Feb 10 Mar 10 Apr 10 May 10 Jun 10 Jul 10 Aug 10 Sep 10<br />

Spanish Cedulas Portugal Covered Italy Covered Ireland Covered<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, iBoxx Covered Indices (4y-6y)<br />

400<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

-50<br />

Chart 3: PGB 5Y ASW Now Above the iBoxx<br />

Portugal Covered Index ASW<br />

50<br />

0<br />

iBoxx € Portugal Covered<br />

-100<br />

Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, iBoxx<br />

PGB 5Y<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

Camille de Courcel 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

29<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


After an easing in ASW around July/August,<br />

mainly due to the summer lull, the re-widening<br />

trend observed since late August in the<br />

peripheral markets needs to be differentiated. On<br />

one hand, the iBoxx Ireland Covered index was at a<br />

new high for the year (+20bp compared with early<br />

July levels) at the time of writing, reflecting growing<br />

concerns over the current situation, despite the fact<br />

that the Irish government is now funded until the end<br />

of H1 2011. Given that the risks perceived by<br />

investors with relation to both the issuer and<br />

sovereign bonds are the main drivers of ASW in<br />

peripheral covered bonds, we expect further<br />

widening as long as uncertainties over the banks’<br />

situation prevail, and as long as the growth outlook<br />

does not improve significantly.<br />

With respect to Portuguese banks, the iBoxx<br />

Portugal Covered index remains 20bp below early<br />

July levels so far, despite a fiscal lag and<br />

uncertainties weighing on the country. While<br />

Portuguese covered bonds appear more resilient<br />

than Irish covered bonds for the time being, we<br />

expect more widening in ASW given the current<br />

outlook, but also given the recent jump in reliance on<br />

ECB funding by Portuguese banks.<br />

Chart 4: Irish GILT 5Y ASW Now Equal to the<br />

iBoxx Ireland Covered Index ASW<br />

450<br />

400<br />

iBoxx € Ireland Covered Irish GILT 5Y<br />

350<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

Jul 08 Jan 09 Jul 09 Jan 10 Jul 10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, iBoxx<br />

And at a lesser extent:<br />

2) BKIR 5Y is 46bp cheaper than Irish GILT 5Y, but<br />

compared with historical data, BKIR/GILT 5Y ASW<br />

differential should widen by at least 44bp.<br />

On the other hand, as far as Spain and Italy are<br />

concerned, the re-widening has been quite limited so<br />

far (around +10bp from their trough in August) and<br />

they are slightly below their levels early July. We<br />

view this re-widening as a consequence of heavy<br />

supply that needed to be digested by the market.<br />

Once this is over, we expect some ASW<br />

compression since the outlook in Spain and Italy has<br />

improved and since the share of Spanish banks in<br />

ECB funding has somewhat decreased.<br />

Market abnormality<br />

Because covered bonds tend to lag during spread<br />

movements (compared to their respective banks<br />

senior and government bonds) and because they are<br />

less volatile, the jump in Irish GILT and PGB ASW<br />

has not been followed yet by Irish and Portuguese<br />

covered bonds in some cases. Looking at iBoxx<br />

Portugal and Ireland Covered indices in comparison<br />

with their corresponding govvies (Chart 3 and 4), we<br />

are now in a situation where the govvies ASW has<br />

reached the same level as that of the respective<br />

iBoxx Covered index ASW. In the case of Portugal,<br />

PGB ASW is even wider than the iBoxx Covered<br />

index!<br />

In particular, we have spotted the following distortion:<br />

1) PGB 4y is 25bp cheaper than Caixa Geral de<br />

Depositos (CXGD) Covered 4y! Looking at their<br />

historical ASW differential, CXGD/PGB 4y should<br />

widen by at least 55bp.<br />

Camille de Courcel 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

30<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


GBP Curve Opportunities Update<br />

• Sterling curve: enter long reds vs. fronts<br />

and greens.<br />

Chart 1: June 11/June 12/June 13 Sterling Fly<br />

• GBP swap curve: keep here 2y/5y/10y GBP<br />

fly, 5y still has to normalise.<br />

• Cross spreads: Get ready to enter 5y/10y<br />

GBP/Eur compression trades.<br />

45<br />

30<br />

15<br />

0<br />

GBP fly cheap vs. Dollar one<br />

Update on key GBP opportunities<br />

September sell-off provided a few opportunities on<br />

the GBP curve. We do an update here of the trades<br />

recommended recently.<br />

Short-Sterling curve: There has been a dramatic<br />

decoupling between the convexity of the Eurodollar<br />

curve and the Short-Sterling one. The box differential<br />

is back on the upper side of its range in the wake of<br />

the 20bp spike on the Sterling fly. The Latest BoE<br />

minutes highlighted the persistent downside risks on<br />

the UK economy, enhanced by massive and<br />

necessary public spending cuts. In such a context,<br />

the protracted BoE status quo is supportive for<br />

front/red Sterling flatteners while red/green spread<br />

should keep some premium as rate hikes will be<br />

gradually moved from 2011 into 2012. This should<br />

push back front/red/green flies towards August lows.<br />

In terms of RV, we found June 11/June 12/June 13<br />

fly the most interesting one (10bp rolldown). We keep<br />

short positions entered at -4, would add at +1.<br />

Target: -18/-20. Stop loss: +5.<br />

GBP Swap curve: Two weeks ago, we highlighted<br />

the extreme expensiveness of the 5y given the shape<br />

of the money market curve. Nonetheless, the fly<br />

disinverted a bit while the steepening of the money<br />

market curve has been more pronounced, which has<br />

pushed the GBP 5y swap fly to more expensive<br />

levels around 3.5 standard deviations from fair value.<br />

In the past, we saw some flies temporarily reaching<br />

four standard deviations such as the Euro one on the<br />

Lehman collapse but the normalisation occurred in<br />

less than a quarter. So far it seems to be the best<br />

trade in terms of reward profile on the GBP swap<br />

curve with a potential of 30bp (see Chart 3).We<br />

entered 2/3 of the position and are ready to add the<br />

rest on a further overshoot.<br />

GBP/Eur 5y/10y swap box: That box is another way<br />

to play the expensiveness of 5y GBP. In contrast, to<br />

the Euro curve, the GBP 5y/10y segment has been<br />

remarkably stable in the mid-90s over the past six<br />

months. The GBP segment is too high vs. the Euro<br />

using the conditional distribution approach. We would<br />

-15<br />

GBP fly expensive<br />

vs. Dollar one<br />

-30<br />

Jan-10 Mar-10 May-10 Jul-10 Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

45<br />

35<br />

25<br />

15<br />

5<br />

-5<br />

-15<br />

-25<br />

3/7/11 Sterling fly 3/7/11 Eurodollar fly<br />

Chart 2: Hedged GBP 2y/5y/10y swap fly<br />

Hedged GBP Swap Fly<br />

(1y/2y spread)<br />

5y cheap<br />

5y expensive<br />

-35<br />

Dec-01 Apr-03 Sep-04 Jan-06 Jun-07 Oct-08 Mar-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 3: Distribution of GBP Fly vs. Short-<br />

Sterling Front/Red Spread<br />

0.08<br />

0.07<br />

0.06<br />

0.05<br />

0.04<br />

0.03<br />

0.02<br />

0.01<br />

GBP swap 2/5/10 with GBP 2/6 between 48 & 58<br />

h= 1.716<br />

0<br />

-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Peak at 14.4<br />

Current level: -11.4<br />

2009 regime<br />

enter compression trades on any spike to the<br />

28/31bp area.<br />

Eric Oynoyan 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

31<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Global Inflation Watch<br />

Eurozone: September HICP Under Focus<br />

Chart 1: German CoL<br />

The figures for the German States, due for release<br />

from Tuesday, and the flash estimate for the<br />

eurozone out on Thursday will provide the first hints<br />

on inflation dynamics in September.<br />

In both cases, following a moderation in August, we<br />

expect energy prices to push the inflation rate higher<br />

over the month together with food. Conversely, core<br />

inflation is forecast to remain broadly stable as some<br />

upward pressures in prices of consumer goods is<br />

offset by subdued dynamics in services.<br />

More specifically in the eurozone, the 1.3% m/m<br />

decline in eurozone energy prices last September will<br />

not be repeated this month, mechanically pushing<br />

energy inflation higher to around 8% y/y, from 6% in<br />

August.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 2: Eurozone HICP<br />

Food inflation should also rise further on the month.<br />

The boost from food price base effects is now past,<br />

but we should increasingly begin to see pass-through<br />

from the recent soft commodity price shock to food<br />

prices in the coming months.<br />

Core inflation, meanwhile, should remain flat for a<br />

second consecutive month at 1.0% y/y. Core inflation<br />

has recovered a little since April’s 0.77% record low,<br />

with both core goods and core services contributing<br />

to the rise. We see scope for core goods inflation to<br />

rise a little further – in part, its strength reflects passthrough<br />

of past euro weakness. But core services<br />

should resume its downward trend given the weak<br />

state of consumer demand and an absence of any<br />

pressure from labour costs. Net, we expect core<br />

inflation to trade flat in September.<br />

Overall, the rise in food and energy will help drive a<br />

rebound in headline inflation to 1.8% y/y, its highest<br />

level since the end of 2008 (ex-tobacco index at<br />

109.79).<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 3: GSCI vs. Eurozone Food Alchool and<br />

Tobacco (FAT) Index<br />

Looking beyond August, headline inflation is likely to<br />

trend slightly higher over the remainder of the year,<br />

as some stabilisation in core inflation is combined<br />

with higher inflation in the most volatile components<br />

of the index (Chart 3).<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Luigi Speranza/Eoin O’Callaghan 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

32<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Table 1: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas' Inflation Forecasts<br />

Eurozone<br />

France<br />

US<br />

Headline HICP Ex-tobacco HICP<br />

Headline CPI<br />

Ex-tobacco CPI<br />

CPI Urban SA CPI Urban NSA<br />

Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y<br />

2009 108.1 - 0.3 107.9 - 0.2 119.3 - 0.1 118.0 - 0.1 214.5 - -0.3 214.5 - -0.4<br />

2010 (1) 109.8 - 1.6 109.5 - 1.5 121.1 - 1.5 119.7 - 1.4 218.3 - 1.7 218.2 - 1.7<br />

2011 (1) 111.5 - 1.6 111.1 - 1.5 122.7 - 1.4 121.3 - 1.3 221.5 - 1.5 221.4 - 1.5<br />

Q3 2009 108.0 - -0.4 107.8 - -0.5 119.4 - -0.4 118.1 - -0.4 215.4 - -1.6 215.7 - -1.6<br />

Q4 2009 108.6 - 0.4 108.4 - 0.3 119.7 - 0.4 118.4 - 0.3 216.8 - 1.5 216.2 - 1.4<br />

Q1 2010 108.6 - 1.1 108.3 - 1.0 120.3 - 1.3 119.0 - 1.2 217.6 - 2.4 217.0 - 2.4<br />

Q2 2010 110.0 - 1.5 109.7 - 1.4 121.3 - 1.6 120.0 - 1.5 217.2 - 1.8 218.1 - 1.8<br />

Q3 2010 (1) 109.9 - 1.7 109.5 - 1.6 121.2 - 1.5 119.8 - 1.5 218.1 - 1.3 218.3 - 1.2<br />

Q4 2010 (1) 110.7 - 1.9 110.4 - 1.9 121.4 - 1.5 120.0 - 1.4 220.0 - 1.5 219.3 - 1.5<br />

Q1 2011 (1) 110.5 - 1.8 110.2 - 1.7 121.8 - 1.2 120.4 - 1.2 220.9 - 1.5 220.4 - 1.5<br />

Q2 2011 (1) 111.6 - 1.5 111.2 - 1.4 122.8 - 1.2 121.3 - 1.1 221.3 - 1.9 222.1 - 1.9<br />

Jan 10 108.1 -0.8 1.0 107.75 -0.8 0.9 119.7 -0.2 1.1 118.32 -0.2 1.0 217.6 0.2 2.7 216.69 0.3 2.6<br />

Feb 10 108.4 0.3 0.9 108.10 0.3 0.8 120.4 0.6 1.3 118.99 0.6 1.2 217.6 0.0 2.2 216.74 0.0 2.1<br />

Mar 10 109.4 0.9 1.4 109.09 0.9 1.3 120.9 0.5 1.6 119.58 0.5 1.5 217.7 0.1 2.4 217.63 0.4 2.3<br />

Apr 10 109.9 0.5 1.5 109.58 0.4 1.4 121.3 0.3 1.7 119.90 0.3 1.6 217.6 -0.1 2.2 218.01 0.2 2.2<br />

May 10 110.0 0.1 1.6 109.71 0.1 1.5 121.4 0.1 1.6 120.04 0.1 1.6 217.2 -0.2 2.0 218.18 0.1 2.0<br />

Jun 10 110.0 0.0 1.4 109.70 0.0 1.3 121.4 0.0 1.5 120.02 0.0 1.4 216.9 -0.1 1.1 217.97 -0.1 1.1<br />

Jul 10 109.7 -0.3 1.7 109.31 -0.4 1.7 121.0 -0.3 1.7 119.68 -0.3 1.6 217.6 0.3 1.3 218.01 0.0 1.2<br />

Aug 10 109.9 0.2 1.6 109.54 0.2 1.5 121.3 0.2 1.4 119.97 0.2 1.3 218.2 0.3 1.2 218.31 0.1 1.1<br />

Sep 10 (1) 110.1 0.2 1.8 109.79 0.2 1.7 121.2 -0.1 1.5 119.85 -0.1 1.5 218.7 0.3 1.3 218.71 0.2 1.3<br />

Oct 10 (1) 110.5 0.3 1.9 110.18 0.3 1.9 121.3 0.1 1.5 119.95 0.1 1.5 219.5 0.4 1.5 219.40 0.3 1.5<br />

Nov 10 (1) 110.6 0.1 1.9 110.25 0.1 1.8 121.4 0.0 1.4 119.93 0.0 1.4 219.8 0.1 1.4 219.25 -0.1 1.4<br />

Dec 10 (1) 111.0 0.4 2.0 110.68 0.4 1.9 121.6 0.2 1.4 120.16 0.2 1.3 220.6 0.4 1.6 219.24 0.0 1.5<br />

Jan 11 (1) 110.0 -0.9 1.8 109.68 -0.9 1.8 121.3 -0.3 1.4 119.84 -0.3 1.3 220.8 0.1 1.5 219.91 0.3 1.5<br />

Feb 11 (1) 110.4 0.4 1.9 110.07 0.4 1.8 121.9 0.5 1.3 120.45 0.5 1.2 220.9 0.1 1.5 220.15 0.1 1.6<br />

Mar 11 (1) 111.1 0.6 1.6 110.74 0.6 1.5 122.2 0.3 1.1 120.78 0.3 1.0 221.1 0.1 1.5 221.08 0.4 1.6<br />

Apr 11 (1) 111.4 0.3 1.4 111.05 0.3 1.3 122.6 0.3 1.1 121.10 0.3 1.0 221.2 0.1 1.7 221.66 0.3 1.7<br />

May 11 (1) 111.6 0.2 1.5 111.25 0.2 1.4 122.8 0.2 1.2 121.36 0.2 1.1 221.3 0.0 1.9 222.23 0.3 1.9<br />

Jun 11 (1) 111.7 0.1 1.6 111.36 0.1 1.5 122.9 0.1 1.3 121.49 0.1 1.2 221.4 0.0 2.1 222.54 0.1 2.1<br />

Updated<br />

Next<br />

Release<br />

Sep 23<br />

Sep Flash HICP (Sep 30)<br />

Sep 23<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 13)<br />

Sep 17<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 15)<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, (1) Forecasts<br />

Chart 4: Eurozone Core HICP (% y/y)<br />

Chart 5: US Core CPI (% y/y)<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Since printing an all-time low in April, core inflation has been a<br />

touch stronger in recent months, reflecting gains in both core<br />

goods and core services inflation. While we expect core services<br />

inflation to head lower, the rebound in core goods has further to<br />

run. We expect a brief interruption to the downward trend in core.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

The downward trend in shelter inflation was recently interrupted<br />

and leading indicators suggest its strength will continue to year<br />

end. The renewed collapse in the housing market should see a<br />

reversion to a downward trend from early next year.<br />

Luigi Speranza/Eoin O’Callaghan<br />

Market Mover<br />

33<br />

23 September 2010<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Table 2: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas' Inflation Forecasts<br />

Japan<br />

UK<br />

Sweden<br />

Core CPI SA<br />

Core CPI NSA<br />

Headline CPI RPI<br />

CPI CPIF<br />

Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y Index % m/m % y/y<br />

2009 100.3 - -1.3 100.3 - -1.3 110.8 - 2.1 213.7 - -0.5 299.7 - -0.3 191.2 - 1.9<br />

2010 (1) 99.2 - -1.1 99.3 - -1.0 114.4 - 3.3 223.3 - 4.5 303.0 - 1.1 194.9 - 1.9<br />

2011 (1) 98.6 - -0.6 98.6 - -0.6 117.2 - 2.4 229.9 - 2.9 309.2 - 2.0 197.2 - 1.2<br />

Q3 2009 99.9 - -2.3 100.1 - -2.3 111.3 - 1.5 214.4 - -1.4 299.5 - -1.2 191.6 - 1.6<br />

Q4 2009 99.7 - -1.8 99.9 - -1.8 112.1 - 2.1 216.9 - 0.6 301.3 - -0.4 193.2 - 2.3<br />

Q1 2010 99.7 - -1.3 99.3 - -1.2 112.9 - 3.2 219.3 - 4.0 301.2 - 1.0 194.0 - 2.6<br />

Q2 2010 99.3 - -1.2 99.3 - -1.2 114.4 - 3.4 223.5 - 5.1 302.8 - 1.1 194.9 - 2.1<br />

Q3 2010 (1) 98.8 - -1.1 99.1 - -1.0 114.7 - 3.0 224.3 - 4.6 302.6 - 1.0 194.6 - 1.6<br />

Q4 2010 (1) 99.1 - -0.6 99.3 - -0.6 115.6 - 3.1 226.3 - 4.3 305.4 - 1.4 195.9 - 1.4<br />

Q1 2011 (1) 98.8 - -0.9 98.4 - -0.9 116.1 - 2.8 227.4 - 3.7 305.2 - 1.3 195.2 - 0.6<br />

Q2 2011 (1) 98.6 - -0.7 98.6 - -0.7 117.1 - 2.4 229.5 - 2.7 308.3 - 1.8 197.0 - 1.0<br />

Jan 10 99.6 -0.1 -1.3 99.2 -0.6 -1.3 112.4 -0.2 3.4 217.9 0.0 3.7 299.8 -0.6 0.6 193.0 -0.2 2.6<br />

Feb 10 99.8 0.2 -1.2 99.2 0.0 -1.2 112.9 0.4 3.0 219.2 0.6 3.7 301.6 0.6 1.2 194.2 0.6 2.7<br />

Mar 10 99.8 0.0 -1.2 99.5 0.3 -1.2 113.5 0.5 3.4 220.7 0.7 4.4 302.3 0.2 1.2 194.7 0.3 2.5<br />

Apr 10 99.3 -0.5 -1.5 99.2 -0.3 -1.5 114.2 0.6 3.7 222.8 1.0 5.3 302.4 0.0 1.0 194.8 0.0 2.2<br />

May 10 99.3 0.0 -1.2 99.3 0.1 -1.2 114.4 0.2 3.3 223.6 0.4 5.1 302.9 0.2 1.2 195.0 0.1 2.1<br />

Jun 10 99.2 -0.1 -1.0 99.3 0.0 -1.0 114.6 0.2 3.2 224.1 0.2 5.0 303.0 0.0 0.9 195.0 0.0 1.9<br />

Jul-10 98.9 -0.3 -1.1 99.0 -0.3 -1.1 114.3 -0.3 3.1 223.6 -0.2 4.8 302.0 -0.3 1.1 194.3 -0.3 1.7<br />

Aug 10 (1) 98.8 -0.1 -1.0 99.1 0.1 -1.0 114.9 0.5 3.1 224.5 0.4 4.7 302.1 0.0 0.9 194.3 0.0 1.4<br />

Sep 10 (1) 98.8 0.0 -1.0 99.2 0.1 -1.0 114.9 0.0 3.0 224.7 0.1 4.4 303.6 0.5 1.1 195.2 0.5 1.5<br />

Oct 10 (1) 99.2 0.4 -0.5 99.6 0.4 -0.5 115.2 0.3 3.1 225.6 0.4 4.4 305.0 0.5 1.3 195.9 0.3 1.5<br />

Nov 10 (1) 99.2 0.0 -0.6 99.3 -0.3 -0.6 115.5 0.2 3.1 226.2 0.3 4.4 305.3 0.1 1.4 196.0 0.1 1.5<br />

Dec 10 (1) 99.0 -0.2 -0.7 99.1 -0.2 -0.7 116.2 0.6 3.2 227.2 0.4 4.2 306.0 0.3 1.4 195.9 -0.1 1.2<br />

Jan 11 (1) 98.9 -0.1 -0.7 98.5 -0.6 -0.7 115.8 -0.3 3.1 226.7 -0.2 4.0 303.7 -0.8 1.3 194.4 -0.7 0.7<br />

Feb 11 (1) 98.8 -0.1 -1.0 98.2 -0.3 -1.0 116.2 0.3 2.9 227.5 0.3 3.8 305.1 0.5 1.2 195.2 0.4 0.5<br />

Mar 11 (1) 98.7 -0.1 -1.1 98.4 0.2 -1.1 116.4 0.2 2.5 228.0 0.2 3.3 306.8 0.6 1.5 196.1 0.4 0.7<br />

Apr 11 (1) 98.6 -0.1 -0.7 98.5 0.1 -0.7 116.8 0.3 2.3 228.7 0.3 2.7 307.8 0.3 1.8 196.7 0.3 1.0<br />

May 11 (1) 98.7 0.1 -0.6 98.7 0.2 -0.6 117.2 0.3 2.4 229.5 0.4 2.7 308.3 0.2 1.8 197.0 0.2 1.0<br />

Jun 11 (1) 98.5 -0.2 -0.7 98.6 -0.1 -0.7 117.3 0.1 2.4 230.2 0.3 2.7 308.9 0.2 1.9 197.2 0.1 1.1<br />

Updated<br />

Next<br />

Release<br />

Sep 16<br />

Aug CPI (Oct 1)<br />

Sep 16<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 12)<br />

Sep 16<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 12)<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, (1) Forecasts<br />

Chart 6: Japanese CPI (% y/y)<br />

Chart 7: UK CPI (% y/y)<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Prices are expected to continue falling but the pace of decline is<br />

easing as the economy recovers.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

We expect inflation to remain above target for the remainder of the<br />

year, although trending down.<br />

Luigi Speranza/Eoin O’Callaghan<br />

Market Mover<br />

34<br />

23 September 2010<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Table 3: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas' Inflation Forecasts<br />

Canada Norway Australia<br />

CPI Core CPI Headline CPI Core<br />

CPI<br />

Core<br />

Index % q/q % y/y Index % q/q % y/y Index % q/q % y/y Index % q/q % y/y Index % q/q % y/y Index % q/q % y/y<br />

2009 114.4 0.3 113.6 1.8 125.7 2.2 118.4 2.6 167.8 - 1.8 - - 3.7<br />

2010 (1) 116.5 1.8 115.5 1.6 128.6 2.3 120.0 1.4 173.2 - 3.2 - - 2.7<br />

2011 (1) 118.6 1.8 117.1 1.4 130.4 1.4 121.9 1.5 179.0 - 3.4 - - 2.9<br />

Q3 2009 114.7 0.5 -0.9 113.9 1.2 1.6 125.8 0.0 1.8 118.5 0.0 2.4 168.6 1.0 1.3 - - 3.5<br />

Q4 2009 114.9 0.6 0.8 114.4 1.9 1.6 126.6 0.6 1.4 119.3 0.7 2.3 169.5 0.5 2.1 - - 3.3<br />

Q1 2010 115.4 2.0 1.6 114.9 1.6 1.9 128.4 1.4 2.9 119.4 0.1 2.0 171.0 0.9 2.9 - - 3.1<br />

Q2 2010 116.2 2.6 1.4 115.5 2.3 1.8 129.1 0.6 2.6 120.3 0.8 1.5 172.1 0.6 3.1 - - 2.7<br />

Q3 2010 (1) 117.0 2.7 2.0 115.6 0.3 1.5 128.2 -0.7 1.9 120.0 -0.3 1.2 174.1 1.2 3.3 - - 2.6<br />

Q4 2010 (1) 117.4 1.5 2.2 116.0 1.2 1.4 128.8 0.5 1.7 120.5 0.4 1.0 175.4 0.7 3.5 - - 2.7<br />

Q1 2011 (1) 117.9 1.6 2.1 116.4 1.6 1.4 129.1 0.2 0.5 120.7 0.2 1.1 177.0 0.9 3.5 - - 2.7<br />

Q2 2011 (1) 118.3 1.7 1.9 116.9 1.7 1.2 130.4 1.0 1.0 122.0 1.0 1.4 177.9 0.5 3.4 - - 2.8<br />

Updated<br />

Sep 21<br />

Sep 16 Sep 16<br />

Next<br />

Release<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 22)<br />

Sep CPI (Oct 11) Q3 CPI (Oct 27)<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas, (1) Forecasts<br />

Chart 8: Canadian Total Versus Core CPI<br />

Chart 9: Australian CPI (% y/y)<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Wage pressures appear subdued, suggesting that underlying<br />

inflation should remain close to the BoC's 2% target.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Near-term inflation pressures should be muted but, with the limited<br />

spare capacity in the labour market being eroded, underlying<br />

inflation is likely to settle near the top of the RBA's target range.<br />

CPI Data Calendar for the Coming Week<br />

Day GMT Economy Indicator Previous<br />

<strong>BNP</strong>P<br />

F’cast<br />

Consensus Comment<br />

Tue 28/09 Germany CPI (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.0% -0.2% -0.1% Energy and food<br />

CPI (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%<br />

HICP (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.1% -0.1% -0.2%<br />

HICP (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.0% 1.3% 1.3%<br />

09:15 Belgium CPI m/m : Sep 0.1% 0.0% n/a<br />

09:15 CPI y/y : Sep 2.3% 2.6% n/a<br />

Wed 29/09 07:00 Spain HICP (Flash) y/y : Sep 1.8% 2.1% 2.1%<br />

Thu 30/09 09:00 Eurozone HICP (Flash) y/y : Sep 1.6% 1.8% 1.8% Energy and food<br />

09:00 Italy CPI (NIC, Prel) m/m : Sep 0.2% -0.1% n/a<br />

09:00 CPI (NIC, Prel) y/y : Sep 1.6% 1.7% n/a<br />

09:00 HICP (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.2% 0.7% n/a<br />

09:00 HICP (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.8% 1.7% n/a<br />

Fri 01/10 23:30 Japan CPI National y/y : Aug -0.9% -0.9% -0.9%<br />

23:30 Core CPI National y/y : Aug -1.1% -1.0% -1.0%<br />

23:30 CPI Tokyo y/y : Sep -1.0% -0.8% -0.8%<br />

23:30<br />

(30/09)<br />

Core CPI Tokyo y/y : Sep -1.1% -1.0% -1.0%<br />

Release dates and forecasts as at c.o.b. prior to the date of publication: See Daily Economic Spotlight for any revision<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Luigi Speranza/Eoin O’Callaghan<br />

Market Mover<br />

35<br />

23 September 2010<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Inflation: Bring QE to Europe!<br />

• GLOBAL: Mixed reception to dovish CBs<br />

• EUR: Stay Negative. Keep long EUR/FRF.<br />

• USD: Volatile. Low RY. 5/10y BE flattener.<br />

• GBP: Correction in the Gilt rally. 1y rich.<br />

GLOBAL: Central bank rhetoric from the US and UK<br />

remains very dovish. The FOMC is “prepared to<br />

provide additional accommodation if needed to<br />

support the economic recovery and to return inflation,<br />

over time, to levels consistent with its mandate”. This<br />

has fuelled a rally in bonds although equities are<br />

weaker following their initial positive reaction.<br />

Commodities have not benefited hugely from USD<br />

weakness given struggling risk appetite although<br />

enhanced liquidity should help asset and commodity<br />

markets to perform. Real yields offer more protection<br />

from a depreciating currency and the inflationary<br />

impact of quantitative easing. Indeed, US real yields<br />

have rallied by 30bp in a couple of sessions.<br />

Between 9 and 23 March 2009 – the onset of QE –<br />

we also saw a tremendous rally in real yields and<br />

breakevens did not suffer much as TIPS were<br />

included in the programme whilst BEs rose in the<br />

eventual yield sell-off – Chart 1. The UK issued<br />

550mn UKTi-27 via mini-tender whilst Tesoro will reopen<br />

BTPei-21 for up to EUR 1.5bn. Breakevens<br />

suffered elsewhere and we continue to find EUR and<br />

especially FRF breakevens rich and exposed here.<br />

EUR: Core/peripheral spreads generally remain<br />

under widening pressure, causing disparity in<br />

linker/breakeven performance. BTPeis breakevens<br />

have outperformed core linkers at the front end but<br />

have underperformed materially at 7-15y maturities<br />

with real spreads widening much more than nominal<br />

ones. Supply is partly to blame, with 7y+ BTPeis<br />

suffering on the announcement of EUR 1.5bn BTPei-<br />

21 supply next week. Whilst the BTPei-21 has<br />

underperformed vs. OATei, it has outperformed vs.<br />

BTPei-23. The BTPei-21 may look attractive in the<br />

inflation and ASW discount curve, but it is hit by the<br />

richness of its nominal (BTP Mar-21 and the<br />

cheapness of BTP Aug-23, nominal comparator for<br />

BTPei-23). After adjusting for this, we find the BTPei-<br />

21 no longer looks cheap vs. either OATei or BTPei<br />

curves and we expect a further concession – both<br />

outright and in relative terms ahead of its auction on<br />

Tuesday 28 September. BTPei-21 offers amongst<br />

the highest real ASW on the curve, whilst the bond<br />

does have a closer-to-money inflation floor. OATi<br />

breakevens are underperforming their EUR<br />

counterparts sharply at the front end, as we called<br />

for. Our long OBLei-13/short OATi-13 BE spread has<br />

moved above -40bp from -45bp mid last Friday –<br />

Chart 1: 10y USD RY, NY & BE into/out of QEI<br />

2.50<br />

2.30<br />

2.10<br />

1.90<br />

1.70<br />

1.50<br />

23-Mar<br />

1.30<br />

3.00<br />

1.10<br />

0.90<br />

10y USD Generic Real Yield<br />

2.50<br />

10y USD Generic Breakeven<br />

0.70<br />

06-Mar<br />

10y USD Generic Tsy Yield, Rhs<br />

0.50<br />

2.00<br />

Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10<br />

Chart 2: Long OBLei-13/Short OATi-13 BE Spd<br />

0<br />

-10<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

-40<br />

-50<br />

-60<br />

BOBLEI13 / OATI13 Breakeven<br />

EUR_HICP / FRF_CPI m/m (0m lag) Rhs<br />

-70<br />

-2.0<br />

Apr-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11<br />

All Charts Source: Bloomberg, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 2. To recap, cumulative inflation (from Aug-<br />

Dec) is expected at 1.30% in EUR compared to<br />

0.75% in FRF and this is not priced with forwards<br />

below the 18m range. We see further potential in this<br />

trade.<br />

USD: Strong rally in real yields post FOMC meeting<br />

although the move is retracing fast on breakevens.<br />

Market felt squeezed (although dealers reported long<br />

on 9-Sep) with 10y real yields at all-time lows and no<br />

supply until end-Oct. Still, Next FOMC is in 6 weeks<br />

and our models find TIPS BEs expensive with poor<br />

seasonals and mixed total return breakevens<br />

dynamics in Q4. Meanwhile, Barcap US Agg Index<br />

story should still add some vol. We expect news from<br />

Friday evening but all depends on the index sponsor,<br />

which is said to be active in the market. Overall we<br />

have no strong opinion near term but are not keen to<br />

short US BEs and expect volatility ahead. We<br />

continue to find the 5y area cheap and 20y area rich.<br />

GBP: Breakevens down sharply (10bp) in the strong<br />

gilt rally. GBP 550mn UKTi-27 mini-tender did not<br />

help although it was digested smoothly (2.2<br />

bid/cover) after concession pre-tender. Real yields<br />

are close to their lower bound and BEs will continue<br />

to experience increased sensitivity to conventionals if<br />

real yields stay this low. We still like selling 1y<br />

inflation swap with a hedge against Dec-10 RPI (via<br />

UKTi-11) and early BoE rate hikes (via the money<br />

market).<br />

5.00<br />

4.50<br />

4.00<br />

3.50<br />

2.0<br />

1.5<br />

1.0<br />

0.5<br />

0.0<br />

-0.5<br />

-1.0<br />

-1.5<br />

Shahid Ladha / Herve Cros 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

36<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Table 1: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Carry Analysis<br />

EUR<br />

Pricing Date<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Term 1<br />

Term 2<br />

3m<br />

6m<br />

12m<br />

Repo Rate<br />

0.47%<br />

0.51%<br />

0.58% 0.70%<br />

0.87%<br />

EUR DRI<br />

109.34900<br />

109.54000<br />

109.79265 110.12671<br />

109.81139<br />

110.88334<br />

FRF DRI<br />

119.71400<br />

119.97000 119.85339<br />

119.94133<br />

119.88290<br />

121.17136<br />

Sett. Date<br />

28-Sep-10<br />

01-Nov-10<br />

01-Dec-10<br />

28-Dec-10<br />

28-Mar-11<br />

28-Sep-11<br />

Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE<br />

OATEI Jul-12 -0.99% 1.68% 2.2 0.8 8.5 6.4 20.0 18.3 -32.3 -31.0 -56.8 -22.0<br />

BTPEI Sep-12 0.12% 1.76% 7.7 0.6 19.0 5.7 35.0 16.3 9.3 -30.1 67.8 -33.0<br />

BOBLEI Apr-13 -0.40% 1.12% 3.9 2.8 10.6 8.7 20.7 18.9 -6.3 -6.8 7.8 20.0<br />

BTPEI Sep-14 1.01% 1.52% 6.1 0.6 13.6 3.2 23.0 8.5 17.5 -11.8 54.5 -9.2<br />

OATEI Jul-15 0.05% 1.54% 3.0 0.5 7.2 2.6 13.0 6.8 2.3 -9.3 15.7 -5.8<br />

BUNDEI Apr-16 0.10% 1.43% 2.7 0.6 6.4 2.6 11.5 6.4 2.5 -6.8 14.1 -2.6<br />

BTPEI Sep-17 1.72% 1.54% 4.6 0.1 9.9 1.4 16.1 4.2 15.7 -8.0 40.9 -7.8<br />

BTPEI Sep-19 2.05% 1.65% 4.1 -0.1 8.6 0.8 13.9 3.0 14.5 -7.0 36.2 -7.0<br />

BUNDEI Apr-20 0.61% 1.62% 2.2 0.1 4.9 1.0 8.3 3.0 4.5 -5.5 14.3 -4.6<br />

OATEI Jul-20 0.85% 1.80% 2.4 -0.1 5.3 0.6 8.9 2.5 5.8 -6.7 17.4 -7.0<br />

BTPEI Sep-21 2.29% 1.60% 3.6 -0.2 7.6 0.4 12.1 2.1 13.2 -6.4 32.1 -7.2<br />

OATEI Jul-22 1.04% 1.72% 2.1 -0.4 4.6 0.0 7.6 1.3 5.5 -6.7 15.5 -8.2<br />

RFFEI Feb-23 1.42% 1.51% 2.5 0.2 5.4 1.2 8.8 3.0 7.7 -3.4 19.8 -2.0<br />

BTPEI Sep-23 2.44% 1.77% 3.3 -0.3 6.9 0.1 11.0 1.5 12.4 -6.5 29.6 -8.4<br />

GGBEI Jul-25 8.49% 1.57% 8.9 -1.8 17.5 -2.6 26.3 -2.4 42.7 -15.2 94.7 -23.4<br />

GGBEI Jul-30 7.14% 3.09% 5.9 -4.5 11.8 -8.1 17.7 -10.5 27.7 -29.5 61.1 -55.0<br />

OATEI Jul-32 1.23% 2.00% 1.5 -0.4 3.2 -0.2 5.3 0.5 4.2 -4.9 11.1 -6.6<br />

BTPEI Sep-35 2.37% 2.38% 1.9 -0.9 4.0 -1.4 6.3 -1.2 6.9 -7.8 16.2 -13.1<br />

OATEI Jul-40 1.26% 2.04% 1.1 -0.4 2.3 -0.4 3.8 0.0 3.0 -4.3 7.9 -6.1<br />

BTPEI Sep-41 2.69% 2.13% 1.8 -0.8 3.8 -1.1 6.0 -0.9 6.9 -6.6 15.9 -10.7<br />

FRF<br />

OATI Jul-11 -1.01% 1.50% 9.5 9.2 -24.7 -23.5 -36.5 -28.6 -214.6 -73.5 - -<br />

OATI Jul-13 -0.54% 1.48% 4.3 2.4 -3.0 -6.3 -3.7 -7.7 -21.0 -27.0 -10.9 -15.5<br />

OATI Jul-17 0.28% 1.82% 2.9 0.3 1.0 -3.8 1.8 -4.9 -1.2 -14.0 11.0 -13.6<br />

OATI Jul-19 0.58% 1.90% 2.7 0.1 1.4 -3.4 2.3 -4.4 1.0 -11.9 12.4 -12.5<br />

OATI Jul-23 0.92% 2.01% 2.2 -0.1 1.6 -2.6 2.4 -3.4 2.2 -8.9 12.1 -9.8<br />

OATI Jul-29 1.09% 2.10% 1.8 -0.2 1.4 -2.3 2.1 -3.1 2.3 -7.9 10.3 -9.2<br />

USD<br />

Pricing Date<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Term 1<br />

Term 2<br />

3m<br />

6m<br />

12m<br />

Repo Rate<br />

0.20%<br />

0.20%<br />

0.21% 0.23%<br />

0.27%<br />

USD DRI<br />

218.00027<br />

218.31200<br />

218.71229<br />

219.22253<br />

219.73273<br />

222.12726<br />

Sett. Date<br />

24-Sep-10<br />

01-Nov-10<br />

01-Dec-10<br />

24-Dec-10 24-Mar-11 26-Sep-11<br />

Yield BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE<br />

TIPS Jan-11 0.24% -0.07% 71.6 73.5 271.2 277.0 945.6 964.8 -<br />

TIPS Apr-11 -0.01% 0.24% 26.8 26.3 77.5 76.5 164.3 163.4 - - - -<br />

TIPS Jan-12 -0.27% 0.60% 7.9 7.0 21.6 19.7 42.3 39.9 68.1 63.1 450.4 438.2<br />

TIPS Apr-12 -0.27% 0.60% 6.6 5.7 17.6 15.8 33.9 31.7 52.0 47.3 245.0 235.5<br />

TIPS Jul-12 -0.44% 0.80% 4.5 3.6 13.0 11.3 26.1 23.8 35.8 31.2 147.9 138.3<br />

TIPS Apr-13 -0.43% 0.95% 3.1 1.8 8.8 6.3 17.3 14.0 22.5 15.5 75.4 59.8<br />

TIPS Jul-13 -0.34% 0.92% 3.3 1.8 8.8 6.0 16.9 13.2 22.6 14.9 71.7 54.2<br />

TIPS Jan-14 -0.17% 0.93% 3.4 1.5 8.5 5.0 15.7 11.0 21.8 12.1 64.3 42.2<br />

TIPS Apr-14 -0.19% 1.04% 3.0 1.0 7.6 4.0 14.1 9.2 19.4 9.1 56.3 33.2<br />

TIPS Jul-14 -0.11% 1.03% 3.1 1.0 7.7 3.8 13.9 8.8 19.5 8.7 55.1 30.8<br />

TIPS Jan-15 0.06% 1.06% 3.1 0.8 7.5 3.2 13.3 7.4 19.2 7.0 52.2 25.0<br />

TIPS Apr-15 -0.07% 1.26% 2.6 0.2 6.4 2.0 11.5 5.6 16.0 3.7 43.5 16.6<br />

TIPS Jul-15 0.09% 1.17% 2.9 0.4 6.9 2.4 12.1 6.0 17.5 4.9 46.4 18.6<br />

TIPS Jan-16 0.20% 1.22% 2.9 0.2 6.7 1.9 11.5 5.1 16.9 3.6 44.0 14.7<br />

TIPS Jul-16 0.20% 1.36% 2.7 -0.1 6.2 1.2 10.7 4.0 15.6 1.9 40.2 10.2<br />

TIPS Jan-17 0.35% 1.39% 2.7 -0.1 6.2 1.0 10.5 3.5 15.7 1.4 39.5 8.4<br />

TIPS Jul-17 0.34% 1.52% 2.5 -0.4 5.7 0.5 9.8 2.7 14.5 0.0 36.3 5.0<br />

TIPS Jan-18 0.43% 1.56% 2.4 -0.4 5.5 0.3 9.2 2.3 13.8 -0.4 34.2 3.7<br />

TIPS Jul-18 0.45% 1.66% 2.3 -0.6 5.1 -0.1 8.6 1.5 13.0 -1.5 31.8 0.8<br />

TIPS Jan-19 0.56% 1.70% 2.4 -0.5 5.2 0.0 8.7 1.7 13.3 -1.0 32.2 1.8<br />

TIPS Jul-19 0.60% 1.78% 2.3 -0.7 5.0 -0.3 8.3 1.1 12.7 -2.0 30.5 -0.6<br />

TIPS Jan-20 0.66% 1.76% 2.2 -0.8 4.8 -0.6 7.9 0.7 12.2 -2.5 29.1 -1.7<br />

TIPS Jul-20 0.72% 1.77% 2.1 -0.8 4.6 -0.6 7.6 0.5 11.8 -2.6 28.1 -2.2<br />

TIPS Jan-25 1.15% 1.89% 2.0 -1.0 4.1 -1.2 6.6 -0.6 10.5 -4.0 24.2 -6.3<br />

TIPS Jan-26 1.20% 1.93% 1.9 -0.9 3.9 -1.2 6.2 -0.6 9.9 -3.8 22.7 -5.9<br />

TIPS Jan-27 1.25% 1.92% 1.8 -0.9 3.8 -1.1 6.0 -0.6 9.7 -3.7 22.2 -5.8<br />

TIPS Jan-28 1.28% 1.96% 1.7 -1.0 3.5 -1.4 5.6 -1.0 9.0 -4.3 20.5 -6.9<br />

TIPS Apr-28 1.33% 1.97% 1.9 -0.7 4.0 -0.8 6.2 -0.2 10.1 -2.7 22.9 -3.8<br />

TIPS Jan-29 1.30% 2.04% 1.7 -0.9 3.6 -1.1 5.6 -0.6 9.1 -3.5 20.6 -5.6<br />

TIPS Apr-29 1.37% 1.97% 1.9 -0.7 3.9 -0.8 6.1 -0.2 9.9 -2.7 22.4 -3.8<br />

TIPS Apr-32 1.39% 2.04% 1.6 -0.9 3.4 -1.1 5.3 -0.7 8.6 -3.6 19.3 -5.8<br />

TIPS Feb-40 1.54% 2.15% 1.3 -0.9 2.6 -1.2 4.0 -1.1 6.6 -3.7 14.7 -6.5<br />

GBP<br />

Pricing Date<br />

23-Sep-10 Term 1 Term 2<br />

3m<br />

6m<br />

12m<br />

Repo Rate<br />

0.55%<br />

0.55%<br />

0.55%<br />

0.61%<br />

0.70%<br />

Sett. Date<br />

24-Sep-10<br />

01-Nov-10 01-Dec-10 24-Dec-10<br />

24-Mar-11<br />

26-Sep-11<br />

Yield BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE Real BE<br />

UKTi Aug-11 -0.33% 0.82% 9.2 10.9 52.7 56.7 79.7 87.0 - - - -<br />

UKTi Aug-13 -1.63% 2.53% -2.2 -3.9 5.3 2.3 7.8 3.7 7.8 -0.1 12.5 -1.8<br />

UKTi Jul-16 -0.30% 2.41% 1.4 -1.7 7.3 1.6 10.2 2.5 16.8 1.4 34.7 2.6<br />

UKTi Nov-17 -0.07% 2.60% 4.2 0.8 5.0 -1.0 8.8 0.7 16.1 -0.3 31.7 -2.1<br />

UKTi Apr-20 0.30% 2.66% 1.7 -1.6 6.0 0.0 8.2 0.2 14.1 -2.1 28.3 -4.8<br />

UKTi Nov-22 0.53% 2.73% 3.2 0.1 4.2 -1.5 6.8 -0.7 12.6 -2.5 24.7 -6.1<br />

UKTi Jul-24 0.60% 2.93% 1.4 -1.5 4.7 -0.6 6.5 -0.7 11.2 -3.1 22.4 -6.6<br />

UKTi Nov-27 0.66% 3.06% 2.3 -0.4 3.1 -1.8 5.0 -1.5 9.3 -3.7 17.9 -8.5<br />

UKTi Jul-30 0.60% 3.29% 1.1 -1.3 3.7 -0.7 5.1 -0.8 8.8 -2.9 17.4 -6.3<br />

UKTi Nov-32 0.64% 3.26% 1.8 -0.6 2.4 -2.0 3.9 -2.0 7.2 -4.5 13.9 -9.9<br />

UKTi Jan-35 0.62% 3.35% 0.9 -1.4 2.8 -1.3 3.9 -1.7 6.6 -4.3 13.1 -8.9<br />

UKTi Nov-37 0.59% 3.38% 1.5 -0.7 2.0 -2.0 3.2 -2.1 5.9 -4.6 11.2 -10.1<br />

UKTi Mar-40 0.61% 3.38% 1.3 -0.8 1.7 -2.1 2.8 -2.3 5.2 -5.1 9.8 -10.7<br />

UKTi Nov-42 0.58% 3.41% 1.2 -0.8 1.6 -2.1 2.6 -2.3 4.7 -5.0 9.0 -10.7<br />

UKTi Nov-47 0.54% 3.46% 1.1 -0.9 1.4 -2.1 2.3 -2.3 4.2 -5.0 7.9 -10.5<br />

UKTi Mar-50 0.54% 3.46% 1.0 -0.9 1.3 -2.1 2.1 -2.4 3.8 -5.0 7.1 -10.6<br />

UKTi Nov-55 0.50% 3.48% 0.9 -0.8 1.2 -1.9 2.0 -2.2 3.7 -4.6 7.0 -9.6<br />

JPY<br />

Pricing Date<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Term 1 Term 2<br />

3m<br />

6m<br />

12m<br />

Repo Rate<br />

0.12%<br />

0.12%<br />

0.12%<br />

0.13% 0.14%<br />

JPY DRI<br />

99.120<br />

99.100<br />

99.200<br />

99.432<br />

98.752 98.600<br />

Sett. Date<br />

28-Sep-10<br />

10-Nov-10<br />

10-Dec-10<br />

28-Dec-10<br />

28-Mar-11<br />

28-Sep-11<br />

Yield BE Yield BE Yield BE Real BE Real BE Real BE<br />

JGBI-1 Mar-14 1.07% -0.89% 3.3 3.1 9.0 8.7 17.1 16.7 5.8 4.9 17.7 16.1<br />

JGBI-2 Jun-14 1.22% -1.03% 3.7 3.4 9.4 9.0 17.1 16.6 8.0 6.8 22.1 19.9<br />

JGBI-3 Dec-14 1.11% -0.87% 2.9 2.5 7.6 7.0 14.1 13.4 5.2 3.6 14.8 11.5<br />

JGBI-4 Jun-15 1.21% -0.94% 2.8 2.4 7.2 6.5 15.4 14.5 5.9 4.0 15.8 11.9<br />

JGBI-5 Sep-15 1.17% -0.88% 2.5 2.1 6.6 5.9 12.2 11.3 4.9 3.1 13.5 9.6<br />

JGBI-6 Dec-15 1.10% -0.79% 2.3 1.9 6.1 5.3 11.3 10.4 4.0 2.0 11.1 7.0<br />

JGBI-7 Mar-16 1.19% -0.86% 2.3 1.9 6.1 5.3 11.2 10.1 4.7 2.5 12.6 8.0<br />

JGBI-8 Jun-16 1.30% -0.94% 2.6 2.0 6.3 5.4 11.3 10.2 5.7 3.3 14.5 9.5<br />

JGBI-9 Sep-16 1.28% -0.90% 2.3 1.8 5.9 5.0 10.7 9.6 5.2 2.7 13.4 8.2<br />

JGBI-10 Dec-16 1.27% -0.85% 2.3 1.7 5.7 4.7 10.3 9.0 4.9 2.2 12.4 6.8<br />

JGBI-11 Mar-17 1.31% -0.87% 2.2 1.6 5.6 4.5 10.0 8.7 5.0 2.2 12.6 6.8<br />

JGBI-12 Jun-17 1.37% -0.90% 2.3 1.7 5.7 4.5 10.0 8.5 3.7 0.8 13.4 7.1<br />

JGBI-13 Sep-17 1.33% -0.82% 2.1 1.4 5.3 4.1 9.4 7.9 4.8 1.7 12.1 5.4<br />

JGBI-14 Dec-17 1.33% -0.78% 2.1 1.3 5.2 3.9 9.1 7.5 4.7 1.3 11.6 4.6<br />

JGBI-15 Mar-18 1.37% -0.78% 2.0 1.3 5.0 3.7 9.0 7.3 4.7 1.3 11.7 4.4<br />

JGBI-16 June-18 1.48% -0.85% 2.2 1.4 5.3 3.9 9.2 7.4 5.4 1.8 13.1 5.3<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Shahid Ladha / Herve Cros 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

37<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Europe ITraxx Credit Indices<br />

• XO/MAIN: we advise to take profit on the<br />

compression trade we recommended last week;<br />

more than 20bp gain. Compression will remain a<br />

major theme in the coming months and we are<br />

now waiting for a better entry level to re-position<br />

it.<br />

• SUB/SEN: the more mixed picture in Bank<br />

Capital instruments –T1 being the sole<br />

exception– should trigger the underperformance<br />

of FIN SUB. Given the recent collapse of the<br />

SUB/SEN ratio, we think it makes sense to take<br />

profit on our compression trade “long risk FIN<br />

SUB / Short risk FIN SEN x1.5” even if further<br />

pressure on GIIPS could further compress the<br />

ratio. Net gain on the trade: 11bp.<br />

• MAIN/CDX: the increase in GIIPS sovereign<br />

risk and decrease in concerns of a double-dip<br />

scenario are making iTraxx MAIN unlikely to<br />

outperform CDX IG. Our trade “long Europe /<br />

short US” which is back to entry level will be<br />

closed as soon as MAIN has retraced from<br />

current oversold levels.<br />

• MAIN 5/10y: the 5/10y is now too steep vs.<br />

the 5y and the forward is very toppish; we<br />

advise to buy the 5y in 5y. Entry levels: 10y:<br />

129; 5y: 119.<br />

• MAIN 3/5y: the 3/5y is steep vs. the 5y and<br />

the forward is high but it has not reached a nobrainer<br />

level. We stay away for now.<br />

• XO 5/10y: we take profit on our 5/10y<br />

steepener in s13 which trades now too steep<br />

given the level of the 5y. The total P&L of the<br />

trade, including carry, is equivalent to a<br />

steepening of 20bp.<br />

Chart 1: 1m correlation MAIN vs. SOVX<br />

120%<br />

100%<br />

80%<br />

60%<br />

40%<br />

20%<br />

0%<br />

-20%<br />

-40%<br />

-60%<br />

-80%<br />

9/09 10/09 11/09 12/09 1/10 2/10 3/10 4/10 5/10 6/10 7/10 8/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Correl 1m MAIN / SOVX<br />

Chart 2: XO – 4x MAIN history<br />

300<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

-<br />

50<br />

3/10 4/10 4/10 5/10 5/10 6/10 6/10 7/10 7/10 7/10 8/10 8/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

iTraxx s12: XO - 4 x MAIN<br />

Q1 (6m)<br />

Median (6m)<br />

Q3 (6m)<br />

Chart 3: SUB -1.5x FIN SEN history<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

iTraxx s12: SUB - 1.5 x SEN<br />

Q1 (6m)<br />

Median (6m)<br />

Q3 (6m)<br />

XO Tight<br />

XO Wide<br />

SUB Wide<br />

5<br />

Update on Pair-trades:<br />

XO/MAIN:<br />

The compression trend between the High-Yield and<br />

High-Grade cash markets somewhat halted this<br />

week in the context of 1/ still relatively active primary<br />

markets and 2/ end-accounts unwilling to put their<br />

cash into secondary markets. Even in Bank Capital,<br />

flows between buyers and sellers have been more<br />

balanced. On a weekly basis, the BoA-ML High-Yield<br />

index is only tighter by 6bp against the iBoxx High-<br />

Grade Non-financials index wider by 1bp.<br />

-<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

-15<br />

3/10 4/10 4/10 5/10 5/10 6/10 6/10 7/10 7/10 7/10 8/10 8/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

SUB Tight<br />

In contrast, we have had decent compression in<br />

iTraxx indices and the ratio between XO and MAIN in<br />

Series 13 reached a new low of 4.27x. It has been<br />

partially supported by the dynamics of the roll:<br />

actually, the bid for MAIN s13 has remained alive<br />

with real-money selling decent amounts of roll –<br />

perhaps as a result of the 0.5bp differential of skew<br />

between the two indices – while on XO, hedgers<br />

Pierre Yves Bretonniere 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

38<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


have been happy to buy the roll to position on the<br />

riskier new index.<br />

In addition to these technical factors, we continue to<br />

think that MAIN trades too wide relative to various<br />

other markets (EUROSTOXX 600 in particular) and<br />

do not rule out a tightening of 5 to 10bp, all other<br />

things being equal. A complete realignment to equity<br />

and volatility indices would imply an outperformance<br />

of about 13bp. It is also worth noting the further drop<br />

in 1-week and 1-month correlations between MAIN<br />

and SOVX; we do not expect the two indices to<br />

completely de-correlate as it is the case for XO but<br />

we see room for MAIN to outperform in the short run.<br />

What’s next? We think compression will remain one<br />

of the main themes in the coming weeks and months<br />

and are now waiting for a new entry point to re-enter<br />

the XO/MAIN trade. In terms of ratio, we would aim<br />

at 4.80x on the new Series, i.e. 110 on MAIN vs. 528<br />

in XO.<br />

SUB/SEN:<br />

With the level of volatility in Ireland CDS and Irish<br />

banks still very elevated – the Sovereign CDS is<br />

80bp wider this week; AIB and BKIR about 120bp<br />

wider – and the level of correlation between SOVX<br />

and FIN SEN still high, we had this week a massive<br />

underperformance of FIN SEN relative to MAIN and<br />

relative to FIN SUB, the latter being perceived as<br />

less systemic. On a weekly basis, FIN SEN and SUB<br />

are respectively wider by 21bp and 26bp; as a result,<br />

the SUB/SEN ratio reached a new 5-month low of<br />

1.47x.<br />

In cash, the momentum has turned much less bullish<br />

for Lower Tier 2, in particular for bullet bonds. We<br />

also saw some profit taking on Tier 1 after the<br />

massive performance of the asset class since the<br />

beginning of the month (120bp in two weeks) but the<br />

tone remains constructive overall, thanks to strong<br />

technicals. Note that the regulatory changes are also<br />

unfolding into the relative performance of Banks in<br />

equity markets and the sector comes as the clear<br />

underperformer on a weekly and monthly basis.<br />

What’s the call?<br />

The more mixed picture in Bank Capital instruments<br />

– T1 being the exception – is making us expect some<br />

underperformance of FIN SUB; given the recent<br />

collapse of the SUB/SEN ratio, we think it makes<br />

sense to take profit on our compression trade “long<br />

risk FIN SUB / Short risk FIN SEN x1.5”, although we<br />

reckon that further pressure on weaker sovereigns<br />

could further compress the ratio. Net gain on the<br />

trade: 11bp01 .<br />

Chart 4: 1m performance by sector (EUROSTOXX 600)<br />

14.0%<br />

12.0%<br />

10.0%<br />

8.0%<br />

6.0%<br />

4.0%<br />

2.0%<br />

0.0%<br />

STOXX 600<br />

Banks<br />

Financial <strong>Services</strong><br />

Insurance<br />

Telecommunications<br />

Media<br />

Technology<br />

Utilities<br />

Oil & Gas<br />

Food & Beverage<br />

Health Care<br />

Retail<br />

Travel & Leisure<br />

Chemicals<br />

Construction & Materials<br />

Basic Resources<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 5: iTraxx MAIN – CDX IG history<br />

-<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

-15<br />

-20<br />

MAIN vs. CDX IG:<br />

Industrial Goods & <strong>Services</strong><br />

Personal & Household<br />

Goods<br />

Automobiles & Parts<br />

3/10 4/10 4/10 5/10 5/10 5/10 6/10 6/10 7/10 7/10 8/10 8/10 9/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

EU MAIN - 1 x US CDX IG (5Y)<br />

Q1 (6m)<br />

Median (6m)<br />

Q3 (6m)<br />

iTraxx MAIN has naturally underperformed CDX IG<br />

this week given the pressure on GIIPS sovereign<br />

debt and European banks. Note that financial<br />

institutions represent 20% of the European basket<br />

and only 12% of the US one, not mentioning the<br />

disproportionate exposure to GIIPS between<br />

European and US financials.<br />

Our trade “long risk MAIN s13 / short risk IG 14<br />

x0.85” is now back to our entry level and is likely to<br />

post losses should the market remain weak and<br />

focussed on GIIPS sovereign debt. This<br />

recommendation initially aimed to perform with the<br />

increase in the likelihood of a double-dip scenario; in<br />

such a scenario, the weaker credit quality of the US<br />

basket relative to the European one would have<br />

ensured the underperformance of the US index. With<br />

these concerns much beyond European sovereign<br />

1 Entry levels: 205 (SUB s13) and 135 (SEN s13);<br />

Closing levels 215.5 (SUB s13) and 149.5 (SEN<br />

s13).<br />

Pierre Yves Bretonniere 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover Non-Objective Research Section<br />

39<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


isk in market participants’ minds, the trade is highly<br />

unlikely to post strong gains now.<br />

That being said, MAIN trades much too wide when<br />

compared to other risky asset markets; a simple<br />

model based on European equities and equity<br />

volatility is pricing MAIN about 7bp below its current<br />

valuations. In the US, the similar model indicates that<br />

IG is trading fair-value vs. the S&P500 and VIX<br />

indices. With this in mind, we think MAIN could<br />

momentarily outperform IG and we aim at closing the<br />

“Long Europe / Short US” trade as soon as we<br />

achieve 2 or 3bp of outperformance.<br />

What’s the call? Increase in GIIPS sovereign risk<br />

and decrease in concerns of a double-dip scenario<br />

are making iTraxx MAIN unlikely to outperform CDX<br />

IG. We aim at closing our “long Europe / short US” as<br />

soon as MAIN retraced from current oversold levels.<br />

Update on Curves:<br />

steepener recommendation (dated 25-Mar) to take<br />

profit at current levels.<br />

Chart 6: Curves’ levels and changes<br />

5y 3/5y 1W Chg 1M Chg 5/10y 1W Chg 1M Chg<br />

MAIN s13 118 25 11<br />

MAIN s12 112.75 26 +0 +3 14 +1.5 +5<br />

SEN s13 153.5 7<br />

SEN s12 150.5 10 +1 +3<br />

SUB s13 225 5<br />

SUB s12 218 8 +2 +4<br />

HVL s13 177 15<br />

HVL s12 157 20 +5 +11<br />

XO s13 530 80 5<br />

XO s12 470 80 +0 +10 15 +10 +18<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Chart 7: Fwd 5y in 5y MAIN in past 2y<br />

Main 5/10y: Last week, we believed this curve was<br />

fully discounting the upcoming roll; actually it didn’t<br />

and the curve managed to steepen further from 12.5<br />

to 14 despite the volatile/bearish context. We believe<br />

that this curve is too steep relative to the level of the<br />

5y (chart7).<br />

250<br />

225<br />

200<br />

175<br />

150<br />

125<br />

100<br />

Fwd 5y in 5y<br />

spot 5y<br />

90<br />

130<br />

Given our view that MAIN has overshot, we think the<br />

best way to play the steepness of the curve is to go<br />

long the 5y in 5y which has broken its long-term<br />

resistance.<br />

What’s the call? The 5/10y is now too steep vs. the<br />

5y and the forward is very toppish; we advise to buy<br />

the 5y in 5y. Entry levels: MAIN 10y: 129; MAIN 5y:<br />

119<br />

Main 3/5y: the call on the 3/5y is much less obvious;<br />

yes, the level of the 3/5 looks too steep vs. the 5y but<br />

the strength of the relationship between the outright<br />

and the curve is much weaker than for the 5/10y. The<br />

key decision factor is the level of the forward 2y in 3y<br />

which is quite high but it did not break the 155 level<br />

which will be the buying signal.<br />

What’s the call? The 3/5y is very steep relative to<br />

the 5y and the forward is high but it has not reached<br />

a level where the flattener is a no-brainer. We stay<br />

away for now.<br />

XO 5/10y: in line with our expectations, we had<br />

further steepening of XO 5/10y curves with the roll.<br />

We closed last week our steepener in s12 and kept<br />

the one in s13 to benefit from the last bit of the rally.<br />

We now see little upside in the curve at current levels<br />

– it trades quite steep relative to the outright level of<br />

the 5y - and advise the investors who followed our<br />

75<br />

50<br />

25<br />

0<br />

9/08 11/08 1/09 3/09 5/09 7/09 9/09 11/09 1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

resistances of the<br />

5y in 5y<br />

Chart 8: Fwd 2y in 3y MAIN in past 2y<br />

250<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

9/08 11/08 1/09 3/09 5/09 7/09 9/09 11/09 1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

MAIN Spot 2y<br />

MAIN Fwd 2y in 3y (rhs)<br />

105<br />

155<br />

resistance levels of<br />

2y in 3y<br />

Note that the level of the forward 5y in 5y has also<br />

significantly increased in the past 2 weeks; it does<br />

not signal a buying signal yet.<br />

What’s the call? We take profit on our 5/10y<br />

steepener in s13 which trades now too steep given<br />

the level of the outright. The total P&L of the trade,<br />

including carry, is equivalent to a steepening of 20bp.<br />

Pierre Yves Bretonniere 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover Non-Objective Research Section<br />

40<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Technical Analysis – Interest Rates & Commodities<br />

Bond & Short-Term Contracts<br />

• Europe 10y: Supportive MT bias again within MT falling channel but needs to break below 2.24 to extend fall<br />

• US 10y: Regained a slight MT positive bias below 2.58 but failure to sustain it would rekindle previous bear tone<br />

• Short-term contracts z0: Supportive tone on ED back on its top but still a toppish/consolidative one on Euribor<br />

Equities & Commodities<br />

• WTI (Cl1): Neutral MT between key 70.76/71.39 & key 78.31/40 but weak ST, back on 73.50/74.00 ST support<br />

• Equity markets: Markets remain supportive MT but showing a ST toppish bias which could last<br />

US 10y: Slight move back below 2.58 pivot reopened way for 2.41 first MT Trend: Neutral/down Range: 2.40/2.65<br />

The break above MT falling wedge 2.03 3.03<br />

(2.21/2.58) was negative & triggered a<br />

classic pullback move on key 2.79 (LT<br />

61.8%) area around which it stalled to be<br />

back now below critical 2.58 (ST 61.8% &<br />

MT falling wedge resistance).<br />

That rekindled the MT bullish bias for 2.415<br />

August low initially but a break below it is<br />

needed to strengthen the previous MT<br />

bullish bias towards 2.03 (2008 low).<br />

A renewed break above 2.58 is needed to<br />

turn slightly negative again, key resistance<br />

above being 2.85/86 (last top & ST 61.8%)<br />

which break would turn it negative again MT<br />

for 3% then.<br />

Tech Snapshot<br />

- Back below 2.58 (ST/MT pivot now)<br />

-Still below key LT 61.8% (2.79) for 2.03 low<br />

- Still a weekly bottom reversal<br />

Strategy: Short 2.58/62 stopped 2.53.<br />

Keep long now if you are below 2.58<br />

US/EUR 10y bond: 6.6 will be ST target if we move back below 22.4 low MT Trend: Neutral/down Range: 10.0/30.0<br />

Failure to overcome MT falling channel<br />

-20.9


Germany 10y: Keeping MT bullish bias below 2.50/56. Watch 2.24 now MT Trend: Neutral/down Range: 2.20/2.40<br />

It stalled below critical 2.52/2.56 (MT falling<br />

1.94/1.95 2.84<br />

channel resistance & ST 61.8%) & took the<br />

way down again with 2.44 gap left for a<br />

move towards key 2.24 (61.8%), next<br />

targets being psychological 2% level &<br />

1.94/1.95 ( MT falling channel support + LT<br />

161.8% extension)<br />

Break below 2.24 is now needed to<br />

strengthen the MT bullish scenario for a<br />

return initially to 2.087 low.<br />

If not, the risk will be to regain a ST negative<br />

bias for a move back towards key 2.50/<br />

52/2.56 (last top + MT falling channel resistance<br />

& ST 61.8%). Note such a move<br />

would imply the risk of a negative rising ABC<br />

Tech Snapshot<br />

- Within LT falling wedge/MT falling channel<br />

- ST rising channel break calls for 2.24<br />

Strategy: Short 2.37 covered 2.50. Play<br />

long small only below 2.24 with close S/L<br />

UK 10y: Keeping MT bullish bias below 3.15 but watch 2.95 now MT Trend: Neutral/down Range: 2.85/3.05<br />

Sharp fall within a MT falling channel<br />

2.57 3.37<br />

(2.57/3.15) allowed reaching 2.93 (2009 low)<br />

around which it is now trading.<br />

The MT tone remains rather positive within<br />

this MT falling channel & a break above its<br />

up boundary (3.15) is needed to turn MT<br />

study negative again with 3.25 (ST 61.8%)<br />

then as a bearish confirmation level.<br />

It needs now a break below 2.93/2.95 (2009<br />

low & 61.8%) to strengthen MT positive bias<br />

for 2.79 low initially.<br />

Note a failure to do so would increase risk of<br />

a negative rising ABC scenario developing.<br />

Tech Snapshot<br />

- Within MT falling channel<br />

- Testing 2.95 (61.8%)<br />

Strategy:Play long only below 2.95 with<br />

close S/L. Play short only above 3.15<br />

S&P: Needs now to break above key 1127/1140 to turn positive MT MT Trend: Neutral/Up Range: 1100/1150<br />

Last sharp rebound allowed reaching critical 1053/63 1219/1228<br />

1127/1140 (Bottom Head & Shoulders<br />

neckline & MT 61.8%), which decisive break<br />

would call for crucial 1219/28/45 (April top<br />

+LT 61.8%+ H&S target).<br />

This 1127/40 is now the ST/MT pivot area.<br />

A failure to break it up now would call for a<br />

return below 1100<br />

However, it needs a break below 1153/63<br />

(ST rising channel support & MT 61.8%) to<br />

regain a MT negative study<br />

Tech Snapshot<br />

- Testing critical 1127/1140 resistance area<br />

- Falling ABC may be over & a MT rising<br />

wave “3” starting<br />

Strategy: Tried long on 1050/70 S/L 1110<br />

now for 1200 with ½ sold at 1140<br />

Christian Sené 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

42<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Trade Reviews<br />

Options, Money Market and Bond Trades – Tactical & Strategic Trades<br />

This page summarises our main tactical (T) and strategic (S) trades. The former focus on short-term horizons (a few weeks)<br />

allowing one to play any near-term corrections within a defined trend, while the latter rely on a medium-term assumed trend.<br />

For each trade we provide the expected target and the recommended stop loss.<br />

Current* Targets Stop Entry<br />

Existing Strategies<br />

Yield Curves<br />

EUR Flattener Sell OEZ0 Buy RXZ0<br />

We re-enter flatteners after FOMC. 5y/10y offers the best risk/reward profile.<br />

GBP RV Pay GBP 2/5/10Y 3M Sell L H1H2<br />

5y GBP is back at extremly expensive levels. We entered 2/3 of the position.<br />

Cross Markets<br />

USD Spread Flattener Sell 10Y ASW Buy 2Y ASW<br />

Auction analysis suggests 5y spread tends to widen more compared to 10y and 30y<br />

spreads post-auction (from T-5 to T+5). 5s10s spread curve has flattened<br />

consistently in the past eight auctions, by an average of 4.66bp.<br />

Gilt ASW Buy Gilt 2.75% 2015 OIS ASW<br />

Pure RV trade that looks to play the cheapness of the 5y sector.<br />

Linkers<br />

EUR/FRF BE Spread Buy OBLei-13 BE 2.25% Apr-13 Sell OATi-13 BE 2.50%<br />

Jul-13<br />

Front-end EUR/FRF cash BE spreads do not seem to be pricing the carry<br />

differential ahead with 3m fwds below the 18m range.<br />

Money Markets<br />

Sterling Fly Sell L M1M2M3<br />

Fly decoupled from US one and BoE on hold for a while. Enter half now and on a<br />

move to +1.<br />

Eurodollar box Sell EDM1Z1 Buy EDM2Z2<br />

That box is a safer way to play a protracted Fed status quo.<br />

78.0<br />

(S)<br />

-9.0<br />

(T)<br />

-20.5<br />

(T)<br />

23.0<br />

(S)<br />

-36.0<br />

(T)<br />

-11.0<br />

(S)<br />

-13.0<br />

(T)<br />

65.0 82.0 77.5<br />

(22-Sep)<br />

10.0 -13.0 -5.75<br />

(09-Sep)<br />

-24.75 -18.75 -20.75<br />

(23-Sep)<br />

10.0 26.0 29.0<br />

(09-Aug)<br />

Carry<br />

/ mth<br />

-20.0 -49.0 -43.0 0/+10/+2<br />

(17-Sep) 5bp<br />

-18/-20 5.0 -4.0<br />

(22-Sep)<br />

-18/20.0 -3.0 -7.5<br />

(09-Sep)<br />

Options<br />

USD Conditional Bull-Flattener Sell 6M1Y ATMF Rec Buy 6M5Y ATMF Rec +52k 300k -150k 0k<br />

Realized curve move in a rally is attractive in beating the hurdle of paying upfront for<br />

this trade, and 6m fwd curve is 10bp steeper than spot which makes up for the cost<br />

(typically has been the reverse during crisis).<br />

(S)<br />

(03-Sep)<br />

Sterling Put Spread Buy L M1 9825/9875 P/S 1X2<br />

1.0 50.0 0.0 1.0<br />

Cheap hedge vs the SLS expiry.<br />

(T)<br />

(17-Aug)<br />

Euribor Put Spread Buy ERZ0 9875/50 P 1x2<br />

1.0 12.0 -1.0 1.0<br />

Playing the normalisation of liquidity by year end.<br />

(S)<br />

(30-Jul)<br />

USD Payer Spread 1x2 Buy 1Y10Y Pay ATMF+50 Sell 1Y10Y Pay ATMF + -10k 300k -150k 0k<br />

97.5<br />

(S)<br />

(29-Jul)<br />

In the coming months we see the 10y staying under 3.5% as it has since the Euro<br />

debt crisis unfolded, and probably trading closer to 3%.<br />

Beyond that, we expect a normalization to higher rates although it would be a<br />

stretch to look for 5% in 2011. This trade loses money in 1y time only if we selloff by<br />

almost 200bp.<br />

*Tactical (T) and strategic (S) trades. **Risk: vega, gamma for options, or ΔDV01 for futures, bonds and swaps.<br />

Risk**<br />

P/L<br />

(ccy/Bp)<br />

10K/01 EUR -5k<br />

-0.5bp<br />

-2.0 7k/01 GBP -21k<br />

-3bp<br />

10k/01 USD -2.5k<br />

-0.25bp<br />

15k/01 EUR +90k<br />

+6bp<br />

15k/01 EUR<br />

+105k<br />

+7bp<br />

5K/01 GBP +35k<br />

+7bp<br />

17.5k/01 USD +92k<br />

+5.5bp<br />

1k/01 USD<br />

+52k<br />

5k/01 GBP<br />

+0k<br />

25k/01 EUR 0k<br />

0bp<br />

1k/01 USD<br />

-10k<br />

Interest Rate Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

43<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Liquidity-Driven FX Markets<br />

• Global asset markets are set to overshoot as<br />

G4 central banks increase excessive reserves<br />

while local market monetary authorities try to<br />

control the pace at which their currencies<br />

appreciate.<br />

• Consequently, liquidity is seeking out<br />

investment opportunities.<br />

• Meanwhile, global rebalancing remains a<br />

theme. China has become the trend setter for<br />

successful rebalancing, with its improving<br />

domestic demand conditions offering export<br />

opportunities for the country’s trading partners<br />

• Commodity currencies will remain strong.<br />

The EUR will sail in the slipstream of the sharply<br />

rising AUD.<br />

• The CAD will rally should markets convert<br />

the theme of ‘Japanisation’ into a bullish asset<br />

theme.<br />

• GBPSEK shorts are a conservative way to<br />

trade the bullish China story as the UK’s trading<br />

relationship with China is less developed than<br />

Sweden’s.<br />

US money market outflows will keep the USD<br />

under selling pressure<br />

The USD is likely to remain under selling pressure for<br />

the rest of this year as cheap USD liquidity finds its<br />

way into higher-yielding asset classes. Money market<br />

outflows into local market funds have reduced money<br />

market holdings, but with US rates set to stay low in<br />

the years ahead, there will be little incentive to keep<br />

funds in USD-denominated debt. The rebalancing of<br />

the global economy will keep return expectations for<br />

local markets high, but the highly leveraged<br />

economies in the West will have to save in order to<br />

bring down debt ratios. These savings will be partly<br />

stashed in domestic financial instruments, keeping<br />

bond yields low and reducing the attractiveness of<br />

these assets to foreign investors. Reduced inflows<br />

from abroad will put the USD under selling pressure.<br />

Risk of confidence crisis in US assets is small<br />

Hence, the long-term trend of the USD seems locked<br />

to the downside. However, the real effective<br />

exchange rate of the USD has already fallen by 20%<br />

over the past decade. Nonetheless, an undervalued<br />

exchange rate can become even more undervalued<br />

in extreme situations and an extreme situation could<br />

arise should the US face a buyers’ strike with regard<br />

Chart 1: US Private Entities Deposit and Money<br />

Market Fund Holdings (USD trn)<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

to funding its external liability position. 10-year<br />

Treasury yields trading near 2.5% do not look<br />

appealing to investors given that their portfolios of<br />

expiring US bonds often provide nominal bond yields<br />

of around 5%. The USD has been the world’s<br />

number-one reserve currency and hence US bond<br />

market dynamics should not be compared to those of<br />

Greece or Ireland; vigilance will nonetheless still be<br />

required. For instance, a clear indication that a<br />

confidence crisis concerning the US debt position<br />

has hit the US would be if bond yields increased at<br />

the time as US shares were selling off and the USD<br />

losing value in FX markets. This is not our main<br />

scenario but we do not ignore this risk.<br />

Risk appetite assessment remains the decisive<br />

factor for the USD trend<br />

The other factor capable of driving the USD for<br />

several months is the USD’s funding currency status.<br />

It is unusual to see a current account deficit currency<br />

used as a funding currency, as deficit countries tend<br />

to show higher yield and rates compared to those<br />

running surpluses. However, this has not been the<br />

case in the US. The US has run current account<br />

deficits since 1994, but as the current account deficit<br />

was widening, foreign investors were keen to buy US<br />

assets even at relatively low yields. This paradox<br />

developed on the back of the Asian crisis. Following<br />

that crisis, Asian central banks kept a tight grip on<br />

their capital accounts, leaving currencies<br />

undervalued even as their current account surpluses<br />

went through the roof. Closed capital accounts<br />

suggested that the recycling of Asia’s current<br />

account surpluses had to occur through currency<br />

reserve managers happily investing in USDdenominated<br />

debt. The liquidity and depth of the US<br />

Hans Redeker 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

44<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


ond market attracted huge swathes of global<br />

currency reserves, providing a stable inflow of capital<br />

into the US for most of the past decade. Despite<br />

these inflows, the USD remained weak because the<br />

US provided cheap USD liquidity globally via its<br />

powerful banking system. Hence, the funding<br />

position of the USD is key to explaining its reverse<br />

relationship with risk appetite. This relationship,<br />

which is likely to persist, constitutes the reason why<br />

we expect the USD to stay weak for the remainder of<br />

this year. Nonetheless, we see a period of USD<br />

strength again next year when we expect slower<br />

global growth in combination with a potential EMU<br />

bond crisis to hit investor confidence once again. The<br />

USD’s position as a funding currency underlines its<br />

status as a safe haven play at times of financial<br />

market stress.<br />

What drives risk appetite?<br />

The assessment of risk appetite requires analysing<br />

liquidity in the context of economic circumstances.<br />

Within stable economic conditions (inflation not<br />

deviating substantially from the 2% target and real<br />

growth operating around the growth potential of<br />

economies), the relationship between liquidity and<br />

risk appetite is linear. The more liquidity there is in<br />

the market, the better for risk appetite. Liquidity can<br />

come from various sources: central bank liquidity<br />

(narrow money supply); the private sector taking out<br />

loans from banks (credit multiplier); and foreign<br />

liquidity, which itself can be divided into income from<br />

abroad via trade or investment-related flows. At<br />

present, central bank liquidity is the focus, while the<br />

other factors of liquidity generation can be ignored.<br />

This applies especially to the credit multiplier, which<br />

will have to remain slow in the context of deleveraging.<br />

For the next quarter, we see central bank<br />

liquidity continuing to support risk appetite. Also<br />

supportive are:<br />

• Japan intervening on the FX markets, leaving<br />

added reserves unsterilised in the system;<br />

• Other Asian central banks limiting the pace of<br />

currency appreciation causing currency reserve<br />

growth gaining momentum again;<br />

• The Fed interest rate statement released this<br />

week, which was dovish – supporting our projection<br />

that it will increase funding into the system in<br />

November;<br />

• The ECB continuing to allocate unlimited repos;<br />

and<br />

• The likelihood that the BoE will soon rejoin the<br />

club of liquidity-adding central banks.<br />

Chart 2: US Cash Position Relative to Total<br />

Assets (measured by total equity market cap)<br />

Still High<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 3: Dow Jones versus Changes in Global<br />

Currency Reserves<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

Apr-05 Apr-07 Apr-09<br />

Y/Y %Change Global Reserves<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

14000<br />

13000<br />

12000<br />

11000<br />

10000<br />

9000<br />

8000<br />

7000<br />

DOW Monthly Close (rhs)<br />

While this liquidity creation will support asset prices<br />

in the short term, the longer-term implications are<br />

less clear. There have been very few cases where<br />

the success or failure of quantitative easing can be<br />

evaluated. BoJ President Shirokawa points out that<br />

quantitative easing may be able to stabilise<br />

expectations via rising asset prices, but that<br />

supportive effects on the economy should not be<br />

overestimated. This assessment is probably correct<br />

given that the elasticity of the economy to changes in<br />

interest rates or rate expectations is low when rates<br />

are near zero. Once the asset price boosting effect<br />

has worked into higher prices for shares and other<br />

risky assets, markets will look for new direction. This<br />

direction will come from the assessment of the<br />

economy. Despite our bullish risk and equity market<br />

outlook for the next quarter, we maintain that the<br />

long-term outlook for equity markets does not look<br />

promising should Western economies not pick up<br />

momentum next year. In fact, we see global growth<br />

slowing from 5% in Q2 2010 to 3.7% in Q2 2011.<br />

Currency markets will trade accordingly. While high<br />

Hans Redeker 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

45<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


eta, yield and commodity currencies will remain firm<br />

this year, the outlook for 2011 is less upbeat.<br />

Successful intervention?<br />

The BoJ intervening on behalf of the MOF has<br />

stabilised JPY markets. But further intervention will<br />

be needed to prevent the JPY from appreciating<br />

again. An analysis of JPY-related flows demonstrates<br />

this. While Japanese institutional investors have<br />

invested heavily in foreign bond markets, betting on<br />

the ‘Japanisation’ of Western economies, these JPY<br />

outflows have all been currency hedged.<br />

Consequently, portfolio flows have been currency<br />

neutral. Since M&A related flows have been<br />

insignificant, we believe that most of the JPY<br />

strength has been caused by commercially related<br />

JPY demand. Japanese exports have been JPY<br />

bidding and, if the semi-official Japanese Postbank<br />

had not quietly offered JPY, the USDJPY decline<br />

seen since March would have been even more<br />

dramatic. Currently, commercial JPY flows are<br />

dominant and intervention will not change Japanese<br />

exporters’ need to buy JPY. Hence, the BoJ will have<br />

to intervene in the amount roughly matching the size<br />

of Japan’s current account surplus. Given that<br />

Japan’s reserve to GDP ratio has over the past six<br />

years risen from 16% to 21%, the BoJ has ample<br />

scope to conduct JPY weakening intervention to<br />

keep USDJPY above 80.00. The coming quarter<br />

should see USDJPY slowly grinding lower, but with<br />

the BoJ in the market, the risk of a sharp move lower<br />

may have been prevented.<br />

ECB repo allocation…<br />

Hence, JPY markets should not dent risk appetite,<br />

allowing us to shift focus to the EUR. EMU<br />

economies show a split performance: Germany is<br />

surprising with its strength, while Spain and other<br />

peripheral economies face a double-dip recession.<br />

However, the market has always believed that<br />

Germany is the trend setter for the eurozone and it<br />

will continue doing so until proven wrong. Indeed,<br />

German export-oriented growth has received a big<br />

boost from booming Asian and Middle Eastern<br />

markets. With Chinese economic statistics showing<br />

domestic demand rising strongly and China allowing<br />

its currency to appreciate at a moderate pace,<br />

exporter optimism in coming surveys could be<br />

buoyed even further. Meanwhile, outstanding ECB<br />

reserves have decreased from EUR 900bn to EUR<br />

600bn, indicating that Europe’s banking sector<br />

overall has become less dependent on ECB liquidity.<br />

Nonetheless, this is the extent of the good news. The<br />

ECB has allocated unlimited repo liquidity at the fixed<br />

1% rate. Some 61% of reserves provided by the ECB<br />

have been absorbed by peripheral banks located in<br />

Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. As long as the<br />

ECB provides unlimited access to central bank<br />

Chart 4: Japan: Current Account Surplus Drives<br />

USDJPY<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro; Current account (12mths sum) (USD), (Bln)<br />

Chart 5: Excess of Reserves Held by European<br />

Commercial Banks with the ECB Reduced<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

liquidity, the solvency of peripheral banks is almost<br />

guaranteed. Peripheral banks can even get access to<br />

short-term private funds. However, once the ECB<br />

begins to exit from the unlimited provision of liquidity,<br />

the outlook will change radically. In this case,<br />

peripheral banks will run short of funds, forcing<br />

sovereigns to step in. The creditworthiness of<br />

peripheral sovereigns has been damaged and, with<br />

bond spreads wide, it is not clear that sovereigns’<br />

fund-raising capabilities are sound enough to deal<br />

with additional liquidity demands from its banking<br />

sector.<br />

…will be important for assessing investment<br />

risks<br />

Indeed, the weak banking sector could easily<br />

undermine EMU credit markets. The successful<br />

Spanish sovereign auctions saw little international<br />

participation, with domestic banks the main investors.<br />

Should the ECB cut banks off from unlimited liquidity,<br />

demand for local bonds will suffer – driving spreads<br />

up. Remember, in November 2009, the ECB’s<br />

Hans Redeker 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

46<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


warning to Greek banks that it might have to impose<br />

haircuts on Greek bonds used as collateral for ECB<br />

funding triggered what proved to be a significant<br />

widening of Greek bond spreads. Again, the ECB is<br />

now in a very uncomfortable position and can only<br />

hope that growth picks up quickly enough in the<br />

eurozone periphery to reduce balance sheet risks<br />

within its banking sector.<br />

As long as growth is weak, peripheral banks will<br />

remain hooked on ECB liquidity – putting the ECB<br />

between a rock and a hard place with regard to<br />

monetary policy. Providing unlimited liquidity<br />

prevents peripheral banks going down the drain, but<br />

such monetary conditions will become far too loose<br />

for core countries. The inflation-fearing German<br />

people will certainly not like the idea of inflating way<br />

peripheral countries’ problems. Alternatively, letting<br />

unlimited repos expire without replacement will send<br />

shock waves across peripheral bond markets which<br />

could easily lead to another round of EUR weakness.<br />

We expect the ECB to try to win time by keeping<br />

unlimited repos in the market well into 2011. While<br />

this implies keeping the floodgates of monetary<br />

policy open, with the ECB effectively acting as the<br />

‘liquidity provider of last resort for the embattled<br />

peripheral banking sector, banking-related issues will<br />

not be the main focus for currency traders this year.<br />

The ECB’s accommodative monetary conditions<br />

suggest the EUR will underperform against highyielding<br />

currencies. Against the USD, the EUR is<br />

expected to make moderate gains. However, next<br />

year, things may look very different. The ECB will not<br />

be able to keep its current approach indefinitely<br />

without risking its own balance sheet. But should the<br />

ECB be forced to exit its policy of providing unlimited<br />

repos at a time when peripheral Europe still needs<br />

life support, all hell would break loose. In such a<br />

case, the EUR trend would reverse quickly.<br />

Trading themes: CAD may play catch-up<br />

Trading opportunities over the next few weeks and<br />

months will come from projected USD weakness<br />

coming on the back of the Fed preparing for another<br />

round of quantitative easing. Over the past few<br />

weeks, it has been the ‘Japanisation’ theme driving<br />

the relative performance of currencies against the<br />

USD – putting the AUD in an out-performing position.<br />

Lower bond yields globally suggested investors<br />

playing the ‘yield pick-up’ theme, putting yielding<br />

currencies into demand. Although the decline in the<br />

USD was accompanied by commodity prices<br />

breaking higher, the CAD has not benefited from the<br />

USD decline. Rather, AUDCAD has rallied by more<br />

than 15% since June. In the short term, this advance<br />

looks overstretched and will be corrected if the<br />

Japanisation theme converts into an asset theme as<br />

we expect. The CAD should receive support once the<br />

Chart 6: Sweden: Export Structure<br />

Sweden Exports by Destination<br />

Scandinavia<br />

23%<br />

Asia<br />

incl<br />

Japan<br />

3%<br />

UK<br />

9%<br />

Oceania<br />

2%<br />

Canada<br />

2%<br />

Others<br />

12%<br />

EU<br />

39%<br />

US<br />

10%<br />

Pulp &<br />

Paper<br />

20%<br />

Sweden Exports by Type<br />

Motor<br />

19%<br />

Pharmaceuticals<br />

15%<br />

Basic metals<br />

2%<br />

Machinery<br />

29%<br />

Chemicals<br />

14%<br />

Communication<br />

1%<br />

Source: Statistics Sweden Exports in SEK bln, using 2009 totals<br />

(sourced via Bloomberg), Statistics Sweden Exports in SEK bln, using<br />

2009 totals (sourced via Bloomberg)<br />

EU<br />

56%<br />

Chart 7: UK: Export Structure<br />

UK Exports by Destination<br />

Asia Scandinavia<br />

incl Japan 7%<br />

4%<br />

Oceania<br />

2%<br />

Canada<br />

4%<br />

Others<br />

6%<br />

US<br />

21%<br />

Food, Beverages<br />

& Tobacco<br />

20%<br />

Finishedmanufactures<br />

12%<br />

UK Exports by Type<br />

Basic Materials<br />

19%<br />

All<br />

manuf<br />

14% Fuel<br />

18%<br />

Semimanufactures<br />

17%<br />

Source: ONS UK Trade in goods by volume indices using 2009 totals<br />

(sourced via Bloomberg), OECD International Trade Statistics Database<br />

expressed in current USD, using 2009 totals<br />

currently dominant bond-related cross-currency flow<br />

converts into an equity flow. We showed above that<br />

central bank liquidity has determined the equity trend<br />

over the past year. With central bank liquidity being<br />

printed not only in the G4 but also Asian central<br />

banks operating looser conditions than warranted by<br />

their domestic fundamental situation, there is a good<br />

chance of seeing share prices move higher. An<br />

increasing focus on equity markets should allow the<br />

CAD to catch up with the AUD.<br />

GBPSEK shorts are the conservative way to play<br />

the China boom<br />

The other big currency trading theme is China and its<br />

increasingly important domestic market. Export<br />

opportunities to China vary significantly between<br />

countries. Generally, countries with a strong<br />

manufacturing sector stand to benefit more than<br />

countries with an underdeveloped manufacturing<br />

sector. Sweden falls into the first category. It is not<br />

only the direct trade relationship that counts.<br />

Machinery exports comprise 21% of Sweden’s total<br />

exports and are exactly what Asian economies are<br />

demanding. Globally, the machinery sector is<br />

booming and Sweden is participating in this boom.<br />

On the other hand, the UK is not known for its<br />

machinery and the financial services it exports are of<br />

little use to China, with its closed capital account.<br />

Hans Redeker 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

47<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


NOKSEK to extend downtrend<br />

• Scandinavian currencies have been the out performers over the past week and in the case of SEK<br />

over the past month<br />

• The SEK uptrend has been accelerated with multi-year trendlines currently being tested; a break of<br />

which will open further significant appreciation potential<br />

• The NOK has remained supported, but the medium term technical position is less encouraging<br />

than that of the SEK…<br />

• …hence we expect NOKSEK to extend the major downtrend, especially given the sharp break<br />

lower through long term support<br />

The Scandinavian currencies have been the out<br />

performers over the course of the past week and<br />

in the case of the SEK the top performer among<br />

the G10 currencies over the past month as well.<br />

Technical indicators are still giving bullish signals<br />

for the SEK and the break through key technical<br />

levels suggests that the SEK has further upside<br />

potential. Indeed, EURSEK is now testing long<br />

term up trendline support currently intervening at<br />

9.1065. A break below here will trigger another<br />

bearish signal leaving EURSEK vulnerable to a<br />

decline towards 8.9595 and then the 2005 low of<br />

8.8800.<br />

EURNOK has been keeping the pressure on<br />

support in the 7.8405 and 7.8125 areas, which<br />

represents the bottom end of the three month<br />

trading range. A break below here is needed to<br />

trigger a decline back towards the 7.6785 May<br />

low. However, medium term technical indicators<br />

have now started to develop positive signals with<br />

both the 9-day and 9-week RSI moving higher.<br />

Hence, the ability to hold above the<br />

7.8405/7.8125 support is likely to see a EURNOK<br />

rebound to test the major down trendline resistance<br />

at 8.0120. A break above here will trigger a renewed<br />

bullish signal opening upside potential towards the<br />

8.2280 level, which is the peak from May as well as<br />

the 38.2% retracement level of the decline from the<br />

9.1460 June 2009 high.<br />

The diverging technical picture between the NOK and<br />

SEK suggests that NOKSEK is now vulnerable.<br />

Indeed, NOKSEK has extended the major down<br />

trend, breaking lower through the bottom end of the<br />

long term trading range in the 1.1645 area to test the<br />

initial channel support at the 1.1495 level. The initial<br />

rebound from here has been limited by the key<br />

resistance at 1.1660 and down trendline resistance at<br />

1.1685. Failure to overcome this resistance will keep<br />

the down trend intact. Indeed, medium term technical<br />

indicators are giving bearish signals. Hence, we<br />

expect a decline below the recent 1.1645 lows<br />

opening downside potential towards the major<br />

channel support at 1.1315 and then long term<br />

support at 1.1195.<br />

EURUSD has<br />

extended the recent<br />

recovery rally to test<br />

channel resistance in<br />

the 1.3445 area.<br />

From here a near-term<br />

correction lower is<br />

likely targeting the<br />

1.32 and 1.3155 area.<br />

The ability to hold<br />

above 1.3155 will<br />

keep the outlook<br />

bullish allowing a<br />

move to 1.3690.<br />

Chart 1: EUR/USD – near-term correction lower<br />

1.46 1.4580<br />

1.41<br />

1.3820<br />

1.3690<br />

1.36<br />

1.3280<br />

1.3400<br />

1.3445<br />

1.31<br />

1.3275<br />

1.26<br />

1.2920<br />

1.21<br />

1.2180<br />

1.16<br />

1.1880<br />

01-Feb-10 31-Mar-10 28-May-10 27-Jul-10 23-Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Ian Stannard 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

48<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Chart 2: EUR/SEK – major support being tested<br />

EURSEK has extended<br />

the major down trend to<br />

test the lower boundary<br />

10.25<br />

10.2480<br />

of the major<br />

10.05<br />

9.9570<br />

descending channel<br />

9.8815<br />

and the long term up<br />

9.85<br />

trendline support which<br />

coincide at<br />

9.1065/9.0930.<br />

A break below here will<br />

9.65<br />

9.6640<br />

trigger another bearish 9.45<br />

10.153<br />

signal leaving EURSEK<br />

vulnerable to a decline 9.25<br />

9.3585<br />

towards 8.8800 over<br />

the medium term. 9.05<br />

01-Feb-10 31-Mar-10 28-May-10 27-Jul-10<br />

9.5300<br />

9.0850<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

The technical picture<br />

for the NOK is less<br />

bullish with EURNOK<br />

failing to break lower<br />

through support.<br />

8.40<br />

8.30<br />

8.20<br />

Chart 3: EUR/NOK – holding above support<br />

8.2640<br />

8.2305<br />

8.1735<br />

Technical indicators<br />

are also giving bullish<br />

signals.<br />

8.10<br />

8.00<br />

7.90<br />

A break above the<br />

down trendline<br />

7.80<br />

resistance at 8.0120<br />

will trigger gains 7.70<br />

towards the 8.1735<br />

and 8.2280 area. 7.60<br />

8.1140<br />

7.9950<br />

01-Feb-10<br />

31-Mar-10<br />

7.6735<br />

28-May-10<br />

7.8000<br />

27-Jul-10<br />

7.9960<br />

7.8500<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

The NOKSEK rebound<br />

has remained limited<br />

keeping the down<br />

trend intact.<br />

Chart 4: NOK/SEK – extending the down trend<br />

1.28<br />

1.26 1.2550<br />

1.2585<br />

1.2530<br />

Major support at the<br />

1.1645 level, which<br />

represents the bottom<br />

end of the major<br />

trading range has<br />

been broken.<br />

1.24<br />

1.22<br />

1.20<br />

1.18<br />

1.2120<br />

1.1870<br />

1.2280<br />

1.2035<br />

We now expect the<br />

down trend to be<br />

extended towards<br />

1.1315 and 1.1195.<br />

1.16<br />

1.14<br />

06-Oct-09<br />

03-Dec-09<br />

01-Feb-10<br />

31-Mar-10<br />

28-May-10<br />

1.1615<br />

27-Jul-10<br />

23-Sep-10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Ian Stannard 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

49<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Currency Spot Trade Recommendations Date<br />

NOKSEK 1.1590 Sell 1.1590, stop 1.1670, target 1.12 23 Sep 2010<br />

AUDNZD 1.3005 Buy 1.2890, stop 1.2790, target 1.3340 23 Sep 2010<br />

AUDUSD 0.9535 Buy 0.9300, stop 0.92, target 0.9700 16 Sep 2010<br />

GBPKRW 1809 Short at 1825, lower stop to 1825, target 1740 17 Sep 2010<br />

EURGBP 0.8500 Long at 0.8250, raise stop to 0.8400, target 0.8600 2 Sep 2010<br />

CHFJPY 85.65 Long at 82.10, raise stop to 84.60, target 86.10 10 Sep 2010<br />

USDZAR 7.0360 Short at 7.20, lower stop to 7.18, target 6.80 3 Sep 2010<br />

USDMXN 12.61 Shorts from 12.95 achieved the 12.65 target 3 Sep 2010<br />

EURNOK 7.9675 Shorts from 8.0400 closed at 7.9700 31 Aug 2010<br />

EURKRW 1537 Shorts from 1505, stopped at 1530 14 Sep 2010<br />

USDKZT 147.36 Short at 147.00, stop at 149.50, target 135.00 28 May 2010<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Ian Stannard 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

50<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Economic Calendar: 24 Sep - 1 Oct<br />

GMT Local Previous Forecast Consensus<br />

Fri 24/09 05:30 07:30 France GDP (Final) q/q : Q2 0.6% (p) 0.6% 0.6%<br />

05:30 07:30 GDP (Final) y/y : Q2 1.7% (p) 1.7% 1.7%<br />

06:45 08:45 Wages (Final) q/q : Q2 0.4% (p) 0.4% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 Wages (Final) y/y : Q2 1.9% (p) 1.9% n/a<br />

16:00 18:00 Job Seekers (ILO def. sa) : Aug -14k 0k -5k<br />

07:30 09:30 Sweden PPI m/m : Aug 0.1% -0.2% -0.4%<br />

07:30 09:30 PPI y/y : Aug 1.0% 1.6% 1.4%<br />

07:30 09:30 Eurozone Eurocoin : Sep 0.37 0.35 n/a<br />

08:00 10:00 Germany Ifo Business Climate : Sep 106.7 106.7 106.4<br />

08:00 10:00 Ifo Current Conditions : Sep 108.2 109.2 108.7<br />

08:00 10:00 Ifo Expectations : Sep 105.2 104.2 104.0<br />

08:00 10:00 Italy Retail Sales y/y : Jul 0.5% 0.9% 0.0%<br />

12:30 08:30 US Durable Goods Orders m/m : Aug 0.4% -1.7% -1.0%<br />

13:00 09:00 Fed’s Duke Speaks at Mortgage Hearing in Washington<br />

13:15 09:15 Fed’s Cumming Speaks at Chicago Fed’s Banking Conference<br />

14:00 10:00 New Home Sales : Aug 276k 300k 295k<br />

14:00 10:00 Fed’s Alvarez Testifies at Compensation Hearing<br />

17:00 13:00 Fed’s Lacker Speaks on Economic Outlook in Kentucky<br />

18:00 14:00 Fed’s Plosser speaks on Monetary Policy in Zurich<br />

20:30 16:30 Fed’s Bernanke Speaks in Princeton on ‘Implications of the Financial Crisis for Economics’<br />

Mon 27/09 23:50 08:50 Japan Trade Balance (nsa) : Aug JPY802bn JPY347bn JPY322bn<br />

(26/09)<br />

07:00 09:00 Eurozone ECB’s Trichet Speaks at ECB-CFS Conference in Frankfurt<br />

07:15 09:15 ECB’s Tumpel-Gugerell Speaks at ECB-CFS Conference in Frankfurt<br />

08:00 10:00 M3 y/y : Aug 0.2% 0.4% 0.4%<br />

08:00 10:00 M3 3m y/y : Aug 0.1% 0.2% n/a<br />

13:00 15:00 ECB’s Trichet Speaks at Economic & Monetary Affairs Cmte of the EU Parliament in Brussels<br />

15:00 17:00 ECB’s Tempel-Gugerell Speaks at EUROFI Debate in Brussels<br />

18:00 20:00 ECB’s Constancio Speaks at ECB-CFS Conference in Frankfurt<br />

07:30 09:30 Neths Producer Confidence : Sep 0.4 -1.0 n/a<br />

Tue 28/09 06:00 08:00 Germany GfK Consumer Confidence : Oct 4.1 4.5 4.1<br />

CPI (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.0% -0.2% -0.1%<br />

CPI (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%<br />

HICP (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.1% -0.1% -0.2%<br />

HICP (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.0% 1.3% 1.3%<br />

06:45 08:45 France Household Consumption m/m : Jul -1.4% 1.6% 0.5%<br />

06:45 08:45 Household Consumption y/y : Jul -1.9% 1.0% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 Household Consumption m/m : Aug n/a -0.5% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 Household Consumption y/y : Aug n/a 1.4% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 Housing Starts (3-mths) y/y : Aug 1.3% 4.5% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 Eurozone ECB’s Tumpel-Gugerell Speaks in Brussels<br />

07:30 09:30 ECB’s Stark Speaks in Istanbul<br />

08:00 10:00 ECB’s Liikanen Speaks in Helskini<br />

07:30 09:30 Sweden Retail Sales (sa) m/m : Aug 0.5% 0.2% n/a<br />

07:30 09:30 Retail Sales (nsa) y/y : Aug 2.0% 4.8% n/a<br />

07:30 09:30 Italy ISAE Consumer Confidence : Sep 104.1 103.0 n/a<br />

08:00 10:00 Wages m/m : Aug 0.1% 0.1% n/a<br />

08:00 10:00 Wages y/y : Aug 2.4% 2.2% n/a<br />

08:30 09:30 UK GDP (Final) q/q : Q2 1.2% (p) 1.2% 1.2%<br />

08:30 09:30 GDP (Final) y/y : Q2 1.7% (p) 1.7% 1.7%<br />

10:00 11:00 CBI Distributive Trades Survey : Sep<br />

09:15 11:15 Belgium CPI m/m : Sep 0.1% 0.0% n/a<br />

09:15 11:15 CPI y/y : Sep 2.3% 2.6% n/a<br />

13:00 09:00 US S&P/Case-Schiller Home Price Index : Jul<br />

14:00 10:00 Consumer Confidence : Sep 53.5 52.0 52.8<br />

21:30 17:30 Fed’s Lockhart to Speaks on Economy in Tennessee<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

51<br />

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Economic Calendar: 24 Sep - 1 Oct (cont)<br />

GMT Local Previous Forecast Consensus<br />

Wed 29/09 23:50 08:50 Japan Tankan (Large Manufacturers DI) : Sep 1 7 7<br />

(28/09)<br />

06:45 08:45 France Consumer Confidence : Sep -39 (Jul) -39 -40<br />

2011 Budget<br />

07:00 09:00 Spain HICP (Flash) y/y : Sep 1.8% 2.1% 2.1%<br />

07:00 09:00 Retail Sales (Adjusted) y/y : Aug 0.5% 0.9% n/a<br />

07:15 09:15 Sweden Consumer Confidence : Sep 25.2 24.0 n/a<br />

07:30 09:30 Italy ISAE Business Confidence : Sep 100.5 98.5 n/a<br />

08:10 10:10 Eurozone Retail PMI : Sep 49.7 50.5 n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 Economic Sentiment : Sep 101.8 101.5 101.0<br />

09:00 11:00 Industrial Sentiment : Sep -4 -5 -5<br />

09:00 11:00 Consumer Sentiment : Jul -11 -11 -11<br />

14:00 16:00 ECB’s Gonzalez-Paramo Speaks in La Paz<br />

08:30 09:30 UK Mortgage Approvals : Aug 49k 47k 46k<br />

08:30 09:30 Net Consumer Credit : Aug GBP0.2bn GBP0.2bn n/a<br />

09:30 11:30 Switzerland KoF Leading Indicator : Sep 2.18 2.05 n/a<br />

14:30 10:30 US EIA Oil Inventories<br />

17:15 13:15 Fed’s Rosengren Speaks in New York<br />

Thu 30/09 23:01 00:01 UK GfK Consumer Confidence : Sep -18 -19 n/a<br />

(29/09)<br />

08:30 09:30 BoE Credit Conditions Survey<br />

23:50 08:50 Japan Industrial Production (Prel, sa) m/m : Aug -0.2% 1.5% 1.2%<br />

23:50 08:50 Retail Sales y/y : Aug 3.8% 4.9% 4.2%<br />

23:50 08:50 Housing Starts y/y : Aug 4.3% 7.6% 9.8%<br />

(29/09)<br />

06:00 08:00 UK Nationwide House Prices Index m/m : Sep -0.9% -0.3% -0.0%<br />

06:00 08:00 Nationwide House Prices Index y/y : Sep 3.9% 2.5% 2.9%<br />

06:45 08:45 France PPI m/m : Jul 0.0% 0.6% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 PPI y/y : Jul 0.5% 4.3% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 PPI m/m : Aug n/a 0.0% n/a<br />

06:45 08:45 PPI y/y : Aug n/a 0.5% n/a<br />

07:00 09:00 Eurozone Finance Ministers Meet in Brussels<br />

09:00 11:00 HICP (Flash) y/y : Sep 1.6% 1.8% 1.8%<br />

10:30 12:30 EU Finance Ministers & Central Bankers Meet in Brussels<br />

07:55 09:55 Germany Unemployment (Chg, sa) : Sep -17k -15k -18k<br />

07:55 09:55 Unemployment Rate : Sep 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%<br />

08:00 10:00 Norway Retail Sales (sa) m/m : Aug 1.3% 0.0% n/a<br />

08:00 10:00 Retail Sales (nsa) y/y : Aug 2.0% 5.3% n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 Italy CPI (NIC, Prel) m/m : Sep 0.2% -0.1% n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 CPI (NIC, Prel) y/y : Sep 1.6% 1.7% n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 HICP (Prel) m/m : Sep 0.2% 0.7% n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 HICP (Prel) y/y : Sep 1.8% 1.7% n/a<br />

12:30 08:30 US GDP (Final, saar) q/q : Q2 1.6% 1.3% 1.6%<br />

12:30 08:30 GDP Deflator (Final, saar) q/q : Q2 1.9% 1.8% 1.9%<br />

12:30 08:30 Initial Claims 465k 458k n/a<br />

13:45 09:45 Chicago PMI : Sep 56.7 58.0 56.0<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

52<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Economic Calendar: 24 Sep - 1 Oct (cont)<br />

GMT Local Previous Forecast Consensus<br />

Fri 01/10 23:30 08:30 Japan CPI National y/y : Aug -0.9% -0.9% -0.9%<br />

23:30 08:30 Core CPI National y/y : Aug -1.1% -1.0% -1.0%<br />

23:30 08:30 CPI Tokyo y/y : Sep -1.0% -0.8% -0.8%<br />

23:30 08:30 Core CPI Tokyo y/y : Sep -1.1% -1.0% -1.0%<br />

23:30 08:30 Household Consumption y/y : Aug 1.1% 1.3% 1.4%<br />

23:30 08:30 Unemployment Rate (sa) : Aug 5.2% 5.2% 5.1%<br />

(30/09)<br />

06:30 08:30 Eurozone EU Finance Ministers & Central Bankers Conclude Meeting<br />

08:00 10:00 PMI Manufacturing (Final) : Sep 53.6 (p) 53.6 n/a<br />

09:00 11:00 Unemployment Rate : Aug 10.0% 10.0% 10.0%<br />

16:30 18:30 ECB’s Constancio Speaks in Lisbon<br />

07:00 09:00 Norway Unemployment Rate (sa) : Sep 2.9% 2.8% n/a<br />

07:30 09:30 Switzerland PMI Manufacturing : Sep 61.4 60.0 59.2<br />

08:30 09:30 UK CIPS Manufacturing : Sep 54.3 53.0 53.9<br />

08:30 09:30 BoE Housing Equity Withdrawal : Q2<br />

12:30 08:30 US Personal Income m/m : Aug 0.2% 0.3% 0.3%<br />

12:30 08:30 Personal Spending m/m : Aug 0.4% 0.3% 0.3%<br />

12:30 08:30 Fed’s Dudley Speaks At SABHEW Conference in New York<br />

13:55 09:55 Michigan Sentiment (Final) : Sep 68.9 67.3 67.0<br />

14:00 10:00 Construction Spending m/m : Aug -1.0% - 0.6 -0.4%<br />

14:00 10:00 ISM Manufacturing : Sep 56.3 53.0 54.9<br />

During 28/9-5/10 Germany Retail Sales (Real, sa) m/m : Aug -0.3% 0.5% 0.3%<br />

Week Retail Sales (Real, sa) y/y : Aug 0.8% 2.9% 3.6%<br />

Release dates and forecasts as at c.o.b. prior to the date of publication: See Daily Economic Spotlight for any revision<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

53<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Key Data Preview<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

90<br />

85<br />

80<br />

Chart 1: German Ifo Business Climate<br />

Expectations (4-Mth Lag)<br />

Current Conditions<br />

75<br />

93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

Headline 106.7 106.7 106.2 101.8<br />

Expectations 104.2 105.2 105.6 102.5<br />

Current Conditions 109.2 108.2 106.8 101.2<br />

Key Point:<br />

Ifo’s business climate index remains very strong but<br />

expectations are likely to moderate given evidence of<br />

weaker external growth.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Cooling Expectations<br />

Germany: Ifo Business Climate (September)<br />

Release Date: Friday 24 September<br />

Ifo’s business climate index rose to its highest level in over<br />

three years in August, propelled by the strength of the subindex<br />

measuring current business conditions.<br />

The latter rose by a cumulative eighteen points in the six<br />

months to August, the strongest run of data in the history of<br />

the series since unification.<br />

This strength largely reflects the exceptional strength in the<br />

manufacturing and export sectors, though domestic sectors<br />

including retail have also shown a marked improvement in<br />

recent months.<br />

As the chart shows, the current assessment is still several<br />

points below its high in the previous expansion, implying<br />

further upside potential, though recent ’hard’ data such as<br />

industrial output, manufacturing orders and exports have<br />

shown signs of weakening.<br />

Given the evidence of a moderation in activity in some of<br />

Germany’s most important markets, including the US and<br />

China, Ifo’s survey of future expectations is likely to top out<br />

in the period ahead.<br />

Net, we expect Ifo’s business climate index to go sideways<br />

in September, though given the external backdrop, we look<br />

for a moderation in the subsequent months.<br />

0.6<br />

0.5<br />

0.4<br />

0.3<br />

0.2<br />

0.1<br />

0.0<br />

-0.1<br />

-0.2<br />

-0.3<br />

-0.4<br />

-0.5<br />

Chart 2: France Job Seekers<br />

01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Unemployment Rate<br />

(3-m change, percentage points)<br />

Job Seekers (3m change, thousands, RHS)<br />

200<br />

150<br />

100<br />

50<br />

0<br />

-50<br />

-100<br />

-150<br />

SA Aug (f) Jul Jun Aug 09<br />

Job Seekers m/m k 0.0 -14.4 -8.6 28.6<br />

Job Seekers y/y % 4.2 5.4 6.9 26.0<br />

Key Point:<br />

The trend has changed from rising to declining, but<br />

the August figure may blip slightly higher.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Stable<br />

France: Job Seekers (August)<br />

Release Date: Friday 24 September<br />

In the last two months, the number of job seekers has<br />

dropped; this represents a reversal in the unemployment<br />

trend. However, the decline has been moderate and, since<br />

it is recent, another month of increase cannot be ruled out.<br />

August is a particular month in that a significant number of<br />

seasonal jobs in the tourism activity can be subject to early<br />

ending because of adverse weather. The level of industrial<br />

activity is also still weak in absolute terms so the need for<br />

temps to replace workers on holidays is less acute. Since<br />

the number of job seekers is adjusted in accordance with<br />

the usual seasonal pattern, we have forecast the number of<br />

unemployed people to remain steady in August.<br />

Nevertheless, the underlying trend has now switched from<br />

the increase that prevailed since Q2 2008 to a modest<br />

decline.<br />

The unemployment rate reported by Eurostat has not<br />

declined yet but we expect this to occur very soon –<br />

probably in the figure for August – unless the summer<br />

months (June and July) are revised down from the present<br />

estimate of 10.0%. The Eurostat figure will be released on<br />

1 October.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com<br />

54


Key Data Preview<br />

Chart 3: US ISM Points to Moderation<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Mixed Report<br />

US: Durable Goods (August)<br />

Release Date: Friday 24 September<br />

Durable goods orders are expected to fall 1.7% in August,<br />

after a 0.4% increase in July, reflecting a sharp drop in<br />

Boeing orders. Excluding transportation, we look for a<br />

modest 0.9% rebound after a sharp 3.7% decline in July.<br />

Orders for durable goods appear to be slowing as the<br />

inventory cycle runs its course and global trade cools. The<br />

new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index has<br />

declined for three consecutive months, pointing to a<br />

noticeable slowing (see chart). Our forecast would be<br />

consistent with a solid but smaller contribution to GDP from<br />

business investment in Q3.<br />

% m/m Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

Durable Goods -1.7 0.4 -0.2 -0.7<br />

Ex-Transport 0.9 -3.7 0.2 1.4<br />

Key Point:<br />

The negative headline reading we expect would be<br />

driven by a sharp decline in Boeing orders; extransport<br />

should post a modest gain.<br />

Chart 4: Japan: Trade Balance (JPY bn, sa)<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

600<br />

400<br />

200<br />

0<br />

-200<br />

-400<br />

-600<br />

-800<br />

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: MOF, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

JPY bn Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

Trade balance (nsa) 347.0 802.0 682.2 316.0<br />

Trade balance (sa) 541.3 610.4 514.5 345.8<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas: Slightly Smaller Surplus<br />

Japan: Trade Data (August)<br />

Release Date: Monday 27 September<br />

Based on trade data through mid-August, we expect<br />

nominal exports in the month as a whole to have declined<br />

more sharply than nominal imports, with the result that the<br />

seasonally adjusted trade surplus should modestly shrink.<br />

Owing to the yen’s appreciation (which causes yen-based<br />

prices to decline for imports and exports), nominal exports<br />

have declined for three straight months and imports have<br />

declined for two. On the other hand, real exports (adjusted<br />

for exchange rate and price fluctuations) continue to trend<br />

higher, led by shipments to Asia. In August, though, there<br />

could be a momentary lull as real exports could contract<br />

slightly (real imports should slightly expand). While the<br />

yen’s dramatic appreciation has not damaged export<br />

volume (real exports) so far, the pace of real export growth<br />

is no longer as robust as before, owing to the fading impact<br />

of overseas inventory restocking and fiscal stimulus.<br />

Key Point:<br />

We expect nominal exports to have declined more<br />

sharply than nominal imports, with the result that the<br />

seasonally adjusted trade surplus should modestly<br />

shrink.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com<br />

55


Key Data Preview<br />

12.5<br />

10.0<br />

7.5<br />

5.0<br />

2.5<br />

0.0<br />

Chart 5: Eurozone M3 & Lending (% y/y)<br />

Private Sector<br />

Bank Lending<br />

M3<br />

-2.5<br />

92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

% y/y Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

M3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0<br />

M3 (3-mth Avg.) 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1<br />

Private Sector Loans 1.2 0.9 0.5 0.2<br />

Key Point:<br />

Rates of growth in M3 and bank lending remain low<br />

but have started to pick up.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Signs of Life<br />

Eurozone: Monetary Developments (August)<br />

Release Date: Monday 27 September<br />

At 0.2% in July, the y/y rate of change in M3 was roughly<br />

half a percentage point above its cycle low in February. We<br />

forecast a further acceleration in August and given that the<br />

base effects over the remainder of the year are favourable,<br />

the y/y acceleration has further to go.<br />

The differential between narrow and broad money growth<br />

remains unusually wide but the gap is closing. The y/y rate<br />

of increase in M1, having been in double digits for almost a<br />

year from mid-2009, slowed to around 8% y/y in July.<br />

The y/y rate of change in M3 minus M2 has been negative<br />

since early 2009, with the relative steepness of yield curves<br />

having encouraged purchases of longer-term assets which<br />

are not captured in M3. This effect has started to diminish<br />

as yield curves have flattened.<br />

As with M3, the y/y rate of increase in bank lending to the<br />

private sector remains very low but has picked up in recent<br />

months. August’s 0.9% y/y growth rate was the highest in<br />

over a year. A further acceleration is forecast in August.<br />

Loan growth to households is the main reason for the pick<br />

up. It has been improving since October last year, with the<br />

y/y rate of change in July, of 2.8%, up by three percentage<br />

points from its cycle low in September 2009. Bank lending<br />

growth to non-financial corporates continues to lag.<br />

Chart 6: French Sales of Manuf. Goods (3m avg)<br />

12.5<br />

10.0 Retail Sales of Manuf. Goods (including cars, Volume % y/y)<br />

7.5<br />

5.0<br />

2.5<br />

0.0<br />

-2.5<br />

-5.0<br />

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

New Car Registrations (% y/y, RHS)<br />

Volume index Aug (f) Jul Jun Aug 09<br />

SA-WDA<br />

% m/m -0.5 1.6 -1.4 -0.9<br />

% y/y 1.4 1.0 -1.9 -0.7<br />

Key Point:<br />

July should be much stronger than August. But the<br />

underlying trend is subdued.<br />

50<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

-10<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Volatile<br />

France: Hh Consumption of Manuf. Goods (Jul.-Aug.)<br />

Release Date: Tuesday 28 September<br />

The raw data are more difficult to collect in August, so<br />

INSEE publishes the July and August retail sales figures<br />

together in September.<br />

Car sales, which are included in the retail sales data, are<br />

the main source of short-term volatility. Car registrations<br />

declined in both July and August, more in the former<br />

month. The progressive ending of the sales incentive<br />

caused a sharp decline through H1 2010; it seems we are<br />

now close to the low point, although the y/y rate will<br />

continue to plunge because of the base effect. Sales of<br />

other manufactured goods were reportedly quite dynamic<br />

during the seasonal sales in July. Tourism activity was also<br />

relatively strong in July after a poor performance in June.<br />

As a result, we estimate retail sales jumped in July, fully<br />

correcting the June decline. However, sales probably<br />

declined again in August. Such a pattern would still open<br />

the door for a solid gain in Q3. Retail sales in July and<br />

August are among the first hard data for that quarter,<br />

allowing us to have a clearer view of how much growth will<br />

decelerate H2 2010 after a respectable 0.6% q/q GDP<br />

increase in Q2.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

56<br />

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Key Data Preview<br />

Chart 7: US Consumer Confidence<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Sep (f) Aug 2H Sep p Aug<br />

Conference Board 52.0 53.5<br />

Michigan Sentiment 67.3 68.0 66.6 68.9<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Still Sluggish<br />

US: Consumer Confidence (September)<br />

Release Date: Tuesday 28 September<br />

The Conference Board Index of Consumer Confidence is<br />

expected to edge down to 52.0 in August after improving<br />

1.5 points to 53.5 in the previous month. The University of<br />

Michigan index of consumer confidence declined in the<br />

beginning of September to 66.6 from 68.9, the lowest<br />

reading for more than a year. Leading the decline, future<br />

conditions dropped to 59.1, the lowest reading since March<br />

2009, suggesting consumers are becoming pessimistic<br />

about future business prospects, jobs and family income.<br />

Recent weakness is particularly worrying as the stock<br />

market has rebounded significantly from its May/June<br />

crash, oil prices have been stable and corporate earnings<br />

reports have been upbeat about Q2 results (which have<br />

generally beat analysts’ estimates). We expect the<br />

recovery to continue and payrolls to keep growing,<br />

although at a moderate pace. Therefore, we should see<br />

confidence stabilise at current depressed levels.<br />

Key Point:<br />

The Conference Board Index of consumer<br />

confidence is expected to edge down in September.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 8: German CoL<br />

% Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

CoL m/m -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.1<br />

CoL y/y 1.2 1.0 1.2 0.9<br />

HICP m/m -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0<br />

HICP y/y 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.8<br />

Key Point:<br />

Energy price base effects should help drive headline<br />

inflation higher in September.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Energy Base Effects<br />

Germany: CoL (September, preliminary)<br />

Release Date: Tuesday 28 September<br />

In August, energy price base effects pushed down inflation<br />

despite stronger food and core inflation. In September,<br />

energy base effects will be in play once again. A 1.5% m/m<br />

decline in energy prices last September will not be<br />

repeated this month, mechanically pushing energy inflation<br />

higher.<br />

Food inflation should also rise further on the month. The<br />

boost from food price base effects is now past, but we<br />

should increasingly begin to see pass-through from the<br />

recent soft commodity price shock to food prices in the<br />

coming months.<br />

Core inflation should creep higher on modest gains in<br />

clothing and non-energy transport price inflation, though<br />

rounded it should remain at 0.6%.<br />

Looking beyond August, German headline inflation is likely<br />

to trend higher over the remainder of the year, but is not<br />

expected to rise above 2%. Core inflation is likely to remain<br />

subdued, although with consumption in Germany gaining<br />

momentum, we do not expect the discount to the euro area<br />

average to continue for long.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

57<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Key Data Preview<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

-15<br />

-20<br />

-25<br />

-30<br />

-35<br />

Chart 9: Eurozone Sentiment by Sector<br />

Consumer<br />

Industry<br />

-40<br />

91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

Economic Sentiment 101.5 101.8 101.1 98.9<br />

Industry -5 -4 -4 -6<br />

<strong>Services</strong> 7 7 7 4<br />

Consumer -11 -11 -14 -17<br />

Key Point:<br />

The economic sentiment index is likely to remain<br />

elevated but a moderation in the industrial sector is<br />

forecast, in line with other survey data.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Topping Out<br />

Eurozone: Economic Sentiment (September)<br />

Release Date: Wednesday 29 September<br />

The eurozone economic sentiment index improved in five<br />

of the six months to August, reaching its highest level since<br />

March 2008. The pick-up in sentiment has also been more<br />

broad based over recent months.<br />

The key driver of the improvement in sentiment early in the<br />

expansion was industrial sentiment, which has the highest<br />

weighting of the five main sub-sectors (at 40% of the total).<br />

The moderation of other leading indicators for the industrial<br />

sector, however, including the PMI for manufacturing, is<br />

indicative of industrial sentiment losing ground in coming<br />

months against a backdrop of slowing global growth.<br />

Having lagged during the initial stages of the recovery, the<br />

domestically driven sentiment sub-surveys, such as those<br />

for the services and retail sectors, have improved markedly<br />

over the summer months. The improvement in these areas<br />

has been most pronounced in Germany, which is linked to<br />

the relative strength of its labour market.<br />

Preliminary September figures for the eurozone, however,<br />

showed consumer sentiment flat at -11, the first month in<br />

four not to show an improvement.<br />

Surveys of price expectations in the household sector have<br />

risen sharply from 2009’s lows, as have pricing intentions<br />

of industrial firms, but they remain well below past peaks.<br />

Net balance<br />

40<br />

30<br />

20<br />

10<br />

0<br />

-10<br />

-20<br />

-30<br />

-40<br />

-50<br />

Chart 10: French Hh Confidence<br />

Good Time to Save<br />

Good Time to Spend<br />

Headline Index<br />

03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Diffusion Index,<br />

SA Sep (f) Aug Jul Sep 09<br />

INSEE indices:<br />

Overall -39 n.a. -39 -35<br />

Buying opportunity -22 n.a. -24 -26<br />

EU Commis. Index:<br />

Headline -20.0 -18.2 -22.3 -24.4<br />

Key Point:<br />

Economic developments are favourable, but the<br />

political context is highly adverse.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Stable<br />

France: Household Confidence (September)<br />

Release Date: Wednesday 29 September<br />

As usual no survey is carried out in August, so the<br />

September results will be compared to July’s.<br />

Over the summer, inflation eased. Petroleum product<br />

prices, to which consumers pay special attention, declined.<br />

Employment rose in 0.2% q/q in Q2 with Q3 probably also<br />

seeing an increase. That resulted in a slight decline in the<br />

number of job seekers. Although households will not feel<br />

this easing, they probably understood that some<br />

improvement has occurred in the labour market. Overall,<br />

economic trends are positive for confidence but politics are<br />

clearly adverse.<br />

In terms of political developments, we saw a slight recovery<br />

of the president and prime Minister in the polls over the<br />

summer, but this move has now reversed. The massive<br />

demonstrations on 7 September show how concerned the<br />

public is about the pension reform and more generally<br />

about its standard of living.<br />

As a result, we forecast the headline confidence index to<br />

be unchanged although the opportunity to make important<br />

purchases should have improved slightly. Since the<br />

savings ratio trend is key for future consumption, it will also<br />

be of interest to see whether the recent divergence<br />

between the willingness and the ability to save persists.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com<br />

58


Key Data Preview<br />

Chart 11: Japanese Production and Exports<br />

120<br />

115<br />

110<br />

105<br />

100<br />

95<br />

90<br />

85<br />

80<br />

75<br />

70<br />

65<br />

(2005=100, seasonally adjusted)<br />

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: METI, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Production<br />

Exports (RHS)<br />

150<br />

140<br />

130<br />

120<br />

110<br />

100<br />

90<br />

80<br />

70<br />

60<br />

50<br />

Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

% m/m 1.5 -0.2 -1.1 0.1<br />

Key Point:<br />

Production in August should firmly expand thanks to<br />

a surge in last-minute demand for cars ahead of the<br />

end of a stimulus programme.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Strong Growth<br />

Japan: Industrial Production (August)<br />

Release Date: Thursday 30 September<br />

We expect production in August to be up 1.5% m/m,<br />

rebounding from two months of decline. But the weak tone<br />

of production since spring should not be taken at face<br />

value, as distortions in the METI’s seasonally-adjusted data<br />

– both the production index and forecast index – have<br />

resulted in a downward bias in readings for Q2 and Q3.<br />

Thus, the actual state of production in August is probably<br />

stronger than indicated by the METI data. In any event,<br />

production in August is likely to get a big boost from the<br />

surge in last-minute demand for cars ahead of the<br />

September termination of subsidies for buying eco-friendly<br />

models. Output in other key sectors should also remain<br />

firm thanks to solid export growth and the revival of<br />

domestic appetite for capital investment. Although negative<br />

payback for the fiscal stimulus programmes could cause<br />

production to momentarily lose some steam moving<br />

forward, so long as export growth does not come to an<br />

abrupt end, the factory sector recovery should continue. As<br />

for fallout from yen appreciation, a strong yen squeezing<br />

profits is certainly is a headwind for producers, but<br />

currency appreciation is a price shock, rather than a<br />

demand (quantity) shock. There should thus be only limited<br />

short-term impact on export volume and production.<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Chart 12: Eurozone HICP<br />

% Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

HICP m/m 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.0<br />

HICP y/y 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.4<br />

HICP Core m/m 0.2 0.4 -0.5 0.0<br />

HICP Core y/y 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9<br />

Key Point:<br />

Inflation should rise to 1.8%, driven up by food<br />

inflation and energy price base effects.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Up On Food & Energy<br />

Eurozone: Flash HICP (September)<br />

Release Date: Thursday 30 September<br />

In August, inflation moderated on energy price base<br />

effects, and in September, they will be in play once again.<br />

A 1.3% m/m decline in energy prices last September will<br />

not be repeated this month, mechanically pushing energy<br />

inflation higher.<br />

Food inflation should also rise further on the month. The<br />

boost from food price base effects is now past, but we<br />

should increasingly begin to see pass-through from the<br />

recent soft commodity price shock to food prices in the<br />

coming months.<br />

Core inflation, meanwhile, should remain flat for a second<br />

consecutive month at 1.0%. Core inflation has recovered a<br />

little since April’s 0.77% record low, with both core goods<br />

and core services contributing to the rise. We see scope for<br />

core goods inflation to rise a little further – in part, its<br />

strength reflects pass-through of past euro weakness. But<br />

core services should resume its downward trend given the<br />

weak state of consumer demand and an absence of any<br />

pressure from labour costs. Net, we expect core inflation to<br />

trade flat in September.<br />

Overall, the rise in food and energy will help drive a<br />

rebound in headline inflation to 1.8% y/y, its highest level<br />

since the end of 2008.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

59<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Key Data Preview<br />

3<br />

2<br />

1<br />

0<br />

-1<br />

-2<br />

-3<br />

Chart 13: Japanese CPI (% y/y)<br />

CPI excluding energy and food, but not alcohol<br />

Core CPI<br />

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: MIC, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

% y/y Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

Core CPI -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -1.2<br />

CPI -0.9 -0.9 -0.7 -0.9<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Slightly Smaller Decline<br />

Japan: CPI (National, August)<br />

Release Date: Friday 1 October<br />

The rate of decline in national core CPI deepened 0.1pp in<br />

July to -1.1% y/y as the decline in food prices accelerated<br />

slightly and price growth in petroleum products slowed.<br />

Other national price indices were either unchanged –<br />

US-style core CPI came in at -1.5% y/y – or improved: the<br />

negative margin of the “10% trimmed mean CPI” eased<br />

0.2pp to -0.5% y/y. Based on CPI data for Tokyo in August,<br />

we estimate that the national index in August should<br />

rebound and improve 0.1 pct point to 1.0%. Thanks to<br />

improvements in the output gap, the downturn in consumer<br />

prices is steadily easing. While such moderating of<br />

deflationary pressures is expected to continue, the pace<br />

moving forward will be tempered by slower improvements<br />

in the output gap and yen appreciation.<br />

Key Point:<br />

We expect, based on Tokyo’s CPI data for August,<br />

that the rate of decline in the national core index will<br />

ease by 0.1pp to -1.0% y/y in August.<br />

Chart 14: Japanese Unemployment Rate (% sa)<br />

6.0<br />

5.5<br />

5.0<br />

4.5<br />

4.0<br />

3.5<br />

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10<br />

Source: MIC, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

% sa Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

Unemployment rate 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.2<br />

Key Point:<br />

Improvements in the unemployment rate have stalled<br />

of late as better economic conditions have<br />

encouraged a growing number of people to quit work<br />

in the hope of finding better employment while<br />

prompting formerly discouraged workers to return to<br />

active job seeking.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Flat<br />

Japan: Unemployment Rate (August)<br />

Release Date: Friday 1 October<br />

We expect the unemployed rate in August to be unchanged<br />

from July at 5.2%. In July, the unemployment rate fell 0.1pp<br />

from June, marking the first improvement in six months.<br />

After hitting an all-time high of 5.6% in July 2009, the<br />

unemployment rate rapidly fell until January, when<br />

improvements essentially stalled. That this should happen,<br />

while the economy this past year has expanded at around<br />

an annualised 4% on average, is due to stronger economic<br />

conditions, which have prompted many discouraged<br />

workers to return to active job seeking and encouraged<br />

dissatisfied jobholders to voluntarily quit one position in the<br />

hope of landing a better one. Meanwhile, job growth is also<br />

still slow in recovering, as corporations, which kept payrolls<br />

intact by cutting working hours during the recession, are<br />

now responding to the improving economy with increased<br />

working hours, rather than hiring.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

60<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Key Data Preview<br />

Chart 7: UK CIPS Manufacturing vs FMCI<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

53.0 54.3 56.9 57.5<br />

Key Point:<br />

We expect the CIPS to fall again in September, with<br />

further downside potential in the coming months.<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Down Again<br />

UK: CIPS Manufacturing (September)<br />

Release Date: Friday 1 October<br />

We expect the manufacturing sector CIPS to continue to<br />

fall in September, by 1.3 points to 53.0; this would be the<br />

lowest since November 2009. Prior to August, the CIPS<br />

had clearly topped out but had managed to avoid the falls<br />

that had been experienced in other major economies. That<br />

came to an end in August, when the index fell by 2.6<br />

points.<br />

The fall was consistent with the tightening in financial and<br />

monetary conditions highlighted by our FMCI (chart). The<br />

same relationship points to further downside in September.<br />

Furthermore, the orders-inventories balance tends to<br />

provide a guide to future trends in the output component<br />

and indeed the headline index. At current levels, this<br />

relationship points to a sub-50 reading on the headline<br />

CIPS over the next three months.<br />

In combination with the OECD leading indicator, the drop in<br />

the CIPS so far and the likelihood that this trend continues<br />

points to a contraction in output by the end of the year.<br />

Output never caught up with the peaks in the survey<br />

indicators, which probably highlighted relief that the<br />

recession was over. The drop in surveys is partly a<br />

correction of that over-optimism but is also likely to reflect a<br />

genuine slowing in hard output.<br />

Chart 8: US Confidence vs Consumption<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

% m/m Aug (f) Jul Jun May<br />

Personal Income 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3<br />

Consumption 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1<br />

Core PCE Prices 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Modest Gains<br />

US: Personal Income & Spending (August)<br />

Release Date: Friday 1 October<br />

Personal consumption is forecast to rise 0.3% in August<br />

after a 0.4% gain in July as rising gasoline prices and a<br />

moderate gain in core sales spurred by back-to-school<br />

spending more than offset a decline in auto sales. Looking<br />

through the gain in prices, our forecast would imply a<br />

relatively subdued 0.1% increase in real spending as<br />

consumers remain cautious about allocating their<br />

purchasing power.<br />

Personal income is forecast to rise by 0.3% after a 0.2%<br />

gain a month prior as the increase in hours worked and<br />

solid gain in average hourly earnings should support wage<br />

and salary income.<br />

The core PCE price index is expected to rise 0.1% despite<br />

the flat reading on core CPI as the weakness in the CPI<br />

reading was driven by a softening in owner’s equivalent<br />

rent (this is weighted less heavily in the PCE measure).<br />

Our forecast would leave the annual rate steady at 1.4%.<br />

Key Point:<br />

We expect modest gains in income and spending and<br />

a steady reading for core inflation.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

61<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Key Data Preview<br />

Chart 13: US: PMI Manufacturing Surveys<br />

Source: Reuters EcoWin Pro<br />

Sep (f) Aug Jul Jun<br />

Headline index 53.0 56.3 55.5 56.2<br />

Prices Paid 62.0 61.5 57.5 57.0<br />

<strong>BNP</strong> Paribas Forecast: Down<br />

US: ISM (September)<br />

Release Date: Friday 1 October<br />

We look for the ISM manufacturing index to fall in<br />

September, to 53.0 from 56.3 in August. The new orders<br />

component of the ISM has been declining for three months,<br />

dropping a total of 12.6 points. The September readings of<br />

the Empire and Philly indices point to further deceleration.<br />

On the ISM-adjusted basis, the Philly Fed Index dropped<br />

through the 50 breakeven level in August to 46.3, edging<br />

up only to 46.6 in September. In the meanwhile the ISMadjusted<br />

Empire State index was at 50.3 in August and<br />

moved up to just 50.9. The pace of manufacturing growth is<br />

settling as the inventory cycle cools. Our forecast would<br />

still be consistent with expansion in the sector, albeit at a<br />

much more sustainable pace. Meanwhile we look for the<br />

prices paid index to remain virtually flat as energy prices<br />

have stabilised recently.<br />

Key Point:<br />

The ISM is expected to cool to 53.0 in September, a<br />

pace consistent with much more sustainable<br />

expansion in the sector.<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

62<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Economic Calendar: 4 – 29 October<br />

4 October 5 October 6 October 7 October 8 October<br />

Eurozone: PPI Aug<br />

US: Pending Home Sales<br />

Jul, Factory Orders Aug<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

Australia: RBA Rate<br />

Announcement, Trade<br />

Balance Aug, Retail Sales<br />

Aug, NAB Business<br />

Confidence Sep<br />

Japan: BoJ Rate<br />

Announcement<br />

Eurozone: Retail Sales<br />

Aug, <strong>Services</strong> PMI (Final)<br />

Sep<br />

UK: CIPS <strong>Services</strong> Sep<br />

Switz: CPI Sep<br />

US: ISM <strong>Services</strong> Sep<br />

Eurozone: GDP (Final)<br />

Q2<br />

Germany: Factory Orders<br />

Aug<br />

Spain: Industrial<br />

Production Aug<br />

US: ADP Labour Sep,<br />

Challenger Labour Sep<br />

Australia: Labour Sep<br />

Japan: Leading indicator<br />

Aug<br />

Eurozone: ECB Rate<br />

Announcement & Press<br />

Conference<br />

UK: BoE Rate<br />

Announcement, IP Aug<br />

Germany: Industrial<br />

Production Aug<br />

France: Trade Balance<br />

Aug<br />

Norway: IP Aug<br />

Neths: CPI Sep<br />

US: Consumer Credit Aug<br />

During Week: UK Halifax House Prices Sep<br />

11 October 12 October 13 October 14 October 15 October<br />

Holiday: Japan, US,<br />

Canada<br />

France: Industrial<br />

Production Aug<br />

Italy: Industrial Production<br />

Aug<br />

Norway: CPI Sep, PPI<br />

Sep<br />

UK: BRC Retail Sales<br />

Monitor Sep, RICS House<br />

Prices Sep, CPI Sep,<br />

Trade Balance Aug,<br />

DCLG House Prices Aug<br />

France: C/A Aug<br />

Germany: CPI Sep<br />

Sweden: CPI Sep<br />

US: FOMC Minutes, NFIB<br />

Small Business Optimism<br />

Sep<br />

Australia: Westpac<br />

Consumer Confidence<br />

Oct<br />

Japan: M2 Sep,<br />

Machinery Orders Aug<br />

Eurozone: Industrial<br />

Production Aug<br />

UK: Labour Sep<br />

France: CPI Sep<br />

Sweden: AMV Labour<br />

Sep<br />

US: Import Price Index<br />

Sep, Treasury Statement<br />

Sep<br />

Japan: CGPI Sep<br />

Eurozone: ECB Monthly<br />

Bulletin<br />

Spain: CPI Sep<br />

Neths: Retail Sales Aug<br />

US: Trade Balance Aug,<br />

PPI Sep<br />

18 October 19 October 20 October 21 October 22 October<br />

Japan: Tertiary Index Aug<br />

UK: Rightmove House<br />

Price Index Oct<br />

US: Industrial Production<br />

Sep, TICS Data Aug,<br />

NAHB Housing Market<br />

Index Oct<br />

Australia: RBA MPC<br />

Minutes<br />

Eurozone: Current<br />

Account Aug<br />

Germany: ZEW Survey<br />

Oct<br />

US: New Home Starts<br />

Sep<br />

Canada: BoC Rate<br />

Announcement<br />

UK: BoE MPC Minutes,<br />

PSNCR Sep, PSNB Sep<br />

Germany: PPI Sep<br />

Italy: Industrial Orders<br />

Aug, Non-EU Trade<br />

Balance Sep<br />

Neths: Consumer<br />

Confidence Oct<br />

US: Beige Book<br />

Canada: BoC Monetary<br />

Policy Report<br />

Eurozone: Governing<br />

Council Meeting (No Rate<br />

Ann), PMIs (Flash) Oct<br />

UK: Retail Sales Sep<br />

France: Business<br />

Confidence Oct<br />

Sweden: Labour Sep<br />

Neths: Labour Sep<br />

US: Philly Fed Oct,<br />

Leading Indicators Sep,<br />

Retail Sales Sep<br />

During Week: Germany WPI Sep<br />

25 October 26 October 27 October 28 October 29 October<br />

Australia: PPI Q3<br />

Japan: Trade Balance Sep<br />

Eurozone: Industrial<br />

Orders Aug<br />

Spain: PPI Sep<br />

US: Existing Home Sales<br />

Sep<br />

UK: GDP (Adv) Q3<br />

France: Consumer<br />

Confidence Oct, Housing<br />

Starts Sep, Job Seekers<br />

Sep<br />

Sweden: Riksbank Rate<br />

Announcement &<br />

Monetary Policy Report,<br />

PPI Sep<br />

Neths: Producer<br />

confidence Oct<br />

US: S&P/Case-Shiller<br />

Home Prices Aug, FHFA<br />

House Prices Aug,<br />

Consumer Confidence<br />

Oct<br />

Australia: CPI Q3<br />

Eurozone: Monetary<br />

Developments Sep<br />

Germany: CPI (Prel) Oct<br />

France: Retail Sales Sep<br />

Spain: Retail Sales Sep<br />

Norway: Norges Bank<br />

Rate Announcement &<br />

Monetary Policy Report<br />

Belgium: GDP (Flash) Q3<br />

US: Durable Goods Sep,<br />

New Home Sales Sep<br />

Japan: BoJ Rate<br />

Announcement & Outlook<br />

Report, Retail Sales Aug<br />

Eurozone: Business &<br />

Consumer Survey Oct,<br />

Retail PMI Oct<br />

Germany: Labour Oct<br />

France: PPI Sep<br />

Italy: Wages Sep<br />

Sweden: Retail Sales<br />

Sep<br />

Norway: Labour (nsa)<br />

Oct<br />

During Week: UK: Nationwide House Prices Oct<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Release dates as at c.o.b. prior to the date of this publication. See our Daily Spotlight for any revisions<br />

63<br />

Japan: BoJ Monetary<br />

Policy Meeting Minutes,<br />

Current Account Aug<br />

UK: PPI Sep<br />

Germany: Trade Balance<br />

Aug<br />

France: BoF Survey Sep,<br />

Budget Balance Aug<br />

Sweden: IP Aug<br />

Neths: Industrial<br />

Production Aug<br />

US: Labour Sep,<br />

Wholesale Trade Aug<br />

Canada: Labour Sep<br />

Eurozone: HICP Sep,<br />

Trade Balance Aug, EU25<br />

New Car Registrations<br />

Sep<br />

Italy: Foreign Trade Aug,<br />

CPI Sep<br />

US: Empire State Oct, CPI<br />

Sep, Retail Sales Sep,<br />

Business Inventories Aug,<br />

UoM Sentiment (Prel) Oct<br />

Australia: PPI Sep<br />

Germany: Ifo Oct<br />

France: Industrial Survey<br />

Q4<br />

Italy: Retail Sales Aug<br />

Canada: CPI Sep<br />

Japan: CPI Tokyo Oct,<br />

CPI National Sep, Labour<br />

Sep, Household<br />

Consumption Sep, IP Sep,<br />

Housing Starts Sep<br />

Eurozone: Labour Sep,<br />

HICP (Flash) Oct,<br />

Eurocoin Oct<br />

UK: GfK Consumer<br />

Confidence Oct, Net<br />

Consumer Credit Sep,<br />

Mortgage Approvals Sep<br />

Germany: Wages Q3<br />

Italy: PPI Sep, CPI (Prel)<br />

Oct<br />

Spain: HICP (Flash) Oct<br />

Norway: Retail Sales Sep<br />

Switz: KoF Leading<br />

Indicator Oct<br />

US: GDP (Adv) Q3, ECI<br />

Sep, Chicago PMI Oct,<br />

UoM Sentiment (Final) Oct<br />

Canada: GDP Aug<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Treasury and SAS Issuance Calendar<br />

Daily update onto https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com, Tools & Apps, Analytical Tools, Market Calendar, Government Flows<br />

In the pipeline - Treasuries:<br />

Ireland: Possibility of a syndicated offering towards the end of 2010<br />

Germany: Plans to issue EUR 2-3bn in inflation-linked bonds and reserves right to issue foreign currency bonds in Q4<br />

Poland: Plans to issue yen-denominated bonds in November and may issue euro-denominated bonds as early as January 2011<br />

UK: Plans a syndicated offering: H2 October, conventional gilt (30-50y area), further details around 2 weeks in advance<br />

Denmark: H2 2010, to issue a 5y EUR loan (EUR 1-2bn). Opening of new 5y (Nov 2016) & 10y (Nov 2021) DGBs postponed to the beginning<br />

of 2011<br />

Slovak Rep.: Considering issuing new syndicated 15y benchmark bond (around EUR 1.5bn) in the autumn<br />

During the week:<br />

UK: Choice of gilt for w.c. 11 Oct mini tender on Fri 1 Oct<br />

Date Day Closing Country Issues Details <strong>BNP</strong>P forecasts<br />

Local GMT<br />

24/09 Fri Sweden Exch. Offer ILB 0.5% Jun 2017 vs. 3.5% Dec15 (# 3105) SEK 6bn<br />

11:00 15:00 US Outright Treasury Coupon Purchase (2014-2016)<br />

FNMA Notes 26 Oct 2015 (new, syndicated)<br />

27/09 Mon 10:55 08:55 Italy CTZ 31 Aug 2012 EUR 3bn<br />

Sweden Exch. Offer ILB 0.5% Jun 2017 vs. 5% Dec20 (# 3102) SEK 6bn<br />

12:00 10:00 Belgium OLO 2.75% 28 Mar 2016 (OLO 59)<br />

OLO 3.75% 28 Sep 2020 (OLO 58)<br />

24 Sep EUR 2-2.8bn<br />

OLO 4.25% 28 Mar 2041 (OLO 60)<br />

Slovak Rep. SLOVGB 3.5% 24 Feb 2016 (#213)<br />

EUR 0.150bn<br />

13:00 17:00 US Notes 0.375% 30 Sep 2012 (new) USD 36bn<br />

28/09 Tue 12:00 03:00 Japan JGB 15 Oct 2012 JPY 2.6tn<br />

10:55 08:55 Italy BTPei 2.1% 15 Sep 2021 EUR 1-1.5bn<br />

Sweden Exch. Offer ILB 0.5% Jun 2017 vs. 3.5% Dec15 (# 3105) SEK 3bn<br />

Neths DSL 3.25% 15 Jul 2015 (Off-the-run facility)<br />

DSL 4% 15 Jul 2018 (Off-the-run facility)<br />

EUR 0-2bn<br />

Denmark DGB 4% 15 Nov 2010 (buy back)<br />

12:00 16:00 Canada Repurchase of 7 Cash Mgt Bonds (Dec10 - Dec11) CAD 1bn<br />

11:00 15:00 US Outright Treasury Coupon Purchase (2011-2040)<br />

13:00 17:00 US Notes 1.25% 30 Sep 2015 (new) USD 35bn<br />

29/09 Wed 10:55 08:55 Italy BTP 2% 1 Jun 2013<br />

CCT 15 Dec 2015 (CCTeu)<br />

BTP 3.75% 1 Mar 2021<br />

24 Sep EUR 5-7bn<br />

11:00 09:00 Sweden T-bonds 4.5% 12 Aug 2015 (# 1049) SEK 2.5bn<br />

13:00 17:00 US Notes 1.875% 30 Sep 2017 (new) USD 29bn<br />

30/09 Thu 11:00 15:00 US Outright Treasury Coupon Purchase (2021-2040)<br />

01/10 Fri 12:00 03:00 Japan Auction for Enhanced-liquidity 24 Sep JPY 0.3tn<br />

05/10 Tue 11:00 09:00 Austria RAGBs 28 Sep<br />

10:30 09:30 UK Index-Linked Gilt 0.625% 22 Nov 2042 28 Sep GBP 0.8bn<br />

Denmark DGB 30 Sep<br />

11:00 15:00 US Outright Treasury Coupon Purchase (2016-2020)<br />

06/10 Wed 11:00 09:00 Germany Schatz 0.75% 14 Sep 2012 EUR 5bn<br />

11:00 09:00 Norway NGBs 29 Sep<br />

11:00 15:00 US Outright Treasury Coupon Purchase (2013-2014)<br />

07/10 Thu 12:00 03:00 Japan JGB 10-year 30 Sep JPY 2.2tn<br />

10:30 08:30 Spain Bono 2.5% 31 Oct 2013 4 Oct<br />

10:50 08:50 France OATs 1 Oct<br />

Sweden Exchange Offer ILBs 30 Sep<br />

11/10 Mon Slovak Rep. SLOVGB (For decision) 4 Oct<br />

12/10 Tue Neths DSL 6 Oct<br />

13:00 17:00 US Notes 3-year (new) 7 Oct USD 33bn<br />

13/10 Wed 11:00 09:00 Germany Bund 2.25% 4 Sep 2020 EUR 5bn<br />

11:00 09:00 Sweden T-bonds 6 Oct<br />

13:00 17:00 US Notes 10-year 7 Oct USD 21bn<br />

14/10 Thu 12:00 03:00 Japan JGB 30-year 7 Oct JPY 0.6tn<br />

10:55 08:55 Italy 5-year BTP and possibly 15- or 30-year BTP 7 Oct<br />

10:30 09:30 UK Gilt 4.75% 7 Sep 2015 5 Oct<br />

13:00 17:00 US Bond 30-year 7 Oct USD 13bn<br />

Sources: Treasuries, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Interest Rate Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

64<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Next week's T-Bills Supply<br />

Date Country Issues Details<br />

24/09 UK T-Bills Oct 2010 GBP 1bn<br />

T-Bills Dec 2010<br />

GBP 1.5bn<br />

T-Bills Mar 2011<br />

GBP 1.5bn<br />

27/09 France BTF Dec 2010 EUR 4bn<br />

BTF Feb 2011<br />

EUR 1bn<br />

BTF Mar 2011<br />

EUR 2bn<br />

BTF Jun 2011<br />

EUR 1.5bn<br />

Italy BOT Mar 2011 EUR 9bn<br />

Germany Bubills Sep 2011 (new) EUR 4bn<br />

US T-Bills Dec 2010 USD 29bn<br />

T-Bills Mar 2011 (new) USD 29bn<br />

FHLMC Bills 3-month & 6-month 24 Sep<br />

28/09 Spain Letras Dec 2010 27 Sep<br />

Letras Mar 2011<br />

27 Sep<br />

Canada T-Bill Jan 2011 CAD 7.7bn<br />

T-Bill Mar 2011 (new) CAD 2.9bn<br />

T-Bill Sep 2011 (new) CAD 2.9bn<br />

US T-Bills 4-week 27 Sep<br />

FHLB Discount Notes<br />

29/09 Japan T-Bills Jan 2011 JPY 4.8tn<br />

Denmark T-Bills<br />

FNMA Bills 3-month & 6-month 27 Sep<br />

30/09 FHLB Discount Notes<br />

01/10 UK T-Bills 24 Sep<br />

Sources: Treasuries, <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Comments and charts<br />

• EGB gross supply will fall to around EUR 12/13bn in<br />

the week ahead from EUR 14bn in the past week. In 10y<br />

duration adjusted terms, it falls to around EUR 6.3bn.<br />

There well be also a significant amount of long-term and<br />

short-term redemptions, leading to negative net supply<br />

figures.<br />

• Italy will kick off EGB issuance with a CTZ Aug-12<br />

tap for EUR 3bn. On the same day, Belgium will tap<br />

three OLO lines: Mar-16, Sep-20 and Mar-41. Then on<br />

Tuesday, Italy will tap BTPei Sep-21 for EUR 1-1.5bn<br />

and Netherlands will conduct off-the-run taps of DSLs<br />

Jul-15 and Jul-18 for EUR 1-2bn. Finally, on Wednesday<br />

Italy will reopen BTPs Jun-13 and Mar-21 and also tap<br />

CCTeu Dec-15 for an expected amount of EUR 4-6bn.<br />

• Outside the eurozone, the US will issue USD 100bn<br />

of 2y, 5y and 7y maturity notes. Sweden and Japan will<br />

also issue paper.<br />

Next week's Eurozone Redemptions<br />

Date Country Details Amount<br />

28/09 Belgium OLO 5.75% EUR 15.8bn<br />

29/09 Greece GGB 6% EUR 0.2bn<br />

30/09 Italy CTZ EUR 16.4bn<br />

Total Eurozone Long-term Redemption EUR 32.4bn<br />

27/09 Austria ATB (EU38) EUR 0.1bn<br />

27/09 Austria ATB (EU37) EUR 0.2bn<br />

29/09 Germany Bubills EUR 5.0bn<br />

30/09 France BTF EUR 10.0bn<br />

30/09 Italy BOT 6mth EUR 9.0bn<br />

30/09 Neths DTC EUR 12.3bn<br />

Total Eurozone Short-term Redemption EUR 36.6bn<br />

35<br />

30<br />

25<br />

20<br />

15<br />

10<br />

5<br />

0<br />

-5<br />

-10<br />

20<br />

18<br />

16<br />

14<br />

12<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

Next week's Eurozone Coupons<br />

Country<br />

Belgium<br />

Total Long-term Coupon Payments<br />

Chart 1: Investors’ Net Cash Flows<br />

(EUR bn, 10y equivalent)<br />

Net Investors' Cash Flows<br />

(EUR bn , 10y equivalent)<br />

Week of Sep 27th Week of Oct 4th Week of Oct 11th Week of Oct 18th<br />

Chart 2: EGB Gross Supply Breakdown by<br />

Country (EUR bn, 10y equivalent)<br />

Germany Italy Portugal Belgium<br />

France Spain Netherlands Austria<br />

Finland Greece Ireland<br />

Amount<br />

EUR 4.7bn<br />

EUR 4.7bn<br />

Week of Sep 27th Week of Oct 4th Week of Oct 11th Week of Oct 18th<br />

Chart 3: EGB Gross Supply Breakdown by<br />

Maturity (EUR bn, 10y equivalent)<br />

14<br />

12<br />

2-3-YR 5-7-YR 10-YR >10-YR<br />

EGBs Gross Supply (EUR bn, 10y equivalent)<br />

10<br />

8<br />

6<br />

4<br />

2<br />

0<br />

Week of Sep 27th Week of Oct 4th Week of Oct 11th Week of Oct 18th<br />

All Charts Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Interest Rate Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

65<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Central Bank Watch<br />

Interest Rate<br />

EUROZONE<br />

Current<br />

Rate (%)<br />

Minimum Bid Rate 1.00<br />

US<br />

Fed Funds Rate 0 to 0.25<br />

Discount Rate 0.75<br />

JAPAN<br />

Call Rate 0.10<br />

Basic Loan Rate 0.30<br />

UK<br />

Bank Rate 0.5<br />

DENMARK<br />

Lending Rate 1.05<br />

SWEDEN<br />

Repo Rate 0.75<br />

NORWAY<br />

Sight Deposit Rate 2.00<br />

SWITZERLAND<br />

3 Mth LIBOR Target<br />

Range<br />

CANADA<br />

0.0-0.75<br />

Overnight Rate 1.00<br />

Bank Rate 1.25<br />

AUSTRALIA<br />

Cash Rate 4.50<br />

CHINA<br />

1Y Bank Lending<br />

Rate<br />

BRAZIL<br />

5.31%<br />

Selic Overnight Rate 10.75<br />

Date of Last<br />

Change<br />

-25bp<br />

(7/5/09)<br />

-75bp<br />

(16/12/08)<br />

+25bp<br />

(18/2/10)<br />

-20bp<br />

(19/12/08)<br />

-20bp<br />

(19/12/08)<br />

-50bp<br />

(5/3/09)<br />

-10bp<br />

(14/1/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(2/9/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(5/5/09)<br />

-25bp<br />

(12/3/09)<br />

+25bp<br />

(8/9/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(8/9/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(5/5/10)<br />

-27bp<br />

(22/12/08)<br />

+50bp<br />

(21/7/10)<br />

Next Change in<br />

Coming 6 Months<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

No Change<br />

+25bp<br />

(26/10/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(26/01/11)<br />

No Change<br />

+25bp<br />

(20/10/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(20/10/10)<br />

+25bp<br />

(2/11/10)<br />

No Change<br />

+50bp<br />

(26/1/11)<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

For the full EMK Central Bank Watch please see our Local Markets Mover<br />

Comments<br />

Doubts about the sustainability of the recovery and low inflation<br />

pressures imply no rise in the refinancing rate for a considerable<br />

period of time: we expect the first increase only in H2 2012.<br />

The FOMC is expected to maintain the funds rate at 0 to 0.25%<br />

for an extended period and is likely to initiate a second round of<br />

quantitative easing in Q4 2010.<br />

We expect the BoJ to maintain its super-low rate policy until<br />

2012, but it may in the meantime further expand its liquidity<br />

provision to cooperate with the government in countering<br />

deflation and the yen’s appreciation.<br />

We expect the MPC to reengage in asset purchases although<br />

elevated inflation could delay this until February 2011. We do<br />

not expect the BoE to start raising Bank Rate before H1 2012.<br />

We expect the central bank to keep its policy rate on hold until<br />

H2 2012, in line with our expectation for the ECB.<br />

As economic growth remains strong and labour market<br />

conditions improve further, we expect the Riksbank to deliver a<br />

further hike at its October meeting.<br />

Moderate growth since the start of the year and our<br />

expectations of a slowdown in growth in Norway’s main trading<br />

partners suggest further rate hikes will come gradually. We<br />

expect the next hike in Q1 2011.<br />

Rates are looking inappropriate given the strength of the<br />

domestic economy. But the first hike is being delayed by<br />

financial stress in the markets and the exceptional strength of<br />

the CHF.<br />

Depending on developments in global financial markets and the<br />

US economic outlook in particular, we expect the BoC to deliver<br />

an additional 25bp of tightening in October. The BoC is then<br />

expected to pause at 1.25% to allow further progress in the<br />

recovery.<br />

The RBA noted in its June statement that policy was appropriate<br />

for the “near term”. This appears to rule out any move in the<br />

coming months, especially in the context of volatility in global<br />

markets. However, likely strong Q2 growth should be enough to<br />

prompt a hike late in the year.<br />

The benchmark lending rate (12-month) should be left<br />

unchanged this year. However, given that housing prices are<br />

failing to correct, the government might hike the mortgage loan<br />

rate in Q4 10. Accordingly, the deposit rate might also be raised<br />

in order to keep the general interest spread unchanged.<br />

The BCB has become much more dovish, sounding more<br />

comfortable with the balance of risks for inflation on the heels of<br />

recent data. However, the monetary authority is likely to resume<br />

hiking rates in early 2011 to tame inflation expectations.<br />

Change since our last weekly in bold and italics<br />

Market Economics 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

66<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Economic Forecasts<br />

GDP<br />

Year 2010<br />

(% y/y) ’09 ’10 (1) ’11 (1) ’12 (1) ’13 (1) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br />

US -2.6 2.6 1.6 2.6 3.1 2.4 3.0 2.9 2.0<br />

Eurozone -4.0 1.7 1.1 1.4 2.0 0.8 1.9 1.9 2.1<br />

Japan -5.2 3.2 1.6 1.6 1.7 4.7 2.4 3.2 2.6<br />

CPI<br />

(% y/y) ’09 ’10 (1) Year<br />

’11 (1) ’12 (1) ’13 (1) Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4<br />

US -0.3 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.1 2.4 1.8 1.3 1.4<br />

Eurozone 0.3 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.9<br />

Japan -1.4 -0.8 -0.8 0.1 0.6 -1.2 -0.9 -0.9 -0.4<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas. End Period, Spot Rates as at 16 September<br />

* Preliminary, to be confirmed in the Global Outlook<br />

Interest Rate Forecasts<br />

Interest Rate (3)<br />

(%) Spot Q4'10 Q1'11 Q2'11 Q3'11 Q4'11<br />

US<br />

Fed Funds 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25<br />

10-year 2.77 2.00 2.00 2.25 2.50 2.75<br />

Eurozone<br />

Refi 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00<br />

10-year 2.48 1.90 1.90 2.00 2.25 2.50<br />

Japan<br />

ODR 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30<br />

Call Rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10<br />

10-year 1.05 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.10 1.10<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas. End Period, Spot Rates as at 16 September<br />

* Preliminary, to be confirmed in the Global Outlook<br />

Market Economics / Interest Rate Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover<br />

67<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


FX Forecasts*<br />

USD Bloc Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

EUR/USD 1.29 1.34 1.27 1.23 1.22 1.20 1.22 1.24 1.26 1.25 1.22<br />

USD/JPY 85 82 85 87 90 92 95 100 110 120 119<br />

USD/CHF 0.98 0.93 1.01 1.07 1.09 1.12 1.11 1.10 1.10 1.12 1.16<br />

GBP/USD 1.54 1.58 1.48 1.40 1.45 1.46 1.49 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.53<br />

USD/CAD 1.02 0.96 0.92 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.02 1.09 1.11<br />

AUD/USD 0.94 1.02 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.87<br />

NZD/USD 0.73 0.78 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.69 0.67 0.66 0.64<br />

USD/SEK 7.13 6.64 6.93 7.32 7.46 7.75 7.54 7.42 7.22 7.28 7.62<br />

USD/NOK 6.12 5.82 6.14 6.26 6.23 6.25 6.07 6.05 6.03 6.00 5.98<br />

EUR Bloc Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

EUR/JPY 110 110 108 107 110 110 116 124 139 150 145<br />

EUR/GBP 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.80<br />

EUR/CHF 1.27 1.25 1.28 1.31 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.36 1.38 1.40 1.41<br />

EUR/SEK 9.20 8.90 8.80 9.00 9.10 9.30 9.20 9.20 9.10 9.10 9.30<br />

EUR/NOK 7.90 7.80 7.80 7.70 7.60 7.50 7.40 7.50 7.60 7.50 7.30<br />

EUR/DKK 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46 7.46<br />

Central Europe Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

USD/PLN 3.06 2.87 2.99 3.13 3.20 3.25 3.20 3.10 3.02 3.00 3.03<br />

EUR/CZK 26.5 24.4 24.5 24.7 25.0 24.7 24.3 24.0 23.9 23.8 24.0<br />

EUR/HUF 275 280 275 270 270 265 250 250 250 245 235<br />

USD/ZAR 7.30 7.00 6.90 7.10 7.00 7.30 7.80 7.80 7.50 7.70 7.00<br />

USD/TRY 1.50 1.45 1.40 1.42 1.40 1.45 1.50 1.52 1.56 1.58 1.45<br />

EUR/RON 4.50 4.25 4.35 4.25 4.20 4.20 4.00 3.95 3.90 3.80 3.90<br />

USD/RUB 29.19 29.49 29.42 29.45 29.12 28.90 28.21 27.75 27.31 27.15 29.12<br />

EUR/PLN 3.95 3.85 3.80 3.85 3.90 3.90 3.90 3.85 3.80 3.75 3.70<br />

USD/UAH 7.9 7.9 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.2 7.0 7.5 -----<br />

EUR/RSD 110 110 105 115 105 100 90 86 87 85 86<br />

Asia Bloc Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

USD/SGD 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.26 1.25 1.25<br />

USD/MYR 3.10 3.07 3.05 3.03 3.00 2.95 2.93 2.90 2.87 2.85 2.85<br />

USD/IDR 8800 8600 8500 8400 8300 8200 8100 8000 7900 7800 7800<br />

USD/THB 30.50 30.00 29.50 29.00 28.70 28.50 28.30 28.00 27.70 27.50 27.50<br />

USD/PHP 44.00 43.00 42.50 42.00 41.50 41.00 40.50 40.00 39.50 39.00 39.00<br />

USD/HKD 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80 7.80<br />

USD/RMB 6.70 6.65 6.60 6.55 6.50 6.45 6.40 6.35 6.30 6.26 6.23<br />

USD/TWD 31.60 31.00 30.50 30.00 29.80 29.50 29.00 28.50 28.80 28.50 28.50<br />

USD/KRW 1150 1100 1080 1060 1050 1040 1030 1020 1010 1000 1000<br />

USD/INR 46.00 45.50 45.00 44.50 44.30 44.00 43.50 43.00 42.80 42.50 42.50<br />

USD/VND 20000 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500 20500<br />

LATAM Bloc Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

USD/ARS 3.95 4.05 4.15 4.20 4.30 4.40 4.55 4.70 4.80 4.90 5.00<br />

USD/BRL 1.75 1.70 1.67 1.65 1.68 1.70 1.73 1.75 1.77 1.79 1.80<br />

USD/CLP 495 485 480 470 475 480 483 485 488 492 494<br />

USD/MXN 12.65 12.40 12.25 12.10 11.80 11.90 12.00 12.20 12.40 12.50 12.55<br />

USD/COP 1810 1790 1760 1730 1720 1740 1755 1780 1800 1825 1835<br />

USD/VEF (Priority) (1) 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80 8.80<br />

USD/VEF (Oil) (1) 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 5.30 5.30 5.30 5.30 5.30<br />

Others Q3 '10 Q4 '10 Q1 '11 Q2 '11 Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 Q4 '12 Q1 '13<br />

USD Index 81.87 78.63 82.19 84.73 85.01 86.48 86.16 86.35 86.57 88.46 90.03<br />

*End Quarter<br />

(1) Following the devaluation of the VEF, there is now an official ‘priority’ exchange rate and a so-called ‘oil’ exchange rate used for certain transactions<br />

Source: <strong>BNP</strong> Paribas<br />

Foreign Exchange Strategy 23 September 2010<br />

Market Mover, Non-Objective Research Section<br />

68<br />

www.GlobalMarkets.bnpparibas.com


Market Coverage<br />

Market Economics<br />

Paul Mortimer-Lee Global Head of Market Economics London 44 20 7595 8551 paul.mortimer-lee@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Ken Wattret Chief Eurozone Market Economist London 44 20 7595 8657 kenneth.wattret@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Luigi Speranza Head of Inflation Economics, Eurozone, Italy London 44 20 7595 8322 luigi.speranza@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Alan Clarke UK London 44 20 7595 8476 alan.clarke@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Eoin O’Callaghan Inflation, Eurozone, Switzerland, Ireland London 44 20 7595 8226 eoin.ocallaghan@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Gizem Kara Scandinavia London 44 20 7595 8783 gizem.kara@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Dominique Barbet Eurozone, France Paris 33 1 4298 1567 dominique.barbet@bnpparibas.com<br />

Julia Coronado Senior US Economist New York 1 212 841 2281 julia.l.coronado@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Yelena Shulyatyeva US, Canada New York 1 212 841 2258 yelena.shulyatyeva @americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Ryutaro Kono Chief Economist Japan Tokyo 81 3 6377 1601 ryutaro.kono@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Hiroshi Shiraishi Japan Tokyo 81 3 6377 1602 hiroshi.shiraishi@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Azusa Kato Japan Tokyo 81 3 6377 1603 azusa.kato@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Makiko Fukuda Japan Tokyo 81 3 6377 1605 makiko.fukuda@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Richard Iley Head of Asia Economics Hong Kong 852 2108 5104 richard.iley@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Dominic Bryant Asia, Australia Hong Kong 852 2108 5105 dominic.bryant@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Mole Hau Asia Hong Kong 852 2108 5620 mole.hau@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Xingdong Chen Chief China Economist Beijing 86 10 6561 1118 xd.chen@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Isaac Y Meng China Beijing 86 10 6561 1118 isaac.y.meng@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Chan Kok Peng Chief Economist South East Asia Singapore 65 6210 1946 kokpeng.chan@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Marcelo Carvalho Head of Latin American Economics São Paulo 55 11 3841 3418 marcelo.carvalho@br.bnpparibas.com<br />

Italo Lombardi Latin America New York 1 212 841 6599 italo.lombardi@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Florencia Vazquez Latin American Economist Buenos Aires 54 11 4875 4363 florencia.vazquez@ar.bnpparibas.com<br />

Michal Dybula Central & Eastern Europe Warsaw 48 22 697 2354 michal.dybula@pl.bnpparibas.com<br />

Julia Tsepliaeva Russia & CIS Moscow 74 95 785 6022 julia.tsepliaeva@ru.bnpparibas.com<br />

Interest Rate Strategy<br />

Cyril Beuzit Global Head of Interest Rate Strategy London 44 20 7595 8639 cyril.beuzit@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Patrick Jacq Europe Strategist Paris 33 1 4316 9718 patrick.jacq@bnpparibas.com<br />

Hervé Cros Chief Inflation Strategist London 44 20 7595 8419 herve.cros@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Shahid Ladha Inflation Strategist London 44 20 7 595 8573 shahid.ladha@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Alessandro Tentori Chief Alpha Strategy Europe London 44 20 7595 8238 alessandro.tentori@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Eric Oynoyan Europe Alpha Strategist London 44 20 7595 8613 eric.oynoyan@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Matteo Regesta Europe Alpha Strategist London 44 20 7595 8607 matteo.regesta@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Ioannis Sokos Europe Alpha Strategist London 44 20 7595 8671 ioannis.sokos@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Camille de Courcel Europe Alpha Strategist London 44 20 7595 8295 camille.decourcel@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Bülent Baygün Head of Interest Rate Strategy US New York 1 212 471 8043 bulent.baygun@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Mary-Beth Fisher US Senior Strategist New York 1 212 841 2912 mary-beth.fisher@us.bnpparibas.com<br />

Sergey Bondarchuk US Strategist New York 1 212 841 2026 sergey.bondarchuk@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Suvrat Prakash US Strategist New York 1 917 472 4374 suvrat.prakash@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Rohit Garg US Strategist New York 1212 841 3937 rohit.k.garg@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Anish Lohokare MBS Strategist New York 1 212 841 2867 anish.lohokare@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Olurotimi Ajibola MBS Strategist New York 1 212 8413831 olurotimi.ajibola@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Koji Shimamoto Head of Interest Rate Strategy Japan Tokyo 81 3 6377 1700 koji.shimamoto@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Tomohisa Fujiki Japan Strategist Tokyo 81 3 6377 1703 Tomohisa.fujiki@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Masahiro Kikuchi Japan Strategist Tokyo 81 3 6377 1703 masahiro.kikuchi@japan.bnpparibas.com<br />

Christian Séné Technical Analyst Paris 33 1 4316 9717 christian.séné@bnpparibas.com<br />

FX Strategy<br />

Hans Redeker Global Head of FX Strategy London 44 20 7595 8086 hans-guenter.redeker@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Ian Stannard FX Strategist London 44 20 7595 8086 ian.stannard@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

James Hellawell Quantitative Strategist London 44 20 7595 8485 james.hellawell@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Kiran Kowshik FX Strategist London 44 20 7595 8086 kiran.kowshik@bnpparibas.com<br />

Sebastien Galy FX Strategist New York 1 212 841 2492 sebastien.galy@bnpparibas.com<br />

Mary Nicola FX Strategist New York 1 212 841 2492 mary.nicola@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Andy Chaveriat Technical Analyst New York 1 212 841 2408 andrew.chaveriat@americas.bnpparibas.com<br />

Emerging Markets FX & Interest Rate Strategy<br />

Drew Brick Head of FX & IR Strategy Asia Singapore 65 6210 3262 Drew.brick@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Chin Loo Thio FX & IR Asia Strategist Singapore 65 6210 3263 chin.thio@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Robert Ryan FX & IR Asia Strategist Singapore 65 6210 3314 robert.ryan@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Jasmine Poh FX & IR Asia Strategist Singapore 65 6210 3418 jasmine.j.poh@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Gao Qi FX & IR Asia Strategist Shanghai 86 21 2896 2876 gao.qi@asia.bnpparibas.com<br />

Shahin Vallée Head of FX & IR Strategy CEEMEA London 44 20 7595 8306 shahin.vallee@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Elisabeth Gruié FX & IR CEEMEA Strategist London 44 20 7595 8492 elisabeth.gruie@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Bartosz Pawlowski FX & IR CEEMEA Strategist London 44 20 7595 8195 Bartosz.pawlowski@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

Diego Donadio FX & IR Latin America Strategist São Paulo 55 11 3841 3421 diego.donadio@@br.bnpparibas.com<br />

69


For Production and Distribution, please contact:<br />

Ann Aston, Market Economics, London. Tel: 44 20 7595 8503 Email: 0ann.aston@uk.bnpparibas.com,<br />

Danielle Catananzi, Interest Rate Strategy, London. Tel: 44 20 7595 4418 Email: 1Hdanielle.catananzi@uk.bnpparibas.com,<br />

Derek Allassani, FX Strategy, London. Tel: 44 20 7595 8486 Email: 2Hderek.allassani@uk.bnpparibas.com,<br />

Martine Borde, Market Economics/Interest Rate Strategy, Paris. Tel: 33 1 4298 4144 Email 3Hmartine.borde@bnpparibas.com<br />

Editors: Amanda Grantham-Hill, Interest Rate Strategy/Market Economics, London. Tel: 44 20 7595 4107 Email: 4Hamanda.grantham-hill@bnpparibas.com;<br />

Nick Ashwell, FX/Market Economics, London. Tel: 44 20 7595 4120 Email: 5Hnick.ashwell@uk.bnpparibas.com<br />

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