Declaration Of Helen J. Hodges In Support Of Lead Counsel's ...

equirements of loss causation codified in the PSLRA; and the extension of joint and several liability
contravened the PSLRA. Defendant Barclays had withdrawn its petition for appeal shortly after it
was filed because the Court had dismissed it from the action. The Court, however, subsequently
allowed Lead Plaintiff leave to replead its case against Barclays. See 12/4/06 Opinion and Order
(Docket No. 5242) at 11-12. Thus, on December 8, 2006, Barclays filed its Motion (With Consent)
of Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc. to Join the Appeal Briefs Filed by
the CSFB and Merrill Lynch Appellants. The motion argued for reversal of the Court’s class
certification decision because the decision was based on an incorrect interpretation of Central Bank
and the PSLRA; the Court erroneously held that two presumptions of reliance were applicable; and
the Court misinterpreted the scope of joint-and-several liability.
274. On December 29, 2006, Lead Counsel filed Appellees’ Brief Responding to Vinson
& Elkins Appeal, which argued against reversal of the class certification order because the issues
presented were not the proper subject of Rule 23(f) appeal; the Court chose a correct legal standard
in adopting the “creator” test; and Lead Plaintiff and the Class have standing to pursue their claims
against V&E. On January 25, 2007, V&E filed a motion in the Fifth Circuit to withdraw its appeal,
which that court granted on January 26, 2007.
275. In accordance with the Fifth Circuit’s accelerated briefing schedule, on December 29,
2006, Lead Counsel filed Appellees’ Brief Responding to Merrill Lynch and Credit Suisse Appeals
which argued against reversal of the class certification order and that the appeal should be dismissed
because the issues raised were outside the jurisdiction and scope of review under Rule 23(f); the
Court committed no abuse of discretion in finding that the requirements for class certification were
satisfied; the Court correctly held that the standard for primary liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)
was satisfied on the facts presented; the Court properly found that reliance can be presumed; and
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