egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The Carter Center Presidential Election in Egypt candidacy would not begin until April 2012. 12 The announcement came at a time when activists were circulating proposals for convening an early presidential election in order to shorten the transition period and end military rule sooner than the SCAF-imposed deadline of June 30, 2012. Some believed that making the presidential election contingent upon the successful drafting and ratification of the constitution would result in the extension of military rule beyond the end of June 2012, as there was no guarantee that the members of a future constituent assembly would succeed in meeting the presumed deadline. In the end, the presidential election followed the parliamentary elections and preceded the completion of the constitutional drafting process. Following the completion of parliamentary elections at the end of February 2012, the electoral focus in Egypt shifted entirely to the presidential election. Parliamentary elections for the People’s Assembly (lower house) and Shura Council (upper house) were conducted in a phased approach from November 2011 through February 2012. The Carter Center observed all three phases of the People’s Assembly elections and both phases of the Shura Council elections. The Center regarded these elections as a formative step in Egypt’s struggle for democracy but had reservations about the broader context in which the elections were held. All Carter Center public statements and its final report on the parliamentary elections can be found on the Center’s website. 13 Both houses of Parliament were seated by the end of February, meeting a condition of the Constitutional Declaration for proceeding to the election of a constituent assembly. By this time, many members of Parliament were skeptical of the possibility of forming a constituent assembly, drafting a constitution, and putting it to a popular referendum ahead of the scheduled June 30, 2012, hand-over. Nevertheless, the SCAF repeatedly demanded that the constitution, be finalized before the presidential election, presumably preferring to see its political and economic privileges defined and protected by the new constitution before relinquishing its power. For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood viewed the constitutional drafting process as a prerogative guaranteed to Parliament by the Constitutional Declaration as well as a privilege earned at the polls. Presumably, it also preferred to define the powers of Parliament before the president took office, lest the new president prove hostile to its political agenda and parliamentary gains. 14 The Constitutional Declaration left undefined the rules governing the processes of selecting members of the constituent assembly, the deliberation over constitution-writing, and approval of the draft constitution inside the elected body (for example, majority rule versus supramajority rule). Furthermore — in spite of various proposals specifically aimed at reaching agreement among all parties on the foundational principles of the constitution — in the first year after the popular uprising, political forces were unable to reach a consensus on constitutional principles that might make the drafting process less contentious. Controversial issues that remain unresolved included but were not limited to the status of the military establishment, 15 the form of government, and the role of Islamic jurisprudence. In late March 2012, Parliament met to elect the constituent assembly. However, political divisions remained, with the majority of the Islamistdominated Parliament deciding that 50 percent of the assembly should be drawn from members of Parliament. Non-Islamist parties were incensed, and some members resigned in protest. Ultimately, this constituent assembly was suspended by an 12 “Egypt constitution to be drafted before presidential elections: Minister.” El Ahram Online, Jan. 1, 2012. http://english.ahram.org. eg/NewsContent/1/64/30684/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-constitution-to-bedrafted-before-presidenti.aspx. 13 http://cartercenter.org/news/publications/election_reports.html#egypt 14 Prior to the presidential election, it was widely assumed that the Muslim Brotherhood would vie for a parliamentary system in order to protect the political gains it made during the parliamentary elections. 15 In the lead-up to the parliamentary elections, the SCAF led controversial, unsuccesful efforts to carve out an agreement with political parties and groups over supraconstitutional principles that would define the role of the military under a civilian-led government. These principles were designed with the assumption that they would govern constitution writing following the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections. 8
The Carter Center Presidential Election in Egypt administrative court ruling on April 10, 2012. 16 With the constitution no closer to being drafted and a lack of clarity on when and how it would be finalized, the electoral preparations for the presidential election began. Political Maneuvering and the Candidate Nomination Process Preparations for the presidential election commenced in early March with the preparation of the voters’ register and the start of the candidate nomination period, a period that was marked by a series of dramatic twists and turns. Late in the process, the Muslim Brotherhood reversed its earlier decision not to field a presidential candidate and nominated not one, but two candidates — Khairat El Shater, the Brotherhood’s deputy leader and main financier as well as Mohamed Morsi, then chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party. Shortly thereafter, former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman entered the race with what was seen by many as the explicit goal of countering the Brotherhood’s influence. Shater and Suleiman were eventually disqualified on technical grounds by the PEC. Shater was disqualified for having been sentenced to a prison term under Mubarak (though the conviction was widely regarded as being politicized), while Suleiman was removed for being 31 signatures short in his registration application. Ayman Nour, who faced off against Mubarak in Egypt’s first multicandidate elections in 2005, also was disqualified for a previous conviction that was regarded as politically motivated. And finally, the Salafist populist candidate Hazem Abu Ismail was disqualified when it was proved that his late mother had previously acquired U.S. citizenship. 17 In the end, Preparations for the presidential election commenced in early March with the preparation of the voters’ register and the start of the candidate nomination period, a period that was marked by a series of dramatic twists and turns. of the 23 Egyptian citizens who initially registered as candidates, only 13 proceeded to the first round of the election. The First Round of the Presidential Election: May 23–24, 2012 The top two candidates who garnered about 25 percent of the vote each and proceeded to the runoff were Mohamed Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, former general, aviation minister, and last-serving prime minister under Mubarak. Morsi and Shafiq were followed in the results by the Nasserite candidate Hamdeen Sabahi, who received 20 percent of the vote; former senior Muslim Brotherhood member Abdel Moneim Aboul Fatouh with 17 percent; and former Arab League head Amr Moussa with 11 percent. Other candidates who got votes from the left and from labor and youth groups included Khalid Ali, a labor organizer and human rights activist; Hisham Bastawisi, a senior judge who was involved in the movement for greater judicial independence; and Abul-Ezz El-Hariri, a socialist labor activist and former parliamentarian. It is worth noting that approximately 50 percent of all eligible voters who participated in the first round of the election chose not to vote either for the 16 The constituent assembly was later re-formed in early June 2012, following multiparty negotiations on its composition. Although this constituent assembly remained intact throughout both rounds of the presidential election, several members, mainly non-Islamists, have resigned from it, citing alleged Islamist domination of the body. The new constituent assembly has also faced renewed court challenges, including a claim that the constituent assembly is invalid because its selection (in part) by members of the People’s Assembly rendered it invalid following the dissolution of the People’s Assembly by the Supreme Constitutional Court. 17 Candidates’ parents, by law, must have Egyptian citizenship exclusively throughout their lives. 9
Page 1 and 2: Presidential Election in Egypt Fina
Page 3 and 4: Presidential Election in Egypt Fina
Page 5 and 6: The Carter Center Contents Executiv
Page 7 and 8: The Carter Center Presidential Elec
Page 11: The Carter Center Presidential Elec
Page 33 and 34: The Carter Center Voter Registratio
Page 47 and 48: The Carter Center The Media Environ
Page 49 and 50: The Carter Center Participation of
Page 51 and 52: The Carter Center Civil Society Org
Page 55 and 56: The Carter Center Out-of-Country Vo
Page 63 and 64:
The Carter Center Presidential Elec
Page 65 and 66:
The Carter Center Announcement of E
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
The Carter Center Conclusions and R
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
The Carter Center The Carter Center
Page 81 and 82:
The Carter Center Appendix B The Ca
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
The Carter Center Appendix D Statem
Page 87 and 88:
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
The Carter Center Appendix F Checkl
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Page 133:
The Carter Center at a Glance Overv
show all

egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?