egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012

The Carter Center
Presidential Election in Egypt
Muslim Brotherhood or the Mubarak regime-affiliated
candidates. Instead, they supported candidates who
were either explicitly “revolutionary” and had a long
history of opposition to the Mubarak regime or ones
who were at the very least moderate and reformist.
The emergence of this “third camp” underlined that
many Egyptians did not feel represented by either a
Muslim Brotherhood candidate or a Mubarak regimeaffiliated
candidate. Ultimately, however, the two
candidates with the most well-established political
machines prevailed, and voters faced a polarizing
choice in the second round.
Political Developments Between
the First and Second Rounds of
the Election
While not exclusively related to the election, several
events with an important impact on Egypt’s ongoing
transition unfolded in the
interim period between the
first and second rounds of
the election. Their timing
contributed to a growing
dissatisfaction with the
electoral process as well
as continued uncertainty
about the role and meaning
of electoral processes in
the context of the militaryorchestrated
transition,
leading to calls for a boycott
and vote-spoiling campaigns.
In the weeks between the
two rounds of polling, the SCAF renewed pressure on
political forces to secure an agreement on the composition
of the constituent assembly to be appointed
by Parliament and the guidelines for drafting a new
permanent constitution. The ruling military council
initiated negotiations between the non-Islamist and
Islamist parties on the composition of a new constituent
assembly, against the backdrop of the looming
In the weeks between the two rounds
of polling, the SCAF renewed pressure
on political forces to secure an
agreement on the composition of the
constituent assembly to be appointed
by Parliament and the guidelines for
drafting a new permanent constitution.
case before the Supreme Constitutional Court that
threatened to dissolve the Parliament and the SCAF’s
announcement that it might unilaterally amend the
Constitutional Declaration in order to further define
the powers of the presidency. The negotiations,
however, ended with an impasse when non-Islamist
members of the constituent assembly walked out
after accusing the Islamists of not holding up their
end of the bargain to have an assembly composed of
no more than 50 percent Islamists. They objected
to the fact that moderate Islamist parties and some
religious institutions were given seats on the assembly
from the half of the body theoretically reserved for
non-Islamists.
On June 14, 2012, only two days before the
second round of voting in the presidential election,
the SCC ruled that the Political Exclusion Law
passed by Parliament in May 2012 and signed by
the military council to exclude high-ranking former
regime officials was unconstitutional.
After Ahmed
Shafiq appealed to the PEC
regarding the validity of
this law, the PEC referred
the law to the SCC and
maintained Shafiq’s position
on the presidential ballot. 18
The SCC verdict supported
the perceived inclination of
the PEC that Shafiq should
be allowed to run. Both the
run-up to the decision and
the timing of the decision
caused political upheaval.
The SCC also ruled on the same day that the
electoral law that was used to elect one-third of the
18 Only a judicial authority can refer a law to the SCC and not an
administrative authority. Although the PEC is composed of judges, it is
unclear in the law as to whether it functions as a purely administrative
body or as a judicial body. In subsequent meetings with the PEC, it
confirmed to The Carter Center that it considers itself a judicial body
and, therefore, has the authority and right to act accordingly.
11