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The Carter Center<br />

Presidential Election in Egypt<br />

of 8 a.m. These inconsistencies in opening times<br />

may have disenfranchised some voters. It is essential<br />

that the training of election officials include<br />

the importance of opening on time and the steps<br />

that election officials and other stakeholders must<br />

take to ensure that all procedures preliminary to<br />

poll opening are completed before the designated<br />

opening time.<br />

Closing procedures: During both rounds of<br />

voting, Carter Center witnesses observed some<br />

instances in which polling station officials<br />

commenced the vote count before closing the<br />

polling station. Beginning the vote count while<br />

voters are still casting ballots increases the likelihood<br />

that the <strong>final</strong> count will be inaccurate and<br />

decreases confidence in the integrity of the electoral<br />

process overall. The Carter Center strongly<br />

recommends that future training of election<br />

officials emphasizes a standardized approach to<br />

the closing of polling stations and the securing of<br />

ballots and that closing procedures should only be<br />

commenced after the conclusion of voting.<br />

Interference by candidate agents: In roughly<br />

5 percent of polling stations, Carter Center<br />

witnesses reported that candidate agents interfered<br />

in the process or actively took on roles of polling<br />

station staff. A clear distinction between polling<br />

station staff and candidate agents is necessary to<br />

promote the independence, and the perception of<br />

independence, of the electoral process. EMB officials<br />

should ensure that judges and other polling<br />

station personnel are trained on the importance<br />

of allowing only polling station staff to conduct<br />

polling activities. EMBs should also develop and<br />

implement training for candidate agents and other<br />

stakeholders to ensure they understand the limits<br />

of their roles in the process.<br />

Ballot secrecy: Carter Center witnesses observed<br />

in many polling stations that voters were not<br />

casting their ballots in absolute secrecy, for various<br />

reasons. In addition to ensuring that polling<br />

stations and polling booths are large enough to<br />

facilitate ballot secrecy, election officials should<br />

also ensure that the right to vote in secret is<br />

incorporated into voter education efforts and that<br />

election officials are well-trained on both the<br />

importance of ballot secrecy and how to ensure<br />

that polling station rooms are best configured to<br />

ensure ballot secrecy.<br />

Determination of ballot validity: Carter Center<br />

witnesses observed inconsistencies at the pollingstation<br />

level in the determination of whether<br />

a marked ballot was valid or invalid. There did<br />

not appear to be systematic review at the District<br />

General Committee (DGC) level of pollingstation-level<br />

decisions regarding ballot validity,<br />

even though the law grants DGCs authority to<br />

review and modify such decisions. Future electoral<br />

processes would benefit by developing training<br />

for election officials and other stakeholders on<br />

their roles in the process of determining and<br />

challenging ballot validity at the polling station<br />

and DGC level.<br />

Use of secure, tamper-evident bags: Although<br />

The Carter Center observed that the transport<br />

of sensitive materials generally took place in an<br />

orderly and efficient manner, the process still<br />

allowed for the possibility of tampering. The<br />

Carter Center reiterates its recommendation that<br />

future EMBs consider the use of secure, tamperevident<br />

bags for the transportation of materials, as<br />

a further protection against electoral fraud.<br />

11. Ensure timely notification of procedural changes.<br />

Changes to procedures close to or on polling days,<br />

such as last-minute modifications, can create a<br />

host of challenges. It is therefore essential that<br />

EMBs prioritize the timely release of election regulations<br />

and procedures. The Carter Center recommends<br />

that in cases of unavoidable late changes<br />

to the regulations or procedures, the EMB takes<br />

immediate steps to ensure that all stakeholders<br />

(including the electorate) are alerted to and, as<br />

necessary, trained on the new regulations and<br />

procedures and that the EMB coordinates quickly<br />

with other agencies to ensure that these changed<br />

procedures and policies are properly implemented.<br />

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