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The Carter Center<br />

Presidential Election in Egypt<br />

from any decisions taken by an election management<br />

body. In accordance with Egypt’s international obligations,<br />

this tribunal should be independent of, and<br />

perceived as independent of, the election management<br />

body. 38<br />

The problem of the PEC’s ultimate authority over<br />

decision-making was compounded by the apparent<br />

conflict of interest that PEC members have with the<br />

courts. By law, the PEC is chaired by the head of<br />

the Supreme Constitutional Court. The other four<br />

members are all senior judges<br />

from the various major<br />

judicial systems of Egypt. In<br />

cases where the PEC refers<br />

matters such as campaign<br />

or election-day violations<br />

to the ordinary courts, or<br />

refers constitutional matters<br />

such as the validity of the<br />

political exclusion law to<br />

the Supreme Constitutional<br />

Court, it is reasonable for<br />

one to assume that the courts might show favoritism<br />

to the PEC. Even the appearance of a conflict of<br />

interest in these cases damages the perceived impartiality<br />

of the courts in hearing matters involving the<br />

PEC, which runs counter to international good practice.<br />

39 In response to these issues, The Carter Center<br />

recommends establishing a permanent, independent<br />

electoral management body and ending the appointment<br />

of judges to leadership positions within the<br />

election management body solely on the basis of the<br />

seniority of their judicial positions.<br />

Attempts To Reinstate State of Emergency<br />

Conditions in Egypt: On May 31, <strong>2012</strong>, the<br />

Emergency Law, under which Egypt had been<br />

governed continuously since 1981, expired. 40 On<br />

June 13, <strong>2012</strong>, however, the Ministry of Justice<br />

issued a decision that would have allowed military<br />

police and intelligence officials to arrest civilians<br />

for a range of crimes typically considered in civilian<br />

courts, including spreading false information with the<br />

intent of injuring national security and “insulting”<br />

The Carter Center commends<br />

Egyptian leaders for allowing the<br />

Emergency Law to lapse without<br />

renewal but remains concerned about<br />

attempts by authorities to reinstate<br />

emergency provisions by other means.<br />

21<br />

public officials. 41 On June 26, following the second<br />

round of the election, the administrative court<br />

declared this decision invalid, stating that it violated<br />

the Constitutional Declaration and Egypt’s Code of<br />

Criminal Procedure. 42<br />

The Carter Center commends Egyptian leaders for<br />

allowing the Emergency Law to lapse without renewal<br />

but remains concerned about attempts by authorities<br />

to reinstate emergency provisions by other means.<br />

The electoral process relies on free expression by<br />

candidates and their agents<br />

and by voters to operate<br />

effectively. Attempts to<br />

reinstate restrictive provisions<br />

of the Emergency Law<br />

are likely to have a chilling<br />

effect on political expression<br />

and contravene Egypt’s<br />

international commitments<br />

to guarantee freedom of<br />

expression for its citizens. 43<br />

Disenfranchisement: The<br />

enjoyment of the right to vote is a primary indicator<br />

of the health of electoral democracy. 44 Egypt’s<br />

commitment to the principles of universal suffrage<br />

requires that the right to vote be extended to the<br />

38 UNHRC, General Comment No. 31, para. 15; AU, African Union<br />

Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa,<br />

para. 3<br />

39 UNHRC, General Comment No. 32, para. 19; AU, African Union<br />

Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa,<br />

para. 3<br />

40 It had been most recently reimposed for a two-year period by the<br />

Mubarak regime in May 2010.<br />

41 Decision No. 4991; Human Rights Watch, Military Power Grab<br />

Creates Conditions for Abuse, June 21, <strong>2012</strong><br />

42 On June 14, five human rights NGOs filed a case against the head<br />

of the SCAF, the minister of justice, the minister of defense, the public<br />

prosecutor, the chief of military justice, and the military prosecutor,<br />

demanding the immediate end of the decision.<br />

43 U.N., ICCPR, Article 10; UNHRC, General Comment 25, para. 19<br />

44 U.N., ICCPR, Article 25 (b); Universal Declaration of Human Rights,<br />

Article 21(3): “The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of<br />

government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine <strong>elections</strong><br />

which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret<br />

vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

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