egypt-final-presidential-elections-2012

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The Carter Center Executive Summary Egypt’s historic 2012 presidential election was the first time Egypt’s head of state would be directly elected by the people in a competitive election that included candidates representing diverse political platforms and where the outcome was genuinely unknown. The presidential election on May 23–24, 2012, and the runoff on June 16–17, 2012, also marked at least 1 the fourth and fifth times, respectively, that Egyptians were called to the polls in little over a year. However, while there was considerable enthusiasm for the electoral process, it was marred by uncertainty about the broader transition overseen by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The paramount question in the leadup to the election was whether this electoral process Former Yemeni Prime Minister Abdul Karim Al-Eryani greets voters standing in a queue during the runoff election on June 16, 2012. would, in fact, result in a full transfer of power from the military to a civilian-led government by June 30, 2012, as the military council had indicated. Another equally important question was the degree to which the powers of the new president would be balanced vis-á-vis other state institutions as they were largely undefined in the Constitutional Declaration Maurice Chammah in force at the time. Finally, the timeline for drafting a new constitution hung in the balance as the final composition of the constituent assembly formed to draft it had not been resolved. On June 17, shortly after the polls closed for the runoff phase of the election, the SCAF issued a controversial addendum to the Constitutional Declaration. In it, it granted to itself the legislative powers of the recently dissolved People’s Assembly — as well as key powers previously held by the Egyptian president — and formalized the military council as a governing institution within the constitutional framework. Furthermore, the SCAF inserted itself into the constitution drafting process by giving itself the powers to appoint a constituent assembly in the event the assembly was unable to fulfill its duties. It also gave itself veto power over content in a future-draft constitution. Following the June 17 constitutional addendum, The Carter Center continued to express grave concerns about the increasing ambiguity of the SCAF-led transition and the meaning and purpose of the presidential election within this context. Ultimately, the election produced Egypt’s first democratically elected civilian president, Mohamed Morsi — a significant milestone in the wake of the January 2011 popular uprising. It did not, however, signal the conclusion to the transfer of power from the military to an elected civilian government as previously promised by the military council. Postelection Developments On Aug. 12, after only 43 days in office, newly elected President Morsi took a series of dramatic steps that included replacing top members of the SCAF’s 1 In some cases, Egyptians may have voted up to nine times in a little over a year as a result of runoff and rerun elections during election for the People’s Assembly and the Shura Council. 2
The Carter Center Presidential Election in Egypt senior leadership as well as replacing the June 17 constitutional addendum with a new addendum. President Morsi’s addendum effectively fully restored the executive office of the presidency, granted legislative powers to the president in the absence of a People’s Assembly, and allowed the president to appoint a new constituent assembly to draft a constitution should the current assembly be prevented from performing its duties. While these moves will undoubtedly have a lasting impact on the future role of the military in formal politics and Egypt’s struggle to produce a civilian-led government, they do not change the fundamental problem that has continued to plague Egypt’s transition from the start: the lack of a constitution that protects fundamental rights and ensures checks and balances of power. President Morsi has asked the Egyptian people to place their trust in him to deliver on the longer-term goals of the popular uprising, which include building the foundation for genuinely democratic politics. It is incumbent upon newly elected President Morsi to do everything in his power to move Egypt toward a greater stability by laying this foundation. This can be done by ensuring an inclusive and transparent constitutional drafting process by a constituent assembly that enjoys popular legitimacy and is afforded the opportunity for full and complete debate and discourse on the content of the constitution and Egypt’s political future. In addition, President Morsi must turn over legislative power to a democratically elected parliament as soon as possible. Finally, the success of the transition will require guaranteed respect for and protection of the fundamental civil and political rights of all Egyptians by a democratically elected, civilian government. The Carter Center and the Presidential Election The Carter Center was present for both rounds of the presidential election. However, its mission to witness the election was limited in scope due to restrictions imposed on election witnesses by Egypt’s electoral authorities. The Carter Center election witnessing mission in Egypt was accredited by the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) on May 3, 2012. Accreditation badges, necessary for witnesses to observe the process, were provided on May 16, less than seven days before the first round of the presidential election. In addition to the delayed issuance of accreditation badges, witnessing regulations included a provision that witnessing missions could not issue statements prior to polling, and it imposed a 30-minute time restriction on witnesses’ presence inside polling stations and prohibited witnessing the final aggregation of the results. Due to these restrictions imposed upon election witnesses by Egypt’s electoral authorities, the Center was unable to assess critical pre-election phases, including voter registration, candidate nomination, Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, with field officer director Sanne van den Bergh, observe poll closing on May 24, 2012. Deborah Hakes 3
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