ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

NO. 136MAY/JUNE1999

Australian Defence Force JournalBoard of ManagementBrigadier A.S. D’Hagé, AM, MC (Chairman)Captain J.P.D. Hodgman, RANLieutenant Colonel N.F. JamesGroup Captain C.A. BeattyMs K. GriffithThe fact that an advertisement is accepted forpublication in the Australian Defence ForceJournal does not imply that the product or servicehas the endorsement of the Australian DefenceForce Journal, the Australian Defence Force or theDepartment of Defence. Readers are advised toseek professional advice where appropriate as theJournal can accept no responsibility for the claimsof its advertisers.Contributions of any length will be considered but,as a guide, 3000 words is the ideal length. Articlesshould be typed double spaced, on one side of thepaper, or preferably submitted on disk in a wordprocessing format. Hardcopy should be suppliedin duplicate.All contributions and correspondence should beaddressed to:The Managing EditorAustralian Defence Force JournalBuilding B-4-26Russell OfficesCANBERRA ACT 2600(02) 6265 2682 or 6265 2999Fax (02) 6265 6972CopyrightThe material contained in the Australian DefenceForce Journal is the copyright of the Department ofDefence. No part of the publication may bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system, ortransmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwisewithout the consent of the Managing Editor.Advertising Enquiries:(02) 9876 5333, (02) 6265 1193General Enquiries:(02) 6265 3234Email: adfj@spirit.com.auwww.adfa.oz.au/dod/dfj/© Commonwealth of Australia 1999ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 1999

No. 136 May/June 1999Front CoverThe Australian Army Bushranger vehicle atMajura Range near Canberra.3. Letters to the EditorContents5. What Has Gone WrongCaptain M.A.J. Watson, RAA13. Strategy and CrisisBrigadier J.J.A. Wallace, AM23. Peace DevelopmentDan Baschiera, Defence Community Organisation35. Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence andForeign PolicyFlight Lieutenant S.A. Madsen, RAAF41. The Importance of Training Needs Analysis inIntegrated Logistic SupportLieutenant Commander Jim Kenny, RAN43. Unconventional Warfare – An OverviewMajor R.C. Moor, Ra Inf.51. Book ReviewsPhotograph bySergeant Dave BroosManaging EditorMichael P. TraceyEditorIrene M. CoombesPrinted in Australia by National CapitalPrinting, Fyshwick, ACT 2609Contributors are urged to ensure the accuracy of the informationcontained in their articles; the Board of Management accepts noresponsibility for errors of fact.Permission to reprint articles in the Journal will generally be readilygiven by the Managing Editor after consultation with the author. Anyreproduced articles should bear an acknowledgement of source.The views expressed in the articles are the author’s own and shouldnot be construed as official opinion or policy.

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3Letters to the EditorAirborne ForcesDear Editor,Major Basan provided a cogent analysis on arelevant topic in his article “Airborne Forces: TheTwenty-First Century’s Rapid Dominance Solution”,(ADFJ Nov/Dec 1998).His thesis is well supported by contemporary trendsin warfare and the emerging strategic environment.Importantly, airborne operations have the potential to bedecisive for either strategic or tactical objectives.Furthermore, with imaginative planning and appropriatecapability sets, airborne forces are employable acrossthe spectrum of conventional to irregular warfare.A key force development issue arises if we acceptthe tenets of Major Basan’s article. Could thedevelopment of Australia’s airborne forces significantlyenhance our military options in the context of amaritime strategy? Airborne characteristics such asstrategic mobility, strike power and versatility should becarefully considered.However, airborne forces alone are not the solution.Ultimately, an effective maritime strategy will rely onbalanced capabilities to project air, naval and landpower. Perhaps further developing our airbornecapability is an opportunity to improve the balance.Certainly, responsive and lethal airborne forces wouldadd to the operational options for Australia’s emergingmaritime strategy.P.K. SinghLieutenant ColonelThe Knowledge EdgeDear Editor,I have just finished reading “The Relevance of theKnowledge Edge” by Professor Paul Dibb in theJan/Feb 1999 ADFJ and felt utterly depressed by thenegative attitude of the Canberra crowd who have suchinfluence on the decision making process in relation toDefence Policy. The article is littered with quotes suchas “Every Australian defence planner needs toremember that there are limits to Australia’s defencecapability”, “the realities of limited resources and thesmall size of the ADF will discipline those who dreamabout aircraft carriers and expeditionary forces for highlevel conflicts”, “For Australia, as a middle power withlimited defence capacity”, “this kind of adaptiveness inAustralia’s force planning will be far from easy giventhe limited financial resources that are likely to beavailable”.Isn’t it about time we took a more positive view ofdefence and decided that if Australia is worth defendingthen its about time Federal Governments made theresources available to do the job properly. What weneed is a large dose of the American “can do” attitudeinstead of the dreadful “can’t do” mentality thatpervades so much of Australian life.The fact is that the ADF’s present force structurewouldn’t, as Sir James Killen noted about twenty fiveyears ago, be capable of defending Bondi beach on aSunday afternoon. And yet we are fed a constant load ofrubbish by Government, Bureaucracy, and ServiceChiefs about our self reliance. Self reliance for what?If it had the will, Australia could and should becomea genuine middle ranking power that had a realinfluence on events in our region to an extent that hasnot been visible since World War 2.Our Foreign Affairs Department gives theimpression of being a toothless tiger staffed by peopleincapable of assessing events in our region and advisinga succession of Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministersswanning around the world gladhanding theircounterparts and achieving little.Bougainville is the classic example of a seriousdispute for which we had a prime responsibility, but didnothing for nine years until New Zealand took up thecudgells to try and broker a solution. Already the PrimeMinister and Foreign Minister are hedging their bets inrelation to Timor with Mr Downer making theunfortunate and stupid comment about not wantingAustralians coming back in body bags.Perhaps someone ought to tell someone in Canberrathat the armed forces do occasionally suffer casualtieswhen on operational duties. We can only be pleased thatno one these days has to make the kind of decisions thathad to be made during the two world wars.Paul Dibb observes “What will have to be avoided,however is any temptation for politicians to reach downinto military operational decisions”. God forbid thatever happening, but it could occur if our military leadersdon’t show more determination in protecting theintegrity of the ADF than they have in the recent past.There needs to be a serious commitment by FederalGovernments to provide the resources for the ADF totake an effective role in whatever troubles may occur inthe future, because its present structure to either defendAustralia against a hostile threat, which is unlikely in theforeseeable future, or participate in meaningful supportin regional trouble spots is totally inadequate.Peter Firkins

AUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WARAustralian Prisoners of War spans the Boer War to the Korea War and commemoratesthose Australians who suffered as Prisoners of War in all conflicts.This is the 10th in a series of commemorative books produced by theAustralian Defence Force Journal.This series of publications was produced with the encouragement of the Chief of theAustralian Defence Force and the Secretary of the Department of Defence inacknowledgement of the contribution made by former members of theAustralian Defence Force in times of adversity.Australian Prisoners of War is available from the office of theAustralian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $29.95.Australian Defence Force Journal – Mail Order FormAUSTRALIAN PRISONERS OF WARPlease send order to Australian Defence Force Journal,B-4-26, Russell Offices, CANBERRA ACT 2600Name: ____________________________________________________________________________________Address: __________________________________________________________________________________I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $_________________being payment forcopies of Australian Prisoners of War.

What Has Gone WrongBy Captain M.A.J. Watson, RAAAuthor’s NoteThis article is addressed to the senior officers of today. The Army and indeed the DefenceForce that you intend to bequeath your subordinates and on a wider scale the Nation will not beworth the paper it is written on.The previous statement is deliberately inflammatory, I make no apologies for that. Itexpresses the view of a single disgruntled malcontent, who is to boot just a mere Captain. Ordoes it? Disaffection within the junior officer ranks is widespread. Whether you choose toacknowledge that fact is irrelevant. The perception that the Army lacks direction and purpose isreality for many junior officers. Alarmingly, recent graduates from the Royal Military Collegeexpressed the view that the only worthwhile Corps for aspiring graduates was RASIGS - for thepotential it offered for civilian employment upon completion of their ROSO! The relative meritsof this statement and the commendable insight of those who arrived at its deduction are outsidethe scope of this work, it does however, offer a telling insight into the psyche of the modernjunior officer.Initially I intend to outline what is wrong with the Army from my perspective. Your criticismof my presumptuousness is predictable. How could I, with my dearth of experience and narrowglobal perspectives, with any hope of credibility, denigrate what is in effect your life’s work? Ifyour minds remain closed I can’t. I would however remind you that at the end of 1998 the ARAwas short 240 Captains on its post DRP strength. I wager that this represents an increasingproportion of “wheat” to “chaff”. Separation at this stage of one’s working life implies thereasonable prospect of advantageous alternative employment. There is no reason to believe thatthis trend will be reversed, and thus, by default my opening statement will come to fruition.Your next logical objection to my train of argument will be to imply that it is so typical forthose of my “generation” to undermine establishment without feeling the need to propose a viablealternative. I intend to propose a vision for the future, not in this article, but in future works. It isanticipated that you will find my solutions simplistic and puerile, perhaps they are, but that maybe because objectivity is not so problematic when self interest is removed from the equation.Finally, you will employ your ultimate leveller. The assertion that if I no longer care for a lifeof servitude that I should resign my Commission and seek an existence elsewhere. I wouldremind you of the numbers that have chosen to do just that. The truth is that I still care enough tovoice my concerns, fully cognisant of the fact that the vast majority of the Army community willhave no inclination to read this document and those that do are likely to find something within itthat will cause offence.I beseech you to read the opening quotation of my article. I believe it is a fine watershed forreaders of this article. Some readers will lament on how much truth the passage contains whilstothers may feel a twinge of discomfort. To the latter I commend the words of Oliver Cromwell inhis address to the Rump Parliament, “You have sat too long here for any good you have beendoing. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!”

6AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999“Unwatched, a peacetime military willdegenerate into a bureaucracy designed byMegalomaniacs to be a vehicle to satisfy theirego’s. Tactical prowess will be allowed to besubordinate to bureaucratic manoeuvre,leadership will become an intangible used toconceal a lack of depth, and loyalty will be usedas censorship to enable the unfettered impositionof careerist initiatives”Major Pat Stogran, PPCLI, 15 Jul 97IntroductionThe personal circumstances of Major Stogran areirrelevant, as is the fact that the intended target ofhis insightfullness was the Armed Forces of is ownnation. The above passage, however, is entirelyappropriate for the current circumstances that prevailacross the Army. At junior officer level there is apalpable sense that the Army has shrugged off anysemblance of its perceived corps values and hasindeed lost its way. The result of this is the belief thatthe Army has begun an inexorable slide intoirrelevance. It was widely lampooned in the Author’sprevious unit that the Army was akin to an old car, onblocks, slowly rusting away in a paddock, a depictionof which is included as Figure 1.As stated in the Author’s Note, this articlerepresents one junior officer’s perception on theprevailing attitude of his fellows. If the readerfundamentally disagrees with the above perception,the validity of this objection being questionable atbest if the reader is not currently a junior officer, thenthis article will have no bearing. This reader shouldproceed no further, rather, they should ensconce theirself in the belief that their ongoing toil is valuable andvalued, unconcerned by the reality that they are thereason for the inclusion of “inexorable” in the aboveparagraph. If this reader gets the impression that theauthor is laughing at them, they are entirely correct.This article will expose the Army’s increasinglydilapidated appearance from the perspective of ajunior officer. Three primary indicators will be usedto attest to the Army’s waning fortunes. Firstly,Army’s share of the Defence Budget, secondly,personnel issues and finally, Army’s muddled“vision” for the future. All three issues areintrinsically linked and their cumulative effects arespeeding the Army towards oblivion.Money Is The Root Of All EvilNowhere is the decline of the Army more obviousthan in the percentage of the annual Defence Budgetthat it manages to secure for itself, particularly in thearea of Capital Equipment Procurement. Armyapologists will attempt to sight the unsympatheticDefence Policies of successive Governments forhaving the effect of syphoning funds into projects forthe Navy and Airforce in order to allow them to denythe air-sea gap. It will be the contention of this article,however, that outside of a vague notion of providingfor Australia’s defence, Australia’s electedofficialdom have neither the capability nor theinclination to actually dictate what the 10 plus billiondollars allocated to the Defence Budget are actuallyspent on. 1 If the role played by politicians inspending the Defence dollar is minimal then surelythe relative success of the Navy and Airforce is due inno small part to both the quality of their personnel andtheir ability to quantify and articulate a vision for thefuture.Figure 1“Total defence spending for the coming financialyear has been set at $10 945.5m, up $589.2m fromoutlays in the current financial year.” 2 The previousstatement is obviously in relation to FY 98/99. TheArmy Program Actual Outcome for 1997-98 was $1268.3m, 3 in comparison with Navy $721.3m 4 andAirforce $695.0m. 5 Not surprisingly this reflects thehigher total numbers in Army, Service PersonnelRunning Costs alone accounted for $1 098.4m. 6 As a

8AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999Defence and Defence Policy at Government level.Examine the following, “With the 20-20 vision ofhindsight, a former Labor Cabinet minister admits:‘We never did properly scrutinise Defence. Therewas nobody in bloody cabinet apart from Kim whounderstood it. (sic) And he could always talk the restof us under the table.’” 23 Defence’s worthy politicalmasters know what they want, “Government wantsoptions”, 24 a balanced amorphous mass, capable ofresponding to whatever contingency Governmentwishes to commit to. This is not an unreasonablerequest for close to $11b a year. The excuse thatArmy is missing out on its share of the AcquisitionsBudget due to an unfavourable external environmentis preposterous in the extreme. Army is missing outbecause no one has the nous to dispel a lie.Would The Last One To Leave PleaseTurn Out The LightsThe Mission of the Directorate General CareerManagement-Army (DGCM-A) is, “To maximiseDefence capabilities by managing Army’s personnelasset in accordance with agreed priorities (sic)ensuring that ‘the right person is in the right job at theright time’” 25 . It would be too easy to launch into avenomous diatribe at the above statement, which intruth would be unwarranted. DGCM-A’sresponsibilities, like those of the Directorate GeneralPersonnel Plans (DGPP) are the metaphoricalequivalent of a large bag filled with two-inch lengthsof string. Their job is a thankless one, analogous to asmall boy suspended from a dyke with all his fingersand toes jammed into an ever-increasing number ofholes. Whilst Army failed to stop the blue and whitesuites from making off with the cookie jar, in terms ofCEPs, this isn’t what is killing the Army, the Army isbleeding to death.It sounds dramatic and there are undoubtablysome that would dismiss the statement as overlyemotive, however the gravity of the situation will beoutlined in the following statistics. It is widely jokedthat all the rats haven’t deserted the sinking ship asyet, they are too busy studying for postgraduatequalifications. The following discussion will centreon Officer separations in the ranks of Captain toLieutenant Colonel. The principal source of data wasthe Deputy Directorate Workforce Planning-Army(DDWP-A) Data Analysis meeting of 17 Feb 99.There has been a 400 per cent increase in the ARAOfficer monthly rolling separation rate in FY 98/99.ARA wide the separation rate as at the end of Januarywas 11.92 per cent, the forecast separation rate for FY98/99 was 10.5 per cent. The total liability in theafore mentioned ranks as at the beginning of Januarywas Captain 6.81 per cent, Major 14.17 per cent andLieutenant Colonel 19.8 per cent. 26 Whilst theLieutenant Colonel figure is alarming it is noted withmalicious and barely concealed glee that it is in theCaptain rank that the first crisis will occur. In theAuthor’s Note a shortfall of 240 Captains wasoutlined, it would seem that in the time of writing thisfigure has climbed to 308 with no sign of abatement,the upshot of this is the recognition that there won’tbe enough Lieutenants in two years eligible forpromotion to fill Captain positions. The suggestedresponse to this dilemma is interesting, to holdCaptains in rank for at least another year, thepredictable course of action for those who are notpromoted is only likely to exacerbate the situation.The Army should look no further when allottingblame for this debacle than the culture that it hasmanaged to inculcate in its members. The author,when assembling this article approached bothDOCM-A and DDWP-A in writing for data on thenumber of Captains in the last two years who haddischarged after undertaking partial or complete postgraduate study. By act or omission the informationwas not forthcoming. The basic proposition here isthat the stated requirement for Officers to obtaintertiary qualifications and the ease with whichsupport, in the form of DFASS and such schemes, forpost graduate study can be accessed when combinedwith a favourable external employment situation ispaving the way for Army’s brightest, if not best, toleave. This is indeed what they are doing. In thecurrent environment there is little or no incentive forjunior officers to pursue professional knowledge. Theeffect of neglecting professional study is exacerbatedwhen it is combined with carte blanche access tomechanisms geared to increasing the prospect ofgaining lucrative employment outside the service.The net effect is that it shouldn’t come as a surprisethat junior officers can converse with more lucidity onthe latest rates for an MBA than the AdvancedWarfighting Experiment.The statistics of people exiting the Army is onlyone portion of the quotient. It is necessary to considerthose opting to join as well. From an Officerperspective, the figures don’t look too bad. This year150 Officer Cadets were inducted for ADFA from atarget of 155 and 130 Staff Cadets were inducted forRMC from a target of 142. This does however haveto be tempered against consideration of thosecandidates that were selected to those that enlisted.For ADFA, non scholarship candidates yielded 98

WHAT HAS GONE WRONG 9enlistees from 122 selected (or 80 per cent) andscholarship candidates yielded 52 enlistees from 100selected (or 52 per cent). In essence, Officerpositions will be offered until the target has beenreached, hence the passable figures. GeneralEnlistment (GE) figures have been included becausethey provide a more level perspective on recruitingtrends. As at the end of February the year to datetarget for Full Time (FT) GE was 879 of which 771(or 87.71 per cent) had been enlisted. It is essential toconsider the Part Time (PT) GE figures as well, forthey are intrinsically linked to Army’s vision for thefuture, their year to date target is 2416 (from a total of3790) of which 1493 (or 61.80 per cent) have beenenlisted. 27 These statistics are crushing the PT Army.Cadre Staff, many of whom are FT junior officers,can relate a litany of PT Army stories that centre onthe common themes of wavering morale, transientcommitment and a genuine questioning of the worthof the PT Army concept. There are even rumblingsamongst the staff at Headquarters 2nd Division as tothe convenient coincidence of the general runningdown of the PT Army and the introduction of phasedcareers for FT personnel.Personnel issues are a paradigmatic enigma in asmuch as Army, having created the problem in the firstplace now has no idea of how to solve it. It was withamusement that the author learnt that “What Colour isyour Parachute?”, a guide for job seekers, was one ofthe widest read, non compulsory texts for thegraduates of Command and Staff College last year.This attitude is endemic, not that this should come asa surprise, if a portion of Officers from the highestechelons down are unashamedly pushing their ownbarrow, middle and junior ranking officers would befools not to follow suit. Superimposed over this is theimplicit message that dissent will not be tolerated.The resultant duplicity, exemplified by those whooutwardly exude a veneer of conscientiousness whilstharbouring their own agendas, is, like most of thecause and effect issues discussed in this article,entirely predictable. Read the opening quotationagain. This situation isn’t likely to change and theresultant exodus of people isn’t likely to decline untilArmy gives its personnel something tangible tobelieve in.We’re On A Road To Nowhere“We are simply kidding ourselves if we think weare not doing a bit of catch-up here. There aresome technologies already fielded by other armieswhich we should have had a long time ago – thearmy has simply fallen behind from atechnological point of view compared to the navyand air force.”Brigadier J.J. Wallace, AMSurely the above passage is the understatement ofthe millennium. As the then Commander of TaskForce 21 (TF21), Brigadier Wallace’s delicateposition is entirely understood, as is his measuredresponse. For reasons outlined at the end of the lastsection it would have been ultimately futile for him tohave nonchalantly uttered words to the effect of:“We really need to have a good look at ourselves.In the neglectful years since our Army’s fineperformance in the Vietnam War we have allowedourselves to deteriorate, both physically in termsof equipment and intellectually in terms of theoperational art to the point where the notion ofinteroperability exists only in the most vividimagination.”Yes the Army is pursuing new equipment, “thearmy has embarked on its own program ofmodernisation instituting projects like Ninox,Wundarra and Bushranger to take it into the nextcentury”. 28 Well thank you very much, these shouldbe the tools of today’s Army (and sadly in many casesyesterdays), they are likely to be worse than useless inthe time of the empty battlefield, information warfareand autonomous “brilliant” Battlefield OperatingSystems. Equipment is only one, very obviousportion of the metaphorical iceberg that Armycollided with long ago.The Army needs to undergo a cathartic process,for different reasons, but similar to that of the USArmy post its Vietnam War experience. General FredFranks (Retired) and Tom Clancy describe such aprocess in painful detail in their collaborative work,Into the Storm. There is extreme danger in attemptingto find a way ahead that is constructed on a series ofpiecemeal solutions (A21, RTA, TF21) which areunderpinned by false premises and unrealisticassumptions. If the One Army concept is thefoundation of RTA, with its focal areas for Brigadesized Task Forces (TF) (including PT Brigades whosemanning figures as illustrated would make even themost optimistic observer cringe) then an obviousdisparity exists with the entire TF Trial process.Whilst TF Trials proceed on their merry, resourcehungry way, there are very disturbing rumourscirculating about the continued viability from amanning perspective of 7 TF in the near future.

10AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999Consider the process outlined below:Define thePresentEngenderRequiredChangeVisualisetheFutureIf it is accepted that this diagram represents aprocess for achieving the grandiose notion of “TheRoad to the Future through ContinuousImprovement” 29 then it is worth examining howArmy’s vision for the future stacks up against it. If itwas the intention of the architects of Army’s future tocreate a force who’s fundamental capabilities lie in itsability to populate the North of Australia, defend keyinstallations (usually the property of the other twoservices and housing their shiny new toys) or chase adisproportionately small enemy around the sunnyNorth whilst expending enormous amounts ofresources (seemingly the thing that the enemy wantedto achieve in the first place) then they should be giventop marks. Army should cease and desist with thischarade forthwith.Strategic Review 97 looks at this early stage like itmay provide some hope of tangible change in the nearfuture. Recent media reports sight the increasedlikelihood of United Nations sponsored Operationsthat would undoubtably be joint in nature but with arequirement for a sizeable and sustainable Armycomponent. 30 There are inherent dangers in thispossible change, on both the conceptual and physicalplanes. Conceptually, whilst this shift in policy hasthe potential to improve Army’s fortunes, it meansthat Army is still subject to the vagaries of changingpolicies, whether they be waxing or waning, Armyhas little or no control of its destiny. Physically, theneglect of Army’s procurement needs outlined in thefirst portion of this article means that there is anecessity for Army to rely overwhelmingly on thequality of its soldiers, particularly at the JNCO level. 31It is commendable that this situation has workedflawlessly to date. Without wishing to suggest anysolutions, the relationship of Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC) to the Joint Chiefs PlanningCommittee (JCPC) and the process by which theyconvince the US Government to endorse their visionfor the future could have some relevance to thisissue. 32 As with much of the processes and doctrinethat Australia has borrowed from overseas, all thecomponents are there, they just don’t produce thesame product.ConclusionThis article represents one persons thoughts on thestate of the Army. Whether the reader agrees or not isof little consequence to the author. The purpose ofembarking on this process was neither to engenderchange nor stimulate debate, it was purely anintellectual exercise aimed at recording the author’sthoughts on a particular topic.The threat board is well and truly illuminated.Army’s equipment is, generally, aged well beyond amature state and Army isn’t securing enough moneyfrom the Acquisition budget to replace it. Not enoughpeople are intersted in joining and far too manypeople are leaving. If Army’s life depended on it, andin many ways it does, it can’t tell its members oranyone else for that matter, including the successivegovernments that fund it, what it will look like in tenyears. As outlined, contrary views are neitherwelcomed nor dismissed, if the figures containedwithin are accepted though, it would be interesting tosee what such an argument is based on.There are no rosy outcomes on the horizon, nopanaceas that will ease Army’s collective woes anddefinitely no quick fix, compartmentalised solutionsthat will have any real effect. What is required isdedicated visionaries with the intelligence and driveto make a difference, blessedly they are few and farbetween.NOTES1. Department of Defence 1998, Defence Annual Report 1997-1998, DPS, Canberra, p. 146.2. La Franchi, P. 1998, ‘Budget 98: F/A-18 Upgrade Sole-Sourced to Boeing’, Australian Defence Business Review, vol17, no 7, 15 May, p. 5.3. Department of Defence 1998, op. cit., p. 207.4. ibid., p. 198.5. ibid., p. 216.6. ibid., p. 207.7. ibid., p. 152.8. ibid., p. 153.9. ibid., p. 154.10. ibid., p. 249.11. loc. cit.12. ibid., p. 250.13. ibid., pp. 250-251.14. Franchi, op. cit., loc. cit.15. loc. cit.16. loc. cit.17. Cotteril, D. 1999, ‘Air 87 Contenders Jockey for Position’,Australian Defence Magazine, vol 7, no 2, February 1999, p. 56.18. Bostock, I, 1998, ‘Habitability the key in Bushranger trials’,Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, October-November 1998, p. 29.19. Ferguson, G. 1999, ‘Squaring up to the Millennium’s firstChallenge’, op. cit., p. 20.

WHAT HAS GONE WRONG 1120. Franchi, op. cit., loc. cit.21. Snow, D. 1999, ‘Choose Your Weapons’, The Sydney MorningHerald, 16 Jan, p. 53.22. ibid., p. 52.23. loc. cit.24. Address by MAJGEN P.J. Dunn, AM, Head DefencePersonnel Executive (HDPE), to the DPE New StartersInduction Day, 22 February 1999.25. Directorate General Career Management-Army (DGCM-A)presentation to the DPE New Starters Induction Day, 22February 1999.26. Directorate Officer Career Management-Army (DOCM-A)presentation to the Deputy Directorate Workforce Planning-Army (DDWP-A) Data Analysis Meeting, 17 February 99.27. The Officer Enlistment (OE) and General Enlistment (GE) cellsof the Operations Section at Defence Force RecruitingOrganisation (DFRO) compiles and maintain all manner ofstatistics on recruiting. This data is accurate for early March1999.28. Logue, J. CPL, 1998, ‘Phoenix 98 Future Snapshot’, ArmyMagazine, no 37, December, p. 10.29. 1997 Intermediate Staff Course, Command Leadership andManagement Handbook, May, p. 2-9.30. Interview with the Hon John Moore, MP, Minister for Defence,ABC 7.30 Report, 11 March 1999.31. Address by COL Pat McIntosh, AM, Commandant, LandWarfare Centre-Canungra to the 2/97 Intermediate Staff Courseon his experiences as Commanding Officer, Australian MedicalSupport Force, Rwanda.32. http://www-tradoc.army.mil/tradsmin.htm.Captain Mark Watson graduated from Royal Military College, Duntroon in December 1992 and was allocated to the RAA. He has servedas a Section Commander, an Intelligence Officer, a Gun Position Officer and a Forward Observer with 103 Medium Battery, 8th/12thMedium Regiment. In January 1998 he became a Visits Officer with the Directorate of Protocol and Visits. He is currently OperationsOfficer, General Enlistment, Defence Force Recruiting Organisation.ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY – MARITIME STUDIES PROGRAMKing-Hall Naval History Conference“History, Strategy and the Rise of Australian Naval Power”IntroductionThe first “King-Hall Naval Conference” will be held in Canberra 22-24 July 1999 in the Telstra Theatre at theAustralian War Memorial, Canberra. It has the theme “History, Strategy and the rise of Australian Naval Power” andaims to examine maritime strategic issues at the turn of the century with particular reference to events leading to thecreation of an independent Australian Navy.The conference is being jointly sponsored by the Royal Australian Navy’s Maritime Studies Program and theSchool of History at the University College, Australian Defence Force Academy.ProgramConference speakers include a wide range of experts from Australia and overseas, and include:Professor Colin Gray – Sea Power in Modern Strategy.Professor Jon Sumida – Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, and Corbett:Misunderstanding and Misuse of Canonical Strategic Texts.Professor John McCarthy – The creation of Australian Naval Strategy.Dr John Reeve – The Rise of Modern Naval Strategy.Dr Nicholas Tracy – Collective Imperial Defence: The Laboratory For Trans-Nationalism.Dr John Mordike – Australian Defence Priorities 1880-1914: the Nation and the Empire.Dr Peter Overlack – “A Vigorous Offensive”: Core aspects of Australian Maritime DefenceConcerns before 1914.Dr Michael Evans – Strategic Culture and the Australian Way of War: Past, Present and FuturePerspectives.RegistrationFormal registration for the conference will open in May 1999. The cost of attendance is likely to beapproximately $120.Early indications of likely attendance, or requests to be included on conference information distribution lists,should be lodged with:Mr Dave GriffinKing-Hall Naval ConferenceNaval History DirectorateCP3-4-41Department of DefenceCANBERRA ACT 2600Telephone: (02) 6266 2654Facsimile: (02) 6266 2782Email: navy.history@dao.defence.gov.au

Images from the Back Seat is a collection ofsome of the more interesting airbornephotographs taken by Defence photographerDenis Hersey.Some of the images portrayed in thispublication have been used for publicitypurposes. However, many have never beenpublished before.The majority of the collection is of RoyalAustralian Air Force aircraft past and present.There is also a fine display of air-to-airphotographs of aircraft from the Army andNavy as well as aircraft from New Zealand,Britain, Italy, United States and Singapore.The book is available from the office of theAustralian Defence Force Journal at a cost of $19.95.Australian Defence Force Journal – Mail Order FormIMAGES FROM THE BACK SEATPlease send order to Australian Defence Force Journal,B-4-26, Russell Offices, CANBERRA ACT 2600Name:Address:I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $being payment for copies of Images from the Back Seat.

Strategy and CrisisBy Brigadier J J A Wallace, AM“Mistakes in operations and tactics can becorrected, but political and strategic mistakes liveforever.”Allan R Millet and Williamson Murray 1IntroductionMallet and Murray’s statement is a potentreminder of the imperative for decision makersat the highest levels to get it right. But if it’s true forthe conduct of routine national affairs, then it is evenmore important in crisis. While we no longer livewith the immediate fear of incidents degenerating intoa nuclear exchange, the stakes in national securitycrises remain high. A benign interstate securityenvironment only works to increase the relativepolitical and moral value of individual life, when it issuddenly threatened by terrorism or intrastateviolence. National prestige forfeited in the inepthandling of crisis is not easily recovered, particularlywhen the adversary is no match in terms of power.Yet crises are increasingly characteristic of thecontemporary security landscape. As guerrilla warsonce exploited the inability of major powers tomobilise an appropriate response from largeconventional military forces, today’s crises seek toexploit the cumbersome nature of their inevitablylarge conventional bureaucracies. Minor powers andeven terrorist groups, often lead the national crisismanagers of powerful countries a merry chasethrough international institutions and media, just ashandfuls of guerrillas once lead their armies throughjungles. Strengthening the analogy is the fact thatdespite the weight of technical, intellectual andpolitical resources being heavily in their favour,national bureaucracies, and their masters, have largelyfailed to come to terms with the nature of thischallenge and the potentially pivotal role of strategy.The problem lies first in the very nature of bothcrisis and strategy. The dynamics at work in crisisdirectly attack the decision-making process, andparticularly in large bureaucracies. In addition, crisisexhibits, as Coral Bell has identified, “the asymmetryof decision-making” 2 and therefore doesn’t lend itselfto prescriptive analysis. In this it is similar to strategy,which Luttwak describes as “pervaded by aparadoxical logic of its own, standing against theordinary linear logic by which we live in all otherforms of life.” 3 It is perhaps not surprising then thatstrategy is so little understood. To some it is simplylong term planning or any action at the strategic level,while in reality it is much more, and is certainly anindispensable element in any competitive activity.This article maintains that despite theacknowledged difficulty of being prescriptive ineither the analysis of crisis or the application ofstrategy, a better understanding of the two can benefitcrisis management. 4 More than this, there is a windowof opportunity in the early stages of most crises,where by the use of some simple models, strategy canbe applied so as to ameliorate many of crisis’snegative effects.CrisisMuch time and academic effort have beendevoted to defining crisis. However for the purposesof this article, dealing as it is within a national securitycontext, Hermann’s definition is appropriate:“Specifically, crisis is a situation that (1)threatens high priority goals of the decisionmakingunit, (2) restricts the amount of timeavailable for the response before the decision istransformed, and (3) surprises the members of thedecision-making unit by its occurrence.” 5Threat, time and surprise therefore become thekey determinants of crisis. Experience generallyproves that while there might be some short termstimulus and benefit from mild increases in the threator time constraint, significant adverse movement inany of these factors over time will place additional,mainly negative pressures on the decision unit andcrisis management process. 6,7 This becomesparticularly relevant at the national strategic level,where the stakes are such that perceptions of threatimpose disproportionate pressures of themselves,even without the impact of the other two dimensions.These pressures, described as “disruptive stress” 8 by

14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999Hermann and Brady, impact on the performance ofboth individuals and organisations.At the individual level, the most obvious effect ofdisruptive stress is fatigue, which though it effectseach individual differently, generally reduces mentalperformance, and increases irritability, paranoia anddefensiveness. The result is reduced individual andteam effectiveness, and a tendency to seek simpleoptions and entertain fewer alternatives. At the sametime the triggering of natural defensive mechanismsunder stress, can cause otherwise incisive thinkers togive undue weight to “expert” advice and to findrefuge in value judgments and precedent.Unfortunately however, national security crises do notlend themselves to such simplistic default action.Each situation is usually unique and the consequencesof error too critical. In addition, national crisis almostinevitably demands a strategic long term view, evenwhile dealing with the immediate. But under thestress of crisis, there is a strong predilection forsolving the short term problem and ignoring thelonger and often more strategically relevantconsequences. 9The major effect of disruptive stress onorganisations is that senior decision makers take auncharacteristic interest in even minor issues and theirmanagement; what Hermann calls “a contraction inauthority”. 10 This has both positive and negativeeffects on the management of crisis. On the positiveside it increases the responsiveness of otherwisebureaucratic structures, cutting out unnecessarylevels, and also increasing the possibility of moreinnovative solutions. The tendency to use a small coremanagement group, increases security and thereforeenhances negotiating flexibility, while also permittinggreater control. But over reliance on a few key playerscan also increase the vulnerability of the organisationto fatigue, and too much secrecy can limit thediversity and integrity of information. 11 The verystatus and direct influence of the decision makers,may interfere with the efficient operation ofcommunication and information channels and causethem to be overloaded, as subordinates responddirectly to key players in an ad hoc hierarchy. In theend, whether the balance of effects is positive ornegative, is very much personality dependent, but it isprudent to plan for the worst case. 12In the case of national security crises, we canpredict with reasonable certainty the institutions andtherefore general types of individuals who are likelyto play key roles in crisis management. There can belittle doubt that the individual and organisationalparadigms within which the key players formulatestrategy, will impact significantly on its quality. Onedescription of crisis as “the imposition of acumulation (sic) of nasty events on passive authoritiesand decision-makers”, 13 suggests that those who willinevitably deal with national crisis are perhaps, insome important ways, the least suitable.Politicians will have the major impact, but whereboth national strategy and crisis demand a long termand usually internationalist view, politicians have,understandably, a predominantly short term and oftendomestic perspective. Bureaucrats will also play a keyrole. However while the requirement is for innovativeand speedy decision-making, the internal dynamics atwork in bureaucracies often cause them to rationalisetheir actions in terms of: “most crises resolvethemselves”, refuge in procedures and a sometimesoverriding interest in preserving the good name of theorganisation and ensuring its internal operationsremain intact. 14 The military will be prominent inmatters of national security, and although its officersare usually better skilled in strategy than their civiliancounterparts, it suffers all the same symptoms ofbureaucratic inertia, and in some cases shows too littleempathy for political imperatives.But if this is the nature of crisis, then as importantis to understand the essential processes taking place.Crises do not occur in a vacuum. They are manifest inthe failure or frustration of other channels ofinteraction, usually conventional diplomatic ones.They are, with apologies to Clausewitz, thecontinuation of negotiation by other means. Thestakes and/or criticality have been raised by one partyor group of parties, to force, if not their position onthe other, then at least his immediate consideration ofit. It is then, as Bouchard maintains, “a series ofbargaining interactions” 15 between two or more sides.There is a competition at play, where no one is likelyto have exclusive control of events, but where each isattempting to resolve the situation in his interest. Inthis competition the instigator of the crisis willinitially hold the initiative. He can be expected toretain it and keep the other side reactive, unless losingit through error or the premeditated action of theopponent. In the final analysis, given the phenomenaof contraction of authority discussed above, thisbargaining or competition may actually be betweenjust a few individuals in each of the participatingparties. 16Therefore the nature of crisis, and particularlynational security crisis, is such that the balance offorces is against the exercise of effective decisionmakingand management. Figure 1. summarises thekey effects of crisis on decision-making. The aimmust be to maximise the potential positive dynamicsof crisis, while at least mitigating its negative impacts.

STRATEGY AND CRISIS15Mandating processes will not do, as the seniority ofthe players is such that they have the authority tooverturn procedures and are likely to do so under theinevitable pressures of crisis. Instead we mustintroduce a new dynamic, a stronger inherent logic,something that focuses action without limiting itsoptions and is relevant to the essentially bargainingprocess which is crisis.THE MAJOR EFFECTS ONDECISION-MAKING IN CRISISPOSITIVE EFFECTSIncreased responsivenessEnhances innovationEnhances flexibilityNEGATIVE EFFECTSNarrowing of OptionsOver reliance on “experts”Refuge in value judgmentPoor mental performanceOverloaded communicationsMeddling in lower levelsReduced team performanceLack of long term viewFigure 1A Role For StrategyFigure 2 suggests four key functions necessary toredress or enhance as appropriate, the effects of crisison decision-making. Establishing and maintaining arelevant focus for activity becomes a major function,because the negative psychological consequences ofdisruptive stress, mainly affect the ability of bothindividuals and organisations to focus on the realsituation. The fatigue factor is essentially a result ofactors assuming too deep a scope of responsibility.Although difficult to mandate, anything that can limitthis, can separate functions, will reduce both thefatigue on key players and on those lower in theorganisational chain disrupted by their suddenattention. The two remaining functions areimperatives for crisis management. They must bepresent to acknowledge the strategic realities innational security crises and the fact that crisismanagement is essentially a competitive bargainingprocess. It is precisely the concern of strategy forthese four functions, that provides its utility in crisis.MAXIMISING/MINIMISING THE EFFECTS OF CRISISCOMPENSATINGPOSITIVE EFFECTS FUNCTIONS NEGATIVE EFFECTSREQUIREDFocus on ActualSituationNarrowing of OptionsOver reliance on “experts”Maintain Separationof FunctionsMaintain LongTerm ViewRefuge in value judgmentPoor mental performanceOverloaded communicationsMeddling in Lower LevelsReduced team performanceLack of Long Term viewIncreased responsivenessEnhances innovationEnhances flexibilityMaintainTempoFigure 2

16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999StrategyA major reason for the inadequate command ofstrategy by national bureaucracies, has been itsmonopolisation as a subject of study, by soldiers andmilitary academics. This has served neither the soldiernor civilian well. To use Liddell Hart’s definition ofstrategy as: “the art of distributing and applyingmilitary means to fulfil the ends of policy”, 17 is tosuggest that it is somehow the unique province of thesoldier and only starts when the matter is handed tohim. For the soldier the danger is that the definitionevokes such military imagery, that he can too easilyfind refuge from tackling its deeper sense, byresorting to the more familiar ground of tactics.Instead the start point needs to be the definition inits ordinary usage of “skilful management in gettingthe better of an adversary or attaining an end.” 18 Theessential notion is that strategy is applied in acompetition between two or more players; and thatthat competition is in fact a contest of wills.Clausewitz and Liddell Hart used the images ofboxers and wrestlers respectively to evoke thisdynamic in strategy. The strength and relevance of theimage being in the personal interplay between the twocontestants, the fact that each is locked inconcentration on the other in an effort to pre-empt orcounter every move. Unfortunately the impact of thisanalogy tends to be lost with the inevitableremoteness of the strategist from the field and/or thefact that the medium of competition is sometimes theless demonstrably competitive environment of policy.But holding onto this image of being engaged in acompetitive struggle is an essential first step in theeffective formulation and application of strategy; andin crisis a most appropriate one, given its essentiallycompetitive bargaining nature.Equally important, and illustrated by the sameanalogy, is the personalisation of the opposition. It isno coincidence that both boxers and wrestlers lock onto each others eyes. What the arms and legs do isinevitably forecast in the eyes. The boxers intensity insearching behind the eyes, must be copied by thesuccessful strategist. But to get inside the mind of theopponent, you must first personalise him. Too oftenthe opposition is seen and treated as a country or anorganisation, without identifying in it, or if necessaryattributing to it, the personality essential to focus thestrategist. The sense of competition is too easily lostwithout this essential step, and strategy quicklysacrificed to the application of procedures or plans.As we have seen by the contraction of authoritycharacteristic of crisis, there is perhaps moreopportunity to exploit this subtle but essential aspectof applying strategy here, than in more routineactivity where the opposition’s decision-makingfunction may be more diffuse.The image of strategy being exercised in acompetitive environment, and the need to personalisethe opposition, are important tools in assisting crisismanagers to focus on the actual situation. Howeverbefore identifying more of strategy’s potentialcontribution in crisis, it is necessary to determine itsvarious dimensions and functions. Like so muchmilitary terminology, these have become confused inthe dual usage of the word in its military and ordinarycontext. Strategy has two dimensions, both relevant,whether it is being applied in a military or generalsense. They have been described as: “the verticaldimension of the different levels that interact with oneanother; and the horizontal dimension of the dynamiclogic that unfolds concurrently within each level.” 19The vertical dimension of strategy can itself havemany layers. 20 However while the detailed functionsin each may vary, the overriding purpose of thestrategic level does not. Its principle purpose is toidentify and initiate the campaigns necessary toachieve political or policy objectives. In doing this itprovides directives, usually in broad terms, andcreates the necessary strategic environment, includingensuring adequate resources, so that the next level ofcommand can achieve the intent of the strategic level.If properly understood and exercised, this functionwill more than occupy strategic crisis managers andso provide a natural delineation between theirs’ andtheir subordinate levels’ responsibilities. However inpractice it is as much observed in the breach, and thenmore through misunderstanding of the functions andresponsibilities of the levels below, than through lackof trust in them.The levels below the strategic are in militaryparlance the operational and tactical levels. Butputting aside the language, the importance is in theirfunctions, which have equal relevance in the civildomain. The significance of the operational level isthat it takes the broad direction of the strategic leveland designs a coordinated sequence of tacticalactivities to achieve it. It might in a national crisis be aMission or Embassy or a special team dispatched orplanned to be dispatched to the general area of thecrisis. Its value is in its proximity to the crisis andlocal knowledge, or at least focus. This places it in thebest position to respond in a timely way to rapidlychanging circumstances and to identify appropriatetactical activities to achieve the higher direction.Nonetheless, it too eschews as much detail as

STRATEGY AND CRISIS 17possible, making this the responsibility of the tacticallevel of command, whose activities it directs,facilitates and coordinates. In this context thesetactical activities may range from on-site negotiation,to military action.If properly understood and applied, this verticaldimension of strategy contributes to crisismanagement in two main ways. First it frees eachlevel to focus better on the actual situation byreducing the scope of its responsibility. Secondly, byseparating functions, it reduces fatigue and thenegative impacts of the inevitable contraction ofauthority in crisis, which is essentially the result ofkey players not understanding the role of the strategiclevel, but at the same time being under incrediblepressure to do something. Of course this verticalrationalisation of responsibility can always beoverturned on the whim of personality under theinherent pressure of crisis, but the deeper theunderstanding, the less this is likely. 21The horizontal dimension of strategy followsnaturally from the acceptance of it being applied in acompetitive environment. This notion provides the“dynamic logic” that should be acting throughoutevery level of an operation or crisis solving activity. Itis the process of outthinking the opposition andmanipulating both him and the situation to achieveour ends. Although speaking of its application to war,von Moltke well captures the more general sense ofthis second dimension of strategy:“Strategy is a system of expediencies. It is morethan a science; it is the application of knowledgeto practical life, the development of an originalleading idea in response to constantly changingcircumstances; it is the art of action underpressure of the most difficult circumstances.” 22This concept of it providing an original leadingidea in response to constantly changingcircumstances, together with its being applied in apersonalised competitive environment, are the crux ofits relevance to crisis management at the strategiclevel. The absence of a leading idea at this levelinevitably leaves the whole organisation wallowingpassively in procedures. Its presence gives focus. Thisleading idea must be kept out in front by the adoptionof a long term view and maintaining tempo.The adoption of a long term view is inherent inthe vertical dimension of strategy and reinforced inthe horizontal. It is implicit that the highest level, thestrategic, adopt the longest view. But this is notrestricted to the time frame for dealing with theimmediate problem, or the legitimate need to providelead time for action at the subordinate levels. Evenmore important is to retain sight of our long termnational objectives. As the opposition will usuallyhave initiated the crisis as an alternate means ofachieving his otherwise frustrated long term aims, it isessential that our response not contribute to his aim bydefault. The Clinton administration’s response toIraq’s incursions into the UN Safe Haven in Sep 96, isan example where the immediate political andstrategic advantages of being seen to be tough withSaddam, had the potential to put long term objectivesat risk. The correct application of strategy demandsnot losing sight of the long term aim, and framingresponses to the immediate problem in this context.At the same time the need to outthink theopponent, the horizontal dimension of strategy,demands a long term view in a different sense. Byconstantly focusing on the desired end state, thecircumstances we wish to prevail at the end of thecrisis, the successful strategist shapes the near andmid term situation to his own advantage. Taking along view causes him to anticipate developments anddrives his information requirements, naturallyassisting him to build on the most valuablecommodity for the strategist, foreknowledge. Butwithout the ability to apply it in a timely manner, toestablish a tempo of decision-making and actionfaster than the opposition, even the best strategy isoften doomed to failure.Establishing and maintaining tempo 23 in theapplication of strategy is an essential drawn from itsbasically competitive nature. The aim is not justanticipation for its own sake, but to render theopposition’s actions irrelevant because they wereframed for old circumstances, which we have sincechanged or caused to be changed. Therefore while thesheer speed of our responses can contribute to tempo,the strategist has additional, more subtle tools. If forinstance as Wylie observes “we deliberately make histheory invalid, we have gone a long way to makinghis actions ineffective”, 24 and have therefore gotteninside his decision cycle, thus establishing superiortempo. In the same indirect way, if we can slow hisdecision-making process, perhaps by complicating it,we have achieved a relative advantage in tempo. Asindicated in Figure 2., the function of maintainingtempo seeks to maximise the few positive effects ofcrisis. As it happens, it is a fundamental objective ofstrategy and applying strategy in crisis will reinforcethis function well.Therefore strategy potentially provides a verypowerful tool for crisis management. Its real utility isin the fact that it provides a compensating dynamic tothe inherently disruptive forces characteristic of crisis.More practically it reinforces four functions critical to

18AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999overcoming these negative forces while enhancing itspositive consequences. But those thrown into thebreach in times of crisis are seldom if ever experts incrisis management or strategy. If for all the logic ofapplying it, we are to hope to see strategy actuallyused in crisis, then initial crisis managementprocedures and expectations by key players mustfacilitate it naturally. This is not to suggest mandatingprocedures for the duration of the crisis. But in thatinitial few hours of chaos, even the most senior andcompetent executives are naturally looking for someframework in which to act. If one can be providedthat facilitates their thinking strategically from theoutset, the natural dynamics of strategy may well takeover. Even if it doesn’t withstand the disruptiveeffects of crisis in the long term, such a start to crisismanagement will be of immeasurable benefit as thesituation unfolds.Getting a Strategic Start in CrisisThe lack of reliable information at the outset ofany crisis is usually so pronounced that remedying itbecomes the focus of even the highest level planners,often distracting them from their real responsibilities,and inviting the contraction of authority andpreoccupation with detail we should be seeking toavoid. Instead the paucity of information should beseen as an advantage. The reality is that at this pointstrategic planners only need to know what hashappened in the most general sense in order to fulfiltheir responsibilities. They need to know how this actor situation might affect national security andtherefore what their objective should be in dealingwith it. Precisely because of the paucity of accurateinformation and also to allow maximum flexibility forsubordinate levels, this objective should not be set inconcrete terms, but expressed as the intent of thegovernment.Crafting this intent therefore becomes the firstresponsibility of the strategic level. It must becarefully done and will deal not so much with themeans the Government might use, but be anexpression of its resolve, and most importantly detailthe conditions it requires to prevail after resolution ofthe crisis. The aim is to incorporate implicit ratherthan explicit qualifications on the means that might beused. An example of an intent for a hostage taking bya renegade group in a foreign country (“Seeland”)might be:The Government’s intention is to achieve the saferelease of the hostages, while reinforcing theauthority and sovereignty of the Seelandgovernment and without heightening the residualthreat to Australian nationals and expatriatesafter resolution of the incident.It is immediately obvious that such a statement isnot reliant on the detail of the situation, but on theintention of the Government. It incorporates thestrategic imperatives and a longterm view. It is robust,and while making clear the main objective of gainingthe safe release of the hostages, implies constraintsthat will be as relevant whether the eventual solutionlies in diplomatic or military action. Its utility forcrisis managers is that it sets important parameterswithin which to operate as more information comes tohand. It allows skilled analysts and staff to alreadyidentify the type of information that might be requiredand in broad terms, the types of contingencies theyshould be considering. Most importantly it provideseveryone a focus.Having crafted our intent the second step is todetermine the opposition’s. It might appear that thisshould be done before deciding our own, but at thestrategic level I believe not. The incident has beeninitiated to disturb the status quo. While in the courseof the crisis we may be forced to accept acompromise solution, or even see advantage in doingso, 25 to be responsive to the opposition from the outsetis to cede the initiative. In the absence of detailedinformation, it is initially both valid and relevant touse the status quo as our reference point. Validbecause to do nothing is to risk slipping into aresponsive mode and relevant because he will haveinitiated the crisis in order to disturb a status quo thatfavoured us more than him. In the absence of reliableinformation, this makes the re-establishment of thestatus quo a reasonable immediate aim for us. This isnot to ignore the realities of the situation. Howeverthe significance of our focusing on the actualsituation, is to take account of it in achieving ourintent, not just in responding to the crisis andparticularly the opposition’s manipulation of usthrough it.Like ours, the opposition’s intent can usually bedetermined from its broad strategic context before allthe details of the incident are available. While it isimportant to identify the opponent’s actual purpose ininstigating the incident, it may only be possible to listhis likely objectives at this stage. These first two stepsare the first order issues in the model at Figure 3.As we move down the left and right hand sides ofthe model, we are looking to ensure that howeverchaotic conditions become, or whatever side issueshave to be dealt with on the way, that like the boxer,we are all the time seeking to weaken his position

STRATEGY AND CRISIS19while defending ours. We examine our intent and hisobjectives, and decide for each, the thing or thingsthat are critical to their achievement. These are ourrespective Centres of Gravity. Those things that ifaccessed or manipulated by one side, could cause theother to fail in his intent or objectives. 26 In some caseseach sides Centre of Gravity may be the same. Forinstance in the hypothetical hostage example, thesupport of the Seeland government could be the mostcritical factor for both sides. However more often theywill be different, and the Centre of Gravity for thehostage takers in this case could be the support of athird country sponsor. But having determined therespective Centres of Gravity, our aim is to focus asmuch of our activity as possible on manipulating his,while ensuring at the same time that ours is protected.ARRIVING AT AN INITIAL STRATEGY IN CRISISDetermine the Govt/StrategicIntentDetermine Opponent’sObjectivesDetermine Our Centre ofGravityInformationRequestsDetermine HisCentre of GravityIdentify How to ProtectOur Centre of GravityIdentify How toManipulate HisCentre of GravitySelect Most EffectiveCombinations of EffectsINITIALSTRATEGYFigure 3To achieve this requires discerning the activitiesor avenues through which the Centres of Gravity canbe manipulated. These general activities are termedDecisive Points, for the effect they can have on theCentre of Gravity. For each of these Decisive Pointsspecific activities are then identified to generate orreinforce these effects. This process need not beexhaustive at this point. If the aim is ensure focus,then discipline must be exercised by considering onlythe more effective and efficient methods. Staff canprovide more detailed analysis latter. The logic of thisprocess is illustrated in Figure 4.

@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@e?@@h?@@@@@@h?@@h?@@@@@@h?@@h?@@@@@@h?@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@g@@g@@g@@g@@g@@g@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@?@@?@@?@@?@@?@@?@@?@@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@@@@ ?@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@20AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999THE LOGIC LINK BETWEEN CENTRE OF GRAVITY,DECISIVE POINTS AND ACTIVITIESThird countrysponsorship of terroristsCENTRE OFGRAVITYIncrease DiplomaticCost for SponsorIncrease FinancialCost to SponsorEtcDECISIVEPOINTSMeans*General Assemblymotion*Seeland dip protest*etc*****MeansFigure 4****MeansACTIVITIESThe final step in arriving at the initial strategy is toselect those activities that provide the most effect, thatmanipulate the more important Decisive Points.Economy of effort will also be a consideration here,and some activities may be selected for the fact thatthey impact on more than one Decisive Point. Iftempo is to be established quickly, priority may alsobe given to some activities because of the speed withwhich they can be initiated, even though otheractivities may replace them later.This combination of activities, together with ageneral scheme for their implementation, is the initialstrategy. It will invariably be modified in execution asmore information comes to hand, but allows bothindividuals and the organisation to respond purposelyand with the best chance of avoiding the disruptiveeffects of crisis. Importantly, as the model at Figure 3.shows, each of these stages generates informationrequests, that both help focus intelligence agenciesand facilitate the early validation of the originalassumptions.ConclusionMost studies of the subjects of crisis and strategyhave failed to bridge the gap between theory andpractice. The asymmetry of the concepts complicatesthis necessary step in both cases. However it is thevery fact that both have been described as art notscience, 27 that makes strategy a natural partner forcrisis. Crisis resists order and strategy should never bemore ambitious than to try to use or shape chaos.Instead of seeking to control chaos, it provides theleading idea and trails a central thread around whichcrisis teams can manoeuvre to advantage throughcrisis.National security crises may have lost some of theportent of catastrophe they held in Cold War days, butthe interests and prestige of nations and coalitions stillride on the success with which they are managed. Ifcrisis managers acknowledge from the outset thatcrisis is a competitive bargaining process, and use itsearly hours to establish both a strategic orientationand intent, we will see far more successful outcomes.Hopefully this model will assist in this process.NOTES1. Allan R. Millet & Williamson Murray. “The lessons of war”, inThe National Interest (Winter 1988).2. Coral M. Bell, “Decision-making by governments in crisissituations”, in International Crises and Crisis Management, ed.Daniel Frei, Saxon House, 1978, p. 50.3. Edward Luttwak, “The logic of strategy”, in War, ed. LawrenceFreedman, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 195.4. For the handling of short notice national security crises, I amusing the term “crisis management” throughout as Snyder andDiesing do to include coercive diplomacy. See: James L.Richardson, “Crisis management: a critical appraisal”, in NewIssues in International Crisis Management, ed. Gilbert R.Winham, Westview Press, Boulder, 1988, pp. 15-16.0

STRATEGY AND CRISIS215. Charles F. Hermann, International Crises: Insights FromBehavioural Research, Free Press, NY, 1972, p. 13.6. James A. Robinson, “Crisis: an appraisal of concepts andtheories”, in Charles F. Hermann (ed.), 1972, p. 33.7. Charles Hermann’s account of laboratory tests of the effects ofheightening these factors appeared to challenge this hypothesis.However even he questioned the validity of the results. See:Charles F. Hermann, “Threat, time, and surprise: a simulationof international crisis”, in International. Crises: Insights FromBehavioural Research, pp. 207-208.8. Hermann and Brady refer to disruptive stress as: “the defectiveoperation of a person’s coping mechanisms – such asmisconception or rigidity in cognitive processing.” See: CharlesF. Hermann, & Linda P. Brady., “Alternative models ofinternational crisis behaviour”, in International Crises: InsightsFrom Behavioural Research., p. 284.9. Ole R. Holsti, “Time, alternatives, and communications: the1914 and Cuban missile crises”, in Charles F. Hermann (ed.),1972, p. 63.10. Charles F. Hermann, “Threat, time, and surprise: a simulationof international crisis”, p. 196.11. Charles F. Hermann & Linda P. Brady, p. 268.12. The effects of crisis on the performance of both organisationsand individuals are discussed in detail in International Crises:Insights From Behavioural Research, edited by Hermann. Seeparticular: James A. Robinson, “Crisis: an appraisal of conceptsand theories”, pp. 33-35; Thomas W. Milburn, “Themanagement of crises”, pp. 263-266; and Charles F. Hermann& Linda P. Brady, pp. 283-90.13. Uriel Rosenthal & Pert Pijnenburg, Crisis Management andDecision-Making Oriented Scenarios, Kulwer AcademicPublishers, Dordecht, 1991, p. 1.14. Ian I. Mitroff & Christine M. Pearson, Crisis Management – ADiagnostic Guide for Improving Your Organisation’s Crisis-Preparedness, Jossey-Bass, San Fransisco, 1993, p. 25.15. Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis, Columbia UniversityPress, 1991, p. 2.16. As Coral Bell illustrates by the Cyprus crisis in 1974, there areusually more than two major players in a crisis. This has anexponential effect on the considerations and interests that mightbe vying for satisfaction. See: Coral M. Bell, pp. 50-51.17. Michael Howard, “The dimensions of strategy”, in War, ed.Lawrence Freedman, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 197.18. The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, 2nd edn, 1994, p. 990.19. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace,Bekanap Press Harvard, 1987, p. 70.20. The military hierarchy of strategy has been variously described,but has included:a. The Grand or National Strategic level, where allelements of national power are considered.b. The Military Strategic level, where all the elements ofmilitary power are considered. (Note that anyfunctional area of government could be substitutedhere for the word “military” e.g. foreign affairs, police,or attorney generals; to reflect the strategic level of thatfunction.)c. Theatre Strategic level, where a subordinate HQ hassome strategic responsibilities, usually including intheatrepolitical liaison.21. The need for this vertical separation of responsibility in crisismanagement has also been identified by students of crisis.Legadec describes the two functions as “strategy constructionand implementation”, and emphasises the need to maintain acritical distance between them throughout a crisis. See: PatrickLagadec, Preventing Chaos in Crisis, trans. Jocelyn M. Phelps,McGraw Hill, 1993, p. 184.22. Helmuth Von Moltke, “Doctrines of war”, Lawrence Freedman(ed.), 1994, p. 220.23. Tempo is not speed, but the rate at which decisions are madeand enacted. This has been variously described as a “DecisionCycle or Loop”, and in Lind’s account of decision-making incombat, as an “OODA Loop” (Observe, Orientate, Decide,Action). See: William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook,Westview Press, 1985, pp. 5-6.24. J.C. Wylie, Rear Admiral USN, Military Strategy: a GeneralTheory of Power Control, Australian Naval Institute Press,Sydney, 1967, p. 110.25. Crisis should not only be seen as a threats, it may provideopportunities to enhance our interests, in ways or areas notnormally available. In fact the Chinese word for crisis meansboth threat and opportunity. See: Thomas W. Milburn, p. 270.26. Purists would argue that there can only be one Centre ofGravity at each level for each protagonist. This generallyapplies in a military strategic analysis, where the solution liesmainly in the application of force. However it is not always sosimple an issue, when considering the broader and more subtleinstruments of national power. Nonetheless it is advantageous,for the focus it provides, to have only one Centre of Gravity ateach level of possible and appropriate.27. For crisis see: Coral M. Bell, p. 51. For strategy see: RobertO’Neil, “An introduction to strategic thinking”, in The Makingof Strategy, Murray, Knox, Bernstein (eds.), CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994, p. 30.Brigadier Jim Wallace graduated into the Royal Australian Infantry from the Royal Military College in 1973. He has served in the 8/9thBattalion RAR, and the Special Air Service Regiment which he commanded from 1988 to 1990. He is a graduate of both the British ArmyStaff College and the Australian College of Defence and Strategic Studies. Brigadier Wallace was Commander Special Forces from 1993to 95 and has recently handed over command of 1st Brigade in Darwin to become the Director General of Land Development. He has seenservice in UNTSO in the Middle East and has previously had an article published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, London.

THE FLIGHT OF THE PIGThe Flight of the Pig, a full colour publicationdepicts the F111 fighter aircraft in all its glory.The book traces the history of the aircraft overits 25 years of faithful duty with the RAAF.Defence Photographer Mal Lancaster, who hashad an affinity with the F111 since its arrival inAustralia has spent the best part of his careerphotographing the “Pig” as the F111 isaffectionately known.The book is available through the office of theAustralian Defence Force Journal at a cost of$29.95.Australian Defence Force Journal – Mail Order FormTHE FLIGHT OF THE PIGPlease send order to Australian Defence Force Journal,B-4-26, Russell Offices, CANBERRA ACT 2600Name:Address:I enclose a cheque or money order payable to the Receiver of Public Monies for $being payment for copies of The Flight of the Pig.

Peace DevelopmentBy Dan Baschiera,Defence Community Organisation“The complexities of Peace are far more difficultto manage than the decisions of War”Shimon PeresWith no definition there is no vision.The United Nations charter has no clear definition forpeacekeeping, therefore, by default, no real vision inpeace management.Peace development (PD) is a longer term strategicoutcome of military based community development(MCD).MCD is a tactical means to bridge the current gapbetween humanitarian aid and peacekeeping.A Short PreamblePost cold war, as the global fabric of stability is tornby the numerous “low tech”, “grey zone” andsocial conflicts, we still do not have any realdefinition for peacekeeping.Peacekeeping has no real definition in the UnitedNations Charter. No definition implies no vision.Something well-demonstrated as peacekeepingstruggles to manage the challenges to peace in ourcurrent democratic paradox -“The New WorldOrder”.In my reading I came across this statement “...anad hoc approach to military and political objectivescarries with it high risk. It is sometimes this approachthat makes managing the peace more difficult thanmanaging the war” (T.R.Dubois). Wise words whenit comes to the challenge of peacekeeping.Peacekeeping in its various forms is currently theonly military based “peace management formula” wehave, and it is ad hoc. It is a formula that struggles toevolve as the phenomena of social conflict and itsgenerated Human crisis accelerates, “in minutesrather than months” (Weinberger).A reporter “in zone” beams our immediateHuman History into millions of homes. For the infieldpeacekeeping commander this can, and does, result ina rapid transition from the tactical to the strategic, andtherefore to the high ground of political diplomacy.Unfortunately this tends to further obfuscate analready ambigious situation. Ad hoc is often anunderstatement.Media coverage of the graphic violence hascreated substantial humanitarian interest and thedesire to do something. The political pressure is ofcourse to do something. But what does “doingsomething” mean?Since the end of the cold war we have witnessedthe emergence of bolder peacekeeping. BolderPeacekeeping implies more than just keeping twoconflicting armies apart, it should imply the use andpromotion of resources in the conflict region to buildfor a longer sustainable peace - a step beyond just“doing something”.However, Bolder Peacekeeping is more often thannot the ad hoc trouble shooting innovation of aninfield commander dealing with a local crisis, ratherthan part of a mandates overall strategic plan. Thebasic problem with bolder peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace development, or whatever label yougive it is the fact that it lacks a strategic vision andcosts money. This is partly why bolder peacekeepinghas not moved toward peace development.Peace Development has to be proactive, effective,and sustainable. It is going that extra mile. It has to bethe tactical implementation of a strategic and effectivepeace. A peace that promotes harmony in the culturaland political ideology of the host community.This article outlines a number of concernsassociated with peacekeeping and suggests a tacticalmodel in Military Community Development that maygive us a pathway to Peace Development.IntroductionPeacekeepers (PK) and Humanitarian Agencies(HA) are and will continue to find themselvesdeployed side by side in the same conflict zone andquite literally in the same foxhole. Traditionally themilitary has not had a role as an emergency reliefprovider and Humanitarian Aid workers, who havethis role, do have differing perceptions andapproaches to that of the peacekeepers. As a result

24AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999they have tended to alienate rather than cooperatewith peacekeepers. It is a situation generallydescribed as a somewhat awkward experience.The complex emergencies in our recent past havecertainly had their mandates, but as recent historyreveals these were no more than a wish list.Peacekeeping mandates, other than those keepingtraditional armies apart, it appears, have had noeffective strategy for success with civilians andcivilian based militias in dislocated war torncommunities. Success should be defined as asustainable politicised peace.This article debates a tactical pathfinding MilitaryCommunity Development model, which could deliverto the ADF and in turn the UN, a means to fine tunecomplex emergencies. In using only current resources(civilian and military) it would link the dualdeployment of PK and HA with effective andachievable objectives. It is a scenario that coulddeliver constructive results moving beyondPeacekeeping, Peacemaking and into PeaceDevelopment (PD). This would be an achievementthat links the ADF’s strategic battle winning role toany given situation - military and/or social conflict.The ADF is referenced as a platform to adopt thismodel for four reasons. Firstly our substantial andeffective on the ground tactical experience hassuccessfully touched on this discipline in UNDeployments. Secondly our well regardedinternational status makes us an effective “diplomaticchip” that can be inserted while negotiations continue.Thirdly the UN Member countries will developspecialist services to UN Deployments, and fourthlyUN Members would value, and therefore pay for, askilled and effective asset in this area. To this end theAustralian Community should have no problem withthe ADF taking on something of a mercenary role fora humanitarian cause, particularly if it can, in thelonger term, reduce the Defence/UN Budget.The model explores a first stepping stone towardproviding the ADF with a means to PeaceDevelopment (PD) as an effective Peacekeeping typestrategy in war torn communities. It would give theADF an innovative, lateral and real tactical ability toproactively address complex, often violent Intra orInternational socio-economic conflicts. In addition itmay well lead military intervention in a shift awayfrom imposition on a host government/community toa paradigm of self-determining support. In turn as amilitary tactic it will also provide a further tangibledirection to intelligence gathering and improving thesecurity and safety of the deployment. It canpotentially achieve this by creating demarcations ofstable community influence.The model could also provide a tactical means forthe ADF to address potential strategic threats tocontinental Australia beyond those of a traditionalmilitary conflict without incurring internationalcondemnation.BackgroundThe shift away from the Cold War has resulted ina multifaceted mix of global tensions. While analysisand preparation in the past tended to focus oninternational tension, a whole new and rapidlyfragmenting socio-political environment is effectingthe balance of International Peace. Some of theincreasingly significant shifts are now in intranationaltension such as ethnic/civil militancy, socialdysfunction and economic instability. These shiftsalso have a potential for catastrophic domino effects.In the main these elements are not new and havetended to be contained by governments in one form oranother since the start of this century. The majorcontainment of this fragmentation in the latter half ofthe century appears to have been the cold war with (asEinstein so correctly predicted) its threat ofthermonuclear conflict. Additional factors that havehelped contain fragmentation are the dynamic shieldsof technology and economy, but these are beingrapidly stripped away by environmental degradation,economic meltdown, and the social chain reaction ofour exploding population bomb.In an ironic twist it should also be noted that sincethe beginning of the century the process of containingthis fragmentation has appeared to have gone fullcircle with a form of “Gun Boat Diplomacy” nowreturning under the banner of UN PK.Historically the UN is a cumbersome and reactivepolitical management system based on an antiquatedethos. The lack of a peacekeeping definition forexample is well demonstrated in the confusing“chapter six and a half” of the UN Charter. The UNCharter itself still appears frozen in a 1940s and 50smindset.The mindset enshrined in the UN Charter, is stillreactive, and not warming quickly enough to meet anew, post-cold war, and therefore complex worldorder. From a futures perspective it is too slow andlacks the finesse, flexibility and delicate tangible skillsof analysing and proactively working with thesensitivity of socio-economic and politicalfragmentation. The variables leading to fragmentation

PEACE DEVELOPMENT 25are ideological and cultural, multiplying, and tend torapidly accelerate in time frame.FragmentationTo effectively deliver a peace keeping mission inour rapidly changing global environment we need torealise that the traditional and conditioned boundariesof social, psychological, economic and politicaldynamics, no longer frozen by the Cold War, are nowever changing. This ever changing, highly populated,unpredictable global environment is defined for thepurposes of this article as fragmentation.A misunderstanding of fragmentation has led tomismanagement and a cycle of culturally confusedconflict that UN involvement has tended tocompound. In turn it has caused the immediateacceleration of further social fragmentation/dysfunction, as Somalia attests to. Additionally therealso appears to be a longer-term hidden cyclic effect,potentially more catastrophic, as we are currentlyseeing and will continue to see as EconomicRationalism appears to accelerate the AsianEconomic meltdown.Much to its chagrin, the UN, as it emerges into thepost cold war era, is beginning to proactively identifythe concerns of a totally different world. However it ishamstrung by the economics of its old reactivemanagement model and the dictates of anInternational Monetary Fund that continues to lockthe solution of human crisis into money with noexperimentation into subsistence and bartereconomies.Without doubt this general scenario acceleratesthe potential for a single dysfunctional nation state todraw its satellites into either conflict or collapse incatastrophic proportions.Fragmentation –Issues of a Peace Keeping ConcernThe common UN Response to the social conflictzones is a peacekeeping mandate that regularly has asensitive application but with an ambiguousimplementation.Both peacekeeping and humanitarian aid wheninserted into these zones, have an enormous impactbut are still used ambiguously by the Internationalcommunity. This ambiguity and the differing roles ofPK and HA creates both a strategic and tacticaldichotomy.It is an operational schism and a potential triggerto the fragmentation of intra and internationaldynamics as a confusingly faster pathway to a nuclearor biological incident or conclusion. Will it be athermonuclear suitcase or a can of fly spray?In a final analysis, it could well be argued that theambiguity in current problem solving creates adichotomy of operational approach in every UNMandate. To date this creates imbroglio, slowsintervention, compounds crises, and places allparticipants together in a “grey zone” of operationalcompromise and lack of strategic commitment.In short, UN military intervention as it stands,with no clear-cut commitment to, let alone philosophyon, the distinction between a social conflict and amilitary conflict is and will always remain just agunfight away from total disaster. It is to the greatcredit of all military commanders in the field that thishas not happened.Commanders have had to think on their feet. Theevolution of PK has had to accommodate crisesat a tactical level where terms such as“wider peacekeeping”, “bolder peacekeeping”,“peacemaking” and “hearts and minds” are all now invogue. This development has grown to the extent thatsome of it has been put into doctrine and commandfield manuals for peacekeeping operations. Butessentially it is a “bottom up” effort to “dosomething” and not part of a strategic “top down”planning process. In short it reflects the lack ofdefinition and by default the lack of vision in the UNCharter.Social conflict is a crisis. It is a force, but it doesnot manoeuvre in any traditional military sense - youdon’t counter act it, - you work with it. This is theexperience gained in the Social Work Discipline ofCommunity Development (CD) when working withthis type of crisis at a “grass roots” level. The MilitaryCommunity Development (MCD) model proposedwith this article is just a first step based on thisdisciplinary experience, but designed to suit the largerscale of UN operations. The ADF with its unique UNdeployment experience is well positioned to adoptMCD as a committed strategy. In doing so, this, byexample, should assist the UN to move into the nextstage beyond the “grey zone” of a “doing something”PK mandate, and by example, into a mandate for PD.The biggest problem with the process offragmentation is our fear of it. It is a fear of thechange it creates and the humanitarian crisis itgenerates. In dealing with fragmentation we need acompletely fresh approach. An approach whichchallenges current mindsets, by not fearing its processbut to proactively “change manage” it. Hence we

26AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999need UN intervention as a change manager and tomake the change management effective. Particularlyas the process of fragmentation will continue tounravel one social disaster after another.Military Community DevelopmentA Pathway to Peace“On the ground” tactical skilling in communitydevelopment (CD) for military units on a PKdeployment is a first step to clarifying and taking astage further the military activity which has oftenbeen loosely defined as a bolder peacekeeping or“hearts and minds” engagement. Traditionally this hasonly been employed with a security enhancingobjective, rather than with a PD mandate andcommitment. The British Army in Bosnia forexample employed “Hearts and Minds” to reactivatethe schools, however not as a military interest inrestoring education. It was a short term objective toremove the children from the streets, and improvelocal attitudes toward the military. Put into a biggerpicture it could also have been part of an overallstrategy and a first step toward PD.What it lacked was commitment to a full PDstrategy and possibly a short fall in the type of skillingthat an extended “Hearts and Minds” tactic needs.“Hearts and Minds” is not a military label for CD.Coined during the Vietnam War, at best, it is basic PRwith very limited CD.It can be argued that an extended and wellmanaged bolder peacekeeping “Hearts and Minds”tactic can lead to enhancing and prolonging a truceenvironment. In turn, particularly if there is aneffective marriage between PKs and HAs, such a“CD tactic” may well improve the chances ofdisarming and demobilising the militias that form as anatural part of the fragmentation process.From current research it appears that the overallpeace process would be assisted by commanders inthe field working with an effective “bridge”, aprofessional link, between the Peace Keepers, theHost Community and Humanitarian Aid/NonGovernment Organisations (NGO). Military basedCommunity Development deployed as a distinct unitto the main force but “in support of” shows promiseas that bridge. The model outlined in this articledescribes the skills and identified objectives ofMilitary based Community Development (MCD). Orin other words a distinct professional base to widerpeace keeping, peace making, or “Hearts and Minds”.Diplomatically it is also a process that can be usedas a first step, a diplomatic chip, to UN Intervention,and then withdrawn or substantially supported as thecase may be.The UN Charter to achieve inter alia,“international co-operation in solving internationalproblems of an economic, social, cultural, orhumanitarian character”, is essentially flawed in itsreliance more on ambiguous cooperation thantangible skill in developing practical solutions andresolving operational dichotomy. As a result, despiteall the best intentions, both PK and HA have foundthemselves constantly operating in a vacuum. Whilesensible efforts have been made to cooperate, strongreservations remain and will continue to divide NGOsand the military. It is a root cause of difficulty inpeacekeeping, and a reason why “peacedevelopment” is so hampered and has not progressed.PK and HA should not be confused with oneanother. This is very relevant in that to do so it cancreate a serious and often confusing overlap in PKdelivery. The reverse however is as equally relevantin that a separation between PK and HA creates avacuum of compromise. It is a classic “damned if youdo and damned if you don’t” scenario and one of theissues that has put PD in the too hard basket. Militarybased Community Development directly linked tocommand and control, however, offers a bridgingprocess that assesses, filters, distils and coordinatesthe opposing operational approaches to the sameproblem with a site specific objective.The above process addresses the difficultiescommanders in the field have had in relying onindeterminate intelligence gathering in theirinteraction with NGOs, and the social/culturalelements of the host community. MCD wouldtherefore compliment standard intelligence gatheringby putting a PD objective based focus to the data.A critique to this model maintains that the militarydo the same things as CD only it is called gatheringintelligence. To some degree this may be so, but theintelligence would lack a skilled focus and direction,and therefore unable to deliver tangible results in theCD target areas you want it to. The priority of militaryintelligence, is and always will be, security and notCD.PD maintains that the UN policy in giving HAresponsibility only to NGOs is antiquated. Past UNstrategy has been based on the “mindset” ofestablishing an ambiguous “cooperative strategy”between the NGOs and military tradition. It does notin any way address the reality of two opposingoperational approaches to the same problem. Thesolutions to this dilemma are left to the commandersin the field who often have to deal with not only athreat to security but a “snobbery” that occurs toward

PEACE DEVELOPMENT 27the military. This is not a scenario that generateseffectiveness or communication. It is a UN policy thatis essentially flawed.This ethos of “cooperation”, without an effectiveability to cooperate, is seen by the author as a mainreason for the burgeoning costs (human andmonetary), ineffectiveness of mandates and endresults to date. It is an issue, which repeats itself overand again, in associated literature.Real cooperation translates into effectiveness andtangible commitment to the overall objective of anyUN mandate and that has to be politicised peace andnot militarised peace or dependency.The means to generate PD, to measure it, andsustain humanitarian targets has seemingly eludedUN intervention despite large budgets and anextensive bureaucracy.Quite possibly this has been due to a number ofreasons, two identified in this article are:a. The inept use of traditional Peace Keeping in acivilian environment, and;b. The fact that CD, as a Social Work discipline,has resided at grass root local levels divorced from thepowerful realms of either military or internationalstrategy.Historically and philosophically, Social Work andcombat do not seemingly mix. Despite the fact thatSocial Work deals with micro disasters every day, nostudy, apparently, has been done to test the hypothesisthat CD in a military environment could be a valuableand effective skill.UN PK deployments are to date an imposition onthe host nation, and regardless of its humanitarianhigh ground, the UN must get it right - this is itsethical responsibility. To date this ethicalresponsibility, and the skills to deliver it, seemingly,have been lost in the obfuscation of civilian andmilitary bureaucracy, and the ambiguous commitmentof the International Community - the UN itself.PD is possibly in the early stages of coming intobeing, and MCD as mentioned is an innovativemilitary tactic in peace keeping that has already takena few tentative (yet successful) steps down this pathunder a range of different guises and smallerobjectives. The excellent efforts of 1 RAR inSomalia, for example, come to mind. In short, whilethe ADF can skilfully play the ball, we could also beputting runs on the board.CD appears well suited as a means to “marry” theopposing operational approaches that exist betweenPK and HA and with its skills and direction it canprovide the missing tactical link in PD.The sensitivity in fragmentation so aptlydemonstrated in Bosnia shows that PK and PeaceEnforcement (PE) are a contradiction and cannotrealistically be conducted simultaneously in the samearea. When PK becomes PE, communitydevelopment has simply not happened. Other than inself-defence there is no place for active use of force ina PD type operation. However a key distinction heremust be made between having a force in place and theactive use of that force.A strong force in place is essentially the gunboatdiplomacy of history and there is nothing wrong withthis in a dangerously fragmented environment. In factminimum force is only a confusion that creates anddoes not negate the danger of violence andprecipitates the hostage factor. In PD the larger theforce the better - it does not necessarily have to act,just be there in “training” while MCD is constantlyactive.Large size has the essential role of being culturallysensitive yet simply but seriously deterring violencethereby allowing normalisation, democratisation, andCD to develop and evolve under its umbrella. A largeand appropriate UN force must be deployed in a PDmission as an effective gesture at both tactical andoperational levels. As IFOR demonstrated it conveysthe weight of international commitment and the realpossibility of retribution to renegade violent militiasregardless of faction or political leaning. It forcescombatants to the discussion table.While a large force is expensive in monetaryterms, it creates an environment that minimiseshuman cost, and can immediately put in place thebasic physical infrastructures, including media, thataccelerate CD, thereby enabling sustainable PD. Thelarge force remains in training. Use of its mechanisedunits depending on logistics is minimised witharmour and air power in reserve. It will maintainbattle ready status, thereby disallowing the expensiveretraining of troops “gone soft” on human reliefoperations that some doubtful critics observe. Criticswho in turn fail to acknowledge the invaluablepreparation and in the main “safe” experience that adeployment of this nature exposes all ranks to.Minimum force is not “safe”.The large force uses extensive, diplomatic, softtarget foot patrols which are ideal for intelligencegathering, in being able to identify war damage,political sensitivity, basic community needs, levels ofcooperation, and re-employment of local manpower.Violence when encountered is quickly identified,isolated, and judiciously eliminated on the age old

28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999principle that every culture understands - an eye foran eye regardless of body politic.The argument that isolated pockets of violencewill turn local communities against the UNintervention are only valid where renegade militiashold influence and where CD intervention is nonexistent. Something of a “catch 22”, however MCDshould be an excellent tool to undermine the influenceof renegade militias. HA organisations experiencingthe negative influence of renegade militias shouldhave the immediate support of MCD.The need now is for the development ofalternative strategies and the means by which pressurecould be best applied to non-compliant culturallydiverse factions. Tangible skill in accurately assessingsocio-cultural and ideological site specific conditions,with an application of eclectic skills based on theprinciples of CD are required. A spectrum ofobjectives focusing on the achievement of communityowned yet practical/viable solutions would begenerated. A commander with the ability toconstructively divert problems back to communityownership and away from his/her troops immediatelycreates a safer environment for the deployment.Modern military philosophy in moving awayfrom the anchors of tradition aims to de-mystifyrather than re-mythicise. The spectrum for tasking istherefore as broad as the desire to effectively andviably problem solve. This is the type of ethosrequired to deal with fragmentation and where MCD,which would have a very broad problem solvingcommission, could evolve into a practical andelementary manoeuvre, a reality based tactic inPD operations.If peace cannot be achieved at the discussion tablethen the Carthatic benefits of battle need to beexplored. This has to be in the context that a large UNPD force in place can control the site, the battle time,and the weapons of the belligerents. It will allow theanger and animosity to burn itself out with out the“ethnic cleansing” which destroys the basicinfrastructure and the children of the host community.A cartharsis as such would enable an easier, lessexpensive (in monetary and humanitarian terms)transition to political peace management in the longerterm. We need the courage and ethical fortitude toallow this and to avoid constantly losing the plot inour current ambiguity.Fragmentation is now too complex and toodangerous to humanity as a whole to allow for anethical and obfuscating debate on controlled violence.Controlled violence has to be safer than uncontrolledviolence. It must be easier to manage a controlledconflict, than a complex uncontrollable limbo ofaggressive belligerents, which the media mistakenlydefines as peace. An aggressive limbo is not peace, itis a conflict that has not happened. Sadly we appear tobe more skilled in managing battle than in managingpeace. If this is the case then may be our battlemanagement skills, used constructively, could be asupport to the peace process.CD principles and practice have been refined anddeveloped to the point where they could now have avery definitive role in bolder peacekeeping.Additionally with some research MCD may wellassist by putting a clearer focus on the demarcating“line in the sand” between PK process and a need toturn to immediate defence/peace enforcement. TheCD process in itself enables a clearer reading of the“political tea leaves” in any given situation. This in itsown right would be of great assistance tocommanders in the field.It is argued that Community Development shouldbe solely the role of NGOs in any UN peacekeepingmission, and to a greater extent NGOs have beentasked in this direction. In context however, and asrecent history reveals, it would appear the NGOs havehad minimal, to no effect in this area. The reasons forthis are complex, but it would appear that the lack ofskilled and strategic knowledge in communitydevelopment at higher levels again references theUN’s antiquated and slow management model. Oftenas not, the problem has already accelerated to thepoint of being overwhelming before real resourcesflow to the relevant NGO.Involvement in MCD processes could wellenhance troop morale. Where in the past meaninglessboredom, fear of threat, and the gruesome burialdetails of a PK deployment have had a negative effecton morale, active community building would act as a“counter balance”. It would give our diggers a realsense of achievement, and not the emptydisheartening vacuum many return home with.The rough military labelling of PR and verylimited CD tactics as “Hearts and Minds” indicatesthat CD is probably not on any military academycurriculum. Surprisingly, given the fact that ThomasEdward Lawrence essentially employed CommunityDevelopment principles to motivate the Arabs intobattle against the Turkish Army during World War 1.ProcessUN member countries simply do not like theconcept of foreign troops going into any other countryand approve it as a last resort i.e. when humanitarian

PEACE DEVELOPMENT 29need cannot be ignored any more. This is a reactiveethos based on the fear of fragmentation and one ofthe reasons why PD is undeveloped, and why UNintervention is in the main unsuccessful. Asmentioned a change of mindset is required here if thejob is to be done properly. The age-old adage “don’tdo a job unless you do it properly” applies.A key problem identified with using CD in a UNdeployment is the time it can take to find strategicentry points to an unsatisfactory social situation andfacilitating a solution. PK and HA operations by theUN, due to the above ethos, are usually on the basisof “get in and get out as soon as possible”.Subsequently there often is only a very narrowwindow of opportunity endorsed by the UN membercountries to keep the combatants apart long enough totake the heat out of a situation. This, though, is oftenthe immediate situation after months of deliberation.It denies the fact that a MCD unit can be a first stageof deployment, a “Weinberger Doctrine” diplomaticchip during the deliberation phase, and then the last toleave if need be. Additionally one can also ask howoften do UN deployments become protracted andfrozen for years into a dangerous “minimal force” PKmode when full PD can be put into process?CD is not suited to the current process of theantiquated UN “minimal force” Peace Keepingintervention, but then who is really satisfied with thecurrent process of UN Intervention in war torncommunities? Can Peace Keeping re-strategise toPeace Development?Within the UN model a dichotomy also existsbetween philanthropy and military. Reasons for thisappear to be deliberate in that no one member countrycan afford to do it all, and if the two were merged, aidcould be used as a “weapon”. Firstly, this fails torecognise modern military philosophy, which caneasily absorb a small, effective, and purpose trainedphilanthropic unit as a resource to the commander inthe field. Secondly a merging of resources withproper impartial management would accelerate thePD process and quite likely, in the longer term,reduce the costs of failed and protracted UNdeployments. It really is a “shooting yourself in thefoot” mindset.The cumbersome nature of current UN PKoperations can well mean that we have a HA teamcoming from a language/cultural group differing tothat of the local Australian military commander. ThisHA team is headed by a non-English speakingcivilian with an independent brief and cautious in anyprotocol with PK. This mix of circumstance onlyexacerbates a situation where HA, overwhelmed bythe need to save people from starvation and death,operates reactively all over the region withoutcommunication/coordination and PK in turn isoverwhelmed by the multiple security task.The technical dynamics of CD can work towardensuring a tangible cooperation between military andNGO. If this does not happen, as is often the case, theright arm will not know what the left was doing. Anend result being generated aid dependency withoutany self-determination. This is certainly a lesson tocome out of UNOSOM I & II.The CD process is dynamic, and fluid. It is oftenan ongoing rapid transfer of information as it psychosocially“tunes in” to its client group. It works withchange agents, the finesse of empowerment andinvestment in stakeholders, while fusing leadershipacross its client community. These are only someelements of its complex technical skill, which withoutquestion would be seriously impeded by alanguage/philosophical/protocol barrier between themilitary commander and HA service deliverer. It is nowonder then, that due to this particular dichotomy inUN Peacekeeping, there has never been any realmovement toward PD. The issue raised in thisparagraph forms a key point in the concept that thechain of Command and Control in a military groupinserted into a UN PD mission should have a MCDunit (complete with a workable budget) attached to itand “in support of” to make its mandate workable. Indue course with training and experience this alsopresents as a means to tackle any future ambiguousmandate effectively.The ADF is ideally positioned to develop a highlyprofessional, coordinated and complimentary triservicetraining regime combining the interdependentmanagement between community development andmilitary support.The MCD Model –Military based Community DevelopmentThe model envisions a highly skilled and mobileunit/team tasked with:a. Regional Profiling and site specific conditionsAssessing target region site specific conditions insuch areas as civilian resources, the culturalmix/beliefsystems/local political agendas, andeffective aid distribution. It identifies communityneeds and means to implement self determinedtraining to meet those needs. It identifiesachievable objectives in balance with local sitespecific conditions and need - hence appropriatetasking to military developed infrastructure;

30AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999b. Social CommunicationAlerting field commanders to sensitive civiliancommunications, hidden agendas, andpropaganda manipulation, while implementingand sustaining constructive links with the targetpopulation;c. Principles of Community OwnershipAssisting field commanders to develop softstrategies aimed at working with localiseddifficulties through the promotion of localownership of problems/benefits, self esteem, andself determination;d. Community Empowerment & localparticipationIn liaison with chain of command working withcommunity leaders and stakeholders in correctlyidentifying problems, developing and linkingbenefits and generating self determined problemsolving. A soft strategy based on cyclic processfocused on returning localised power. Immediatemoves in this direction will start a process thatimpedes local conflict with the UN mandate, aswas the culturally based case in Rwanda/Somalia.This strategy develops the foundation for thelonger term PD goal of socio-politicalharmony/stability with the host region. It has theadvantage of practical, on-the-groundskilling/training, and “big picture” orientation, asdistinct to ambiguous “cooperative diplomacy” orshort term “Hearts and Minds”;e. Using Change AgentsBased on appropriately assessed site specificconditions the use of relevant change agents aid insupport to promote training, regionaleconomy/infrastructure eg. in Somalia a goodchange agent was provision of veterinary care bythe Indian contingent as distinct from mechanisedfarming implements. Media control, but withdemonstrated movement toward communityownership, is integral to this process. In PD acommunity-based vacuum of information can bemanipulated by belligerents;f. Local Participation in project cycleThe encouragement of all involved in local projectcycles, with leadership from behind in the contextof predetermined provision of logistical support,basic infrastructure and community basedinfrastructure training with set timeframes and setobjectives. In liaison with local leadership, agreedgeneral coordination while generating a real,active and constructive image of PDthroughout the community. This would have theeffect of nullifying resistance, alienating and/orpacifying belligerents and developing/maintaininga constructive, culturally based, self-determininglocal political agenda. It would be objectively andessentially an enabling role. Alert to anddefining/maintaining impartiality-controlledemotional involvement as an objective in itself.Soft patrols using “Hearts and Minds” with a longterm objective;g. Creating StakeholdersThere are stakeholders in every community. Akey skill in community development is identifyingand creating relevant stakeholders, and workingwith them to identify issues, meet communityneed and identifying community owned benefits.Stakeholders are a key element in generating selfdeterminationand community ownership;h. Tracking ProgressWith the tactics outlined above objectives aretangible, and more to the point professionallydefinable. Within corporate methodology,progress can be tracked toward the achievementof objectives. So at any one time the fieldcommander can assess the effective status of hisoperation, effectively troubleshoot, and not relyon fluid, potentially double barrelled orambiguous information/outcomes;i. Linking BenefitsThis is a key area where cooperation between PKand HA can play a very powerful role in localarea stabilisation as part of the process toward PD.Appropriately linked benefits in liaison with thelocal community can make the whole operation ofresource and its implementation effective.Particularly if the strategy is focused onpromoting self determination in the hostcommunity;j. Distribution of BenefitsAppropriate distribution that enhances communityempowerment/ownership allows the local area PDstrategy to spread into neighbouring regions;k. Involving CommunityThis is the first stage and political side of the PDLeaders process. The approach is clinicallyprofessional with no political objective other thanthe mandate. A large military force enablesenforcement to the impartial discussion table andwhere all parties are assigned rules and roles inthe PD process. The key positive motivator herebeing stability and infrastructure in the region.Non cooperation by a belligerent will therefore bea self grown negative political image. Positiverespondents will rapidly gain ground as a result ofthe PD process Any violent reaction is isolatedand controlled, but access to the discussion tableand HA continues (only a large force will enable

PEACE DEVELOPMENT 31this). The objective is politicisation andreduction/destruction of militarisation as a firststage to democracy. It is this process that shoulddictate the time frame of any UN PD mandate.This is a short outline of the model’s concept.MCD Model S.W.O.T.Strengthsa. Provision of community based intelligence forcommanders.b. Provides commanders with the ability to worklaterally and informatively across thechaotic, cumbersome and systemic problems thatcurrently effect UN PK missions.c. Provides definable, and tangible objectives to PDmissions.d. Reduces threat to troops on the ground, bymoving quickly and effectively.e. Support to CISM.f. Linking of local resources to a PK/PD mission.g. Provides increased options in communication andcoordination.h. Monitors and facilitates NGO operations as partof Command and Control.i. Will assist as a filter for “misinformation”.j. A “Military Mould” already exists.k. Identifies and works with host communityleadership.l. Provides the field commander with a skilledmeans of communicating across the multifacetedcivil - military environment thereby reducingopen ended mission statements/endstates.m. Information supplied could well assistcommanders relying on decentralised execution ofdecisions and orders, particularly in assessment ofopportunity and risk in seemingly ambiguouspolitical situations.n. Information gained will constantly drive missionre-analysis.o. Being able to provide a focus for troops by linkingmultiple and seemingly unrelated political,community, and military activities into a unifyingmission concept.p. Potentially very cost effective.q. Generates positive morale for troops in the field.Weaknessesa. Will need skilled and appropriate staffing.b. In sensitive path finding work such as thismistakes will be made.c. As a new concept, and a diversion from traditionalmilitary manoeuvre it will encounter resistancewithin ADF.d. It will require time for R&D plus training.e. Will initially impinge on budgetOpportunitiesa. A marketable ADF model/ resource with potentialto sell/export to other UN members.b. A pathway toward real UN PK resolutions and“Peace Development”.c. Reduce belligerent ability from using PK forcesfor their own purposes by negating/alienating the“fight - talk, talk -fight” technique.d. Enhance communication in unilateral PKmissions.e. Can commence working immediately andcontinue through the stages of interposition,observation, reporting, assessment, and action.f. An opportunity to research and highly tunepeacekeeping liaison between factions.g. Effective delivery of service should reduce“Mission Creep”.h. The development of highly skilled negotiators as aresource support to the field commander.i. Increased access and control to community basedinformation could well provide an ADF fieldcommander with political leverage, and animproved ability to “read the political tea leaves”in any given UN PK situation.j. Will assist in the promotion of the ADF as aproactive futures based tri service defence force,and provide leadership in future PK missions.Threatsa. Loss of credibility through inappropriate tasking.b. Rejection/resentment from NGO’s to theformation of a CD military unit.c. Budget limitations.d. Conflict with Operations Other Than Wardoctrine, and ADF UN PK general doctrine.e. Communication/change resistance bycommanders in the field.f. Communication/change resistance by ADFbureaucracy.g. Communication/change resistance by AustralianGovt and UN bureaucracyConclusionThe basic tenets of community development arelocal participation, communication analysis, creating

32AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999stakeholders, linking/distributing benefits, involvingcommunity leadership, participation in project cycles,using change agents, correctly identifying site specificconditions, tracking progress and promotingcommunity ownership.To some extent and with out an identifiableprofessional model (other than “Hearts and Minds”)these tenets were endeavoured by the 1 RARBattalion Group, UNOSOM II, Baidoa Human ReliefSector, Somalia. As mentioned previously modernmilitary philosophy is demystifying to the pointwhere MCD could well be an effective tool in thefield for commanders servicing a UN mandate. Thisexemplifies the point that a platform already exists inthe modern military for community development.Additionally a well trained unit would be able todevelop an effective community intelligence networkon a par and working with PSY OPS.Most literary arguments indicate that UN charterwork will increasingly make demands on the ADFand in this context it requires a role similar, butdifferent from the traditional military operation. Theauthor believes this is part of the challenge that thefuture offers the ADF.Australia is additionally well positioned in itscivilian police forces to assist in civilianising PDdeployments. The Northern Territory Police Force forexample has been dealing and working with withcommunity based fragmentation for years.The concept outlined with MCD will requireongoing refinement, and can provide a step towardtangible and effective PK/PD operations. What isneeded is an opportunity to put together all theelements defined in this paper and then demonstrate itin the field.Authors note and acknowledgmentThe author is a Social Worker with the DefenceCommunity Organisation (DCO) however the DCOdoes not auspice this discussion article. This not tosay that the DCO thinks the model will not work. It isviewed, and quite rightly so, as a radical departureand a long way from the theoretical social work framework of CD as practised anywhere in the world. Thisis simply due to the concept of its application in whatis essentially a combat situation.I am of the view that the ADF will increasingly beinvolved in UN Humanitarian deployments as theprocess of fragmentation continues. Any suggestedtactical skill that can assist the ADF with itsresponsibility in minimising human life loss on thesemandates, and improving the quality of life gained, isI believe, also part of a social worker’s duty of care.Having worked in the field of CommunityDevelopment on and off for some twenty years I havea habit of linking benefits, and somewhat stunnedmyself with the realisation that quite possibly whatUN military deployments might need was a tangibleCD model. I could not believe that after all theexpenditure on UN deployments and their constantshortfalls that no one had really looked at a CDmodel. In researching this article this factor becamemore and more obvious.I started writing this article in late 96 after a fewdiscussions with ADF members who having beendeployed on UN mandates were expressing somemeasure of frustration. It seemed that a lot of thoseinvolved on UN deployments saw themselves, atvarious levels, working in something of a vacuum andtrying to grasp at something that was always justbeyond their reach. It was a common groundexpressed by all ranks. This aspect was also reflected(directly and indirectly) in the articles I was readingon the subject. I have drawn, and based some of theargument on the material listed in the bibliography.John Mackinley’s article however was published afterthe first draft of this article. It is recommendedcomplimentary reading as it helped to link the modeltogether and touches on the above mentioned“common ground”.The first draft was completed in late 96, by March97 it was a rough model, but enough for theA/DGDCO, Mr Lindsay Kranz to give it an excellentcritique. In addition one of my consultant's FLTLTRohan Gaskill took a copy with him on hisdeployment to Bosnia. On his return he contacted meto tell me he had found it a useful reference platformand encouraged me to finish the work. Not havingbeen on a deployment myself I was a little uncertainwriting about something I had not experienced firsthand.Everything is fluid in this world and the MCDmodel pushes the envelope of my profession. Thesmall bibliography and my lack of experience “onthe-ground”ascertain's that this is not an authoritativework. It is only a discussion article and hopefully thework will generate a healthy debate.To all I have spoken to on the subject, and tothose who have taken the time to read the drafts andoffer comment. Your feedback has beenconstructively critical and helpful, thank you.

PEACE DEVELOPMENT33BIBLIOGRAPHYGavin Fry, Rwanda the Australian Contingent 94-95,Australian Army 96Sean Maloney, Insights into Canadian Peacekeeping Doctrine,Military Review, LXXVI March - April 96, No 2.John Teager, Blessed be the Peacemakers, Air Power StudiesCentre, Canberra, 96.Major Jeffrey Rosenfeld/Colonel Peter Warfe, Moral andPhilosophical Challenges of a Medical Peacekeeping Missionin Rwanda, Australian Defence Force Journal, No 118,May/June 96.Captain D.J. Wilson, Psychological Operations in Somalia,Australian Defence Force Journal, No 107 July/August 94.Major Stephen Martin, Keeping up with a Rapidly-ChangingWorld, Australian Defence Force Journal, No 108, Sept/Oct94.Erich Frankland, European Security: Turning Chaos intoCooperation, Military Review, Vol LXXV, Dec 94.Bernard Lietaer, Beyond Greed and Scarcity, YES! Magazine #2Spring 97John Mackinlay, NGOs and military peacekeepers: friends or foes?,Janes International Defense Review 7/97Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, Faber & Faber, 72Lt.Colonel Jon Sparks, The Australian Defence Force-ItsResponsiveness to Change, Australian Defence Force Journal,No 109 Nov/Dec 94.Brigadier General Morris Boyd, US Army, Peace Operations: ACapstone Doctrine, Military Review, Vol LXXV, May/June 95Australian Defence Force Journal on Peace Keeping.Thomas R. Dubois, The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation ofKuwait, Vol XX1 No. 4 WINTER 1991-92.Dr John Reid, The Armed Forces and Society, RUSI JournalApril 1997.TTCP Proceedings of Symposium on Psychological Aspects ofPeacekeeping, Dec 95, TTCP/SGU/95/011.Hugh Smith, editor, Australians on Peace and War - proceedings ofconference, Australian Defence Force Academy, Aug 87.Caspar Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power, Defense, Jan 85.Donald Snow, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peaceenforcement:The U.S. role in the new International Order.http://carlisle.www.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs93e/peackeep/peckepss.htmSamuel P. Huntinton, The Clash of Civilizations, Foreign Affairs,Vol 72, No 3, Summer 93.Jacinta O’Hagan, Inter-Civilisational Conflict: a Critique of theHuntington Thesis, ANU, May 94.Dan Baschiera is a Defence Social Worker in the Northern Territory, employed by the Defence Community Organisation. He is a 1978graduate with a Bachelor of Applied Science (Social Work) from Curtin University WA. His career, continuously in Northern Australia,has included substantial crisis management working as an adult educator, community development consultant and social worker. Hehas a number of interests including history, Jungian synchronicity and a heuristic philosophy.

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Comparing Australian and New Zealand Defence andForeign Policy since 1985By Flight Lieutenant S.A. Madsen, RAAFIntroductionThroughout their progression from colony todominion and finally independent democracy,Australia and New Zealand have shared commonsecurity and foreign policy priorities. During the firsthalf of this century, their membership of the BritishCommonwealth bound them to the Mother countryand each other. 1 Differences emerged during WorldWar II when Australia turned to the United States,and withdrew its divisions from the Middle East todefend Australia. At the same time, New Zealandcontinued to send its forces to the Middle East andEurope despite the threat posed by Japan. 2In the immediate post-war period, Australia waseager to bring about a Pacific alliance binding theUnited States to the region, and underwriting itssecurity. New Zealand welcomed the Treaty asessential to Pacific security but was careful to remaincommitted to Middle East security in support ofBritain. 3The ANZUS Treaty became the cornerstone offoreign policy in Australia, and successivegovernments, both Conservative and Labor, werecareful to preserve it. Thus, when actions by NewZealand in 1985 looked set to destroy the Treaty,Australia sided with the United States. Consequently,ANZUS became, in effect, two bilateral agreementsfor Australia with the other former tripartite partners. 4The ANZUS crisis forced Australian and NewZealand to change foreign and defence policy. NewZealand freed from a degree of United Statesdominance became more tightly allied to Australia, asa result of the ANZUS crisis. Both countries havetaken more independent positions in the World since1985 but in broad terms they desire similar outcomesin today’s global society.Three important themes have emerged todominate defence and foreign policy in bothcountries:1) defence self-reliance,2) regional engagement, and3) good international citizenship.While they embraced these policy directions,Australia and New Zealand have not necessarilyimplemented them in a similar vein.The 1985 ANZUS CrisisIn 1985, the New Zealand (Labor) Governmentsought assurances from the United States that avisiting Naval (USN) vessel did not carry nuclearweapons. The US policy to neither confirm nor denythe presence of nuclear weapons effectively meantNew Zealand had banned port visits by the USN (orany other Nuclear Power with similar non-disclosurepolicies). 5The United States reacted swiftly, and suspendedits defence cooperation, and high level diplomaticinteraction with New Zealand. New Zealand DefenceForce (NZDF) personnel found themselves suspendedfrom training in the USA, and cut off from the largeUS defence and intelligence networks overnight.Diplomatic access to the Pentagon and White Housewas also suspended. 6The Australian (Labor) Government saw NewZealand’s actions as a threat to the ANZUS Alliance,and publicly expressed their objections to any actionthat led to a break with the United States. NewZealand would not relent, and ANZUS, in essence,became two bi-lateral agreements between Australiaand the other signatories. 7 Although not solelyresponsible, the crisis precipitated a period of changein Australian and New Zealand foreign policy. Todaythe treaty, though still important, is no longer centralto foreign policy in either country.Defence Self-relianceIn 1969, President Nixon, in the so calledGuam Doctrine, stated that the United States expectedits allied nations to be more responsible for their owndefence. The United States military would onlybecome involved in conflicts where another majorpower was a belligerent. 8 The effects of this policyshift on Australian and New Zealand defence

36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999planning did not become readily apparent until after1985. Australia and New Zealand have released threeDefence White Papers since 1985, New Zealand in1987, 1991, 1998 and Australia in 1987, 1994 and1997, stressing self-reliance but the emphasis andlevel of commitment differs between the twoAntipodean neighbours. In his preface to the 1987Australian White Paper, Kim Beazley wrote:The first aim of defence self-reliance is to giveAustralia the military capability to prevent anaggressor attacking us successfully in our sea andair approaches, gaining a foothold on any part ofour territory, or extracting concessions fromAustralia through the use or threat of militaryforce. 9To back up this rhetoric, the Labor Governmentset out a program of defence expenditure larger thanat any other time in Australia’s peacetime history.Commitments to acquire new submarines, theJindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN),Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft andreplacement of the aging Mirage fighters were themore significant defence acquisitions endorsed at thattime. 10New Zealand, by contrast, espoused self-reliancewithin the bilateral alliance with Australia thatANZUS became for them, and foresaw no directmilitary threat to the country. 11 A direct military threatto New Zealand has always been difficult to identify,even during World War II, and the expense of a largeforce capable of defending the country was politicallyunacceptable. 12 The 1991 Defence White Paper issuedby New Zealand stated:Self-Reliance in Partnership is the strategy usedfor implementing this policy. “Self-reliance” isessential for the national tasks that anyindependent nation must carry out - resourceprotection, counter-terrorism, and surveillance ofour approaches. “Partnership” involves theprotection of our wider security interests, such asthe maintenance of international law and order,and freedom of the seas. This can only be done incooperation with countries who share similarinterests. 13In the period since 1987, Australia has becomecentral to New Zealand Defence Policy. In 1991,New Zealand and Australia agreed to pursue betterinteroperability and coordination between theirDefence Forces through the Closer Defence Relations(CDR) process. 14 Defence spending in New Zealandhas declined in the period since 1985 (more recentlyremaining stable in dollar terms), and Australia hasquestioned the usefulness of CDR if the New ZealandGovernment does not bring about modernisation ofthe NZDF and remain interoperable. 15Regional EngagementDefence self-reliance has assisted the Antipodeanneighbours to become more independent in theirdealings with the world, especially within the AsiaPacific region. Australia and New Zealand arefounding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), and Australia was instrumental in forming theAsia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) processin 1989. 16 APEC and ARF are considered amongst themost important diplomatic successes of the Hawkeand Keating Governments, and highlight the extent towhich Australia sought to become enmeshed with theregion. 17 The Howard (Coalition) Governmentcontinued this engagement with the region, asevidenced in their policy white paper:Australia’s most important strategic andeconomic interests lie in a region—the AsiaPacific—of great cultural and historical diversity.This region covers South East Asia, North EastAsia, the Pacific, and the eastern reaches of theIndian Ocean. Australia’s biggest markets are inNorth East Asia. 18New Zealand has not been as aggressive in itsmoves into Asia but its links to the Pacific arestronger [than Australia’s] through their formermandated territories. 19 Regardless, the defence whitepapers of 1991 and 1997 emphasised regionalsecurity as a primary role for the NZDF:contributing to regional security which includesmaintaining our key defence relationships withAustralia and our Five Power DefenceArrangements (FPDA) partners - Australia,United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore 20A major difference between Australia and NewZealand is their relative positions (as perceived bythemselves and other nations) in the world. Australiais seen as a middle-power, and as such can wieldsufficient influence (with other middle-powers) tobring about more desirable outcomes for the region. 21New Zealand could not claim to have the sameinfluence, and had hooked its trailer to Australia in theface of an indifferent Britain, and unfriendly UnitedStates. 22Successive Labor Governments in Australia tookthe initiative on a number of global issues, and strodethe world stage with growing confidence, particularlyafter Gareth Evans assumed the role of ForeignMinister in 1988. APEC and ARF aside, Australia

COMPARING AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1985 37brokered the peace proposal in Cambodia andagricultural reforms in GATT during Evans’ period ofoffice, all significant achievements. 23 In 1995,Australia signed an agreement with Indonesia onmaintaining security. This agreement (with treatystatus) recognised both countries’ interests in regionalsecurity, and both agreed to consult on commonsecurity matters, and develop cooperation to benefitregional security. 24New Zealand has taken part in the negotiations forGATT, APEC and ARF with Australia but it can beargued that the more important agreements wereconcluded with Australia alone. CDR, and itseconomic counterpart Closer Economic Relations(CER) have been significant instruments of NewZealand foreign and defence policy since theirinception. CER has been used as the vehicle toengage with the ASEAN countries; fostering bettertrade relations with the tiger economies of theregion. 25 New Zealand did not embrace Asia asquickly as Australia, remaining more committed to itsEuropean roots, but they have benefited fromAustralia’s vigorous regional engagement. Closercooperation has afforded Australia a bigger voice inthe region, and further opened the gates to Asia forNew Zealand. 26Good International CitizenshipThe end of the Cold War, and the strengthening ofthe United Nations that followed, presentedopportunities for smaller nations to contribute to the“New World Order” in international forums. 27 NewZealand and Australia have taken their responsibilitiesas “good international citizens” seriously, and theircontributions have been significant.Ironically, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policiesare probably the first signs of the move to becomegood international citizens. Support for the antinuclearmovement in New Zealand was wide spread(69 per cent in 1986) and ultimately embraced by allpolitical parties. 28 New Zealand implemented thesepolicies in the face of hostile reaction in the UnitedStates, and disapproval elsewhere including Australia.Australia’s government took a less altruistic stand onthe anti-nuclear movement. Australia ensured theSouth Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty allowedsignatories to permit visits by nuclear armed vesselsand aircraft vital to the ANZUS Alliance. Thisensured that Australia’s relationship with the UnitedStates was unthreatened while the governmentcommitted to a politically correct anti-nuclearpolicy. 29New Zealand clearly enunciated its intention toplay their role in the world to bring about justice andpeace in their Defence White Papers:being a good international citizen by playing ourpart in global collective security efforts,particularly peacekeeping. 30The NZDF has been active in peacekeeping andother United Nations operations throughout the worldsince 1990. In the Gulf War, the government wouldnot commit combat forces but did provide supportand medical elements which were accepted eagerlyby the United States despite continuing post-ANZUStension. This decision, supported by 80 per cent of thepopulation, emphasis’ the countries growing antimilitarismsince 1985. 31 New Zealand supported theUnited Nations in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia andmore recently had a major part in brokering the peacenegotiation ending conflict in Bougainville. 32Australia articulated its support for the “goodinternational citizenship” concept continuallythroughout the years since 1985, especially duringGareth Evans period as Foreign Minister. Evansexplained:Good international citizenship is perhaps bestdescribed, not least for the cynical, as an exercisein enlightened self-interest: an expression ofidealistic pragmatism. Our refugee program, forexample, shows how we can be faithful tohumanitarian concerns and, in the process, alsoacquire for Australia human resources and skillswhich strengthen our economic and enrich oursociety 33Support for the global community whenAustralia’s national interest is satisfied does not quitethe altruistic policy Hedley Bull conceptualised in the1970s. However, it shows Australia’s growingconfidence on the world stage, and all governmentshave displayed a responsibility to their country firstand foremost even in the “new world order”. 34Australia’s credentials as a “good internationalcitizen” were further enhanced by acceptance of theFramework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)in 1992. Ros Kelly, Minister for the Environment,stated, “Australia and many other countries workedand negotiated for stronger outcomes on climatechange, biodiversity and some of the items in Agenda21 ...”. 35 Australia saw itself as leader in theenvironmental cause but the government’s motiveswere not all together unselfish. Evans saw theproblem as a threat: as low lying nations wereclaimed by the rising waters; Australia would beinundated by refugees. He advocated a policy that

38AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999called on all nations to play their part to halt thegreenhouse effect, following Australia’s lead. Despitethe rhetoric, Australia was backpedalling on its ownresponsibilities by 1994, and did not create anysignificant initiatives to meet the targets set. A“carbon tax” was proposed but rejected by Cabinet,and the business community thought the targetsagreed to in Rio unattainable. The targets were finallyabandoned by the Coalition Government in 1996. 36ConclusionAustralia and New Zealand share a commonheritage and history, and their relationship with eachother has been strong throughout the short period oftheir independence. By 1985, both were in full controlof their defence, and foreign policy, ready to playtheir part in global issues.As a result of the ANZUS crisis, and the UnitedStates withdrawal from the region, both countries hadto adjust their defence policies and began to look toAsia for partners in regional security. Australia, whilesympathetic to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy,saw ANZUS (and hence the United States) as thecentrepiece of the country’s foreign policy, and wouldnot jeopardise that relationship. New Zealand shiftedits defence dependence to Australia, and in doing so,found itself serving a far harder master than theUnited States. Both countries have strengthened theirdefence relationships in Asia: New Zealand throughits continued commitment to the Five Power DefenceArrangement (FPDA), and Australia through anumber of bilateral agreements, the most significantwith Indonesia.The moves by both countries to become engagedin Asia, and strengthen bilateral relations with theimportant North Asia countries, highlight thediscarding of the final colonial baggage. Theformation of ARF and APEC are significant defenceand foreign policy initiatives, and together withAustralia’s security agreement with Indonesiahighlight the developing relationships in the AsiaPacific region.“Good international citizenship” is a growingtrend in western societies and both countriesembraced it as an ideal in the early nineties. NewZealand has had the conviction of its ideals,defending its anti-nuclear policy against the might ofthe United States, yet joining with them to defendpeace across the globe. Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia andBougainville are but a few of the countries in whichNZDF personnel have served as peacekeepers since1985, and this role is a centrepiece of New Zealanddefence policy. Australia tempered its “goodinternational citizenship” with national interestparticularly when addressing anti-nuclear andenvironmental issues. Economic growth and therelationship with the United States were consideredmore important than becoming a truly altruisticsociety. Australia has been successful in promotingpeace in the region (Cambodia most notably), andcontributes peacekeeping forces to a number of globaltrouble spots.Both countries have matured as nations since1985, displaying growing confidence on the worldstage. Successive Australian and New Zealandgovernments recognised the importance of becomingfull partners in the region. As the colonial influences(European and American) diminished, and Asianeconomies boomed, they implemented policies thatwill continue to influence each country’s stature forthe foreseeable future.NOTES1. A. & R. Burnett, The Australia and New Zealand Nexus,Australian National University, Canberra, 1978, pp. 66-71.2. M. McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: NewZealand in the world since 1935, Auckland University Press,Auckland, 1993, pp.45-46.3. C. Bridge (ed), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s relations withBritain and the United States since the 1930s, MelbourneUniversity Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.110.4. T.B. Millar, Australia in War and Peace: external relationssince 1788 (Second Edition), Australian National UniversityPress, Canberra, 1991, p.363.5. M. McKinnon, op. cit., pp. 282-284.6. ibid., p. 283.7. ibid.8. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, Australia in the World: Anintroduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford UniversityPress, Melbourne, 1996, p. 65.9. Australia, Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia1987, AGPS, Canberra, 1987.10. ibid.11. M. McKinnon, op. cit., p. 297.12. ibid., pp. 46-48.13. New Zealand, Department of Defence, New Zealand DefenceWhite Paper, http://www.mft.govt.nz/, 199714. New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, NewZealand's Foreign and Trade Policy: Bilateral and RegionalRelationships, http://www.mft.govt.nz/part2.html, 199615. M. Ramage, ‘New Zealand Defence Post-election: in limbo’,Research and Analysis, Directorate of Army Research andAnalysis, No. 11, December, 1996, p. 3.16. T.B. Millar, op. cit., pp. 364-369.17. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op.cit., p. 87.18. Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In theNational Interest Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy WhitePaper, National Capital Printing, Canberra, 1997, p. 1.19. M. McKinnon, op. cit., pp.252-277.

COMPARING AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 19853920. New Zealand, Department of Defence, New Zealand DefenceWhite Paper, http://www.mft.govt.nz/, 199721. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op.cit., pp.95-113.22. New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, loc. cit.23. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op.cit., pp.108-110.24. Commonwealth of Australia, Agreement between theGovernment of Australia and the Government of the Republicof Indonesia on Maintaining Security, AGPS, Canberra, 1997.25. New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, NewZealand's Foreign and Trade Policy: Bilateral and RegionalRelationships, http://www.mft.govt.nz/part2.html, 1996.26. R. Garnaut, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy,AGPS, Canberra, 1990, pp. 154-155.27. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, loc. cit.28. M. McKinnon, op. cit., p. 289.29. T.B. Millar, op. cit., pp. 362-363.30. New Zealand, Department of Defence, New Zealand DefenceWhite Paper, http://www.mft.govt.nz/, 1997.31. M. McKinnon, op. cit., p. 290.32. New Zealand, Department of Defence, New Zealand DefenceWhite Paper, http://www.mft.govt.nz/, 1997.33. G. Evans, ‘Australian Foreign Policy: Priorities in a ChangingWorld’, Australian Outlook, vol. 43, no. 2, p.13, quoted in G.Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op.cit., p.219.34. ibid.35. R. Kelly, The United Nations Conference on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED): Where to Now and What Does itMean for Australia?, Address to the National Press Club,Canberra, 19 June 1992, quoted in G. Smith, D. Cox and S.Burchill, op.cit., pp. 193-195.36. G. Smith, D. Cox and S. Burchill, op.cit., pp. 193-200.BIBLIOGRAPHYBridge, C., (ed), Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s relations withBritain and the United States since the 1930s, MelbourneUniversity Press, Melbourne, 1991.Burnett, A. & R., The Australia and New Zealand Nexus,Australian National University, Canberra, 1978.Commonwealth of Australia, Australia-Indonesia Agreement onMaintaining Security (AMS), AGPS, Canberra, 1997.Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, The Defenceof Australia 1987, AGPS, Canberra, 1987.Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, DefendingAustralia: Defence White Paper 1994, AGPS, Canberra, 1994.Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs andTrade, In the National Interest Australia’s Foreign and TradePolicy White Paper, National Capital Printing, Canberra, 1997.DeAngelis, Dr. R., Middle-Level Power Overstretch?, 1995Foreign Policy Review, January 1996.Garnaut, R., Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy,AGPS, Canberra, 1990.McKinnon, M., Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand inthe world since 1935, Auckland University Press, Auckland,1993.Millar, T.B., Australia in War and Peace: external relations since1788 (Second Edition), Australian National University Press,Canberra, 1991.New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,New Zealand's Foreign and Trade Policy: Bilateral andRegional Relationships, http://www.mft.govt.nz/part2.html,1996.Research and Analysis, Directorate of Army Research andAnalysis, No. 11, December, 1996.Smith, G., Cox, D. and Burchill, S., Australia in the World: Anintroduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford UniversityPress, Melbourne, 1996.Flight Lieutenant Madsen joined the RAAF in 1980 as an Air Defence Operator. He served in various operational roles, both inAustralia and Malaysia, before being commissioned as an Air Defence Officer in 1992. Upon graduation from Air DefenceController Basic course, he served at No 2 Control and Reporting Unit from 1993-1996. He graduated as a Fighter CombatController in 1997 prior to taking up his current duties as a Staff Officer at Headquarters No 41 Wing.Minister Launches Medals BookletA new booklet launched in Canberra recently will provide readers with an easy-to-read and understand guide toAustralia’s campaign and Operational Medals.The Minister for Veterans Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence, Mr Bruce Scott, launched thebooklet Campaign and Operational Medals of the Australian Defence Force at the Australian War Memorial.The booklet contains colour illustrations, descriptions and the eligibility criteria for campaign and operational medals.“An important part of Australia’s history has been written on the many battlefields and in the many countries inwhich Australian Defence Force personnel have served,” Mr Scott said.Apart from the colour pictures of medals, the book provides plain language outlines of eligibility criteria for each ofthe awards.Operational Medals Awarded to the Australian Defence Force which was written by the Defence Staff Officer –Medals, Mr Ron Horton, is being distributed to Australian Defence Force units and Headquarters, MPs and Senators, theRSL and Sub-Branches and other veterans organisations.It may be bought by interested members of the public at the Australian War Memorial Bookshop – and AusInfo(formerly the Government Bookshop).

40AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999Collins Class submarine undergoing trials

The Importance of Training Needs Analysis in IntegratedLogistic SupportBy Lieutenant Commander Jim Kenny, RAN“The secret of successful purchasing andmaintenance of expensive technology lies in themanagement of risk. There are numerouspotential risks associated with acquiring trainingtechnology which can be a part of integratedlogistic support philosophy for control ofprocurements of training systems.”(P.Gramson - Director, Independent TrainingSystems: consultant to RAF, 1993)Logistics in Project ManagementThree fundamental questions that major projectmanagement needs to be clear on could bedistilled down to: why is the project happening, howwill it happen and with what will it be able to occur.The last question relates directly to the concept oflogistics which provides the resources to get the workdone. Although the logistics concept is not new to themilitary, the tying together of the various resourceneeds of a project that come together under thelogistics umbrella in an integrated fashion is relativelynew to the ADF. Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) isa discipline developed out of the systems approach toengineering. In many ways ILS embraces an eclecticapproach which brings together other disciplines suchas Needs Analysis (NA) such as in training, ValueAnalysis (VA) and Life Cycle Costing.Essentially ILS is defined as a unified andinteractive approach to management and technicalactivities necessary to influence research and designand support of a project. The ILS process serves tofocus attention on identifiable outputs includingcomputing support, HR, facilities and supply support.ILS has developed three conceptual roles; influencethe design, or selection of design to ensure supportconsiderations are taken into account. Secondly,develop the support system and integration into theexisting infrastructure and its through life support.Thirdly, manage the acquisition of the logistic supportsystem. In the typical life of a project, ILS costs overan equipment’s life often exceeds the initialacquisition cost by a significant amount. Specialconcern in the cost of ILS support, is the cost of theHR component which is a major contributing factor,especially the training resource element whichnormally runs on for a lengthy period after the initialacquisition phase. This element can cover items suchas training development, conduct as well as thefacilities and devices eg: simulators used in training.Considering the importance of this component of theoverall costing, the RAN needs a methodology and“total project cost appreciation” in order to capture totrue level of investment made in any new asset.Activity Based Management may do this, but only ifthe structural relationships are made connectingcurrently perceived isolated costs to the overallpicture. Equipment and services purchased for theCOLLINS Class submarine as an example, be theyspare propellers or sophisticated training simulatorsare all costs on the one project - not isolated to theorganisation from which the funds come from.Training Equipment - Beware the BlackHoleThe acquisition of complex (and expensive)training systems is not a trivial matter. Theconsequences of getting it wrong will impact on aproject or at least the larger organisation, such as theRAN well into the future. These consequences canrange from trivial matters as facility support at placeof use to buying devices that have obviousshortcomings in their performance, or requiretechnical skills for their upkeep which may beincompatible with a planned or anticipated skill baseor service budget. Avoiding, some of the major cost“blowouts” is not magical, as with the analysis forjustification of the asset in the first place, thederivation of the need for the training or TrainingNeeds Analysis (TNA) is also a critical aspect in thesuccess of the whole training process, indeed arguablythe asset’s ILS process. Potentially, poor TNA willprobably lead to an inappropriate mix of trainingdevices which may be under (or indeed over) utilisedfor the capital invested, or do not cover the range oftasks as effectively as they should. Without knowingprecisely (as possible) the underlying reasons andfactors for acquisition of training resources, the

42AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999potential to make significant error is high. There is nosuggestion that the future can be read accurately, butmost major asset acquisition projects in themselvesneed to be “forward looking” by more than a fewdecades, so the same for the ongoing training (indeedHR) requirements. The United Kingdom Ministry ofDefence 1 has recognised the inadequaciesexperienced with definition analysis of training needsand failures in making the most effective use ofavailable technology. These flaws, pointed out by theNational Audit Office, have had a major impact ontraining systems and associated resource expendituresfailing to satisfy user’s requirements. The RAF havesubsequently introduced a policy on synthetic trainingin 1989 which has appropriate TNA as a cornerstoneto ensure that acquisition choices are based onimproved, and more timely, definition of trainingneeds and on a full appreciation of the technologyavailable.Training Needs AnalysisABR 5286 (RANTS Volume 2) describes TNAas a multifaceted process which identifies relevantfactors of the training situation which will have abearing on the training strategy adopted. TNAequates to the four fundamental forms of analysisused in the RANTS - job, training, feasibility and taskanalyses. The aim of the four is to determine the“training fit”, that is, does training need to occur andif so what is the most effective way to do it. In thelogistic support continuum, before any determinationon how to acquire training systems is made, the morebasic question of do we need it must be answered -using a high proportion of fact and analysis and muchless “basic instinct”.DRB 37 “Value Analysis (VA) Handbookdescribes VA as: “the systematic effort directed atidentifying the functions of systems, etc for thepurpose of achieving the essential functions at thelowest cost consistent with the needed purpose,performance, reliability, sustainability andmaintainability. Before any assessment of thecapability of a piece of kit is determined, the domainof the engineer, its purpose must be clearlydetermined. Both VA and TNA are disciplines usinga systematic approach to problem solving, both taketime and effort, however, both are necessary,especially for high value items - like trainingsimulators.How Does the TNA Process WorkThe start really should begin with the end oroutcome. This is a clearly defined statement of whatis expected at the end of the project. All further workmust relate back to this and because we deal inoutcomes, there should be no restrictions onalternatives to achieve the outcome. RANTS Vol 2“Training Analysis and Design” Chapter 4 stressesthe point, management has to make a decision as tothe most cost effective means of closing thecompetency gap (people to do the work), they shouldconsider a range of options of which training is butone. This feasibility analysis is a “number crunching”exercise largely focused on cost benefit of the variousforms of training options. It may well show that othernon-training options are more cost effective, but onlya thorough analysis will show. The end result of thisstudy is the “formalisation” and interpretation of datacollected in documentation form.Training documentation is not an end in itself, butthe necessary method collecting, collating andretaining the corporate knowledge of the analysesdone. It is not the intention of documentation to besacrosanct, on the contrary, it is vital that adequateresources be put into this aspect of the TNA processso as to keep it up to date and readily useableConclusionProject management uses a comprehensive ILSprogramme to provide the necessary through lifesupport essential for the types of major projectsundertaken by the ADF. ILS is an eclectic disciplinewhich must be developed early in the project’s life sothat costly modification and unnecessary waste can beavoided. HR is a significant long term component ofthe ILS package, and training is a primary element interms of cost and resource utility. For training to beresourced in a cost effective manner, especially inareas such as simulators and the like, comprehensiveTNA is required. TNA is a related discipline to VAand by using, both purchasing and maintenancedecisions have a far better chance of being made onlower risk basis and ultimately saving resource in atime of constraint.NOTES1. HMSO 247, 6 November 1992 - “Ministry of Defence: Use ofSimulators in Training”.Lieutenant Commander Tim Kenny is the Logistics Officer – Training for the New Submarine Project (UWS Branch).

Unconventional Warfare – An OverviewBy Major R.C. Moor, RA Inf.BackgroundThe history of unconventional warfare in the 20thcentury is rich and colourful. Many myths andlegends have been created and many decisivecampaigns conducted. Prime examples includeLawrence in Arabia, Lettow von Vorbek in EastAfrica, Wingate in Abyssinia and Burma, Vockmannand Fetig in the Philippines, the 2/2nd IndependentCompany in Timor, Wright on New Britain, TomHarrison and his band from Z Special Unit in Borneo,and Barry Petersen in Vietnam.Lawrence’s exploits are perhaps the best known.He was able to effectively protect General Allenby’sright flank during the British advance throughPalestine and Syria. More importantly Lawrenceexamined unconventional warfare in terms ofconventional theory and formulated a moderndoctrine outlining an indirect approach to warfighting.The essential elements of his doctrine are:• The algebraic element or science of war. That isthose aspects that are fixed. Those aspects that canbe calculated, that are subject to mathematicallaw; for example space, time, terrain, weaponcapabilities, number of personnel etc;• The biological element of lives. The recognitionthat the use of mass and the expenditure of livesdoes not necessarily guarantee victory, converselyin some circumstances the life on one’s owntroops must be guarded at all costs in order topreserve the will to fight.• The psychological element. A recognition of theimportance of the psychological element inshaping and influencing attitudes and behaviouraffecting the achievement of political and militaryobjectives. 1Lawrence saw the power of a revolt in terms of itseffect on the mind. Whereas conventional theoryrequired decisiveness through battle, either bydestroying the enemy or capturing ground, Lawrencepostulated “our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind;and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so wemight offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed aregular soldier might be helpless without a target,owning only what he sat on, and subjugating onlywhat, by order, he could poke his rifle at.” 2The fact that a revolt was taking place and that ithad the potential to cause harm to the Turks if notchecked meant that Lawrence could achieve his aimwithout resorting to force. “Battles in Arabia were amistake, since we profited in them only by theammunition the enemy fired off.” 3 He onlyconfronted the enemy when he wished to weakentheir morale or to boost the esprit de corps of his owntroops. He did not confront the enemy to lessen hisnumbers or to take ground. The Turks were unable tocounter the revolt, they responded bothdisproportionately and inappropriately. Theexacerbated the situation. Their troops remained tieddown in a secondary theatre defending open desert,while the Arabs gained confidence and cohesion andthe British took Damascus.Essentially all successful unconventional warfarecampaigns follow a similar pattern. They have beenable to force the enemy to react disproportionatelyand inappropriately. The 2/2nd IndependentCompany were able to tie down a Japanese Divisionon Timor for nearly a year at a time when an extraDivision in New Guinea may have been fatal to theallied cause. In New Britain Wright and his cohortswere able to effectively stop the eastward retreat ofthe Japanese and prevent them from consolidatingtheir position in Rabaul. In Borneo a handful of ZSpecial troops were able to arm and train 2000 Dyakguerrillas behind the Japanese lines. They thencommenced operations in time to support the 9thAustralian Division landing at Brunei Bay. ZSpecial’s operations accounted for an estimated 1500Japanese killed, disrupted their tactical regroupingand seriously hindered their defence against the 9thDivision. Immediately following the Japanesesurrender the same troops were instrumental inhunting down renegade Japanese troops, disarmingothers in remote areas and re-establishing the civiladministration.Current SignificanceIn the Clausewitzian context of nation statescomposed of the trinity of government, military andpeople, nations have exerted power and influence

44AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999through economic policy, the control of information,diplomacy and warfare. In this context warfare hastwo forms, conventional and unconventional.Conventional military forces exert overt combatpower to destroy or neutralise the enemy’s plans andcapacity to wage war. Conventional military forcesgenerally focus on neutralising or destroying anopponents military capacity.This view, however, restricts conflict to thatwhich occurs between nation states, and does not takeinto account the rise of the trans-national corporation,international crime syndicates, radical religiousmovements, the break down of states and growingdisaffection within many societies. Many nation statesare losing control over economic policy andinformation, while others are disintegrating entirely.In addition the effectiveness of bi-lateral diplomacy isconstrained by multi-lateral agreements, conventionsand organisations. With these changes low intensityconflict appears to be becoming endemic, war withoutbeginning or end. In these circumstances thetraditional utility of conventional operations, as ameans of projecting national power or protectingnational interests, is reduced.Unconventional warfare, on the other hand,allows for the use of resources and capabilitiesbeyond the scope of conventional forces. Whereasconventional forces primarily depend on firepowerand mobility to achieve their aim unconventionalforces delve into the realm of illusion, half-truths,deceit, disguise, deception, cunning and guile. AsThomas Hobbes observed “force and fraud are, inwar, the two cardinal virtues.” 4 Unconventionalwarfare is primarily concerned with the secondelement of Hobbes observation. Its use enablesnation’s to project national power and protect nationalinterests in an unstructured combat environment.Unconventional warfare also shifts the focus inwarfighting from defeating an opponents militarycapacity to undermining his will to wage war.ConceptThe concept of unconventional warfare is toprotect national interests by influencing a potentialadversary to such an extent that conflict is avoided or,if this is not possible, to weaken an enemy’swarfighting capability primarily by exploiting hispolitical and psychological vulnerability’s and ifnecessary his military and economic weaknesses. Itmay be implemented unilaterally by selected forceelements or where appropriate, by providing supportand direction to indigenous resistance forces.Unconventional operations may be mounted in arange of contingencies before, during and afterconflict, and frequently rely on the indirectapplication of military force to achieve strategic oroperational objectives. In effect unconventionalwarfare can be either passive or active.Passive operations aim at preventing conflict orrestoring stability following conflict. They includebilateral and multilateral military programs andactivities that aim to enhance stability and security orto restore law and order.Active operations traditionally embrace, but arenot limited, to intelligence gathering, subversion,sabotage, evasion and escape, and the fostering ofresistance movements.In an established theatre of operations, in whichsignificant conventional ground operations are underway, unconventional warfare may be conductedprimarily to complement, support, or extend theseoperations. Within geographical areas under enemycontrol or influence, to which conventional forcescannot be deployed, unconventional warfare may beconducted as an economy of force measure and toreduce or dissipate the enemy effort.Unconventional warfare also allows seniorcommanders to extend the area of operations. Thiscan be achieved by disrupting an enemy’s operationbehind his forward elements or by extending theconflict to another front. In addition by exploiting tothe maximum extent the principles of surprise anddeception a commander can lower the enemy’sefficiency and morale as well as obtain valuableinformation. Unconventional warfare has the potentialto play a significant role in all levels of conflict. Themagnitude of the effect, relative to the effort requiredwhen this effort is judiciously applied, will normallyexceed that which can be achieved by conventionalmeans and will maximise the use of friendlyresources.The effect and effectiveness of unconventionalwarfare is felt principally at the operational andstrategic levels. Operational effect is achieved throughthe application of essentially tactical level techniquesto influence local political, military and/or economiccircumstances. Strategic effect is achieved through themanipulation of the operational level environment toachieve national political or psychological objectives.For example during Operations Desert Storm andDesert Shield US and British Special Forces operatedin Western Iraq. By conducting long rangereconnaissance, disrupting the local infrastructure,and attacking selected military targets they were ableto disrupt communications and locate and destroy a

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE – AN OVERVIEW 45number of Scud Missile Launchers. At the operationallevel this disrupted Iraq’s launch program. At thestrategic level it helped prevent Israel’s entry into thewar and thus preserve the Arab coalition.Unconventional warfare allows the fullwarfighting capacity of a nation to be exerted. It canbe used to:• manipulate a potential adversary so as to preventbellicose behaviour;• maximise force to coerce the enemy to accede;• divert part of the enemy military effort away fromtheir main objective;• sow doubt in the minds of the enemy hierarchy,armed forces and populace;• reassure and bolster friendly forces and people;• provide time for conventional forces to preparefor operations;• prepare the way for and/or directly assistconventional forces; and• re-establish law and order following the resolutionof conflict.Traditional Unconventional WarfareMissionsSubversionAs outlined unconventional warfare traditionallyembraces subversion, sabotage, escape and evasionand the fostering of resistance movements.Subversion is defined as “action designed to weakenthe military, economic or political strength of a nationby undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of itscitizens.” 5 Subversion embraces passive resistance.Typical acts of subversion include boycotts, riots,demonstrations, ahimsa (non-violent noncooperation),ostracism, defamation, rumour andinnuendo, strikes, civil disobedience, noncompliance,and so on. Subversive activities can standalone or be integrated into a wider unconventionalwarfare campaign.SabotageSabotage is defined as the “malicious injury towork, tools, machinery, etc, or any underhandinterference with production or business”. 6 Sabotageembraces active resistance normally against anadversaries industry or infrastructure. Typical acts ofsabotage include the destruction or damage ofindustrial plant and tools; tampering with the qualityof raw materials and manufactured goods; tamperingwith food production and distribution, disruption topower, water, sewerage and telecommunications;disruption to radio and television; tampering withinformation systems, and so on. Sabotage activitiescan stand alone or be integrated into a widerunconventional warfare campaign.Evasion and EscapeEvasion and escape is defined as “the proceduresand operations whereby military personnel and otherselected individuals are enabled to emerge from anenemy held or hostile area to areas under friendlycontrol”. 7 All Special Operations and strategic strikemissions that enter hostile territory require theestablishment of evasion and escape procedures.Except for Combat Search and Rescue escape andevasion is generally conducted using unconventionalwarfare techniques. Escape and evasion plans canstand alone or be integrated into a widerunconventional warfare campaign.Resistance MovementsResistance is the effort by individuals or groups toresist, oppose, or overthrow an establishedgovernment or occupying power which exercisesauthority over them. This resistance may be passiveand use subversive techniques or active and resort tosabotage and armed opposition, such as terrorism,guerrilla warfare and paramilitary operations.Historically, resistance movements have beengiven such labels as, guerrilla warfare, revolution,rebellion, civil war, liberation movements,underground, and so on. For clarity resistance is bestdefined as “an organised effort by some portion of thecivil population of a country to resist, oppose, oroverthrow the existing government or occupyingpower.” It is important to recognise, however, that inusing this definition resistance must be considered asan armed political movement and not as a simplemilitary action.Before resistance occurs there is a requirement forset grievances and a level of rebellion against theruling authority by the local populace. Resistance canbe entirely indigenous or initiated, sponsored anddirected by an external source. Whenever a nationgoes to war it is possible, and indeed likely, that aportion of the enemy’s indigenous population willhave a significant grievance against their owngovernment. The initial development of a resistancemovement may occur locally or could be externallysponsored. The nature of any resistance, cannot bepredicted for its reasons, motives, ideals, cultural,religious and ethnic backgrounds may differ.Consequently any two resistance movements, evenwhen operating against a common enemy, will most

46AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999likely be quite different and may even be opposed toone another.The various historical accounts of resistancemovements often use confusing and overlappingdefinitions of just what constitutes the movement. Forclarity and understanding resistance movements arebest viewed as consisting of the following elements:• the guerrilla force,• the auxiliary, and• the underground.While it is possible and even likely that in practicethese clear cut delineation’s will be blurred, the rolesperformed by the three elements are interdependentand need to be conducted to a greater or lesser degreeby someone or some organisation.• Guerrilla ForceA guerrilla force is a group of irregular,predominantly indigenous personnel, organised alongmilitary lines to conduct military and paramilitaryoperations in enemy or enemy held territory. It is theovert combat element of the resistance movement. Itstraining, organisation and employment followmilitary principles. In order to survive, grow andprosper, guerrilla forces must have the support of thelocal populace, who must be organised to providelogistic support, security and recruits. The guerrilla isnormally a combat participant in unconventionalwarfare. He has the legal status of a belligerent andhis conduct is covered in the laws of armed conflict.• AuxiliaryThe auxiliary is that element of the resistancemovement established to provide and organisecivilian support for the guerrilla force. Its organisationand operations are clandestine and its members do notopenly indicate their sympathy of involvement withthe resistance movement. The auxiliary is generallycomposed of local civilians. Its members carry oneveryday activities and assist the resistance movementpart-time. They are not expected to move from placeto place to conduct operations, however, they areexpected to support mobile and possibly non-localforces. Ideally the auxiliary should be organised toparallel existing government and administrativefunctions. One of the principal functions of theauxiliary is to organise and operate an internal supplysystem for the resistance and, in addition to theprocurement of food, clothing and medicine, theauxiliary also provides transportation, security andearly warning, intelligence and counter-intelligence,recruits and other missions as directed by theresistance command.• UndergroundThe third element of the resistance movement isthe underground. Enemy security measures or theantipathy of certain segments of the population maydeny some portions of the area of operations to theguerrilla force and the auxiliary. The underground isused to conduct operations in these areas. It isemployed to reach targets that would otherwise beinaccessible and to provide supplies, equipment orinformation that cannot be obtained from any othersource. The underground is a valuable and importantintelligence source. It is clandestine and organised ona cellular or “fail safe” principle of compartmentationand parallel lines wherein if one element iscompromised, the entire system will not beincapacitated. In addition to gathering intelligence itmay also participate in sabotage and subversion andwill control escape and evasion nets if established.Principles and PrerequisitesPrinciplesDuring the conduct of unconventional warfare thetraditional principles of war apply with addedemphasis on:• Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.Particular attention must be paid to the politicaland diplomatic overtones associated with the aim.• Security. Security is the dominant consideration.Protection of information prior to, during andfollowing operations is of prime importance. Incertain instances sophisticated deception plansmay be required.• Flexibility. Unconventional warfare provides themeans for a nation to enhance its diplomatic effortto prevent conflict, or to exercise power at thatcritical point where diplomacy has failed butactual hostilities have yet to commence. It allowsfor a flexible response to a wide range ofsituations through the selected use of force. It hasthe capacity to:• demonstrate political will and militarycapacity, while limiting escalation ofhostilities; and• use deniable force.PrerequisitesIn addition the following prerequisites must bemet for a resistance movement to flourish:

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE – AN OVERVIEW 47• Unity of Effort. In most instances the “cause”provides unity. If, however, this unifying factor isnot present or if the movement is divided thechance of ultimate success is slim. In addition,should a divided resistance gain victory there isthe possibility that the fruits of victory may besubsequently lost to opposing parties or fractionalinfighting. Therefore, where major differencesexist they must be resolved as early as possible.There must be unified direction overpsychological operations, intelligence gathering,communications, combat operations and logistics.When sponsoring a resistance movement everyeffort must be made to submerge the personalambitions and jealousies of all individuals andunits so as to obtain unity of effort against thecommon enemy.• Support of the People. Once the unifying causeis established it must be supported by the people.The support provided may be either active orpassive. Active support will probably only comefrom a relatively small portion of the populationwith even a smaller number actually bearing arms.While it is not necessary that the entire populationbe engaged in active support there must be at leastpassive support from the majority of the people.This passive support may, however, represent asignificant effort on the part of the people as theywill in all probability be subjected to extreme trialand duress. Where necessary this support may begained by persuasion, and on occasion, coercion.Coercion should, however, be kept to a minimumas its indiscriminate use will in the long run becounter-productive.• Will to Resist. It is necessary to promote the willto resist to prevent the development and spread ofa fatalistic attitude. That will must then bedeveloped into active resistance.• Leadership. The will to resist must be properlydirected through the exercise of strong anddecisive leadership. Resistance leaders must bepolitically astute, tough, tactically competent andhave an abiding faith in the “cause”.• Discipline. Discipline in a resistance movement isstrongly if indirectly maintained by identificationwith the cause and the maintenance of the will toresist. This, however, does not preclude thenecessity of a formal code. Discipline under theconditions of resistance must necessarily be strictand justice must be melted out swiftly anddecisively.• Intelligence. Information about the enemy isabsolutely essential to the survival and success ofthe resistance forces. A concerted, comprehensiveand well coordinated intelligence effort must beestablished from the outset to determine theenemy’s weakness and provide security for theresistance movement.• Propaganda. One of the most important uses ofgood intelligence lies in the preparation ofeffective propaganda. The means for thedissemination of propaganda must either alreadyexist or be able to be developed. It can be used togain popular support for the cause, sustain the willto resist or undermine the enemy’s will to fight.• Favourable Environment. The environment hasa great influence on all resistance operations. Theenvironment includes geography, climate, terrain,civilian infrastructure, economic conditions,locations of population centres, populationdensity, attitude of the people, as well as theethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and politicaldivisions. Differing combinations of factors tendto support differing modus operandi and thevarious elements of the resistance usually finddifferent segments of the environment morefavourable to their individual operations.• Outside Assistance. Outside assistance greatlyenhances the effectiveness of resistancemovements, especially if a sanctuary is provided.Characteristics and TechniquesMany of the characteristics and techniques ofconventional warfare apply to unconventionalwarfare. There are, however, certain techniques whichmust be significantly modified and even reversed ifthe resistance fighter is to survive. The principledifference between the two are:• Concentration vs Dispersion. In resistanceoperations, the insurgent force is not capable ofmounting a decisive offensive. The insurgent doesnot seek to engage the enemy’s strength but ratherstrikes at his weakness. The undergroundmembers survive by remaining dispersed amongthe population, the guerrillas survive by remainingdispersed throughout the area of operations. Thereis no target, other than the civilian support base,for the enemy to strike, thus his superior power isof little military advantage. The resistanceconcentrates its force only at a point chosen by the

48AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999resistance for the attack. In this way, the resistancefighter survives and lives to fight another day.• Centralisation vs Decentralisation. In resistanceoperations, the forces employed cannot always beas responsive through the command structure ascan conventional forces. Due to problems causedby the paramount importance of security and thesubsequent difficulty with communications,directive control must be practised at all times.• Disciplined Strategy vs Freedom of Movement.When moving large masses of men and largequantities of material, it is necessary for thoseengaged in such an enterprise to have commonexpectations and for individuals to know and beable to predict how others are going to act.Therefore, the bigger the organisation the morecomplex and restrictive the regimentation. As theresistance, however, is relatively small it normallytakes maximum advantage of its freedom to moveand strike at will.• Decisive vs Non Decisive Battle. In the exerciseof conventional battle tactics the army attempts toclose with and destroy the enemy. Decisivecombat is the key to victory. This is preciselywhat the resistance fighter must avoid unless hebelieves that by engaging in battle he candecisively influence the enemy’s national will towage war. It is normally the mission of theresistance to harass, demoralise, and weaken theenemy through a campaign of attrition, or toconduct intelligence gathering and interdictionoperations in the enemy rear in support of friendlyconventional operations.• Standing Army vs Deliberate Development. Atthe onset of hostilities the regular army isgenerally fully developed and can be quicklyexpanded if necessary. The resistance must,however, be carefully and deliberately developedunder conditions of clandestine existence. This isusually a protracted process requiring aconsiderable amount of time. In some instances,especially in the case of recently occupiedcountries, the opposite holds true. In thesecircumstances the resistance strength is greatest atthe outset, before the enemy is able to establishpopulation control measures and a viable counterresistance intelligence net. In such circumstances,it may be that by rapidly unifying the resistanceeffort, arming them, and conducting widespreadinterdiction operations as early as possible, thegreatest harm can be done to the enemy, and thatthey can be defeated or at least halted in theiradvance before they are able to establish firmcontrol over the country. The resistance and itsoutside sponsors must continuously and carefullyevaluate its strength. It must carry out only thoseoperations within its capability while fullyutilising that capability to inflict damage upon theenemy yet work towards the common objective.• Reserve vs No Reserve. “In a regular army, thereserve is the significant medium of the general’sart. It is his insurance against the unknown.Defensively, it is used to contain a superior attack;offensively, it is used to deepen and widensuccess.” 8 In unconventional warfare, however,reserves are seldom available. As guerrillas avoiddefending ground there is no necessity to containattack. Occasionally during offensive operations apart of the guerrilla force might be used to create adiversion or assume the posture of a reserve force.• Fixed Bases vs No Bases. Due to the greatproblem of supply and communications in regulararmies, elaborate rear area bases are needed. AsMao writes, however, “while guerrillas do havebases, their primary field of activity is in theenemy’s rear areas, they themselves have norear.” As guerrilla operations are usually on asmall scale they do not need the elaborate rearbases of the regular armies. In fact, their “rearbases” may often be the airfields of the sponsoringpower that supports them. In addition, guerrillasmay have “safe areas”. These may be in a friendlyforeign nation across the border or even in thecountry itself. These areas must be well hidden,well guarded, and easily moved at very shortnotice.ConclusionWar is an extension of politics. In war, politicswill continue to be the central theme which drives anddirects all actions be they economic, psychological ormilitary. Available to a nation at war are bothconventional and unconventional warfare techniques.Conventional techniques use combat power todominate the enemy through the control of ground orthe destruction of the enemy’s warfighting capability.Unconventional techniques are able to complementand in certain circumstances replace conventionaltechniques by providing an indirect means to engageand occupy the enemy where the direct application ofcombat power is either unsuitable of unavailable. Inaddition unconventional techniques can be used inunstructured combat environments where the enemyand/or the centre of gravity are not obvious and the

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE – AN OVERVIEW49use of direct force is ineffective. While these actionsare often indecisive in isolation they have the effect ofdraining the enemy and dissipating his effort and thusgaining time during which alternate solutions can beexplored, developed and implemented.Unconventional warfare is, however, an art withinitself. While many conventional principles andpractices apply several key distinctions exist. Thesedistinctions must be understood and embraced beforean unconventional approach to warfare can bedeveloped and adopted.NOTES1. Lawrence, T.E. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London:Jonathan Cape Ltd.2. ibid.3. ibid.4. Hobbes, T. The Leviathan.5. ADFP 101 Glossary.6. The Macquarie Dictionary. Second Revision.7. ADFP 101 Glossary8. Lawrence, T.E. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London:Jonathan Cape Ltd.BIBLIOGRAPHYCallinan, B. (1953) Independent Company: The Australian Army inPortuguese Timor 1942–1943 (Melbourne: Heinemann).Courtney, G. (1993) Silent Feet (McCrea Australia R.J. & S.P.Austin).Feldt, E. (1979) The Coast Watchers (Garden City, NY: NelsonDoubleday).Foot, M. (1984) SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940–46(London: BBC).Hart, L. (1934) T.E. Lawrence (London: Jonathan Cape).Lawrence, T. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Cape).Long, B. (1989) ‘Z’ Special Unit’s Secret War: Operation Semut 1(Hornsby, NSW: Transpareon Press).McNeill, I. (1992) The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam1962–1972 (St Lucia, Qld:UQP).Miller, C. (1974) Battle for the Bundu: The First World War inEast Africa (London: McDonald and James).Mosley, L. (1955) Gideon Goes to War (London: Arthur BarkerLtd).Ross, S. (1989) And Tomorrow Freedom: Australian Guerrillas inthe Philippines (Sydney: Allen and Unwin).Toffler, A. & H. (1993) War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawnof the Twenty First Century (Little Brown, Boston).USAIMA. (1979) “Special Forces Officers Course – StudentsNotes”.Wray, C. (1990) Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War(Melbourne: Mandarin).Major Moor graduated from RMC in 1976. His formal qualifications include a BA(Mil) and Graduate Diploma in AdultEducation. He has spent the majority of his career with Special Forces and has participated in and led many adventuroustraining exercises both in Australia and overseas. He was the Officer Commanding and Chief Instructor of the ArmyAdventurous Training Centre. Major Moor is currently posted to HQ Special Operations Detachment in Canberra.

50AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999STILL ACTION:THE WAR PHOTOGRAPHY OF DAMIEN PARERAustralian War MemorialSpecial Exhibition gallery1 April – 23 July 1999Still Action: the war photography of Damien Parer is on display in the Australian War Memorial’snew Special Exhibition gallery from 1 April to 23 July 1999.Damien Parer is best known for his wartime cinematography, winning an Oscar for KokodaFrontline, produced while he was an official Department of Information photographer. But, he wasalso a very accomplished stills photographer, and this exhibition features a selection of his very beststills work.In fact, Parer started his career in stills. Apprenticed to Melbourne photographer ArthurDickensen, he trained in taking glamourous fashion shots. His appetite for movies was whetted whenhe worked as stills photographer on Chauvel’s Uncivilised and Forty Thousand Horsemen. But hislove of still photography remained, fuelled by stints working with Max Dupain and Olive Cotton.Still Action: the war photography of Damien Parer is a tribute to Parer’s professionalism, talentand his life as a stills photographer. The exhibition consists of 55 framed black and whitephotographs, seventeen of which are framed enlargements of films. It shows Parer’s pre-war work, hiswork in North Africa and the Middle East and later in the South West Pacific. It also explores Parer’sfascination with the sinister beauty of planes, tanks, ships and guns and depicts the mood and emotionof Australia’s fighting men.Almost all works come from the extensive collection held by the Australian War Memorial inCanberra. The exhibition was developed by the Australian War Memorial in cooperation with theOrange Regional Art Gallery and is being toured by the Memorial.Parer was born in Melbourne in 1912, grew up on King Island in Bass Strait and at the age of 11went to boarding school in Bathurst.In 1940, Parer joined the Sixth Division, 2nd AIF in the Middle East, and covered land, sea and airactions at Tobruck, Derna, Greece and Syria. In July 1942, he returned to Australia and was sent northto cover the fighting in Timor and New Guinea. During his time in New Guinea, Parer was in the frontline, exposed to the same dangers as the soldiers he was capturing on film, and it’s perhaps theseimages that are most familiar to Australians. Ultimately, it cost him his life. Parer, now working forthe Paramount News Corporation, was killed on 17 September 1944, filming US Marines storming aJapanese bunker on Peleliu Island. He was just 32.As Frank Hurley’s images provide the lasting memories of Australia’s involvement in the FirstWorld War, so Damien Parer’s are the benchmark memories of our part in that second great conflict.The exhibition is part of the Australian War Memorial’s travelling exhibitions program funded bythe Department of Veteran’s Affairs Their Service – Our Heritage. Other travelling exhibitionsinclude: Ivor Hele: the Heroic figure, Too dark for the Light Horse, Impressions: Australians inVietnam, Up Front: faces of Australia at war and 1918 Australians in France.

Book ReviewsROOTING DEMOCRACY – GROWING THESOCIETY WE WANT by M. Rayner, Allen &Unwin, St Leonards NSW, 1997.Reviewed by A. Zoiti-Licastro“Australians have little respect for politics, andless for politicians…91% of those interviewed…saidthat politicians twisted the truth to suit themselves,and 66% believed that politicians were not usuallytruthful” (p11).For anyone who remembers WA Inc., the closureof Fairlea women’s prison and the protests overGrand Prix racing at Albert Park, this is an interestingbook. Moira Rayner, a lawyer with her heart in theright place, was so good at her job as Commissionerfor Equal Opportunity in Victoria that she became thelast one. The Liberal Government in Victoria has aneconomic agenda they were voted in to pursue. Oncea party has been elected is that where the democracyends? Who can argue with the winner in the race?This book asks you to consider what democracy isand where we, as a society, are going.Using examples such as children being stripsearchedbefore they are allowed to see theirimprisoned mothers and the famous Rosa Parksrefusal to give up her seat for a white person on a busin 1950s America, Rayner examines modern Westernculture; the way we act (are we inherently selfish assome believe) and the way Kant says we should act(your treatment of others is the end not just themeans). Does a parent have the right to bring up achild in a way that contradicts the UN Convention onthe Rights of the Child? This book asks you to thinkabout what you believe, even people who say they arenot interested in politics will have an opinion on suchmatters. Rayner brings politics home to the reader’sbackyard in plain language.A government will never represent every singleperson. The day after an election, how do people feelwho voted for a minority party and had theirpreferences crawl up the ladder to wind up puttingone of the big two back in? How long will Australiathrive with only two major parties? QueenslanderRussell Hinze said to Joh Bjelke-Peterson: “If youwant the boundaries rigged, let me do it, and we’llstay in power for ever. If you don’t do it, people willsay you’re stupid” (p51). What does that famed“ordinary Australian” know about such workings?The message is that an elected government cannot bethe first and last word in the running of a democracy,we who vote the parties in must be able to hold themto account. There must be a separation of powers, anindependent judiciary, an independent public serviceand security of tenure. If the steady erosion of ourcivil and human rights continues is our democracygoing in the right direction? “Total power must neverbe concentrated in one place” (p64), says Rayner whorecounts her experience in Latvia where state officialsacted as if they were exempt from following the law.The days when student lawyers were taught thatUN treaties were unenforceable are over, anindependent judiciary can call up a UN treaty asjustification for a decision. Rayner says when this didhappen, bureaucrats were stunned. Human rights aspart of everyday life did not occur to them.Remember the apprentice who was set alight by hisfellow workers? People who will never have to facebeing set alight during the course of their work daymight roll their eyes when human rights arementioned, for the apprentice and for those of us whoread about him, justice was an imperative. “Humanrights cannot be doled out by the powerful as akindness to those who “deserve” them (p.73).The three parts of the book address the past, thepresent and the future of democracy. Part two, “AWilting Democracy”, describes the signs of a healthydemocracy and why we should be concerned whenour voices are not heard or are over-ridden byeconomic considerations.Rayner quotes US President Thomas Jefferson,who suggested the review of the constitution every 30years to ensure its relevance. Approaching 100 yearsof age, the Australian Constitution is overdue for areview. Although we do have a constitution, thosevoted in to represent us are often so engrossed in thebig picture they forget the local ramifications of theirbig picture decisions, alternatively, they know enoughabout the workings of government to use it to thecommunity’s disadvantage. One former minister saidhe enjoyed giving long-winded answers because itprevented anyone else from asking questions. “Bysuch strategies the all-important Question Time hasbecome a travesty” (p.93).The midnight sessions of Parliament in Victoriashow the zeal with which new laws can be enacted,would the government meet with such gusto to passthrough reforms “that are likely to subject their own

52AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999actions to closer scrutiny” (p.101). Rayner quotesGough Whitlam who says that after his own ambushby the Governor-General, “no Prime Minister canever afford to trust a governor-general again; (p.104).After WA Inc, where reasons for decisions in manycases were not documented, can anyone believe theparty made an honest mistake? Did the 91% of peoplewho thought politicians twisted the truth think twiceabout this affair?Public servants, who leave paper trails whereverthey gather, have faced the axe “in the name ofefficiency” (p.113). Rayner argues that tenure protectsthe public service from political interference. AsCommissioner for Equal Opportunity in Victoria, herexplicit duty was to administer the Equal OpportunityAct; when she did this to the letter of the law herposition was dissolved by the Victorian Government.What happens to laws the government in power doesnot like?With the outsourcing of government contracts toprivate companies, where is the “commercial-inconfidence”line drawn. The public has a right toknow how public funds are spent. Rayner says “Theneed for an independent, neutral public service is asgreat now as it was a century ago” (p.121). Shequotes the story of Major Hills of the British Armywho was ordered to repatriate prisoners he felt surewould be shot on their return. The moral dilemma thatfollowed required a creative solution. In the end 200of the thousands he began with were knowingly sentto their deaths.Rayner says the “the whole principle of justice ispolluted” without independent judges, “removableonly by a fair, public, parliamentary process” (p.131).Without independent judges, Northland SecondaryCollege could not have been re-opened. The Kennettgovernment adamant that it was in the right viewedthe decision purely as a financial one. Rayner saysstate governments can often initiate “new directionsin political strategy and public policy, for good or forill” (p.148). The failure of the Kennett government toclose Northland Secondary College reminds the partyin power that government is not just another moneymakingbusiness representing the wealthy. Raynerremembers when “it was still quite novel for nonpropertyowners to vote at all” (p.165). When thegovernment focuses decision making on the freemarket, economic rationalisation and asks wage andsalary earners to bear the tax burden what doesdemocracy mean? When we vote in politicians weexpect to lie to us what does our vote mean?Politics used to be “White, Anglo-Celtic men’sbusiness” (p.249). Parties with “hierarchicalorganisation, rigid membership structures and amastery of meeting procedures” (p.250) flourished.Rayner says parties with these characteristics are not amovement of the people, the measure of goodgovernment is their concern for social not justfinancial well-being of the people. Rayner says“Governments have set their face against civil society,and actively discouraged citizens from becominginformed, egalitarian and active; we are all dwarfedby their neglect” (p.263).Finally, when all else fails, look to a formerpolitician’s attitude to independence of the media, JohBjelke-Petersen said in 1986, “The greatest thing thatcould happen to the State and the nation is when weget rid of the media. Then we could live in peace andtranquillity and no-one would know anything”(p.194).ALL MEN BACK – ALL ONE BIG MISTAKE,by W.A. (Bill) Bee.Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Greg Swinden,RANAn odd title for a very interesting book. This is thestory of young Signalman Bill (Buzzer) Bee, whoserved in the cruiser HMAS Perth at the Battles of theJava Sea and Sunda Strait and was later a Prisoner ofWar of the Japanese.Following the sinking of Perth, and the cruiserUSS Houston, in the Sunda Strait the story followsthe adventures and misadventures of Bill Bee and theother Perth survivors as they are held captive in avariety of Japanese POW Camps. These includecamps in Java, Singapore, Thailand, Burma(including their time spent on the infamous Thai –Burma Railway) Indo China and finally Japan wherethey were employed underground in Japanese coalmines.The title of the book comes from a habitual sayingof their Japanese overlords; when a planned movedfrom one camp to another fails to eventuate due tosome breakdown in the Japanese communication orlogistics chain (a bit like the Australian version of“packs on, packs off – hurry up and wait”).The book ends with Bee returning safely to hisfamily home in Western Australia, however, over 100of his comrades did not return – victims of untreatedwounds received in battle, malnutrition, Japanesebrutality or killed when their unmarked prison shipswere sunk by Allied submarines or aircraft.I found the authors style of writing very easy toread and the story captivating, no pun intended, andfinished the 156 page book in a few hours. Althoughthe story of Australian POW’s held by the Japanese

BOOK REVIEWS 53has been told several times before, both collectivelyand on an individual basis, the tales of the hardshipthey endured and their determination to survive nevercease to amaze me.Hesperian Press published this book and theyhave done a very good job in doing so. The bookincludes over 30 illustrations, mainly photo’s ofHMAS Perth and members of her crew and a foldedmap of South East Asia which is a copy of a RedCross publication from World War II showing thelocation of Japanese POW Camps. An appendix liststhe Ships Company of HMAS Perth their final fate(i.e. killed in action at Sunda Strait, died as a POW,died since the end of the war, or still living).I purchased my copy for $19.95 from a smallbookstore in Western Australia (where the publisherand author are located), however; it may not bereadily available on the east coast. The book isavailable from Hesperian Press PO Box 317 VictoriaPark WA 6979 for $23.50 (which includes $3.50postage and handling) or direct from the author,William Bee of 26 David St Mullaloo WA 6027.Payment in both cases is by cheque or money order.WIRRAWAY TO HORNET: A history of theCommonwealth Aircraft Corporation Pty Ltd, byBrian L. Hill, Southern Cross Publications, POBox 420, Bulleen, Vic 3105. 1998, casebound, bluelinen, gold lettering on spine, 180x155mm, x/294pp. 117 b&w photos, 23 aircraft dwgs, 4organisation charts, factory layout, 10 pagesglossary, index, 10 pages aircraft and engine basicdata, 9 pages profiles senior CAC people, list ofCAC Board members. Cost $68.00.Reviewed by Major General John WhitelawOne does not need to be an aviation enthusiast toread this book - but it would help! The Author at theend, and looking to the future, quotes Santayana“Those who cannot remember the past arecondemned to repeat it” This is a sad tale; sad forAustralia. The CAC started with promise and morethan a smattering of idealism in 1935; it was right forits time; it made a rapid significant contribution toAustralia’s defence during the dark days of 1942-44and onwards to the 1950s and 1960s then it started tofall apart.Why was this so? Brian Hill tells us in detail. Thenarrative is splashed with “what may have been”,stories of opportunity lost, timing astray, conservativeforces at work, indecision at the highest level, delayupon delay, everlasting enquiries, recommendationsignored. But through it shines the dedication, talentand sheer determination of such outstandingAustralians as Essington Lewis and LawrenceWackett together with a wonderful team of aeroplanedesigners and engineers who were patently “beforetheir time”.The opening and closing chapters which describethe circumstances of the founding of CAC and itslingering demise are of great interest and should becarefully noted by the Department of Defence andpoliticians involved with the equipment cycle of theDefence Force. They should heed Santayana’saphorism.Not a book for the faint hearted; but a valuablerecord of a little appreciated facet of our nationalstory.PORTLAND’S HISTORIC BATTERY (1889):Including the Western Artillery Corps (1866-1884)and the Portland Battery Garrison Artillery(1884-1904), by Gwen Bennett, printed by E.Davis & Sons, Portland, Vic. Card cover, 240x150mm, 10 b&w photos, seven line drawings, iv/52 pp,nom roll personnel 1866-1904, Copies availablefrom author, 43 Edgar Street, Portland, Vic 3306,$11 per copy incl. postage.Reviewed by Major General John WhitelawThis book is one of those little gems which onecomes across every now and then. It is bursting withinformation about a little known facet of Australia’smilitary history even for those familiar with thehistory of colonial Victoria.In this book we get quite a number of evocativephotos of the colonial period, some of which couldusefully respond to enhancement. The line drawingsare well done and add much to the narrative, while thenominal roll of those who served has beenpainstakingly assembled from available records. Itwill be much appreciated by those people interested ingenealogy or research into records of service of theAustralian Commonwealth and Colonial forces.There is an interesting, if brief, coverage of theformation of the Western Artillery Corps from 1866,which does not describe in any detail the politicalpressures leading to the allocation of, what were then,quite significant resources into a distant militaryventure. From there the story progresses to thebuilding of the battery, emplacement of the guns andthe continuing progress of the Artillery in Portlanduntil closure of the Fort in 1904.There are some delightful minor stories told aboutthe guns themselves, including a wooden gun fortraining (what a wonderful item for a museum!), the

54AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999band, the Orderly Rooms and some redoubtablepersonalities.This book is recommended for those interested inAustralian and colonial history and those who wish tograsp something of the flavour of our military history.THE BROKEN EIGHTH: A History of the 2/14thAustralian Field Regiment. Author – Ron Jackson,printed and published by Clipper Press, Ashwood,Vic. Hard cover, 158 b&w photos, 6 maps, 10dwgs, xi/305pp, Roll of Honour, list of awards,nom roll, no index or bibliography. Copiesavailable from author 3/105 Surrey Road,Blackburn North, Vic 3130. Price $45 plus $5 p&p.Reviewed by Major General John WhitelawThis is not a “military” history in the acceptedsense. It does not deal with the wide sweep of eventsin the Pacific War, evaluate the decisions ofcommanders or examine strategy and tactics; but itdoes tell in a plain, straight forward fashion the storyof a gunner regiment from formation in 1940 untildisbandment at war’s end. The author has drawnskillfully on the official war diaries lodged in theAustralian War Memorial, the memories of hiscomrades, their photographs and sketches, togetherwith items from wartime news-sheets of the RegimentThe Drum started in 1955 by the post-war regimentalAssociation was also a valuable source.Some 700 ordinary Australian men came togetherin 1940 at Puckapunyal to form one of the major unitsof the 8th Australian Division. They pooled theirtalents, skills and intelligence to build a regiment fit inall respects for operational service. They alsoachieved, although many would not have recognisedit at the time, an exceedingly strong regimental spiritwhich was to stand them in good stead in adventureswhich lay ahead.Firstly was their long and arduous service inDarwin under a perceived threat of Japanese invasionand enduring some 50 air raids. The loss of theircompanion units in the 8th Division in 1942 as theJapanese successively captured Malaya, Singapore,Ambon, Timor and New Britain was sorely felt by theRegiment, the sole remaining major combat unit ofthe Division. To mark this sad circumstance aperpendicular “break” was inserted in their colourpatch to signify The Broken Eighth.After re-equipment and training in NSW andQueensland, the Regiment embarked for New Guineaand operations with 5th Australian Division along thenorth coast of the Huon Peninsula to Alexishafen,then to Jacquinot Bay where the task was to isolatethe very large force of Japanese in the GazellePeninsula. The Regiment again showed its reliabilityand ability in some sharp actions in the Open Bay andWide Bay areas. The cessation of hostilities led to aperiod of garrison duty in Rabaul where, for the lasttime, the Regiment demonstrated its amazing “cando” attitude so carefully nurtured from those far offdays in 1940. It returned home for disbandment inDecember 1945.The Broken Eighth is an attractive, qualityproduction with a “good feel” to it. It is a credit toClipper Press and Ron Jackson. While it is sad that somany years have passed before this story has beentold, I am sure that it will prove of much interest tothe families of those who served and will bring backmemories to those members still with us. It shouldalso find a deserved place with the histories of otherdistinguished units of the Australian Army on theshelves of any military library.THE THUNDER OF THE GUNS; A History ofthe 2/3 Australian Field Regiment, by Les Bishop,printed by Brown Prior Anderson, Burwood, Vic.Hard cover, 250 b&w photos, 1 colour page, 11maps, xxvii/746 pp, nominal roll, roll of honour,lists of POW, wounded and awards (withcitations), bibliography and index. Copiesavailable from author 12 Wyralla Road, YowieBay, NSW 2228, $50.00 per copy (+$5.85 p&p).Reviewed by Major General John WhitelawThis book has been many years in the making, yetit deals with only six years in the lives of its manycharacters, both as individuals and collectively as partof one of the most notable regiments of the 2nd AIF.It tells the story of how ordinary Australian youngmen from around the Commonwealth came togetherin their various troops and batteries for their “greatadventure” during World War II. Their adventures inNorth Africa, Greece, Crete and New Guinea anddescribed in vivid colour in large part from personalreminiscence, supplemented from War Diary andOfficial History sources, and enlived by manypersonal photographs. It will surely please thesurvivors of this Regiment while serving as amemorial to those who have left us.The difficulties, the rush of action, the fear, andthe heartbreak at the loss or incarceration of theirmates is told with sensitivity. The periods of trainingin various countries, some short and specificallyobjective, others long drawn out, the boredom, therumours bring out the wry humour of the Australiansoldier and give a good idea as to why he was

BOOK REVIEWS 55respected by friends and enemies for his soldierlyqualities.Les Bishop has produced a unit history which willprove of unfailing interest to those who shared in itsmaking as members of the 2/3rd Australian FieldRegiment. They are fortunate to have a comrade withthe imagination, skill and sheer perseverance to carryit to a successful outcome. Through it they will relivetheir years of war and their families will understand.In the wider field of military history, this bookdoes not contribute to our knowledge of the clash ofnations, nor does it pretend to do so. But it does tellthe story of how a diverse group of young Australianscame together in 1939 and forged a strong andsuccessful weapon of war. It will be a mine ofinformation for future research, and in its own right isa unit history of considerable worth, exceedingly wellillustrated and pleasingly presented. It deserves aplace in any library of military history and will find avalued place on general library shelves.THE “LETTER” BATTERIES: The history ofthe “letter” batteries in World War II, by RegKidd and Ray Neal, printed by Ligare Pty Ltd,published by authors 1998, 250x180mm, 20 b&wphotos, 14 maps, 4 dwgs/diagrams, xiv/415pp,hard cover, glossary, bibliography, index. Copiesavailable from RJ Kidd, Whistlepipe Court,Forrestfield, WA 6058, Ph 08 9453 2393, or RENeal, 5 Tower Reserve, Castlecrag, NSW 2068, Ph02 9958 2717. Cost $30 plus $7.50 p&p.Reviewed by Major General John WhitelawThe authors of this book were kind enough toinvite me to write the foreword so, “declaring myinterest” I offer it in lieu of the traditional review.“No six years of history has been more writtenabout than 1939-1945.” These are the final words ofJohn Keegan’s book The Battle for History. While theviews of this eminent military historian are alwaysworth attention we must be thankful that people likeReg Kidd and Ray Neal have seen fit to add to thequantum of our available knowledge. Their work willgive pleasure to their surviving comrades and serve asa comprehensive guide to a little known aspect ofAustralia’s great effort in World War II for those whomay care to research further.This book is not about the broad sweep of grandstrategy, it is about the endeavours of a wonderful lotof young Australians thrown together by the chancesof war into 19 heavy batteries and three firecommands of the Royal Australian Artillery.The entry of the Japanese into the war on 7December 1941 gave sharp focus to the gaps in thearrangements for the coastal defence of many of ourimportant ports. Before long it was also appreciatedthat coastal defences would be needed to protect ourforward bases as the Allied forces held, and thenpushed back, the Japanese. The solution was seen inacquiring guns, searchlights and associated equipmentfrom the United States of America and formingmobile coast batteries which could be deployed tomeet changing circumstances Reg Kidd and Ray Nealhave delved assiduously into the records of theAustralian War Memorial and the AustralianArchives. They have consulted wisely and widely tounearth detail of each of these units in the years 1942-1945. The result of their work reveals fascinatinginsights into the difficulties encountered andsurmounted, the months of isolation of both thebatteries and their detached elements, of the growing“family feeling” within each battery, theestablishment of a strong espirit de corps and aboveall the dedication of these young men in the service oftheir guns.The last few years has seen a surge of interest inthe history of Australian units during World War II.This has been partly due to the excellent “AustraliaRemembers” program in 1995, but also as Ray andReg observe, because now the “old chaps” have hadsome time to look back and remember. We are intheir debt for having done so and in particular theRoyal Australian Artillery welcomes their endeavoursas another enduring contribution to its history.BILLION DOLLAR BUSINESS: Strategies andLessons in Australian Arms Acquisition by DrPaul Earnshaw, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, 1998, $20.00.Reviewed by Lieutenant Commander Alan Hinge,RANThe Department of Defence’s procurement andproject management of major equipment has beenheavily criticised by the Australian National AuditOffice and various parliamentary committees in recentyears, and an obvious way of improving performanceis to transmit to today’s project managers the lessonsof what went right and what went wrong in projects.However, it is ironic that Defence appears to havemade remarkably little effort to systematically pass onlessons learned. This is where Dr Paul Earnshaw’sbook, Billion Dollar Business comes in as anoutstanding and all too rare example of

56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999comprehensive, objective analysis of Defenceacquisition and project management – warts and all.Rather than rely on project theory, Earnshaw takesa systematic, case study approach in order to illustratesignificant lessons for acquisition strategy and projectmanagement. He examines three major capitalacquisition projects in considerable detail – the BlackHawk Helicopter (largely managed by Air Force), theArmy’s Perentie vehicle and the Navy’s AustralianFrigate. The lives of these projects are traced fromidentification of requirement, through bureaucratic,political and committee approval processes and rightinto production. While all projects eventuallydelivered serviceable products, some fared worse thanothers in terms of cost and schedule blowout and fromthe perspective of defence/industry partnerships.Overall, Black Hawk and Perentie emerged asseriously flawed projects in several aspects, with theAustralian Frigate getting a “satisfactory” report card.Importantly, reasons for these assessments are spelledout in meticulous detail. For example, Army’sinability to justify to committees the number ofvehicles it required was a key factor in what proved tobe a dysfunctional acquisition process involvingpiecemeal ordering, disrupted production runs,assembly plant closures and dis-bandment of projectteams. Similarly, the Black Hawk suffered fromphased acquisition and attendant contract, cost anddelivery problems. In both cases, the authoremphasises the importance of Industry participatingmore fully in Defence acquisition processes.Dr Earnshaw gives credit where it is due andpoints to key project success factors, many of whichshould be applied in the planning and source selectionphase of projects. The Australian Frigate, for example,benefited enormously from research undertaken by theDefence Naval Destroyer Group (DNDG) which wasestablished specifically to resolve a range of complexissues concerning follow on destroyer forcerequirements and acquisition.Of particular interest to me is Chapter Seven(Decision Making Rationality) where, after describingeach project in detail and then comparing them in thefour previous chapters, the author seeks to clarify, asmuch as possible, the extent of rational decisionmakingin the three projects – this is important becausenon-rational decision making for new high-technologyprojects has resulted in notable planning disasters thatwe live with today. The author expertly traces thecontext of bureaucratic politics and suggests whycommittee players adopted particular positions fromtheir apparent behaviours, perspectives on long-termstrategic planning and “incremental bargainingtactics”.Earnshaw frequently points to where fundamentalimprovements in defence decision making process canbe achieved. For example, he suggests that, “… (a)system should be developed whereby ideologicaldifferences and values can be expressed and exploredin relation to strategic capabilities required to meetnational security objectives, and a far greater emphasison research and appropriate resource allocation in theearly planning stage. The relative success of theAustralian Frigate…can be attributed to the unusuallycomprehensive research conducted by bureaucraticadversaries during the conceptual and project planningstage of that project, the extensive training andexperience of successive project directors andpragmatic initiatives such as a two year deliveryband…”.While the three case study projects werecompleted in the late 1980s / early 1990s, their lessonsare enduring value in terms of application to today’sacquisition and project management decision making.For example, Earnshaw reveals the poor economics ofBlack Hawk assembly in Australia (unit assemblytime never got below 16,000 hrs – almost twice theUS figure). This highlights the questionable nature ofdeciding on Australian assembly of penny packets ofaircraft where skill levels will be quickly lost ordegraded without real follow-on work (not simplymaintenance contracts).Billion Dollar Business is a work of great valueand sets a solid benchmark for the honest andobjective evaluation of projects. It is essential readingfor those who are serious about improving what isnow generally accepted as Defence’s lack lustreperformance in key aspects of major capitalacquisition and project management.