ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

WHAT HAS GONE WRONG 9enlistees from 122 selected (or 80 per cent) andscholarship candidates yielded 52 enlistees from 100selected (or 52 per cent). In essence, Officerpositions will be offered until the target has beenreached, hence the passable figures. GeneralEnlistment (GE) figures have been included becausethey provide a more level perspective on recruitingtrends. As at the end of February the year to datetarget for Full Time (FT) GE was 879 of which 771(or 87.71 per cent) had been enlisted. It is essential toconsider the Part Time (PT) GE figures as well, forthey are intrinsically linked to Army’s vision for thefuture, their year to date target is 2416 (from a total of3790) of which 1493 (or 61.80 per cent) have beenenlisted. 27 These statistics are crushing the PT Army.Cadre Staff, many of whom are FT junior officers,can relate a litany of PT Army stories that centre onthe common themes of wavering morale, transientcommitment and a genuine questioning of the worthof the PT Army concept. There are even rumblingsamongst the staff at Headquarters 2nd Division as tothe convenient coincidence of the general runningdown of the PT Army and the introduction of phasedcareers for FT personnel.Personnel issues are a paradigmatic enigma in asmuch as Army, having created the problem in the firstplace now has no idea of how to solve it. It was withamusement that the author learnt that “What Colour isyour Parachute?”, a guide for job seekers, was one ofthe widest read, non compulsory texts for thegraduates of Command and Staff College last year.This attitude is endemic, not that this should come asa surprise, if a portion of Officers from the highestechelons down are unashamedly pushing their ownbarrow, middle and junior ranking officers would befools not to follow suit. Superimposed over this is theimplicit message that dissent will not be tolerated.The resultant duplicity, exemplified by those whooutwardly exude a veneer of conscientiousness whilstharbouring their own agendas, is, like most of thecause and effect issues discussed in this article,entirely predictable. Read the opening quotationagain. This situation isn’t likely to change and theresultant exodus of people isn’t likely to decline untilArmy gives its personnel something tangible tobelieve in.We’re On A Road To Nowhere“We are simply kidding ourselves if we think weare not doing a bit of catch-up here. There aresome technologies already fielded by other armieswhich we should have had a long time ago – thearmy has simply fallen behind from atechnological point of view compared to the navyand air force.”Brigadier J.J. Wallace, AMSurely the above passage is the understatement ofthe millennium. As the then Commander of TaskForce 21 (TF21), Brigadier Wallace’s delicateposition is entirely understood, as is his measuredresponse. For reasons outlined at the end of the lastsection it would have been ultimately futile for him tohave nonchalantly uttered words to the effect of:“We really need to have a good look at ourselves.In the neglectful years since our Army’s fineperformance in the Vietnam War we have allowedourselves to deteriorate, both physically in termsof equipment and intellectually in terms of theoperational art to the point where the notion ofinteroperability exists only in the most vividimagination.”Yes the Army is pursuing new equipment, “thearmy has embarked on its own program ofmodernisation instituting projects like Ninox,Wundarra and Bushranger to take it into the nextcentury”. 28 Well thank you very much, these shouldbe the tools of today’s Army (and sadly in many casesyesterdays), they are likely to be worse than useless inthe time of the empty battlefield, information warfareand autonomous “brilliant” Battlefield OperatingSystems. Equipment is only one, very obviousportion of the metaphorical iceberg that Armycollided with long ago.The Army needs to undergo a cathartic process,for different reasons, but similar to that of the USArmy post its Vietnam War experience. General FredFranks (Retired) and Tom Clancy describe such aprocess in painful detail in their collaborative work,Into the Storm. There is extreme danger in attemptingto find a way ahead that is constructed on a series ofpiecemeal solutions (A21, RTA, TF21) which areunderpinned by false premises and unrealisticassumptions. If the One Army concept is thefoundation of RTA, with its focal areas for Brigadesized Task Forces (TF) (including PT Brigades whosemanning figures as illustrated would make even themost optimistic observer cringe) then an obviousdisparity exists with the entire TF Trial process.Whilst TF Trials proceed on their merry, resourcehungry way, there are very disturbing rumourscirculating about the continued viability from amanning perspective of 7 TF in the near future.