ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

More documents

Recommendations

Info

48AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999resistance for the attack. In this way, the resistancefighter survives and lives to fight another day.• Centralisation vs Decentralisation. In resistanceoperations, the forces employed cannot always beas responsive through the command structure ascan conventional forces. Due to problems causedby the paramount importance of security and thesubsequent difficulty with communications,directive control must be practised at all times.• Disciplined Strategy vs Freedom of Movement.When moving large masses of men and largequantities of material, it is necessary for thoseengaged in such an enterprise to have commonexpectations and for individuals to know and beable to predict how others are going to act.Therefore, the bigger the organisation the morecomplex and restrictive the regimentation. As theresistance, however, is relatively small it normallytakes maximum advantage of its freedom to moveand strike at will.• Decisive vs Non Decisive Battle. In the exerciseof conventional battle tactics the army attempts toclose with and destroy the enemy. Decisivecombat is the key to victory. This is preciselywhat the resistance fighter must avoid unless hebelieves that by engaging in battle he candecisively influence the enemy’s national will towage war. It is normally the mission of theresistance to harass, demoralise, and weaken theenemy through a campaign of attrition, or toconduct intelligence gathering and interdictionoperations in the enemy rear in support of friendlyconventional operations.• Standing Army vs Deliberate Development. Atthe onset of hostilities the regular army isgenerally fully developed and can be quicklyexpanded if necessary. The resistance must,however, be carefully and deliberately developedunder conditions of clandestine existence. This isusually a protracted process requiring aconsiderable amount of time. In some instances,especially in the case of recently occupiedcountries, the opposite holds true. In thesecircumstances the resistance strength is greatest atthe outset, before the enemy is able to establishpopulation control measures and a viable counterresistance intelligence net. In such circumstances,it may be that by rapidly unifying the resistanceeffort, arming them, and conducting widespreadinterdiction operations as early as possible, thegreatest harm can be done to the enemy, and thatthey can be defeated or at least halted in theiradvance before they are able to establish firmcontrol over the country. The resistance and itsoutside sponsors must continuously and carefullyevaluate its strength. It must carry out only thoseoperations within its capability while fullyutilising that capability to inflict damage upon theenemy yet work towards the common objective.• Reserve vs No Reserve. “In a regular army, thereserve is the significant medium of the general’sart. It is his insurance against the unknown.Defensively, it is used to contain a superior attack;offensively, it is used to deepen and widensuccess.” 8 In unconventional warfare, however,reserves are seldom available. As guerrillas avoiddefending ground there is no necessity to containattack. Occasionally during offensive operations apart of the guerrilla force might be used to create adiversion or assume the posture of a reserve force.• Fixed Bases vs No Bases. Due to the greatproblem of supply and communications in regulararmies, elaborate rear area bases are needed. AsMao writes, however, “while guerrillas do havebases, their primary field of activity is in theenemy’s rear areas, they themselves have norear.” As guerrilla operations are usually on asmall scale they do not need the elaborate rearbases of the regular armies. In fact, their “rearbases” may often be the airfields of the sponsoringpower that supports them. In addition, guerrillasmay have “safe areas”. These may be in a friendlyforeign nation across the border or even in thecountry itself. These areas must be well hidden,well guarded, and easily moved at very shortnotice.ConclusionWar is an extension of politics. In war, politicswill continue to be the central theme which drives anddirects all actions be they economic, psychological ormilitary. Available to a nation at war are bothconventional and unconventional warfare techniques.Conventional techniques use combat power todominate the enemy through the control of ground orthe destruction of the enemy’s warfighting capability.Unconventional techniques are able to complementand in certain circumstances replace conventionaltechniques by providing an indirect means to engageand occupy the enemy where the direct application ofcombat power is either unsuitable of unavailable. Inaddition unconventional techniques can be used inunstructured combat environments where the enemyand/or the centre of gravity are not obvious and the
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE – AN OVERVIEW49use of direct force is ineffective. While these actionsare often indecisive in isolation they have the effect ofdraining the enemy and dissipating his effort and thusgaining time during which alternate solutions can beexplored, developed and implemented.Unconventional warfare is, however, an art withinitself. While many conventional principles andpractices apply several key distinctions exist. Thesedistinctions must be understood and embraced beforean unconventional approach to warfare can bedeveloped and adopted.NOTES1. Lawrence, T.E. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London:Jonathan Cape Ltd.2. ibid.3. ibid.4. Hobbes, T. The Leviathan.5. ADFP 101 Glossary.6. The Macquarie Dictionary. Second Revision.7. ADFP 101 Glossary8. Lawrence, T.E. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom. London:Jonathan Cape Ltd.BIBLIOGRAPHYCallinan, B. (1953) Independent Company: The Australian Army inPortuguese Timor 1942–1943 (Melbourne: Heinemann).Courtney, G. (1993) Silent Feet (McCrea Australia R.J. & S.P.Austin).Feldt, E. (1979) The Coast Watchers (Garden City, NY: NelsonDoubleday).Foot, M. (1984) SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940–46(London: BBC).Hart, L. (1934) T.E. Lawrence (London: Jonathan Cape).Lawrence, T. (1935) Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Cape).Long, B. (1989) ‘Z’ Special Unit’s Secret War: Operation Semut 1(Hornsby, NSW: Transpareon Press).McNeill, I. (1992) The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam1962–1972 (St Lucia, Qld:UQP).Miller, C. (1974) Battle for the Bundu: The First World War inEast Africa (London: McDonald and James).Mosley, L. (1955) Gideon Goes to War (London: Arthur BarkerLtd).Ross, S. (1989) And Tomorrow Freedom: Australian Guerrillas inthe Philippines (Sydney: Allen and Unwin).Toffler, A. & H. (1993) War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawnof the Twenty First Century (Little Brown, Boston).USAIMA. (1979) “Special Forces Officers Course – StudentsNotes”.Wray, C. (1990) Timor 1942: Australian Commandos at War(Melbourne: Mandarin).Major Moor graduated from RMC in 1976. His formal qualifications include a BA(Mil) and Graduate Diploma in AdultEducation. He has spent the majority of his career with Special Forces and has participated in and led many adventuroustraining exercises both in Australia and overseas. He was the Officer Commanding and Chief Instructor of the ArmyAdventurous Training Centre. Major Moor is currently posted to HQ Special Operations Detachment in Canberra.
Page 1 and 2: NO. 136MAY/JUNE1999
Page 3 and 4: No. 136 May/June 1999Front CoverThe
Page 5 and 6: 3Letters to the EditorAirborne Forc
Page 7 and 8: What Has Gone WrongBy Captain M.A.J
Page 10 and 11: 8AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL N
Page 12 and 13: 10AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL
Page 14 and 15: Images from the Back Seat is a coll
Page 22 and 23: @@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@e?@@@@@@@@?e@@@@@
Page 24 and 25: THE FLIGHT OF THE PIGThe Flight of
Page 36 and 37: Australia Remembers records the act
Page 58: 56AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL

ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?