ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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18AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999overcoming these negative forces while enhancing itspositive consequences. But those thrown into thebreach in times of crisis are seldom if ever experts incrisis management or strategy. If for all the logic ofapplying it, we are to hope to see strategy actuallyused in crisis, then initial crisis managementprocedures and expectations by key players mustfacilitate it naturally. This is not to suggest mandatingprocedures for the duration of the crisis. But in thatinitial few hours of chaos, even the most senior andcompetent executives are naturally looking for someframework in which to act. If one can be providedthat facilitates their thinking strategically from theoutset, the natural dynamics of strategy may well takeover. Even if it doesn’t withstand the disruptiveeffects of crisis in the long term, such a start to crisismanagement will be of immeasurable benefit as thesituation unfolds.Getting a Strategic Start in CrisisThe lack of reliable information at the outset ofany crisis is usually so pronounced that remedying itbecomes the focus of even the highest level planners,often distracting them from their real responsibilities,and inviting the contraction of authority andpreoccupation with detail we should be seeking toavoid. Instead the paucity of information should beseen as an advantage. The reality is that at this pointstrategic planners only need to know what hashappened in the most general sense in order to fulfiltheir responsibilities. They need to know how this actor situation might affect national security andtherefore what their objective should be in dealingwith it. Precisely because of the paucity of accurateinformation and also to allow maximum flexibility forsubordinate levels, this objective should not be set inconcrete terms, but expressed as the intent of thegovernment.Crafting this intent therefore becomes the firstresponsibility of the strategic level. It must becarefully done and will deal not so much with themeans the Government might use, but be anexpression of its resolve, and most importantly detailthe conditions it requires to prevail after resolution ofthe crisis. The aim is to incorporate implicit ratherthan explicit qualifications on the means that might beused. An example of an intent for a hostage taking bya renegade group in a foreign country (“Seeland”)might be:The Government’s intention is to achieve the saferelease of the hostages, while reinforcing theauthority and sovereignty of the Seelandgovernment and without heightening the residualthreat to Australian nationals and expatriatesafter resolution of the incident.It is immediately obvious that such a statement isnot reliant on the detail of the situation, but on theintention of the Government. It incorporates thestrategic imperatives and a longterm view. It is robust,and while making clear the main objective of gainingthe safe release of the hostages, implies constraintsthat will be as relevant whether the eventual solutionlies in diplomatic or military action. Its utility forcrisis managers is that it sets important parameterswithin which to operate as more information comes tohand. It allows skilled analysts and staff to alreadyidentify the type of information that might be requiredand in broad terms, the types of contingencies theyshould be considering. Most importantly it provideseveryone a focus.Having crafted our intent the second step is todetermine the opposition’s. It might appear that thisshould be done before deciding our own, but at thestrategic level I believe not. The incident has beeninitiated to disturb the status quo. While in the courseof the crisis we may be forced to accept acompromise solution, or even see advantage in doingso, 25 to be responsive to the opposition from the outsetis to cede the initiative. In the absence of detailedinformation, it is initially both valid and relevant touse the status quo as our reference point. Validbecause to do nothing is to risk slipping into aresponsive mode and relevant because he will haveinitiated the crisis in order to disturb a status quo thatfavoured us more than him. In the absence of reliableinformation, this makes the re-establishment of thestatus quo a reasonable immediate aim for us. This isnot to ignore the realities of the situation. Howeverthe significance of our focusing on the actualsituation, is to take account of it in achieving ourintent, not just in responding to the crisis andparticularly the opposition’s manipulation of usthrough it.Like ours, the opposition’s intent can usually bedetermined from its broad strategic context before allthe details of the incident are available. While it isimportant to identify the opponent’s actual purpose ininstigating the incident, it may only be possible to listhis likely objectives at this stage. These first two stepsare the first order issues in the model at Figure 3.As we move down the left and right hand sides ofthe model, we are looking to ensure that howeverchaotic conditions become, or whatever side issueshave to be dealt with on the way, that like the boxer,we are all the time seeking to weaken his position
STRATEGY AND CRISIS19while defending ours. We examine our intent and hisobjectives, and decide for each, the thing or thingsthat are critical to their achievement. These are ourrespective Centres of Gravity. Those things that ifaccessed or manipulated by one side, could cause theother to fail in his intent or objectives. 26 In some caseseach sides Centre of Gravity may be the same. Forinstance in the hypothetical hostage example, thesupport of the Seeland government could be the mostcritical factor for both sides. However more often theywill be different, and the Centre of Gravity for thehostage takers in this case could be the support of athird country sponsor. But having determined therespective Centres of Gravity, our aim is to focus asmuch of our activity as possible on manipulating his,while ensuring at the same time that ours is protected.ARRIVING AT AN INITIAL STRATEGY IN CRISISDetermine the Govt/StrategicIntentDetermine Opponent’sObjectivesDetermine Our Centre ofGravityInformationRequestsDetermine HisCentre of GravityIdentify How to ProtectOur Centre of GravityIdentify How toManipulate HisCentre of GravitySelect Most EffectiveCombinations of EffectsINITIALSTRATEGYFigure 3To achieve this requires discerning the activitiesor avenues through which the Centres of Gravity canbe manipulated. These general activities are termedDecisive Points, for the effect they can have on theCentre of Gravity. For each of these Decisive Pointsspecific activities are then identified to generate orreinforce these effects. This process need not beexhaustive at this point. If the aim is ensure focus,then discipline must be exercised by considering onlythe more effective and efficient methods. Staff canprovide more detailed analysis latter. The logic of thisprocess is illustrated in Figure 4.
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ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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