ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

14AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999Hermann and Brady, impact on the performance ofboth individuals and organisations.At the individual level, the most obvious effect ofdisruptive stress is fatigue, which though it effectseach individual differently, generally reduces mentalperformance, and increases irritability, paranoia anddefensiveness. The result is reduced individual andteam effectiveness, and a tendency to seek simpleoptions and entertain fewer alternatives. At the sametime the triggering of natural defensive mechanismsunder stress, can cause otherwise incisive thinkers togive undue weight to “expert” advice and to findrefuge in value judgments and precedent.Unfortunately however, national security crises do notlend themselves to such simplistic default action.Each situation is usually unique and the consequencesof error too critical. In addition, national crisis almostinevitably demands a strategic long term view, evenwhile dealing with the immediate. But under thestress of crisis, there is a strong predilection forsolving the short term problem and ignoring thelonger and often more strategically relevantconsequences. 9The major effect of disruptive stress onorganisations is that senior decision makers take auncharacteristic interest in even minor issues and theirmanagement; what Hermann calls “a contraction inauthority”. 10 This has both positive and negativeeffects on the management of crisis. On the positiveside it increases the responsiveness of otherwisebureaucratic structures, cutting out unnecessarylevels, and also increasing the possibility of moreinnovative solutions. The tendency to use a small coremanagement group, increases security and thereforeenhances negotiating flexibility, while also permittinggreater control. But over reliance on a few key playerscan also increase the vulnerability of the organisationto fatigue, and too much secrecy can limit thediversity and integrity of information. 11 The verystatus and direct influence of the decision makers,may interfere with the efficient operation ofcommunication and information channels and causethem to be overloaded, as subordinates responddirectly to key players in an ad hoc hierarchy. In theend, whether the balance of effects is positive ornegative, is very much personality dependent, but it isprudent to plan for the worst case. 12In the case of national security crises, we canpredict with reasonable certainty the institutions andtherefore general types of individuals who are likelyto play key roles in crisis management. There can belittle doubt that the individual and organisationalparadigms within which the key players formulatestrategy, will impact significantly on its quality. Onedescription of crisis as “the imposition of acumulation (sic) of nasty events on passive authoritiesand decision-makers”, 13 suggests that those who willinevitably deal with national crisis are perhaps, insome important ways, the least suitable.Politicians will have the major impact, but whereboth national strategy and crisis demand a long termand usually internationalist view, politicians have,understandably, a predominantly short term and oftendomestic perspective. Bureaucrats will also play a keyrole. However while the requirement is for innovativeand speedy decision-making, the internal dynamics atwork in bureaucracies often cause them to rationalisetheir actions in terms of: “most crises resolvethemselves”, refuge in procedures and a sometimesoverriding interest in preserving the good name of theorganisation and ensuring its internal operationsremain intact. 14 The military will be prominent inmatters of national security, and although its officersare usually better skilled in strategy than their civiliancounterparts, it suffers all the same symptoms ofbureaucratic inertia, and in some cases shows too littleempathy for political imperatives.But if this is the nature of crisis, then as importantis to understand the essential processes taking place.Crises do not occur in a vacuum. They are manifest inthe failure or frustration of other channels ofinteraction, usually conventional diplomatic ones.They are, with apologies to Clausewitz, thecontinuation of negotiation by other means. Thestakes and/or criticality have been raised by one partyor group of parties, to force, if not their position onthe other, then at least his immediate consideration ofit. It is then, as Bouchard maintains, “a series ofbargaining interactions” 15 between two or more sides.There is a competition at play, where no one is likelyto have exclusive control of events, but where each isattempting to resolve the situation in his interest. Inthis competition the instigator of the crisis willinitially hold the initiative. He can be expected toretain it and keep the other side reactive, unless losingit through error or the premeditated action of theopponent. In the final analysis, given the phenomenaof contraction of authority discussed above, thisbargaining or competition may actually be betweenjust a few individuals in each of the participatingparties. 16Therefore the nature of crisis, and particularlynational security crisis, is such that the balance offorces is against the exercise of effective decisionmakingand management. Figure 1. summarises thekey effects of crisis on decision-making. The aimmust be to maximise the potential positive dynamicsof crisis, while at least mitigating its negative impacts.