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ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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36AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>136</strong> MAY/JUNE <strong>1999</strong>planning did not become readily apparent until after1985. Australia and New Zealand have released three<strong>Defence</strong> White Papers since 1985, New Zealand in1987, 1991, 1998 and Australia in 1987, 1994 and1997, stressing self-reliance but the emphasis andlevel of commitment differs between the twoAntipodean neighbours. In his preface to the 1987<strong>Australian</strong> White Paper, Kim Beazley wrote:The first aim of defence self-reliance is to giveAustralia the military capability to prevent anaggressor attacking us successfully in our sea andair approaches, gaining a foothold on any part ofour territory, or extracting concessions fromAustralia through the use or threat of militaryforce. 9To back up this rhetoric, the Labor Governmentset out a program of defence expenditure larger thanat any other time in Australia’s peacetime history.Commitments to acquire new submarines, theJindalee Over-the-Horizon Radar Network (JORN),Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft andreplacement of the aging Mirage fighters were themore significant defence acquisitions endorsed at thattime. 10New Zealand, by contrast, espoused self-reliancewithin the bilateral alliance with Australia thatANZUS became for them, and foresaw no directmilitary threat to the country. 11 A direct military threatto New Zealand has always been difficult to identify,even during World War II, and the expense of a largeforce capable of defending the country was politicallyunacceptable. 12 The 1991 <strong>Defence</strong> White Paper issuedby New Zealand stated:Self-Reliance in Partnership is the strategy usedfor implementing this policy. “Self-reliance” isessential for the national tasks that anyindependent nation must carry out - resourceprotection, counter-terrorism, and surveillance ofour approaches. “Partnership” involves theprotection of our wider security interests, such asthe maintenance of international law and order,and freedom of the seas. This can only be done incooperation with countries who share similarinterests. 13In the period since 1987, Australia has becomecentral to New Zealand <strong>Defence</strong> Policy. In 1991,New Zealand and Australia agreed to pursue betterinteroperability and coordination between their<strong>Defence</strong> <strong>Force</strong>s through the Closer <strong>Defence</strong> Relations(CDR) process. 14 <strong>Defence</strong> spending in New Zealandhas declined in the period since 1985 (more recentlyremaining stable in dollar terms), and Australia hasquestioned the usefulness of CDR if the New ZealandGovernment does not bring about modernisation ofthe NZDF and remain interoperable. 15Regional Engagement<strong>Defence</strong> self-reliance has assisted the Antipodeanneighbours to become more independent in theirdealings with the world, especially within the AsiaPacific region. Australia and New Zealand arefounding members of the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF), and Australia was instrumental in forming theAsia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) processin 1989. 16 APEC and ARF are considered amongst themost important diplomatic successes of the Hawkeand Keating Governments, and highlight the extent towhich Australia sought to become enmeshed with theregion. 17 The Howard (Coalition) Governmentcontinued this engagement with the region, asevidenced in their policy white paper:Australia’s most important strategic andeconomic interests lie in a region—the AsiaPacific—of great cultural and historical diversity.This region covers South East Asia, North EastAsia, the Pacific, and the eastern reaches of theIndian Ocean. Australia’s biggest markets are inNorth East Asia. 18New Zealand has not been as aggressive in itsmoves into Asia but its links to the Pacific arestronger [than Australia’s] through their formermandated territories. 19 Regardless, the defence whitepapers of 1991 and 1997 emphasised regionalsecurity as a primary role for the NZDF:contributing to regional security which includesmaintaining our key defence relationships withAustralia and our Five Power <strong>Defence</strong>Arrangements (FPDA) partners - Australia,United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore 20A major difference between Australia and NewZealand is their relative positions (as perceived bythemselves and other nations) in the world. Australiais seen as a middle-power, and as such can wieldsufficient influence (with other middle-powers) tobring about more desirable outcomes for the region. 21New Zealand could not claim to have the sameinfluence, and had hooked its trailer to Australia in theface of an indifferent Britain, and unfriendly UnitedStates. 22Successive Labor Governments in Australia tookthe initiative on a number of global issues, and strodethe world stage with growing confidence, particularlyafter Gareth Evans assumed the role of ForeignMinister in 1988. APEC and ARF aside, Australia

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