ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

16AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999StrategyA major reason for the inadequate command ofstrategy by national bureaucracies, has been itsmonopolisation as a subject of study, by soldiers andmilitary academics. This has served neither the soldiernor civilian well. To use Liddell Hart’s definition ofstrategy as: “the art of distributing and applyingmilitary means to fulfil the ends of policy”, 17 is tosuggest that it is somehow the unique province of thesoldier and only starts when the matter is handed tohim. For the soldier the danger is that the definitionevokes such military imagery, that he can too easilyfind refuge from tackling its deeper sense, byresorting to the more familiar ground of tactics.Instead the start point needs to be the definition inits ordinary usage of “skilful management in gettingthe better of an adversary or attaining an end.” 18 Theessential notion is that strategy is applied in acompetition between two or more players; and thatthat competition is in fact a contest of wills.Clausewitz and Liddell Hart used the images ofboxers and wrestlers respectively to evoke thisdynamic in strategy. The strength and relevance of theimage being in the personal interplay between the twocontestants, the fact that each is locked inconcentration on the other in an effort to pre-empt orcounter every move. Unfortunately the impact of thisanalogy tends to be lost with the inevitableremoteness of the strategist from the field and/or thefact that the medium of competition is sometimes theless demonstrably competitive environment of policy.But holding onto this image of being engaged in acompetitive struggle is an essential first step in theeffective formulation and application of strategy; andin crisis a most appropriate one, given its essentiallycompetitive bargaining nature.Equally important, and illustrated by the sameanalogy, is the personalisation of the opposition. It isno coincidence that both boxers and wrestlers lock onto each others eyes. What the arms and legs do isinevitably forecast in the eyes. The boxers intensity insearching behind the eyes, must be copied by thesuccessful strategist. But to get inside the mind of theopponent, you must first personalise him. Too oftenthe opposition is seen and treated as a country or anorganisation, without identifying in it, or if necessaryattributing to it, the personality essential to focus thestrategist. The sense of competition is too easily lostwithout this essential step, and strategy quicklysacrificed to the application of procedures or plans.As we have seen by the contraction of authoritycharacteristic of crisis, there is perhaps moreopportunity to exploit this subtle but essential aspectof applying strategy here, than in more routineactivity where the opposition’s decision-makingfunction may be more diffuse.The image of strategy being exercised in acompetitive environment, and the need to personalisethe opposition, are important tools in assisting crisismanagers to focus on the actual situation. Howeverbefore identifying more of strategy’s potentialcontribution in crisis, it is necessary to determine itsvarious dimensions and functions. Like so muchmilitary terminology, these have become confused inthe dual usage of the word in its military and ordinarycontext. Strategy has two dimensions, both relevant,whether it is being applied in a military or generalsense. They have been described as: “the verticaldimension of the different levels that interact with oneanother; and the horizontal dimension of the dynamiclogic that unfolds concurrently within each level.” 19The vertical dimension of strategy can itself havemany layers. 20 However while the detailed functionsin each may vary, the overriding purpose of thestrategic level does not. Its principle purpose is toidentify and initiate the campaigns necessary toachieve political or policy objectives. In doing this itprovides directives, usually in broad terms, andcreates the necessary strategic environment, includingensuring adequate resources, so that the next level ofcommand can achieve the intent of the strategic level.If properly understood and exercised, this functionwill more than occupy strategic crisis managers andso provide a natural delineation between theirs’ andtheir subordinate levels’ responsibilities. However inpractice it is as much observed in the breach, and thenmore through misunderstanding of the functions andresponsibilities of the levels below, than through lackof trust in them.The levels below the strategic are in militaryparlance the operational and tactical levels. Butputting aside the language, the importance is in theirfunctions, which have equal relevance in the civildomain. The significance of the operational level isthat it takes the broad direction of the strategic leveland designs a coordinated sequence of tacticalactivities to achieve it. It might in a national crisis be aMission or Embassy or a special team dispatched orplanned to be dispatched to the general area of thecrisis. Its value is in its proximity to the crisis andlocal knowledge, or at least focus. This places it in thebest position to respond in a timely way to rapidlychanging circumstances and to identify appropriatetactical activities to achieve the higher direction.Nonetheless, it too eschews as much detail as