ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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42AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 136 MAY/JUNE 1999potential to make significant error is high. There is nosuggestion that the future can be read accurately, butmost major asset acquisition projects in themselvesneed to be “forward looking” by more than a fewdecades, so the same for the ongoing training (indeedHR) requirements. The United Kingdom Ministry ofDefence 1 has recognised the inadequaciesexperienced with definition analysis of training needsand failures in making the most effective use ofavailable technology. These flaws, pointed out by theNational Audit Office, have had a major impact ontraining systems and associated resource expendituresfailing to satisfy user’s requirements. The RAF havesubsequently introduced a policy on synthetic trainingin 1989 which has appropriate TNA as a cornerstoneto ensure that acquisition choices are based onimproved, and more timely, definition of trainingneeds and on a full appreciation of the technologyavailable.Training Needs AnalysisABR 5286 (RANTS Volume 2) describes TNAas a multifaceted process which identifies relevantfactors of the training situation which will have abearing on the training strategy adopted. TNAequates to the four fundamental forms of analysisused in the RANTS - job, training, feasibility and taskanalyses. The aim of the four is to determine the“training fit”, that is, does training need to occur andif so what is the most effective way to do it. In thelogistic support continuum, before any determinationon how to acquire training systems is made, the morebasic question of do we need it must be answered -using a high proportion of fact and analysis and muchless “basic instinct”.DRB 37 “Value Analysis (VA) Handbookdescribes VA as: “the systematic effort directed atidentifying the functions of systems, etc for thepurpose of achieving the essential functions at thelowest cost consistent with the needed purpose,performance, reliability, sustainability andmaintainability. Before any assessment of thecapability of a piece of kit is determined, the domainof the engineer, its purpose must be clearlydetermined. Both VA and TNA are disciplines usinga systematic approach to problem solving, both taketime and effort, however, both are necessary,especially for high value items - like trainingsimulators.How Does the TNA Process WorkThe start really should begin with the end oroutcome. This is a clearly defined statement of whatis expected at the end of the project. All further workmust relate back to this and because we deal inoutcomes, there should be no restrictions onalternatives to achieve the outcome. RANTS Vol 2“Training Analysis and Design” Chapter 4 stressesthe point, management has to make a decision as tothe most cost effective means of closing thecompetency gap (people to do the work), they shouldconsider a range of options of which training is butone. This feasibility analysis is a “number crunching”exercise largely focused on cost benefit of the variousforms of training options. It may well show that othernon-training options are more cost effective, but onlya thorough analysis will show. The end result of thisstudy is the “formalisation” and interpretation of datacollected in documentation form.Training documentation is not an end in itself, butthe necessary method collecting, collating andretaining the corporate knowledge of the analysesdone. It is not the intention of documentation to besacrosanct, on the contrary, it is vital that adequateresources be put into this aspect of the TNA processso as to keep it up to date and readily useableConclusionProject management uses a comprehensive ILSprogramme to provide the necessary through lifesupport essential for the types of major projectsundertaken by the ADF. ILS is an eclectic disciplinewhich must be developed early in the project’s life sothat costly modification and unnecessary waste can beavoided. HR is a significant long term component ofthe ILS package, and training is a primary element interms of cost and resource utility. For training to beresourced in a cost effective manner, especially inareas such as simulators and the like, comprehensiveTNA is required. TNA is a related discipline to VAand by using, both purchasing and maintenancedecisions have a far better chance of being made onlower risk basis and ultimately saving resource in atime of constraint.NOTES1. HMSO 247, 6 November 1992 - “Ministry of Defence: Use ofSimulators in Training”.Lieutenant Commander Tim Kenny is the Logistics Officer – Training for the New Submarine Project (UWS Branch).
Unconventional Warfare – An OverviewBy Major R.C. Moor, RA Inf.BackgroundThe history of unconventional warfare in the 20thcentury is rich and colourful. Many myths andlegends have been created and many decisivecampaigns conducted. Prime examples includeLawrence in Arabia, Lettow von Vorbek in EastAfrica, Wingate in Abyssinia and Burma, Vockmannand Fetig in the Philippines, the 2/2nd IndependentCompany in Timor, Wright on New Britain, TomHarrison and his band from Z Special Unit in Borneo,and Barry Petersen in Vietnam.Lawrence’s exploits are perhaps the best known.He was able to effectively protect General Allenby’sright flank during the British advance throughPalestine and Syria. More importantly Lawrenceexamined unconventional warfare in terms ofconventional theory and formulated a moderndoctrine outlining an indirect approach to warfighting.The essential elements of his doctrine are:• The algebraic element or science of war. That isthose aspects that are fixed. Those aspects that canbe calculated, that are subject to mathematicallaw; for example space, time, terrain, weaponcapabilities, number of personnel etc;• The biological element of lives. The recognitionthat the use of mass and the expenditure of livesdoes not necessarily guarantee victory, converselyin some circumstances the life on one’s owntroops must be guarded at all costs in order topreserve the will to fight.• The psychological element. A recognition of theimportance of the psychological element inshaping and influencing attitudes and behaviouraffecting the achievement of political and militaryobjectives. 1Lawrence saw the power of a revolt in terms of itseffect on the mind. Whereas conventional theoryrequired decisiveness through battle, either bydestroying the enemy or capturing ground, Lawrencepostulated “our kingdoms lay in each man’s mind;and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so wemight offer nothing material to the killing. It seemed aregular soldier might be helpless without a target,owning only what he sat on, and subjugating onlywhat, by order, he could poke his rifle at.” 2The fact that a revolt was taking place and that ithad the potential to cause harm to the Turks if notchecked meant that Lawrence could achieve his aimwithout resorting to force. “Battles in Arabia were amistake, since we profited in them only by theammunition the enemy fired off.” 3 He onlyconfronted the enemy when he wished to weakentheir morale or to boost the esprit de corps of his owntroops. He did not confront the enemy to lessen hisnumbers or to take ground. The Turks were unable tocounter the revolt, they responded bothdisproportionately and inappropriately. Theexacerbated the situation. Their troops remained tieddown in a secondary theatre defending open desert,while the Arabs gained confidence and cohesion andthe British took Damascus.Essentially all successful unconventional warfarecampaigns follow a similar pattern. They have beenable to force the enemy to react disproportionatelyand inappropriately. The 2/2nd IndependentCompany were able to tie down a Japanese Divisionon Timor for nearly a year at a time when an extraDivision in New Guinea may have been fatal to theallied cause. In New Britain Wright and his cohortswere able to effectively stop the eastward retreat ofthe Japanese and prevent them from consolidatingtheir position in Rabaul. In Borneo a handful of ZSpecial troops were able to arm and train 2000 Dyakguerrillas behind the Japanese lines. They thencommenced operations in time to support the 9thAustralian Division landing at Brunei Bay. ZSpecial’s operations accounted for an estimated 1500Japanese killed, disrupted their tactical regroupingand seriously hindered their defence against the 9thDivision. Immediately following the Japanesesurrender the same troops were instrumental inhunting down renegade Japanese troops, disarmingothers in remote areas and re-establishing the civiladministration.Current SignificanceIn the Clausewitzian context of nation statescomposed of the trinity of government, military andpeople, nations have exerted power and influence
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ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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