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ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

ISSUE 136 : May/Jun - 1999 - Australian Defence Force Journal

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28AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. <strong>136</strong> MAY/JUNE <strong>1999</strong>principle that every culture understands - an eye foran eye regardless of body politic.The argument that isolated pockets of violencewill turn local communities against the UNintervention are only valid where renegade militiashold influence and where CD intervention is nonexistent. Something of a “catch 22”, however MCDshould be an excellent tool to undermine the influenceof renegade militias. HA organisations experiencingthe negative influence of renegade militias shouldhave the immediate support of MCD.The need now is for the development ofalternative strategies and the means by which pressurecould be best applied to non-compliant culturallydiverse factions. Tangible skill in accurately assessingsocio-cultural and ideological site specific conditions,with an application of eclectic skills based on theprinciples of CD are required. A spectrum ofobjectives focusing on the achievement of communityowned yet practical/viable solutions would begenerated. A commander with the ability toconstructively divert problems back to communityownership and away from his/her troops immediatelycreates a safer environment for the deployment.Modern military philosophy in moving awayfrom the anchors of tradition aims to de-mystifyrather than re-mythicise. The spectrum for tasking istherefore as broad as the desire to effectively andviably problem solve. This is the type of ethosrequired to deal with fragmentation and where MCD,which would have a very broad problem solvingcommission, could evolve into a practical andelementary manoeuvre, a reality based tactic inPD operations.If peace cannot be achieved at the discussion tablethen the Carthatic benefits of battle need to beexplored. This has to be in the context that a large UNPD force in place can control the site, the battle time,and the weapons of the belligerents. It will allow theanger and animosity to burn itself out with out the“ethnic cleansing” which destroys the basicinfrastructure and the children of the host community.A cartharsis as such would enable an easier, lessexpensive (in monetary and humanitarian terms)transition to political peace management in the longerterm. We need the courage and ethical fortitude toallow this and to avoid constantly losing the plot inour current ambiguity.Fragmentation is now too complex and toodangerous to humanity as a whole to allow for anethical and obfuscating debate on controlled violence.Controlled violence has to be safer than uncontrolledviolence. It must be easier to manage a controlledconflict, than a complex uncontrollable limbo ofaggressive belligerents, which the media mistakenlydefines as peace. An aggressive limbo is not peace, itis a conflict that has not happened. Sadly we appear tobe more skilled in managing battle than in managingpeace. If this is the case then may be our battlemanagement skills, used constructively, could be asupport to the peace process.CD principles and practice have been refined anddeveloped to the point where they could now have avery definitive role in bolder peacekeeping.Additionally with some research MCD may wellassist by putting a clearer focus on the demarcating“line in the sand” between PK process and a need toturn to immediate defence/peace enforcement. TheCD process in itself enables a clearer reading of the“political tea leaves” in any given situation. This in itsown right would be of great assistance tocommanders in the field.It is argued that Community Development shouldbe solely the role of NGOs in any UN peacekeepingmission, and to a greater extent NGOs have beentasked in this direction. In context however, and asrecent history reveals, it would appear the NGOs havehad minimal, to no effect in this area. The reasons forthis are complex, but it would appear that the lack ofskilled and strategic knowledge in communitydevelopment at higher levels again references theUN’s antiquated and slow management model. Oftenas not, the problem has already accelerated to thepoint of being overwhelming before real resourcesflow to the relevant NGO.Involvement in MCD processes could wellenhance troop morale. Where in the past meaninglessboredom, fear of threat, and the gruesome burialdetails of a PK deployment have had a negative effecton morale, active community building would act as a“counter balance”. It would give our diggers a realsense of achievement, and not the emptydisheartening vacuum many return home with.The rough military labelling of PR and verylimited CD tactics as “Hearts and Minds” indicatesthat CD is probably not on any military academycurriculum. Surprisingly, given the fact that ThomasEdward Lawrence essentially employed CommunityDevelopment principles to motivate the Arabs intobattle against the Turkish Army during World War 1.ProcessUN member countries simply do not like theconcept of foreign troops going into any other countryand approve it as a last resort i.e. when humanitarian

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