Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary - Faculty of Social Sciences

30 HISTORY OF TTIE EDITIONS. IIISTORY OF THE EDTTTONS. 31begin its actions upon ; and 'tis on the goodness or badnessof the motives that the virtue of the action depends. Thisproves, that to every virtuous action there must be a motiveor impelling passion distinct from the virtue, and that virtuecan never be the sole motive to any action. You do notassent to this : though I think there is no proposition morecertain or important. I must own my proofs were not distinctenough and must be altered. You see with what reluctanceI part with you, though I believe it is time I shouldask your pardon for so much trouble.''When this volume was ready, Hume changed his publisher.Although, as Mr. Burton observes, 501. was a fair sum 'foran edition of a new metaphysical work, by an unknown andyoung author, born and brought up in a remote part of theempire,' and although Noone reported that the book did notsell, Hume was suspicious, and, looking back upon it as abad bargain, availed himself of Hutcheson's good offices toobtain an introduction to Thomas Longrnan. Upon tllissubject he wrote to Hutcheson,-' 16th Narch, 1740.' DEAR SIR,-I must trouble you to write that letter youwas so kind as to offer to Longman the bookseller. I concludedsomewhat of a hasty bargain with iny bookseller,from indolence and an aversion to bargaining : as also becauseI was told that few or no booksellers ~vould engage for oneedition with a new author. I was also determined to keepmy name a secret for some time, though I find I have failedin that point. I sold one edition of these two volumes for- fifty guineas, and also engaged myself Zleedlessly in a clause,which map prove troublesome, viz. that upon printing 6second edition I shall take all tlle copies remaining uponhand at the bookseller's price at the time. 'Tis in order fohave some check upon my bookseller, that I would willinglyengage with another : and I doubt not but your recommendationwould be very serviceable to me, even though you benot personally acquainted with him.' I wait with some impatience for a second edition, principallyon account of alterations I intend to mnlce in my performance.This is an advantage that we authors possesssince the invention of printing, and renders the nonzcmprematwr irz ccnnum not so necessary to us as to the ancients.' Life. Val. i., p. 112.Without it I should have been guilty of a very great temerity,to publish at my years so many novelties in so delicate a partof ; and at any rate, I am afraid that I mustplead as my excuse that very circumstance of youth whichnlay be urged against me. I assure you, that without runningany of the heights of scepticism, I am apt in a coolhour to suspect, in general, that most of my reasonings willbe more useful by furnishing hints and exciting people's.curiosity, than as containing any principles that will augmentthe stock of knowledge, that must pass to future ages. Iwish I could discover more fully the particulars wherein Ihave failed. I admire so much the candour I ]lave observedin Mr. Locke, yourself, and a very few more, that I would beextremely alnbltious of imitating it, by frankly confessingmy errors. If I do not imitate it, it must proceed neitherfrol-(1 my being free from errors nor want of inclination, butfrom my real unasected ignorance. I shall c~nsider morecarefully all the particulars you mention to me : though withregard to abstract ideas, 'tis with difficulty I can entertain adoubt on that head, notwithstanding your authority. Ourconversation together has furnished me a hint, with whichI shall augment the second edition. 'Tis this-the wordsimple idea is an abstract term, comprehending different individualsthat are similar. Yet the point of their similarity,from the very nature of such ideas, is not distinct nor separablefrom the rest. Is not this a proof, among many others,that there may be a similarity without any possible separationeven in thought ?'I niust consult you i11 a point of prudence. I have concludeda reasoning with these two sentences : "When youpronounce any action or character to be vicious, you meannothing but that, from tlle particular constitution of yournature, you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from theconterrlplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may becompared to sou~lds, colours, beat, and cold, which, accordingto modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptionsin the mind. And this discovery in morals, like thatother in physics, is to be regarded as a mighty advancementof the speculative sciences, though like that too it has littleor no influence on practice.' '1 ' Sre this passage in the'' Treatise of where it appears with no other variit-Huma~i Natnre," Fmk iii. Part i. sect. 1. tion than tlie substitution of the word