Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

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242 MIDDLE EASTERN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTSsprings on which they relied, and occasionally split settlements in two(Biger 1989). As Biger (1989) points out, “in no case did the terms ofagreement provide for continuing rights of access by inhabitants totheir vital land and water resources.”As a result of the 1948 war, the Jordan River was even moredivided than it had been under the Mandates. The Hasbani rose inLebanon with the Wazzani, a major spring of the Hasbani, situatedonly a few kilometers north of the Israeli border. The Banias flowedfor five kilometers in Syrian territory before crossing into Israel. TheDan rose and remained within Israeli territory. The confluence ofthe three, the Jordan River, flowed along the Israeli-Syrian border,often through a demilitarized zone, until it reached the Sea of Galilee.The sea lay wholly in Israel, with the Syrian border ten metersfrom the eastern coast. The Yarmuk rose in Syria, then became theSyrian-Jordanian border until its confluence with the Jordan. Southof the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan River formed first the Israeli-Syrianborder, then the Israeli-Jordanian border below the confluence withthe Yarmuk, finally flowing wholly into Jordanian territory and theDead Sea, which was about one quarter Israeli and three quartersJordanian. Groundwater was similarly divided, with the rechargezones of two springs on which Israel increasingly relied, the Yarkonand the Tanninim, originating in the Jordanian territory of the WestBank (see Figure 6).THE WAR OF 1967Water Resources and Background to the WarThe legacy of the partition and the 1948 war was the division ofthe Jordan River in a manner so convoluted that unilateral waterresources development, the only strategy possible among the hostileriparians, would lead inevitably to conflict. By the early 1950s, Arabstates were discussing organized exploitation of two northernsources of the Jordan—the Hasbani and the Banias (Stevens 1965).The Israelis also made public their All Israel Plan, which includedthe draining of Huleh Lake and swamps, diversion of the northernJordan River and construction of a carrier to the coastal plain andNegev Desert—the first out-of-basin transfer for the watershed(Naff and Matson 1984).Jordan, in 1951, announced a plan to irrigate the East Ghor ofthe Jordan Valley by tapping the Yarmuk. At Jordan’s announcement,Israel closed the gates of an existing dam south of the Sea ofGalilee and began draining the Huleh swamps, which lay within thedemilitarized zone with Syria. These actions led to a series of borderskirmishes between Israel and Syria which escalated over the summerof 1951 (Stevens 1965). In July 1953, Israel began constructionBULLETIN 103
WOLF 243Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk river system (Medzini 1976).on the intake of its National Water Carrier at the Daughters of JacobBridge north of the Sea of Galilee and in the demilitarized zone.Syria deployed its armed forces along the border and artillery unitsopened fire on the construction and engineering sites (Cooley 1984).Syria also protested to the U.N. and, though a 1954 resolution forthe resumption of work by Israel carried a majority, the USSR vetoedthe resolution. The Israelis then moved the intake to its currentsite at Eshed Kinrot on the northwestern shore of the Sea of Galilee(Garbell 1965).YALE F&ES BULLETIN
Page 1 and 2: WOLF 221Hydrostrategic Decisionmaki
Page 3 and 4: WOLF 223BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HY
Page 5 and 6: WOLF 225of international rivers, no
Page 7 and 8: WOLF 227The Zionist PositionThe Zio
Page 9 and 10: WOLF 229Aaronson thought his ideas
Page 11 and 12: WOLF 231Figure 3 Disputed area, Mar
Page 13 and 14: WOLF 233the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk
Page 15 and 16: WOLF 235Figure 4 United Nations pla
Page 17 and 18: WOLF 237develop a series of impound
Page 19 and 20: WOLF 239Arab state to reflect the m
Page 21: WOLF 241Figure 6 Rhodes armistice d
Page 25 and 26: WOLF 245resources and to provide fo
Page 27 and 28: WOLF 247water Diversion Plan to pre
Page 29 and 30: WOLF 249• The 1979 Litani Operati
Page 31 and 32: WOLF 251In the taking of the Golan
Page 33 and 34: WOLF 253below which the entire lake
Page 35 and 36: WOLF 255string of kibbutzim was est
Page 37 and 38: WOLF 257Figure 11 West Bank groundw
Page 39 and 40: WOLF 259tion and industrial growth,
Page 41 and 42: WOLF 261the quantity and quality of
Page 43 and 44: WOLF 263Israel-Jordan Treaty of Pea
Page 45 and 46: WOLF 265put a stop to illegal drill
Page 47 and 48: WOLF 267which it had occupied from
Page 49 and 50: WOLF 269protect Israel’s groundwa
Page 51 and 52: WOLF 271Fromkin, D. 1989. A peace t
Page 53: WOLF 273Tonkin, E. 1994. Borderline

Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

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