Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

WOLF 253below which the entire lake is in danger of becoming saline. On thesame day, a field investigation showed that both the Ayoun and theHasbani above the Wazzani springs were dry.4) A hypothetical trucking operation is even more difficult toprove or disapprove. Both Mekorot officials (interview, Turgemon,October 1991), and Israeli military officers responsible for southernLebanon acknowledge that witnesses may have seen Israeli militarywater trucks in southern Lebanon. Each has suggested that the mostlikely explanation is that the trucks were carrying drinking waterfrom Israel to Israeli troops stationed in the “security zone.” Israelimilitary code, they point out, insists that soldiers drink water onlyfrom official collection points, all of which are in Israel.An officer who has acted as liaison officer between Israeli andSouth Lebanon forces doubts that anyone saw Israeli trucks filling atthe Litani, pointing out that the 20-ton “Rio’s” which are used tocarry water could not make the grade of the military road whichleads away from the Litani, if the trucks were full (interview, October1991). Soffer (1991) has calculated that a cubic meter of watertrucked from the Litani into Israel would cost about $4 to $10, ascompared to about $1.50 for a cubic meter of desalinated water.The Hydrostrategic Imperative—ConclusionsAfter closely examining the arguments both in favor and againsta hydrostrategic imperative driving military and territorialdecisionmaking, it is possible to answer the question posed at thebeginning of this section: “Has territory been explicitly targeted,captured, or retained because of its access to water resources?”I argue the following:1) Water resources were not a factor for strategic planning in thehostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. By this I mean that the decisionto go to war, and strategic decisions made during the fighting,including which territory was it necessary to capture, were not influencedby water scarcity or the location of water resources. The locationsof water resources were not considered strategic positions(except in the purely military sense), nor were they a factor inretaining territory immediately after the hostilities.2) There is no evidence that Israel is diverting any water from theLitani River, either by pipe or by truck. In fact, since 1985, whencentral southern Lebanon lost its own water supply, an average of50,000 m 3 /mo has been piped into that region from wells in northernIsrael (Wolf 1995). As a consequence, it is difficult to view wateras a rationale for Israeli retention of Lebanese territory. 1212Nevertheless, Amery (1993) hasspeculated that Israel will, at a minimum,pressure Lebanon to make Litani wateravailable as a prerequisite to Israeli militarywithdrawal.YALE F&ES BULLETIN