Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

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268 MIDDLE EASTERN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTSThe watershed was further divided in the 1922 creation ofTransjordan in territory east of the Jordan River, Dead Sea, andWadi Araba/Arava. The Zionists attempted to reinforce their sovereigntyof the headwaters region through settlement activity in thelate 1930s, always within negotiated boundaries.It seems clear that water was uppermost in the minds of plannersand political decisionmakers, particularly among the Zionists, asboundaries were negotiated over the years. However, despite studiesadvocating the need for greater access to water through 1947, officialadherence to sovereignty over such hydrostrategic territory has ceasedeach time negotiations over legal borders have been concluded.During warfare between competing riparians, has territory beenexplicitly targeted, captured, or retained because of its access towater sources? This has been the most elaborately argued questionin the literature relating water resources to Arab-Israeli relations,although it is too rarely investigated in detail. In contrast to thefunctionalists and advocates of a “hydrostrategic imperative,” waterrelatedterritory seems actually to have played almost no role inArab-Israeli warfare. Close examination of strategic planning andmilitary decision making and tactics suggest no evidence at all thatwater was a factor in the hostilities of 1948, 1967, 1978, or 1982. Theonly instance in which territory was sought for access to water was abrief attempt by Israel in 1979 to move the boundary with Lebanonabout a kilometer north to gain access to the Wazzani Springs—anattempt quickly vetoed by the local Lebanese commander.In the course of peace negotiations, has hydrostrategic territorybeen seen as vital for retention by any of the riparians? Here, too,the answer seems to be no, despite a flurry of studies recommendingIsraeli retention of territory to protect its water sources. That is notto say that water has not been a difficult topic for negotiationsbetween Israel and its neighbors—again, quite the opposite, but thedebate has been over rights, allocations, and management, not overterritory. Of territory identified in Israeli studies as being vital to theprotection of Israel’s water resources, none has been retained byIsrael because of the location of water alone. This has been true ofagreements completed as of this writing—the 1994 treaty of peacebetween Israel and Jordan, and the 1993 Declaration of Principlesand the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and PalestinianAuthority—where arrangements were made for joint managementand sovereignty concerns were not highlighted.Hydrostrategic territory is being insisted upon, however, inongoing negotiations when at least one other compelling justificationexists. Israel may point to demographic and/or security concernsover some Jewish settlements which were reportedly sited toBULLETIN 103
WOLF 269protect Israel’s groundwater resources, for example. And Israel’sinsistence that boundaries with Syria be drawn at the 1923 mandateline rather than according to the temporary 1949 armistice agreementis based on precedent and its interpretation of internationallaw as well as on perceived hydrostrategic needs.The facts show that water has had much less impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict than is increasingly argued, certainly in strategic,spatial, and territorial terms. As Libiszewski (1995) concludes in athorough study of water and security in the Middle East,the Arab-Israeli conflict is not primarily a struggle “overwater.” The conflict is over national identity and existence,territory, as well as over power and national security.In this context, water has played a minor role but only, it seems,in conjunction with one or more of these overriding imperatives.The true lesson of the Arab-Israeli experience seems not to be ofwater as exacerbator of conflict but rather, as the people in the regionmove from war to peace and the desire for sovereignty givesway to principles of joint management, of water as inducer to cooperation.As Lord Curzon (cited in Prescott 1987) said in 1907, “frontiersare indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended themodern issues of war and peace.”ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSI am grateful to Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and the Dayan Centerfor Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University forhosting me so graciously during the summer of 1995, and to JerryWebster of the University of Alabama for helping with sources anddrafts along the way. Some portions of this article, particularlythose regarding the “hydraulic imperative,” are drawn from Wolf, A.1995. Hydropolitics along the Jordan River. Tokyo: United NationsUniversity Press.REFERENCESAllan, J. and C. Mallat, eds. 1995. Water in the Middle East: legal, political, and commercial implications.London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies.Alpher, J. 1994. Settlements and borders. Final Status Issues: Israel, Palestinians, Study #3. Tel Aviv: JaffeeCenter for Strategic Studies.Amery, H. 1993. The Litani river. Geographical Review 83 (3): 230-237._________ 1996. The role of water resources in the historical evolution of the Palestine-Lebanon Border.Unpublished. Available from the author.YALE F&ES BULLETIN
Page 1 and 2: WOLF 221Hydrostrategic Decisionmaki
Page 3 and 4: WOLF 223BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HY
Page 5 and 6: WOLF 225of international rivers, no
Page 7 and 8: WOLF 227The Zionist PositionThe Zio
Page 9 and 10: WOLF 229Aaronson thought his ideas
Page 11 and 12: WOLF 231Figure 3 Disputed area, Mar
Page 13 and 14: WOLF 233the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk
Page 15 and 16: WOLF 235Figure 4 United Nations pla
Page 17 and 18: WOLF 237develop a series of impound
Page 19 and 20: WOLF 239Arab state to reflect the m
Page 21 and 22: WOLF 241Figure 6 Rhodes armistice d
Page 23 and 24: WOLF 243Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk rive
Page 25 and 26: WOLF 245resources and to provide fo
Page 27 and 28: WOLF 247water Diversion Plan to pre
Page 29 and 30: WOLF 249• The 1979 Litani Operati
Page 31 and 32: WOLF 251In the taking of the Golan
Page 33 and 34: WOLF 253below which the entire lake
Page 35 and 36: WOLF 255string of kibbutzim was est
Page 37 and 38: WOLF 257Figure 11 West Bank groundw
Page 39 and 40: WOLF 259tion and industrial growth,
Page 41 and 42: WOLF 261the quantity and quality of
Page 43 and 44: WOLF 263Israel-Jordan Treaty of Pea
Page 45 and 46: WOLF 265put a stop to illegal drill
Page 47: WOLF 267which it had occupied from
Page 51 and 52: WOLF 271Fromkin, D. 1989. A peace t
Page 53: WOLF 273Tonkin, E. 1994. Borderline

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