Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

WOLF 261the quantity and quality of its water, Israel had to retain politicalcontrol over the entire West Bank. 16 On December 12, 1991, 70copies of the report were sent throughout Israel for review, includingto the Ministry of Agriculture. Calling the maps mentioned “anoutline for retreat,” Rafael Eitan and Dan Zaslavsky, whom Eitanhad recently appointed Water Commissioner, insisted on a recall ofthe review copies and a delay in the release of the report. In January1992, the Israeli military censor backed the position of the Ministryof Agriculture and, citing sensitivity of the report’s findings, censoredthe report in its entirety. 1716Eitan’s position, argued in full-page ads inthe Israeli press, has little basis inhydrogeology, as discussed in Wolf 1995.17When peace talks began in 1991, thedocument remained censored out of fearthat it would reveal an Israeli negotiatingstrategy. At press, the document has notbeen made public.Alpher’s ProposalsOnce negotiations began in 1991, boundary proposals took onnew urgency. In one of the most comprehensive post-negotiationexaminations of West Bank boundary options, Alpher (1994) bothsummarizes previous proposals for final boundary arrangements,including the recent “Third Way” and Sharon plans (neither ofwhich have a hydrostrategic component), and offers his own. Indefining Israel’s requirements in a negotiated agreement, Alpherspecifies Israel’s needs according to nine parameters: security, water,Figure 14 Alpher’s “Water Boundaries” (Alpher 1994).Figure 15 Alpher’s “Final Boundaries” (Alpher 1994).YALE F&ES BULLETIN