Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

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244 MIDDLE EASTERN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTSAgainst this tense background, President Dwight Eisenhowersent his special envoy Eric Johnston to the Middle East in October1953 to try to mediate a comprehensive settlement of the JordanRiver system allocations. 8 Johnston’s initial proposals were based ona study carried out by Charles Main and the Tennessee Valley Authority(TVA) at the request of the U.N. to develop the area’s water8For a detailed normative assessment of theJohnston framework, see Elmusa (thisvolume).Figure 8 (Wolf 1995)BULLETIN 103
WOLF 245resources and to provide for refugee resettlement (Main 1953). BothIsrael and a united Arab League Technical Committee respondedwith their own counterproposals. The Israeli “Cotton” plan includedintegration of the Litani River’s flow into the Jordan basin, with asubsequent increase in allocations to Israel. The Arab plan rejectedintegration of the Litani and substantially reduced Israel’s share ascompared with the Main plan. Johnston worked until the end of1955 to reconcile these proposals in a Unified Plan amenable to allof the states involved. In the Unified Plan, Johnston accomplishedno small degree of compromise. Although they had not met face toface for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a regionalapproach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and theArabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, butfinally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam and the Sea ofGalilee so long as neither side would have physical control over theshare available to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, tointernational supervision of withdrawals and construction. Allocationsunder the Unified Plan, later known as the Johnston Plan,included 400 million m 3 (MCM)/yr to Israel, 720 MCM/yr to Jordan, 35MCM/yr to Lebanon, and 132 MCM/yr to Syria (Unpublished summaries,U.S. Department of State).The technical committees from all sides accepted the UnifiedPlan, but continuing political support could not be garnered and thePlan was never ratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordan have generallyadhered to the Johnston allocations and technical representativesfrom both countries have met from that time until the presenttwo or three times a year at “Picnic Table Talks,” named for the siteat the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers where the meetingswere held.As each state developed its water resources unilaterally, theirplans began to overlap. By 1964, Israel had completed enough of itsNational Water Carrier that actual diversions from the Jordan Riverbasin to the coastal plain and the Negev were imminent. AlthoughJordan was also about to begin extracting Yarmuk water for its EastGhor Canal, it was the Israeli diversion which prompted PresidentNasser to call for the First Arab Summit in January 1964, a meetingwhich brought together heads of state from the Mideast and NorthAfrica specifically to discuss a collective Arab strategy on water.The options presented at the summit were (1) to complain to theU.N., (2) divert the upper Jordan tributaries into Arab states (as hadbeen discussed by Syria and Jordan since 1953), or (3) to go to war(Schmida 1983). The decision to divert the rivers prevailed at asecond summit in September 1964 and the Arab states agreed tofinance a Headwater Diversion project in Lebanon and Syria and toThe technical committees from all sidesaccepted the Unified Plan, butcontinuing political support could notbe garnered and the Plan was neverratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordanhave generally adhered to the Johnstonallocations and technical representativesfrom both countries have metfrom that time until the present two orthree times a year at “Picnic TableTalks,” named for the site at theconfluence of the Yarmuk and JordanRivers where the meetings were held.YALE F&ES BULLETIN
Page 1 and 2: WOLF 221Hydrostrategic Decisionmaki
Page 3 and 4: WOLF 223BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HY
Page 5 and 6: WOLF 225of international rivers, no
Page 7 and 8: WOLF 227The Zionist PositionThe Zio
Page 9 and 10: WOLF 229Aaronson thought his ideas
Page 11 and 12: WOLF 231Figure 3 Disputed area, Mar
Page 13 and 14: WOLF 233the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk
Page 15 and 16: WOLF 235Figure 4 United Nations pla
Page 17 and 18: WOLF 237develop a series of impound
Page 19 and 20: WOLF 239Arab state to reflect the m
Page 21 and 22: WOLF 241Figure 6 Rhodes armistice d
Page 23: WOLF 243Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk rive
Page 27 and 28: WOLF 247water Diversion Plan to pre
Page 29 and 30: WOLF 249• The 1979 Litani Operati
Page 31 and 32: WOLF 251In the taking of the Golan
Page 33 and 34: WOLF 253below which the entire lake
Page 35 and 36: WOLF 255string of kibbutzim was est
Page 37 and 38: WOLF 257Figure 11 West Bank groundw
Page 39 and 40: WOLF 259tion and industrial growth,
Page 41 and 42: WOLF 261the quantity and quality of
Page 43 and 44: WOLF 263Israel-Jordan Treaty of Pea
Page 45 and 46: WOLF 265put a stop to illegal drill
Page 47 and 48: WOLF 267which it had occupied from
Page 49 and 50: WOLF 269protect Israel’s groundwa
Page 51 and 52: WOLF 271Fromkin, D. 1989. A peace t
Page 53: WOLF 273Tonkin, E. 1994. Borderline

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