Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

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266 MIDDLE EASTERN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTSHeights. As mentioned above, Schwartz and Zohar (1991) advisedIsraeli retention of the Golan Heights west of the Jordan River watershedline in order to guarantee continued control of both waterquantity and quality (see Figure 13). In a 1994 study, Shalev (1994),himself a retired general in the Israeli army, cites five other retiredgenerals on the importance of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan tothe protection of water resources. Even in his small sample, Shalevfinds a range of military opinions, from those who suggest thatIsrael retain a physical presence on the Golan Heights, to those whoadvocate retention of at least the plateau above the Sea of Galilee, tothose (such as former Chief of Staff Mordechai Gur) who argue thatthe water problem can be resolved politically in a peace treaty, andthat the territory is not vital. Shalev concludes that Syria would notrisk a war with Israel for water, especially since a diversion wouldtake years to construct and would constitute a clear casus belli. Itstands to reason, Shalev argues, that countries involved in watersharingagreements would want to maintain them.In the meantime, Schiff (1995), Tarnopolsky (1996), and othershave argued in the popular Israeli and Jewish press that water’sparamount importance may scuttle negotiations over the Golan,while Israeli politicians from the Labor party, including Prime MinisterShimon Peres and his Foreign Minister Ehud Barak, argue thatwhile the land may be negotiable, the water is not (Jerusalem Post,January 6, 1996 and January 27, 1996).In answer to the question posed at thebeginning of this section, “How much ofthe quest for negotiated boundaries hasbeen influenced by the location of waterresources?” the evidence seems tosuggest: not much. This is not to say thatwater has not been an important topic ineach set of negotiations—quite theopposite. The questions of waterallocations and rights have been intricateand have been only partially resolved,and even so with great difficulty.Water and Negotiations—ConclusionsIn answer to the question posed at the beginning of this section,“How much of the quest for negotiated boundaries has been influencedby the location of water resources?” the evidence seems tosuggest: not much. This is not to say that water has not been animportant topic in each set of negotiations—quite the opposite. Thequestions of water allocations and rights have been intricate andhave been only partially resolved, and even so with great difficulty.Nevertheless, with the concluded negotiations between Israel andJordan and the ongoing talks between Israel and the PalestinianAuthority (and despite the quantity of studies identifyinghydrostrategic territory and advising its retention) no territory todate has been retained simply because of the location of water. Solutionsin each case have focused on creative joint management of theresource, rather than insistence on sovereignty.The pattern which does seem to be emerging, however, is thatwater in addition to one or more other concerns, may justify retentionof territory. For example, in the absence of any legal claims,security interests, or settlements, Israel withdrew from territoryBULLETIN 103
WOLF 267which it had occupied from Jordan—even those small portionswhich had hydrostrategic importance. What was important was anagreement on water management, not territory.By contrast, Israel developed some settlements on thewesternmost side of the West Bank to address security and demographicconcerns in addition to protecting its water supply. Whilecontrol of much of this territory is being turned over to the Palestinians,determination of the final status of those settlements has beenpostponed until the final round of negotiations. Again, the solutionwas found through agreements guaranteeing joint water management,precluding the need for annexation of territory.These principles may be played out in negotiations betweenIsrael and Syria as well. While Syria insists on the Armistice Line asit stood on June 5, 1967, Israel is arguing for boundaries based onthe 1923 international division between the British and Frenchmandates—the difference being three small areas of vital hydrostrategicimportance. Based on the experience of other regional boundarydelineations, Israel is likely to address hydrostrategic territorialconcerns in conjunction with its legal claims.CONCLUSIONSMichel Foucher (1989) describes cross-border “realities andrepresentations” thus:Border analysis does not only deal with space, but also with time.So boundaries can be considered as time written in space—notmerely the past, but also a special relationship with that pastwhich stands as an inevitable background to current geopoliticaldecisions.I have sought to address in this paper the existence of hydrostrategicterritory (that is, territory over which sovereignty has beensought politically or militarily solely because of its access to watersources) and its role in boundaries, warfare, and negotiations.Hydrostrategic behavior has occurred in the political realm but ithas not occurred in the military realm.Have boundaries been drawn historically on the basis of thelocation of water access? Beginning with the Paris Peace Talks in1919 and ending with the 1923 mandate boundaries, the Zionistposition clearly defined their future state in hydrologic terms, seekingas much of the Jordan Basin as possible, and occasionally someof the Litani as well. They were only marginally successful in achievingthese goals, losing two of the three headwaters, but retainingmost of the flow of the upper Jordan and all of the Sea of Galilee.YALE F&ES BULLETIN
Page 1 and 2: WOLF 221Hydrostrategic Decisionmaki
Page 3 and 4: WOLF 223BORDERS, BOUNDARIES, AND HY
Page 5 and 6: WOLF 225of international rivers, no
Page 7 and 8: WOLF 227The Zionist PositionThe Zio
Page 9 and 10: WOLF 229Aaronson thought his ideas
Page 11 and 12: WOLF 231Figure 3 Disputed area, Mar
Page 13 and 14: WOLF 233the Upper Jordan and Yarmuk
Page 15 and 16: WOLF 235Figure 4 United Nations pla
Page 17 and 18: WOLF 237develop a series of impound
Page 19 and 20: WOLF 239Arab state to reflect the m
Page 21 and 22: WOLF 241Figure 6 Rhodes armistice d
Page 23 and 24: WOLF 243Figure 7 Jordan/Yarmuk rive
Page 25 and 26: WOLF 245resources and to provide fo
Page 27 and 28: WOLF 247water Diversion Plan to pre
Page 29 and 30: WOLF 249• The 1979 Litani Operati
Page 31 and 32: WOLF 251In the taking of the Golan
Page 33 and 34: WOLF 253below which the entire lake
Page 35 and 36: WOLF 255string of kibbutzim was est
Page 37 and 38: WOLF 257Figure 11 West Bank groundw
Page 39 and 40: WOLF 259tion and industrial growth,
Page 41 and 42: WOLF 261the quantity and quality of
Page 43 and 44: WOLF 263Israel-Jordan Treaty of Pea
Page 45: WOLF 265put a stop to illegal drill
Page 49 and 50: WOLF 269protect Israel’s groundwa
Page 51 and 52: WOLF 271Fromkin, D. 1989. A peace t
Page 53: WOLF 273Tonkin, E. 1994. Borderline

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