Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

WOLF 259tion and industrial growth, absence of dense Arab populations, andpsycho-tactical space.In describing the influence of the above principles, Cohen describedhow water might influence territorial compromise: Israelwould need to retain sovereignty over the Banias-Har Dov-Hermonshoulder headwaters region, the Golan slopes east of the UpperJordan, and the Golan Heights that overlook the Sea of Galilee andthe Lower Yarmuk and its Raqqad tributary. On the West Bank,Cohen argued that Israel should annex the territory which extendsuntil the “subterranean water divide,” which he identifies as extending2-6 km east of the Green Line. 15 Despite his acknowledgmentthat this territory includes Arab population centers, Cohen arguedthat the substantial geopolitical advantage that Israel would gain(presumably over and above the hydrostrategic considerations)would outweigh those concerns. Overall, for all the factors listedabove, Cohen advised Israel to annex approximately 20% of theWest Bank, 19% of the Gaza Strip, and 50% of the Golan Heights(see Figure 13).15Cohen is probably referring to Cantor’s“red line.” The watershed divide is actuallyseveral kilometers inland along the ridge ofthe Samarian and Judean Hills.The Jaffee Center’s “Arrangements”In 1991, the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv Universityasked two researchers, Yehoshua Schwartz, the director ofTahal, Israel’s water planning agency, and Aharon Zohar, also atTahal at the time, to undertake a study of the regional hydrostrategicsituation and the potential for regional cooperation. The result, a300-page document titled, “Water in the Middle East: Solutions toWater Problems in the Context of Arrangements between Israel andthe Arabs,” was one of the most comprehensive studies of its kind(Schwartz and Zohar 1991). It examined a number of possible scenariosfor regional water development, including possible arrangementsbetween Israel and Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey,Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza.Scenarios were included both for regional cooperation and for itsabsence. Evaluations included hydrologic, political, legal, and ideologicalconstraints. The impacts of potential global climatic changewere also considered. The study showed, in the words of JosephAlpher, the director of the Jaffee Center, “the potential beauty ofmultilateral negotiations” (interview, Alpher, December 1991).Some of the findings of the study contradicted governmentpolicies at the time, however. In the sections on possible arrangementsbetween Israel and the Palestinians, and between Israel andSyria, maps of the West Bank and Golan Heights included lines towhich Israel might relinquish control of the water resources in eacharea, without overly endangering its own water supply. The line inYALE F&ES BULLETIN