Hydrostrategic Decisionmaking and the Arab ... - Yale University

WOLF 245resources and to provide for refugee resettlement (Main 1953). BothIsrael and a united Arab League Technical Committee respondedwith their own counterproposals. The Israeli “Cotton” plan includedintegration of the Litani River’s flow into the Jordan basin, with asubsequent increase in allocations to Israel. The Arab plan rejectedintegration of the Litani and substantially reduced Israel’s share ascompared with the Main plan. Johnston worked until the end of1955 to reconcile these proposals in a Unified Plan amenable to allof the states involved. In the Unified Plan, Johnston accomplishedno small degree of compromise. Although they had not met face toface for these negotiations, all states agreed on the need for a regionalapproach. Israel gave up on integration of the Litani and theArabs agreed to allow out-of-basin transfer. The Arabs objected, butfinally agreed, to storage at both the Maqarin Dam and the Sea ofGalilee so long as neither side would have physical control over theshare available to the other. Israel objected, but finally agreed, tointernational supervision of withdrawals and construction. Allocationsunder the Unified Plan, later known as the Johnston Plan,included 400 million m 3 (MCM)/yr to Israel, 720 MCM/yr to Jordan, 35MCM/yr to Lebanon, and 132 MCM/yr to Syria (Unpublished summaries,U.S. Department of State).The technical committees from all sides accepted the UnifiedPlan, but continuing political support could not be garnered and thePlan was never ratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordan have generallyadhered to the Johnston allocations and technical representativesfrom both countries have met from that time until the presenttwo or three times a year at “Picnic Table Talks,” named for the siteat the confluence of the Yarmuk and Jordan Rivers where the meetingswere held.As each state developed its water resources unilaterally, theirplans began to overlap. By 1964, Israel had completed enough of itsNational Water Carrier that actual diversions from the Jordan Riverbasin to the coastal plain and the Negev were imminent. AlthoughJordan was also about to begin extracting Yarmuk water for its EastGhor Canal, it was the Israeli diversion which prompted PresidentNasser to call for the First Arab Summit in January 1964, a meetingwhich brought together heads of state from the Mideast and NorthAfrica specifically to discuss a collective Arab strategy on water.The options presented at the summit were (1) to complain to theU.N., (2) divert the upper Jordan tributaries into Arab states (as hadbeen discussed by Syria and Jordan since 1953), or (3) to go to war(Schmida 1983). The decision to divert the rivers prevailed at asecond summit in September 1964 and the Arab states agreed tofinance a Headwater Diversion project in Lebanon and Syria and toThe technical committees from all sidesaccepted the Unified Plan, butcontinuing political support could notbe garnered and the Plan was neverratified. Nevertheless, Israel and Jordanhave generally adhered to the Johnstonallocations and technical representativesfrom both countries have metfrom that time until the present two orthree times a year at “Picnic TableTalks,” named for the site at theconfluence of the Yarmuk and JordanRivers where the meetings were held.YALE F&ES BULLETIN