Landstuhl in Germany, Clark AFB in <strong>the</strong> Philippines, on Guam and at Bagnoliin Italy and Diego Garcia. The Navajo FLTSATCOM system consisted of sevensatellites parked in geosynchronous orbit all around <strong>the</strong> equator and providedworldwide coverage, except in <strong>the</strong> polar regions. These provided mostly for <strong>the</strong>U.S. Navy, communications by digitalized voice, teleprinter and o<strong>the</strong>r techniques,and operated at UHF. These satellites were also important hosts forAFSATCOM transponders. Indeed, according to one report, each host forAFSATCOM satellites had 23 channels, ten of which were allotted to <strong>the</strong> Navyfor command of its air, ground and sea force, 12 to AFSATCOM for nuclearrelatedcommunications, and one reserved for <strong>the</strong> National CommandAuthorities.35One particularly important function for FLTSATCOM – along with <strong>the</strong>DSC’s satellites – was <strong>the</strong> relaying of data from SOSUS and SURTASS (surveillancetowed array) hydrophone systems to <strong>the</strong> Central Shore Station orAcoustic Research Center at Moffett Field, California, “where it is integratedwith data from o<strong>the</strong>r sources and processed by <strong>the</strong> ILLIAC 4 computer complexto provide a real-time submarine monitoring capability.”36 There is also realtimetransmission of data and displays from ocean-surveillance satellites providedto U.S. surface and submarine fleets.FLTSATCOM utilized control or receiver sites. There were several in <strong>the</strong>U.S. at Norfolk, Wahiawa (Hawaii), Stockton, California and ano<strong>the</strong>r atFinnegayan in Guam. Overseas, <strong>the</strong>re were additional stations at Bagnoli, Italyand at Diego Garcia and an AN/MSC-61 system located at Exmouth, NorthwestCape, Australia.37According to <strong>the</strong> U.S. Defense Communications Agency, <strong>the</strong> European AU-TOSEVOCOM system consisted of about 225 wideband subscriber terminalshomed on four AN/FTC-31 switches and 16 SECORDS providing secure voiceservice. Ano<strong>the</strong>r 85 subscribers were provided worldwide secure voice access<strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> 117Table 5 Giant Talk/Scope Signal III stationsCountryLocationAscensionAzoresLajes, Cinco PincosGreenlandThuleGuamAnderson AFB, Barrigada, Nimitz HillJapanOwada, Tokorozawa, YokotaOkinawaKadenaPanamaHoward and Albrook AFBsPhilippinesClark AFB, Cubi Point, Camp O’DonnellSpainTorrejonTurkeyIncirlikU.K.RAF Croughton, Mildenhall, Barford St. JohnSource: SIPRI data, Harkavy, <strong>Bases</strong> Abroad, p. 164.İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavythrough 10 AUTOVON switches.38 Locations of <strong>the</strong> main switching center for<strong>the</strong> AUTOVON network are listed in Table 6.One of <strong>the</strong> major U.S. uses of overseas <strong>the</strong>ater communications was thatinvolved in <strong>the</strong> highly proliferated microwave/troposcatter systems used to linkU.S. and o<strong>the</strong>r allied forces within <strong>the</strong> European and Pacific <strong>the</strong>aters. This inturn involved a number of sub-systems, perhaps <strong>the</strong> best known of which was<strong>the</strong> NATO ACE HIGH system within Europe. According to Jane’s:ACE HIGH is an 80-voice-channel trophospheric scatter/microwave linksystem which dates back to 1956 when SHAPE developed a plan for anexclusive communications system which would comprise <strong>the</strong> minimumessential circuits of early warning and alert and implementation of <strong>the</strong> trip-Page 24Page 25
wire retaliation strike plan. The network extends from nor<strong>the</strong>rn Norway andthrough Central Europe to Eastern Turkey.39All of <strong>the</strong> U.S. NATO allies hosted numerous troposcatter relay links – <strong>the</strong>rewere some 40 in West Germany, six in Belgium, eight in Greece, 16 in Italy, 15in Turkey, and so on. (Earlier <strong>the</strong>re were some 30 such links in France.)40 Thesetypes of link also ran from <strong>the</strong> continental U.S. via Greenland, Iceland, <strong>the</strong>Faeroes and <strong>the</strong> U.K. to Europe; indeed, <strong>the</strong>y were originally designed as onelink in <strong>the</strong> Ballistic Missile Early <strong>War</strong>ning System (BMEWs). In Iceland, it isreported that each such North Atlantic Relay System (NARS) installation consistedof four large “billboard” troposcatter antennas.41 Parts of <strong>the</strong> troposcatternetwork were modernized as <strong>the</strong> Digital European Backbone System (DEBS).The transmission, relay and reception of strictly military and diplomatic messagesdoes not exhaust <strong>the</strong> uses to which overseas facilities were put within <strong>the</strong>broad domain of communications. Basing diplomacy also entered <strong>the</strong> news inconnection with broadcast communications. This took any of several forms, forinstance, <strong>the</strong> major powers’ use of foreign territories for clandestine radio118 <strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong>Table 6 Location of <strong>the</strong> main switching centers for <strong>the</strong> AUTOVON networkCountryLocationJapanFuchu, AS, Camp Drake (moved to Yokota)OkinawaGrass Mountain or Ft BucknerPhilippinesClark AFBPanamaCorozalSpainHumosaU.K.Martlesham Heath, Hilingdon, RAF CroughtonFDR GermanySchoenfield; Fieldberg, Donnersberg, Pirmasens,LangerkopfItalyColtano, Mt. VergineGuamFinnegayanSource: Defense Communications Agency, “Defense Communications System/European CommunicationSystems: Interoperability Baseline,” Washington, DC, 1 February 1981; and Jane’s MilitaryCommunications (Macdonald: London, 1981).İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavytransmitters, particularly adjacent to rivals’ territories or those where civil warswere in progress. (In <strong>the</strong> 1987 U.S. Congressional Iran/“Contragate” hearings,information emerged about <strong>the</strong> CIA-run clandestine transmitters in CentralAmerica and in <strong>the</strong> Caribbean directed against Nicaragua and Cuba.) On a moreovert basis, this involved, at least as pertained to <strong>the</strong> U.S. side, <strong>the</strong> global transmissionnetwork of <strong>the</strong> government’s Voice of America (VOA). There wereSoviet, French and British counterparts.Access for VOA transmitters, even despite <strong>the</strong> absence of obvious militaryimplications, was not always a simple matter. Soviet and o<strong>the</strong>r nations’ sensitivitiesto radio-broadcast intrusion were such that a nation hosting a VOA facilityrisked a degree of displeasure.42For its short-wave broadcasts, <strong>the</strong> VOA had six main 500-kilowatt transmitters;additionally, a variety of some 100 antennas and relay stations in Asia, Africa andCentral America. The VOA had overseas radio stations in Antigua, Thailand,Botswana, Greece (two), West Germany, <strong>the</strong> Philippines (two), Costa Rica, SriLanka, Morocco, Belize and <strong>the</strong> U.K. (and later in Israel). In 1984–1985, as <strong>the</strong>Central American crisis intensified, it was reported that Costa Rica and Belize hadagreed to host VOA broadcast relay stations – in addition, VOA had obtainedagreements to construct relay stations in Sri Lanka, Israel, Morocco and Thailand.Intelligence43During <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> <strong>the</strong> U.S. relied on a variety of technical methods for intelligencecollection (i.e., o<strong>the</strong>r than HUMINT) which involved <strong>the</strong> use of overseasfacilities. These involved <strong>the</strong> domains of imaging or photographic reconnaissance,signals intelligence, ocean surveillance, space surveillance and nucleardetonation and monitoring.44 Variously, cutting across <strong>the</strong>se categories, thisinvolved fixed land-based facilities, air bases and naval facilities. In some cases,<strong>the</strong> utilization of foreign facilities for specific purposes was well-known, asPage 26
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