for instance in <strong>the</strong> cases of large strategic radars or air bases used to stage<strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> 119Table 7 Interconnections between ACE HIGH and DCSDCSACE HIGHMormond Hill (U.K.)Mormond Hill (U.K.)<strong>Cold</strong> Blow Lane (U.K.)Maidstone (U.K.)SHAPE (Belgium)Costeau (Belgium)Bonn (FRG)Kindsbach (FRG)Aviano (Italy)Aviano (Italy)Naples (Bagnoli, Italy)Bagnoli (Italy)Izmir (TurkeyIzmir (Turkey)Incirlik (Turkey)Adana (Turkey)Sources: Defense Communications Agency, “Defense Communications System/European CommunicationSystems; Interoperability Baseline,” Washington, DC, 1 February 1981; and Jane’s MilitaryCommunications (Macdonald: London, 1981).İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavyphotoreconnaissance flights. In o<strong>the</strong>rs, however, data were more limited – thiswas particularly true regarding <strong>the</strong> relay of data from satellites to major headquartersin <strong>the</strong> U.S. homeland.The U.S., <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> and beyond, made important use of reconnaissancesatellites which conducted area surveillance, close-look and real-time surveillance.Crucially, this involved <strong>the</strong> Keyhole series, KH-9 (Big Bird) devotedto area-surveillance and KH-8 (Close Look), later superseded (in 1976) by <strong>the</strong>KH-11 and later by <strong>the</strong> KH-12 (Ikon). Mostly, <strong>the</strong>se satellites appear to havefunctioned without <strong>the</strong> help of overseas downlinks.The U-2 and SR-71 strategic reconnaissance aircraft were usable for a varietyof nuclear and non-nuclear related missions. The latter can fly at a speed of Mach4 (about 4160km per hour), at a height of over 25,000 meters, can track SAM missiles,has radar detectors, a variety of ECMs, and a syn<strong>the</strong>tic-aperture radar forhigh altitude night imaging. Some 15–19 SR-71s were utilized, co-located at someof <strong>the</strong> same bases as <strong>the</strong> U-2s, at Mildenhall in <strong>the</strong> U.K., Kadena on Okinawa andAkrotiri on Cyprus (<strong>the</strong> U-2s also utilized Incirlik, Peshawar, Clark AFB, Atsugiand Wiesbaden). The still newer TR-1A reconnaissance aircraft, of which some 14were deployed, also utilized some of <strong>the</strong>se bases.O<strong>the</strong>r satellites and also land-based facilities were used for SIGINT, anacronym that subsumes several categories of intelligence collection, i.e.,COMINT (communications intelligence), ELINT (electronic intelligence),TELINT (telemetry intelligence) and FISINT (foreign instrumentation signalsintelligence). The major <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> SIGINT satellite systems–Chalet, Rhyolite(targeted against telemetry, radar, communications, extending across <strong>the</strong> VHF,UHF and microwave frequencies), Ferret, Magnum/Aquacade (low orbitingferret satellites used to map Soviet and Chinese radars) apparently made littleuse of overseas downlinks.But, <strong>the</strong> U.S. long made use of a plethora of ground-based SIGINT stations,as identified in Table 8.Although <strong>the</strong>re were diverse types and mixes of <strong>the</strong>se facilities, a few widelydeployed types were notable. One involved a combination of AN/FLR-9 HF andVHF interception and direction-finding system (DF) with CDAA (CircularlyDisposed Antenna Array) known as an “elephant cage.” Ano<strong>the</strong>r involvedtelemetry interception capability with combined VHF-UHF-SHF receivers, usedto monitor missile launches.45 Then <strong>the</strong>re were FPS-17 detection radars andFPS-79 tracking radars also used in connection with missile launches. Therewere also a considerable number of AN/FLR-15 antennas.46The identifiable land-based SIGINT facilities included those shown in <strong>the</strong>accompanying table. In some of <strong>the</strong>se cases – Canada, <strong>the</strong> U.K., Turkey andperhaps Japan – SIGINT stations were jointly operated with host personnel, and<strong>the</strong> data intake shared to one degree or ano<strong>the</strong>r, no doubt negotiated on a caseby-casebasis and subject to periodic renewal; hence, a function of <strong>the</strong> state ofpolitical relationships and associated reciprocal leverage.120 <strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong>İ 2007 Robert E. HarkavyPage 27
Ocean surface surveillance47The U.S. had a number of systems – satellites, aircraft, ground stations and ships– for observing <strong>the</strong> world’s ocean surfaces, that is, for tracking Soviet warships,auxiliary intelligence ships, merchant and fishing vessels etc. Operationally, <strong>the</strong>goal was to know <strong>the</strong> location of all Soviet ships at any time. In normal conditions,one major purpose was to track <strong>the</strong> itineraries of Soviet ships carryingarms to clients – this was a key item of intelligence. In crises or, hypo<strong>the</strong>tically,at <strong>the</strong> outset of a major war, <strong>the</strong> hair-trigger, preemptive nature of modern navalwarfare – nuclear or non-nuclear – would have put a premium on real-time locationand targeting of rival fleets, in all wea<strong>the</strong>rs. Contrariwise, both sides wouldhave worked hard to devise methods for eluding detection, again, particularly<strong>during</strong> wartime conditions.<strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> 121Table 8 Land-based SIGINT facilitiesCountryLocation/commentsAustraliaNorthwest CapeThe AzoresVilla NovaCanadaMassett, Argentia, Whitehorse, LeetrimChinaKorla, QtaiCubaGuantanamoCyprusFive StationsDenmarkBornholmDiego GarciaHondurasPalmerolaKwajaleinMidwayFDR GermanyAugsburg, Hof, a network called La Faire Vite to monitor WTOcommunications, and o<strong>the</strong>rsU.K.Cheltenham, Wincombe, Morwenstow, KirknewtonGreeceIraklion and Nea MakriIcelandKeflavik, StockknesItalySan Vito, Vicenza, TrevisoJapanMisawa, Camp Zama, Hakata, Sakata, Wakkanei, KamiseyaSouth KoreaYonchon, Camp Humphreys, Pyongtaek, Sinsan-ni, KangwhaMoroccoKenitrarNorwayVarda, Vadso, ViksofjelletOmanAl Khasab, Umm Al-Ranam IslandPanamaCorozol, Fort Clayton, Galeta IslandPakistanBada BienPhilippinesSan Miguel, Clark AB, John May CampOkinawaTori, Hanza, Sobe, Omna PointSpainRota, El Casar del TalamancaTaiwanShou Lin Kou, Tapeh, Nan Szu PuTurkeySinop, Dyarbakir, Samsun, Karamursel, Antalya, Agri, Kars,Edirne, AnkaraSource: SIPRI data, and J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, The Ties That Bind (Allen and Unwin: Boston,1985), appendix 1.İ 2007 Robert E. HarkavyPage 28
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