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6 Bases during the Cold War

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The Soviet AGIs had near global patrolling areas. There was a concentratedeffort to monitor off <strong>the</strong> sou<strong>the</strong>astern coast of <strong>the</strong> U.S. (where U.S. surface andsubmarine units were concentrated), in <strong>the</strong> English Channel, <strong>the</strong> Norwegian Seaand off Holy Loch. In <strong>the</strong> Indian Ocean and Mediterranean Sea, Western navalmovements were monitored, particularly near <strong>the</strong> straits of Gibraltar, Hormuzand Bab El Mandeb, and <strong>the</strong> Suez Canal. In <strong>the</strong> Pacific Ocean, <strong>the</strong>re was correspondingemphasis off <strong>the</strong> coasts of China, Japan, Guam and in <strong>the</strong> watersaround Vietnam.The dependence of <strong>the</strong>se “spy ships” on provisioning from foreign ports wasdifficult to gauge, but must certainly have been considerable. As noted by one140 <strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong>İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavysource, <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union had chosen “not to build an auxiliary fleet of <strong>the</strong> sizenecessary to reduce out-of-area base support to a manageable minimum . . . Shipdesigns, both for ease of maintenance and for reasons of habitability, still arenotoriously poor . . . Unlike U.S. ships, most Soviet ships cannot distill enoughfresh water and are dependent upon water tankers.”This situation necessitated frequent operational port visits by auxiliaries totake on food and fresh water, which were <strong>the</strong>n transferred to combatants, presumablyalso AGIs, at roadsteads or at sea. This presumably fur<strong>the</strong>r directedattention to <strong>the</strong> main Soviet basing hosts and clients – Cuba, Angola, Syria,Vietnam, South Yemen etc. – as critical to fueling and o<strong>the</strong>rwise provisioning<strong>the</strong> Soviet Union’s global AGI effort.Soviet forward-based missiles79By <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s, of course, both <strong>the</strong> U.S./NATO and <strong>the</strong> USSR deployed largenumbers of externally based, nuclear-armed missiles in Europe, constituting amassive and critical forward presence. Centrally, this involved Soviet deploymentof short-range <strong>the</strong>ater weapons and tactical weapons in Eastern Europe(SS-12/22s, SS-23s and SS-7 “Frogs”) and a countervailing U.S. deployment ofPershings, cruise missiles and Lance battlefield weapons.The Soviet SS-20 <strong>the</strong>ater missiles which were at <strong>the</strong> center of <strong>the</strong> INF negotiationswere first deployed in 1977. These missiles, carrying three nuclear warheadswith ranges of 3400 miles (5000km), were phased in to replace <strong>the</strong> olderSS-4s. The latter were first deployed in 1959, with a single warhead platformand a range of 1120 miles.By 1987, it was typically reported that over 300 SS-20s were deployedagainst NATO west of <strong>the</strong> Ural Mountains, with ano<strong>the</strong>r 100 or so in SovietAsia, for a total of 441. None of <strong>the</strong>se were based outside <strong>the</strong> USSR (nor wereany of <strong>the</strong> 112 reported SS-4s which were still deployed in <strong>the</strong> western USSR).They were based in several fields in <strong>the</strong> western Soviet Union and near <strong>the</strong>Caspian Sea. The SS-20s threatened <strong>the</strong> entirety of NATO-Europe with <strong>the</strong>ir5000-km ranges, as well as many o<strong>the</strong>r important targets – <strong>the</strong> Azores, Greenland,Philippines, Guam, Okinawa, etc.O<strong>the</strong>r nations’ external basing: Britain and France80Somewhat in <strong>the</strong> face of historical nostrums associated with Mahan and o<strong>the</strong>rs,it is apparent that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> competition – if that is what it was – for overseasnaval access was largely a two-nation game. In that sense at least, bipolarityunquestionably reigned. There were, none<strong>the</strong>less, a few not altoge<strong>the</strong>r insignificantinstances of naval basing retained by – or recently acquired by – some o<strong>the</strong>rnations: France, Britain, Australia, <strong>the</strong> Ne<strong>the</strong>rlands and maybe o<strong>the</strong>rs. Of course,almost all navies conduct periodic port visits abroad, variously involving “presence,”solidification of political friendships, broadening of horizons for navalpersonnel, and so on.<strong>Bases</strong> <strong>during</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cold</strong> <strong>War</strong> 141İ 2007 Robert E. HarkavyFrance had <strong>the</strong> most significant external naval presence besides <strong>the</strong> superpowers,most notably represented by its Indian Ocean Flotilla (Alindien) of fivefrigates, three minor combatants, two amphibious and four support ships (also asmall naval marine detachment). That force was deployed out of Djibouti (hencewas within combat range of <strong>the</strong> Persian Gulf), also making extensive use ofbases at Reunion and Mayotte (Mozambique Channel), both French overseaspossessions (earlier, up to 1973, France had extensive access to Diego Suarez inPage 48Page 49

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