6 Bases during the Cold War

eturn to the link here with aircraft overflight rights.During the latter part of the Cold War, the U.S. utilized some overseas basesfor its Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), a battle managementaircraft often used for coercive diplomacy as a modern form of “gunboat diplomacy.”Earlier in the Cold War, indeed, it had deployed overseas other electronicwarfare aircraft (ECM and ECCM), for instance, RC-135 CONVENT/ELINT aircraft for monitoring radars and telemetry had been based at RAFMildenhall, Hellenikon in Greece and Kadena in Okinawa. The EC-135, a modifiedKC-135 Stratotanker, was used as a radio and telemetry intercept aircraft,and four of these “Silk Purse” planes were based at Mildenhall. In the latter partof the Cold War, USAF EF-111 Ravens were based in Spain and Turkey(Diyarbakir).The AWACS themselves were home-based well back from potential lines ofconfrontation, so as to mitigate the chances of preemptive strike. Some werebased at Keflavik in Iceland in relation to the crucial G-I-UK Gap, others atGeilenkirchen in Germany, and several in Japan. Also used as forward AWACSoperating bases were Trapani in Italy, Konya in Turkey and Oerland in Norway.A NATO command center at Maisieres in Belgium controlled NATO AWACSand British Nimrod early warning systems. Still other AWACS were sold toSaudi Arabia but operated there with U.S. crews.Aircraft overflights13One of the less visible forms of foreign military presence, also one whichinvolves movable and transitory presences, is that of aircraft overflight privileges.It is a form of external access.This occasionally crucial matter of aircraft overflight privileges involves acomplex range of practices and traditions, some of which were, in an overallBases during the Cold War 103İ 2007 Robert E. Harkavysense, altered by time in an era of increasingly “total” warfare, diplomacy andideological rivalries. In parallel with – and closely bound up with – what hasbeen wrought by nations’ increasing insistence upon extension of sovereigncontrol further outward from coastlines (now more or less institutionalized by200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones – EEZs), the trend here during the ColdWar was towards tightened restrictions on overflights.In the past – and in some cases continuing to the present – some nations haveallowed others more or less full, unhindered and continuous overflight rights(perhaps involving only pro forma short-term notices, i.e., filing of flight plans).In other cases, however, where political relations are weaker or not based onalliances, ad hoc, formal applications for permission to overfly must be madewell ahead of time, which may or may not be granted depending upon thepurpose and situation, be it routine or crisis.It is to be stressed that the day-to-day diplomacy of overflight rights is a veryclosed and obscure matter, albeit of often crucial importance. We have little data– the subject periodically emerges to prominence during crises such as the 1986U.S. raid on Libya. Of course, it is precisely when urgent military operations areinvolved that the subject acquires the most importance.Nowadays, of course, well past the introduction of radar and its widespreadglobal distribution, few overflights can be made on a covert basis, as wascommon before World War II, when detection depended primarily on visualobservation from the ground. Not only “host nation” radar, but now also thesuperpowers’ satellite reconnaissance makes such “covert” activities almostimpossible, particularly if a small nation has access to information from one ofthe superpowers, be it on a regular or ad hoc basis. This in turn may have hadimportant ramifications for intra-Third World rivalries, specifically, regardingthe balance of diplomatic leverage involved. Nations inclined, for instance, toprovide overflight rights in connection with a U.S. airlift to Israel knew thatSoviet satellite reconnaissance would provide information about that to Arabgovernments. That was a powerful deterrent.Some overflights were made without permission (as with the respective useby the United States and the USSR of U-2 and MiG-25 reconnaissance flights),overtly or with a tacit or resigned wink by the overflown nation. Often a nationwhose airspace is violated will not openly complain for fear of international ordomestic embarrassment over its impotence, or untoward diplomatic repercussionswith a strong power. Hence, the USSR is thought to have overflown Egyptand Sudan, among others, without permission in supplying arms to EthiopiaPage 11