Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, 2010

More documents

Recommendations

Info

DROUGHTSOverviewA drought can be defined as an:‘agricultural drought’ where there is soil moisture deficit which impacts on agriculturaland horticultural industries, and/or‘water supply’ drought which results in a water supply shortage.Dry periods in Northland normally occur for 3-4 months from November/December toMarch/April and are influenced by El Nino cycles and the Interdecadal Pacific Oscillation(IPO).Northland experiences two types of drought, regional and localised drought, with droughtstending to be more severe at east coast locations and in sheltered inland areas. Northlandhas experienced a number of droughts in the last 100 years each with very different spatialand temporal characteristics with the worst drought being recorded in 1914-15 and thesecond most severe drought in 1982-1983. The drought in 1982 was assessed as 1:40 yearsand resulted in water restrictions in Whangarei, severe pasture damage and loss of dairyproductivity.HazardLikelihood(B/C)HazardConsequence(2)Northland experiences a minor regional drought on average once every three years at eastcoastal and inland locations and once every four years at west coastal and high altitudelocations. Droughts can be forecast against the IPO and the El Nino-Southern Oscillation(ENSO) cycles.Social:Inadequate water supply is unlikely to result in loss of life directly, although healthproblems could result. Families in rural communities may need to buy in water to topup tanks. Communities on town supplies may have to ration water.Built-Economic:Drought has the potential for large farming and crop losses in the district. Financialhardship for farmers required to reduce stock numbers, move stock to non-droughtaffected areas, buy in stock feed and water, or who face large crop losses. Back-tobackdrought events may result in the abandonment of traditional agriculturalactivities that may no longer be sustainable in the region.The worst case scenario would be failure of water supply to the Refinery (which cannotoperate without mains water supply) but this is very unlikely.Natural:How do wemanage thisrisk?What moreshould we bedoing?Lower river levels can pose a hazard to river biota, increase chances of algal blooms,and increase the chance of toxic contamination due to the lack of dilution ofpollutants. Low soil moisture can slow growth of crops and fruit.Planning of water storage (both rural and town supply).Development of a Rural Support Trust to specifically provide for the response andrecovery activities in the rural sector.Farm management practices.Study of climate change affects would be useful for long-term water supply planning.What is thefuture risk?Climate change may exacerbate periods of drought.Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, 2010-2015 Page 80
INFRASTRUCTURE FAILUREOverviewHazardLikelihoodFuel/Electricty(B/C).Telecomms (C)HazardConsequence(3)How do wemanage thisrisk?What moreshould we bedoing?What is thefuture risk?The Northland Lifelines Group has carried a significant amount of work to improve theunderstanding of the likelihood of various types of infrastructure failure. Many of thepotential causes of failure are natural hazards and in these cases the consequences ofinfrastructure failure are incorporated into those respective hazard assessments. Howeverthere is also the risk of some type of internal system failure, such as technology failure, fireat a critical facility, human operational error, etc. It is this type of internally-generatedfailure that is being assessed in this section.As illustrated in Table 13, the electricity and fuel sectors are most vulnerable to singlepoints of failure that could potentially affect the whole region. By contrast, the watersupply networks are more dispersed and internal system failures are likely to have onlylocalised impacts on individual town water supply systems.Failures are likely to occur to significant parts of the infrastructure quite frequently,perhaps as often as once a year. However most can be restored quite quickly or there isredundancy in supply networks that enables services to continue. The type of catastrophicfailure that are being assessed in this section – ie a prolonged, regional outage, is unlikely,but there is little hard data available to make an accurate assessment.The most significant consequence arises from electricity, fuel and telecommunicationsfailure as these will have a knock-on effect on most other lifeline utility services.Electricity: Built: A prolonged outage would see severe disruption to water supply, fuel andtelecommunications services. Social: Worst-case scenario is a winter outage which may see a public health impactboth in terms of lack of heating and lack of water supplies. Economic: Severe disruption to all types of businesses that do not have standbygeneration.IT/Telecommunications Failure: Built: Disruption to electricity, gas, air/sea transport, fuel, water supplies which rely oncontrol systems. Social: Inconvenience. Potential public health impact, particularly those in moreremote areas who rely on telecommunications to seek help in emergencies. Economic: Severe disruption to business, particularly commercial/retail.Fuel failure: Built: Will impact on all other utility’s ability to respond to network outages. Social: Inconvenience. Disruption to emergency services response capability. Economic: Severe disruption to business, particularly transportation sectors and thosewith perishable goods that require transport.Generally there are procedures in place to ensure that lifeline utility and emergency serviceagencies have priority if one utility network fails (for example, the draft national fuel planrequires the fuel sector to give priority to ‘CDEM-critical’ customers and electricitycompanies have load shedding arrangements that minimise impacts on key agencies).Ongoing Northland Lifelines Group work to improve the understanding of risks posed byhazards to the region’s infrastructure, and what can be done to mitigate that risk. Society is likely to becoming increasing dependant on technology and utilities. Some sectors are increasing resilience in the networks – for example a majorelectricity transmission upgrade through Auckland will reduce the risk of region-wideoutages in Northland (though it will not eliminate the risk).Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, 2010-2015 Page 81
Page 2:
PLAN STRUCTURESection1:Introduction
Page 5 and 6:
GLOSSARY OF TERMSCommonly used term
Page 7 and 8:
SUMMARYThe Northland Civil Defence
Page 9 and 10:
1 INTRODUCTIONSection 1 outlines th
Page 11 and 12:
1.3 THE PLAN CONTEXT1.3.1 CORE PRIN
Page 13 and 14:
1.4.1 NORTHLAND CDEM GROUP VISION A
Page 15 and 16:
1.4.3 HOW THIS PLAN SUPPORTS NATION
Page 17 and 18:
Whangarei District population risin
Page 19 and 20:
2.1.3 ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTPROFILETh
Page 21 and 22:
2.2 CDEM GROUP HAZARDSCAPE2.2.1 ANA
Page 23 and 24:
Figure 12: River Network in Northla
Page 25 and 26:
2.3 HAZARD RISK PRIORITIES2.3.1 THE
Page 28 and 29:
3 RISK REDUCTIONThis section provid
Page 30 and 31: In 2009, NRC published a review of
Page 32 and 33: 4 READINESSThis section provides an
Page 34 and 35: 4.2 COMMUNITY READINESS4.2.1 AWAREN
Page 36 and 37: 4.3 GROUP READINESS: STAFF CAPACITY
Page 38 and 39: 2. To facilitate communication betw
Page 40 and 41: Other OrganisationPlans(refer Appen
Page 42 and 43: OBJECTIVE 3d:Current Status:Methodo
Page 44 and 45: In terms of effort applied to respo
Page 46 and 47: 5.3 CDEM EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTRE
Page 48 and 49: Welfare Centres can also be set up
Page 50 and 51: Table 9: Specific Response Issues a
Page 52 and 53: audience. The information it provid
Page 54 and 55: 6 RECOVERYThis section sets out the
Page 56 and 57: The role of the Group Recovery Mana
Page 58 and 59: 7 MONITORING AND EVALUATIONThis sec
Page 60 and 61: CommunityEducation /ParticipationCD
Page 62 and 63: 8 MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCEThis sec
Page 64 and 65: The functions of the Group are deta
Page 66 and 67: 8.3.3 WORK PROGRAMMESAn annual work
Page 68 and 69: During a declared emergency (Level
Page 70 and 71: APPENDIX A - ORGANISATIONS WITH A K
Page 72 and 73: APPENDIX B - HAZARD SUMMARIESThe re
Page 74 and 75: WIDESPREAD HEAVY STORMSOverviewHaza
Page 76 and 77: VOLCANOOverviewHazardLikelihood (E)
Page 78 and 79: Figure 20: Historical Earthquake Lo
Page 82 and 83: Table 13: Infrastructure Failure Sc
Page 84 and 85: MAJOR TRANSPORT ACCIDENTOverviewHaz
Page 86: ANIMAL / PLANT DISEASE AND PESTSOve
show all

Northland Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan, 2010

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?