397 B.R. 642 Page 13397 B.R. 642(Cite as: 397 B.R. 642)fendant had separate property claims for the loan. Thisratification occurred more than ninety (90) days beforeDebtor filed for bankruptcy protection. As such, theDebtor did receive value for the release <strong>of</strong> his obligationsfor the loan. Had the loan not been released, the parentsmight have asserted an equitable lien against the MaritalResidence.Based upon the foregoing analysis, this Court holds thatthe Transfer was not a fraudulent transfer, and therefore,the Trustee's Claim under Section 548 must fail. Accordingly,for the reasons stated above, the Court finds thatthat portion <strong>of</strong> the Debtor's motion seeking summaryjudgment on Count 1 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint shouldbe granted, and that portion <strong>of</strong> the Trustee's Cross-Motionon Count 1 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint should be denied.The Transfer Was Not a Constructive Intent FraudulentConveyanceIn Count 2 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint, the Trustee allegesthat the Transfer can *657 be avoided under DCL §273 as a constructively fraudulent conveyance. An essentialelement to proving a constructively fraudulent conveyanceis that the transfer lacks fair consideration. Asnoted above, DCL § 272 defines fair consideration. ThisCourt adopts the above analysis <strong>of</strong> the exchange <strong>of</strong> considerationas it relates to Count 1 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint,and hereby incorporates by reference that analysiswith respect to Count 2 <strong>of</strong> the Complaint. As a result,Debtor received fair consideration as a matter <strong>of</strong> law.Therefore, that portion <strong>of</strong> Defendant's motion seekingsummary judgment as to Count 2 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be granted, and that portion <strong>of</strong> the Trustee'sCross-Motion as to Count 2 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be denied.The Transfer Was Not a Conveyance by a Person Aboutto Incur DebtsThe Trustee in Count 3 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint seeksto avoid the Transfer under DCL § 275 as a conveyancemade by a person about to incur debts. As with DCL §273, an essential element to the DCL § 275 claim is thatthe transfer was made or incurred without fair consideration.The Court adopts its analysis and conclusion above,that Debtor received fair consideration as a matter <strong>of</strong> law.Therefore, that portion <strong>of</strong> Defendant's motion seekingsummary judgment as to Count 3 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be granted, and that portion <strong>of</strong> the Trustee'sCross-Motion as to Count 3 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be denied.The Transfer Was Not a PreferenceCount 5 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaint seeks to avoid theTransfer as a preference under Section 547. First, as to theparents <strong>of</strong> the Defendant, repayment <strong>of</strong> their loan was notan insider preference. In addition, Defendant did not receivea preference.[13][14] The Trustee bears the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> on allelements <strong>of</strong> a preference claim under Section 547. Includedwithin those elements are insolvency <strong>of</strong> the debtorat the time <strong>of</strong> the Transfer, under Section 547(b)(3), andthat the transferee received more than it would have receivedunder Chapter 7 had the transfer at issue not beenmade, under Section 547(b)(5). The Trustee has failed toraise a genuine issue <strong>of</strong> material fact on either <strong>of</strong> theseelements.Section 547(f) creates a presumption that the Debtor wasinsolvent, but that presumption applies only to the ninety(90) days preceding the petition date. Here, the Transferoccurred ninety-four (94) days preceding the petition dateif measured from the Decree <strong>of</strong> Divorce, or one hundredand twenty-five (125) days prior to the petition date ifmeasured from the date <strong>of</strong> the Transfer itself. As such,there is no presumption <strong>of</strong> insolvency.The only evidence <strong>of</strong> solvency <strong>of</strong> the Debtor before thisCourt is Debtor's retention <strong>of</strong> his $92,000 annuity andDebtor's retention <strong>of</strong> certain personal property. As Debtorclearly had equity in the Marital Residence, and was relieved<strong>of</strong> all other marital liabilities, the Court cannotconclude that a genuine issue exists as to Debtor's insolvencyat the time <strong>of</strong> Transfer.Moreover, the Trustee did not provide evidence <strong>of</strong> insolvency.He simply stated in his Affirmation that "Debtorwas insolvent at the time the parties entered into the SettlementAgreement." [dkt item 17, Ex. 2, 3] This unsupportedconclusion is not adequate under Anderson andMatsushita to raise a genuine issue <strong>of</strong> material fact. SeeAnderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, andMatsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Moreover,the Trustee's assertion does not address November 11,2003, when the Transfer occurred, or December 10, 2003,when the Judgment <strong>of</strong> Divorce was entered. As such, theTrustee *658 did not raise a genuine issue <strong>of</strong> material facton Debtor's insolvency.Therefore, that portion <strong>of</strong> Defendant's Motion seekingsummary judgment as to Count 5 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be granted, and that portion <strong>of</strong> the Trustee's© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
397 B.R. 642 Page 14397 B.R. 642(Cite as: 397 B.R. 642)Cross-Motion as to Count 5 <strong>of</strong> the Amended Complaintshould be denied.This Court Does Not Reach the Issue <strong>of</strong> Application <strong>of</strong>BFP to a Preference ClaimIn light <strong>of</strong> this Court's disposition <strong>of</strong> the Trustee's preferenceclaim, this Court need not and therefore does notreach the issue <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>of</strong> BFP v. ResolutionTrust Corp. to a preference claim under Bankruptcy Code§ 547.The "Repayment" <strong>of</strong> the Parents' Loan was Not a PreferenceThe Trustee argues that, even if the money provided tothe Debtor and Defendant by Defendant's parents is considereda loan, the "repayment" <strong>of</strong> the $61,000 Debtorallegedly owed the parents should still be set aside as animpermissible preference to an insider pursuant to Section547. As noted above, the repayment <strong>of</strong> the parents' loanoccurred more than ninety days prior to the Petition Date.As there is no genuine issue <strong>of</strong> material fact as to Debtor'ssolvency during that period, Defendant's parents did notreceive an insider preference.This Court Rejects Defendant's Affirmative Defenses tothe Preference ClaimThis Court rejects Defendant's affirmative defenses to theTrustee's preference claim. Defendant asserts that the repayment<strong>of</strong> the parents loan was not a preference based onthe defense <strong>of</strong> "contemporaneous exchange" underBankruptcy Code Section 547(c)(1), and as a support obligationunder Section 547(c)(7). Defendant asserts asfollows:The defendant in return for obtaining the debtor's halfinterest in the marital residence, gave up a basket <strong>of</strong>items as outlined in her Affidavit. This is clearly the"contemporaneous exchange" referred to in BankruptcyCode § 547(c)(1), as a defense to a preferential transferclaim. In fact, the Judgment <strong>of</strong> Divorce treats the maritalresidence transfer and the settlement agreement as"contemporaneous." (Exhibit C, page 7, paragraph b)16. As a further defense to this preferential claim underBankruptcy Code § 547, the defendant in her answer tothe amended complaint refers to Bankruptcy Code §547(c)(7) which provides that a bona fide payment <strong>of</strong> adebt to a spouse, former spouse or child <strong>of</strong> the debtorfor alimony, maintenance or support for such spouse orchild in connection with a separation agreement, divorcedecree or other order <strong>of</strong> a court <strong>of</strong> record made inaccordance with a state law or property settlementagreement is a defense to a preferential transfer claim.Clearly § 547(c)(7) was intended to protect spouses orformer spouses against the preferential payment claimsby trustees.[dkt items 15].[15] Defendant's affirmative defense <strong>of</strong> contemporaneousexchange under Section 547(c)(1) is rejected. The obligationsto Defendant's parents that arose prior to or evenduring the course <strong>of</strong> the divorce proceedings were notcontemporaneous exchanges with the Transfer, nor werethose exchanges intended to be contemporaneous. Thoseobligations preceded the Transfer and were released as aresult <strong>of</strong> the Transfer.[16] Moreover, the parents' loan does not qualify for theaffirmative defense under Section 547(c)(7). As Section547(c)(7) stood prior to the enactment <strong>of</strong> BAPCPA, thisdefense was for payments made on a *659 bona fide debtto the extent made for alimony, maintenance or support <strong>of</strong>the spouse or former spouse <strong>of</strong> the debtor or a child <strong>of</strong> thedebtor. Here, the parents' loan does not qualify for thisdefense.ConclusionSummary judgment will be granted in favor <strong>of</strong> Defendantand denied as to the Trustee on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 <strong>of</strong>the Trustee's Amended Complaint. Summary judgment isdenied as to both parties on Counts 4, 6, 7, and 8. A trialdate will be scheduled by the Court on these remainingclaims. A separate judgment hereon will be entered.397 B.R. 642END OF DOCUMENT© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Nassau Academy of LawCLE Live Class
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McKinney's Debtor and Creditor Law
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McKinney's Debtor and Creditor Law
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BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP45 Rockefeller
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usiness of defendant Bernard L. Mad
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BACKGROUND, THE TRUSTEE, AND STANDI
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Madoff who received fraudulent tran
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42. Ruth Madoff was never an employ
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONTURNOVER AND A
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66. At the time of each of the Two-
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EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTIONUNDISCOVERED
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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTIONDISALLOWANCE O
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111. Mrs. Madoff benefited from the
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WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully
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- Page 144 and 145: FRAUDULENT TRANFERENCESRonald M. Te
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Bankruptcy Code Section§ 548. Frau
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Ron Terenzi is a founding partner a