302 B.R. 760 Page 6302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)21. Furthermore, both Sharp and PT Imports haddealings with another Brooklyn-based entity, namedKent International, whose "principals had fraudulentlyinflated the company's net sales figures by creatingfalse sales with related real customers and fictitiouscustomers." Id. 27.In the fall <strong>of</strong> 1998, despite the fact that the Sharploan was current, well within line limits, and--basedon Sharp's reported financial condition, appeared tobe oversecured--State Street took various actions thatdemonstrated its mounting concerns regarding theSharp loan. That September, Nancy Loucks("Loucks"), a Senior Vice President and Credit RiskOfficer at State Street, who had also had oversightresponsibility for State Street's lending relationshipwith PT Imports, assigned James Benninger ("Benninger")from State Street's loan workout departmentto assist with the Sharp credit. See id. 33. CharlesGlerum ("Glerum"), outside counsel specializing introubled loans, was also put on the case. See id.Loucks has admitted that she "devoted more time tothe Sharp credit than to any other credit on which sheworked throughout the summer and fall <strong>of</strong> 1998, eventhough Sharp was not in monetary default during thistime period." Id. 37. Loucks further alerted a number<strong>of</strong> high-level State Street <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> her concerns.See id.On two separate occasions, State Street took the"unusual step" <strong>of</strong> contacting several <strong>of</strong> Sharp's largestcustomers to confirm that they were, in fact, purchasingproducts from Sharp. See id. 38. In early October,State Street sent letters to Sharp seeking informationfrom Sharp regarding its largest customers andrequesting access to Sharp's facilities to conduct aphysical inventory count. See id. 39. State Streetalso requested the work papers <strong>of</strong> Sharp's outsideauditor, KPMG Peat Marwick ("KPMG"), in connectionwith the audit it had done for the fiscal year endingMarch 31, 1998. See id. 40.On October 22, 1998, State Street's outside counselretained First Security Services Corporation ("FirstSecurity"), a firm specializing in investigating financialfraud, to conduct a formal investigation <strong>of</strong> Sharp.See id. 41. Sharp alleges on information *767 andbelief that the purpose <strong>of</strong> the investigation was todetermine whether fraud was being committed bySharp and whether State Street had any legal claimsagainst Sharp as a result. See id. On November 3,1998, First Security produced a 60-page report relayingthe results <strong>of</strong> its investigation, which was reviewedby State Street's outside counsel, Loucks, andother high-level <strong>of</strong>ficials at State Street. "Loucks hasadmitted that this report further heightened her concerns<strong>of</strong> fraud at Sharp." Id. 42.On November 4, 1998, State Street representativesmet with the Spitzes at Sharp's facilities. State Streetindicated its intent to conduct formal confirmations<strong>of</strong> Sharp's receivables with the aid <strong>of</strong> Sharp's auditor,KPMG. Sharp refused to consent to these confirmationsand further instructed State Street not to involveKPMG, fearing that its auditor might be "spooked"by such an inquiry. See id. 43.On November 6, 1998, Benninger, the loan workoutspecialist assigned to the Sharp credit, requested thathe be provided copies <strong>of</strong> Sharp checks that hadpassed through State Street's demand deposit account.Benninger reviewed the checks in order to identifythe parties with whom Sharp was doing business andto determine whether Sharp had made any substantialpayments to the Spitzes. See id. 45. Two weekslater, on or about November 20, 1998, Benninger hadadditional checks pulled and reviewed them for thesame purpose. See id. The complaint does not indicatewhat, if anything, was revealed by these inquiries.Several days later, a team <strong>of</strong> State Street field auditorsmade a scheduled visit to the Sharp facility inorder to review Sharp's detailed accounts receivablestatement and cash receipts. However, despite itsprior agreement to do so, Sharp refused to make thisinformation available to the State Street personnel.See id. 46. Eventually, in response to another letterfrom State Street demanding access to this information,Sharp provided State Street "gross numbers,without any backup." Id.Sharp alleges that State Street's investigative effortsculminated on November 18, 1998, when Loucksobtained Dun & Bradstreet reports (the "D & B Reports")on 18 <strong>of</strong> Sharp's reported customers. Accordingto Sharp, the D & B Reports "contained sufficientdisclosures to afford [Loucks] the knowledge thatSharp had fraudulently created fictitious customersand accounts receivable." Id. 47. More specifically,the D & B Reports showed that "one supposed Sharpcustomer had no known address, another had gone© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
302 B.R. 760 Page 7302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)out <strong>of</strong> business in 1991, and a number <strong>of</strong> others--towhich Sharp reported selling millions <strong>of</strong> dollarsworth <strong>of</strong> watches--were engaged in businesses havingnothing to do with the sale a watches (e.g., plasticsmanufacturer, food wholesaler, fabric laminator, andphoto equipment retailer)." Id.At this point, State Street "halted its investigation <strong>of</strong>Sharp," deciding "not to confront the Spitzes withwhat it knew or to alert anyone else to the clear evidence<strong>of</strong> fraud in its possession." Id. 48. Sharp allegesthat State Street wanted to avoid a potentiallyembarrassing loss such as the one it had recently sufferedfrom the PT Imports fraud. See id. 49. StateStreet recognized that "without a substantial infusion<strong>of</strong> new funds, Sharp in all likelihood would be unableto repay the almost $15 million it owed State Street."Id. Thus, at a meeting held on November 30, 1998,State Street demanded and obtained Sharp's agreementto secure new financing--presumably from investorsunaware <strong>of</strong> the fraud--and to use that financingto pay <strong>of</strong>f the debt to State Street. See id. 50.State Street agreed to give Sharp until the end <strong>of</strong>March 1999 to retire *768 the debt. See id. To securethe new financing necessary to pay <strong>of</strong>f State Street'sline <strong>of</strong> credit by the March deadline, the Spitzescaused Sharp to raise an additional $25 million fromthe Noteholders, who had loaned Sharp $17.5 millionthe previous July. See id. 51.Sharp claims that, upon learning that the Noteholderswere planning to provide Sharp with additional debtfinancing, State Street deliberately concealed itsknowledge <strong>of</strong> the Spitzes' fraud. Specifically, prior tothe closing <strong>of</strong> the second Note <strong>of</strong>fering, Dan Lobdell,the account <strong>of</strong>ficer assigned to the Sharp account, atthe advice <strong>of</strong> State Street's counsel, repeatedly"avoided" phone calls from the Noteholders' representatives,who he knew would be inquiring aboutSharp's credit. See id. 52. Furthermore, on or aboutMarch 22, 1999, State Street consented in writing tothe additional $25 million in financing. Under theterms <strong>of</strong> State Street's loan agreement with Sharp,such consent was a prerequisite to Sharp's taking onany additional debt. See id. 53.On March 23, 1999, without any knowledge <strong>of</strong> theSpitzes' fraud, the Noteholders purchased an additional$25 million in subordinated notes from Sharp.[FN3] See id. 54. A month later, Sharp paid StateStreet $12,250,024, using a portion <strong>of</strong> the March1999 funds, thus reducing Sharp's debt from approximately$15 million to $2.7 million. See id. 55.State Street then accepted personal promissory notesfrom the Spitzes in exchange for releasing Sharpfrom the balance <strong>of</strong> the debt, although "State Streethad little confidence that the Spitzes would repaythese notes." Id. Sharp alleges that between November1998, when State Street discovered the fraud, andOctober 1999, the Spitzes looted Sharp <strong>of</strong> more than$19 million. See id. 58.FN3. On May 30, 2001, the Noteholderscommenced a separate action against StateStreet in New York State court, allegingfacts virtually identical to those alleged inthe present adversary proceeding. The Noteholdersasserted claims for fraud, negligentconcealment, and aiding and abetting fraud.In an unpublished opinion, dated April 14,2003, which quoted extensively from theBankruptcy Court's decision dismissingSharp's adversary complaint, the courtgranted State Street's motion for summaryjudgment as to all <strong>of</strong> the Noteholders'claims. See Albion v. State Street, Index No.602711/01 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co. Apr. 14, 2003)(Cahn, J.). Counsel for the Noteholders, whowas present at oral argument in this appeal,represents that the Noteholders have appealedthe state court's order granting summaryjudgment. See Tr. <strong>of</strong> Aug. 13, 2003Oral Arg. at 2.On July 1, 1999, KPMG withdrew its prior, unqualifiedaudit opinions with respect to Sharp's financialstatements for fiscal years 1997 and 1998, and terminatedits engagement on behalf <strong>of</strong> Sharp, refusing toissue its audit opinion with respect to Sharp's financialstatements for fiscal 1999. See id. 56.(2)On September 7, 1999, the Noteholders commencedan involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedingagainst Sharp. See id. 57. The bankruptcy courtgranted an order <strong>of</strong> relief, and appointed FTI/KahnConsulting, Inc. as "responsible <strong>of</strong>ficer" <strong>of</strong> Sharp,removing the Spitzes from the operation <strong>of</strong> the business.See id. In November 2000, bankruptcy courtentered a judgment <strong>of</strong> $44,378,650.30 against theSpitzes and three <strong>of</strong> their companies, jointly and severally.That judgment remains unsatisfied. See id. © 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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FRAUDULENT TRANFERENCESRonald M. Te
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Nursing home case_ Transfer of pers
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Sections 548 and 544 work in concer
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U.S. Supreme CourtBFP v. Resolution
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example, from net 15 to COD; or cha
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Bankruptcy Code Section§ 548. Frau
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Ron Terenzi is a founding partner a