302 B.R. 760 Page 14302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)In the end, despite Sharp's efforts to cast State Streetas an instigator and active participant in the Spitzes'scheme, the complaint cannot overcome the absence<strong>of</strong> any duty on State Street's part to protect Sharp'sinterests. Indeed, each <strong>of</strong> the alleged affirmative actsthat Sharp identifies as comprising State Street's"substantial assistance" are at root omissions-- failuresto act. By allowing Sharp continued access tothe line <strong>of</strong> credit, for instance, State Street in essencepreserved the status quo. Although it would havebeen in the long-term best interests <strong>of</strong> Sharp (and itsother creditors) for State Street to have immediatelycut <strong>of</strong>f the Spitzes' access to the revolving loan facilityand loan proceeds, State Street owed Sharp noduty <strong>of</strong> loyalty, and had no obligation to put Sharp'sinterests ahead <strong>of</strong> its own. Similarly, State Streetcould possibly have thwarted the fraud by disclosingwhat it knew to the Noteholders prior to the closing<strong>of</strong> the second financing. However, in the absence <strong>of</strong> aduty to disclose its knowledge <strong>of</strong> the Spitzes' fraud,State Street cannot be held liable for its failure torespond to inquiries from the Noteholders' representative.[FN8] See Renner, 2000 WL 781081, at *9(concluding that a bank <strong>of</strong>ficial did not aid and abet acustomer's fraud by "fail[ing] to respond" to inquiriesconcerning the customer). Indeed, the failure to answeror respond to phones calls (even if motivated bya conscious desire not to disclose information) canhardly be characterized as more than inaction.FN8. Had State Street made any false ormisleading statements to the Noteholders, itmight have had a duty to correct any resultingmisimpressions. Surely, however, theNoteholders could not have viewed StateStreet's failure to respond to their inquiriesas any kind <strong>of</strong> endorsement <strong>of</strong> the proposedtransaction. If anything, under the circumstances,State Street's evasiveness mighthave aroused a prudent investor's suspicions.[16] The closest Sharp comes to identifying any act<strong>of</strong> participation by State Street is the written consentState Street gave in March 1999 to the Noteholders'purchase <strong>of</strong> $25 million in subordinated notes fromSharp. Sharp argues that State Street's act <strong>of</strong> consentingto the transaction was a sine qua non <strong>of</strong> theSpitzes' expanded fraud, since without the consent,Sharp would not have been able to borrow any additionalmoney, and the Spitzes' continued looting wasfunded in part by the additional funds advanced bythe Noteholders. However, State Street's contractuallybargained-for authority to block Sharp from furtherborrowing, did *777 not confer on the bank anaffirmative duty to protect Sharp--and still less toprotect other third-parties, such as the Noteholders--from the actions <strong>of</strong> Sharp's management. Significantly,although the consent made it possible for theSpitzes to seek additional financing through fraud,there is no allegation that State Street did anything toinduce the Noteholders to lend to Sharp. Sharp hasnot alleged, for example, that the consent was intendedas--or could have been reasonably interpretedby the Noteholders to be--a representation by StateStreet as to Sharp's creditworthiness. More importantly,although State Street may have anticipatedthat the Spitzes would continue to loot the company,they had no duty to intervene to prevent breaches <strong>of</strong>fiduciary duty by Sharp's management.Equally unavailing are Sharp's efforts to hold StateStreet accountable for encouraging or inducing theSpitzes to expand the scope <strong>of</strong> their fraud. Althoughthe case law and the Restatement identify "inducement"as an independent form <strong>of</strong> participation, thereis scant authority setting forth exactly what conductwould qualify as inducement in this context. SeeSharp Mem. at 13 ("[W]e are not aware <strong>of</strong> any mention<strong>of</strong> inducement <strong>of</strong> this sort in the case law...."). Inits complaint, Sharp asserts thaton November 30, 1998, State Street demanded andobtained Sharp's agreement to secure new financingfrom investors unaware <strong>of</strong> the fraud, and to usethat financing to pay <strong>of</strong>f State Street's line <strong>of</strong> credit.In exchange, State Street agreed to give Sharp untilMarch 31, 1999 to obtain this new financing and toretire the debt to State Street.Compl. 50. The Bankruptcy Court concluded thatthis pleading violated Rule 9(b), "by failing to allegewho made the demand, who else was present, exactlywhat was said, and where this occurred." Bankr.Dec.at 517.Assuming that Rule 9(b) applies to these allegations,and that the pleading falls short <strong>of</strong> the rule's particularitythreshold, this would not, <strong>of</strong> course, be groundsfor dismissal with prejudice, since Sharp could begranted leave to replead to provide more detail. SeeLuce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir.1986)("Complaints dismissed under Rule 9(b) are almostalways dismissed with leave to amend."); accord© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
302 B.R. 760 Page 15302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Miller FeaturesSyndicate, Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 198, 225(S.D.N.Y.2002). However, even accepting the adequacy<strong>of</strong> Sharp's pleading under Rule 9(b), it is difficultto see how State Street could be held accountablefor inducing a fraudulent scheme that was well underwaybefore State Street is alleged to have evenhad any knowledge <strong>of</strong> it. The allegations <strong>of</strong> the complaintamply demonstrate that the Spitzes required noencouragement or inducement to defraud creditors orto breach the duties <strong>of</strong> loyalty that they owed Sharp.Indeed, more than half <strong>of</strong> the $44 million stolen bythe Spitzes had already been diverted by the timeState Street allegedly discovered the fraud.Although Sharp has adequately pled State Street'sknowledge <strong>of</strong> the Spitzes' scheme, the failure <strong>of</strong> thecomplaint to identify any affirmative act <strong>of</strong> participationin the Spitzes' breach <strong>of</strong> their fiduciary duties toSharp necessitates the dismissal <strong>of</strong> the complaint forfailure to state a claim.(2)Fraudulent Conveyance ClaimsConstructive Fraudulent Conveyance[17] The D.C.L., under which Sharp brings the second,third, fourth and fifth counts <strong>of</strong> its complaint, isNew York's version <strong>of</strong> the Uniform Fraudulent ConveyancesAct (the "U.F.C.A."). The statute *778codifies a set <strong>of</strong> legal principles that are intended to"protect creditors by invalidating certain transactionsthat render debtors' assets unreachable." Note, GoodFaith & Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L.Rev.495, 495 (1983).In the second, third, and fourth counts <strong>of</strong> the complaint,Sharp alleges that the $12 million paymentthat State Street received from Sharp in April 1999,in satisfaction <strong>of</strong> Sharp's valid pre-existing debt toState Street, constitutes a constructive fraudulentconveyance under the D.C.L.Pursuant to the D.C.L. a conveyance by a debtor isdeemed constructively fraudulent if it is made without"fair consideration," as defined in the statute, andany <strong>of</strong> the following conditions is met: 1) the transferoris insolvent or will be rendered insolvent by thetransfer in question [FN9]; 2) the transferor makingthe conveyance is a defendant in an action for moneydamages who fails to satisfy a judgment enteredagainst him [FN10]; 3) the transferor is engaged or isabout to engage in a business transaction for whichits remaining property constitutes unreasonably smallcapital [FN11]; or 4) the transferor believes that itwill incur debts beyond its ability to pay. [FN12]FN9. See D.C.L. § 273 ("Every conveyancemade ... by a person who is or will bethereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent asto creditors without regard to his actual intentif the conveyance is made ... without afair consideration.").FN10. See D.C.L. § 273a ("Every conveyancemade without fair consideration whenthe person making it is a defendant in an actionfor money damages or a judgment insuch an action has been docketed againsthim, is fraudulent as to the plaintiff in thataction without regard to the actual intent <strong>of</strong>the defendant if, after final judgment for theplaintiff, the defendant fails to satisfy thejudgment.").FN11. See D.C.L. § 274 ("Every conveyancemade without fair consideration whenthe person making it is engaged or is aboutto engage in a business or transaction forwhich the property remaining in his handsafter the conveyance is an unreasonablysmall capital, is fraudulent as to creditorsand as to other persons who become creditorsduring the continuance <strong>of</strong> such businessor transaction without regard to his actualintent.").FN12. See D.C.L. § 275 ("Every conveyancemade ... without fair considerationwhen the person making the conveyance ...intends or believes that he will incur debtsbeyond his ability to pay as they mature, isfraudulent as to both present and futurecreditors.").Sharp alleges that the challenged payment to StateStreet was made while Sharp was insolvent; that atthe time <strong>of</strong> the payment Sharp was engaged or wasabout to engage, in a transaction for which the propertyremaining in its possession constituted unreasonablysmall capital; and that Sharp believed itwould incur debts beyond its ability to pay. See© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Nassau Academy of LawCLE Live Class
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FRAUDULENT TRANFERENCESRonald M. Te
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Nursing home case_ Transfer of pers
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Sections 548 and 544 work in concer
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U.S. Supreme CourtBFP v. Resolution
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example, from net 15 to COD; or cha
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Bankruptcy Code Section§ 548. Frau
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Ron Terenzi is a founding partner a