Page 4991 F.2d 31(Cite as: 991 F.2d 31)revolving line <strong>of</strong> credit to KIC, secured by the NewYork Property. Key Bank ordered a title report whichdisclosed the transfers <strong>of</strong> the property from Kinderhillto KIC and the nominal consideration paid byKIC. Key Bank also received Kinderhill's auditedfinancial statements for fiscal year 1986, which disclosedthat “[t]he Court [adjudicating the CaliforniaAction] has indicated that it has decided to grantjudgement [sic] to the plaintiff in an amount approximating$1,250,000....” Key Bank approved theloan and, on March 13, 1987, KIC gave Key Bank a$2.5 million mortgage on the New York Property tosecure advances under the line <strong>of</strong> credit.On June 17, 1987, Orr obtained a judgment in theCalifornia Action against Kinderhill individually for$159,338, and against Kinderhill and Martin, jointlyand severally, for $1,071,489, plus prejudgment interest.The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed thatjudgment, but Orr has been able to collect only$42,000 from Kinderhill and Martin.In March 1991, Orr brought the present action againstKinderhill, KIC, Key Bank, Martin, his wife, and thetrustee <strong>of</strong> a trust established by Martin, seeking to setaside several transfers <strong>of</strong> property (including Kinderhill'stransfers <strong>of</strong> the New York Property to KIC) asfraudulent under Debtor & Creditor <strong>Law</strong> §§ 273 and273-a. After some discovery, both Orr and Key Bankmoved for summary judgment on the claims relatingto the validity <strong>of</strong> Key Bank's mortgages. Key Bankasserted several affirmative defenses, including aclaim that Orr's action was barred by the applicablestatutes <strong>of</strong> limitations.In an opinion and order dated August 26, 1991, JudgeCholakis denied the summary judgment motions. Heheld that the six-year limitations period <strong>of</strong>N.Y.Civ.Prac.L. & R. (“CPLR”) § 213(1) applied t<strong>of</strong>raudulent conveyance actions under both sections273 and 273-a. First, there being no evidence thatKey Bank was amenable to suit in California, he rejectedKey Bank's claim that California's four-yearlimitations period applied to the section 273 claimunder New York's borrowing statute, CPLR § 202.See Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d142, 152 (2d Cir.1981) ( “New York's borrowingstatute does not require the application <strong>of</strong> the statute<strong>of</strong> limitations <strong>of</strong> a jurisdiction if the cause <strong>of</strong> actioncould never have been brought in that jurisdiction.”).Second, he held that Orr's section 273-a claim wascontrolled by CPLR § 213(1)'s six-year limitationsperiod, not CPLR § 214(2)'s three-year period governing*34causes <strong>of</strong> action created by statute. On theother hand, he denied plaintiff Orr's motion for summaryjudgment because there were questions <strong>of</strong> factregarding whether KIC gave fair consideration for theNew York Property.After further discovery and additional submissions tothe court, both parties renewed their motions forsummary judgment. In an opinion and order datedMarch 30, 1992, Judge Cholakis granted summaryjudgment to plaintiff Orr on his 273-a claim, concludingthat KIC had not given “fair consideration” forthe New York Property. The district court granteddefendant Key Bank summary judgment on Orr'ssection 273 claim, thereby reversing itself on thestatute-<strong>of</strong>-limitations issue. Judge Cholakis held that,because Key Bank had now demonstrated that it wasamenable to jurisdiction in California, the actioncould have been brought there and, therefore, NewYork's borrowing statute did apply. Because Orr'ssection 273 claim was untimely under the Californialimitations period <strong>of</strong> four years, the court concludedthat Key Bank was entitled to summary judgment.Judge Cholakis entered a partial summary judgmentreflecting his opinion and he certified an interlocutoryappeal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On appeal, KeyBank challenges Judge Cholakis's award <strong>of</strong> summaryjudgment to Orr on his section 273-a claim; and Orrcross-appeals Judge Cholakis's award <strong>of</strong> summaryjudgment to Key Bank on the section 273 claim.Statute <strong>of</strong> LimitationsDISCUSSION[1] Key Bank argues that Orr's claim under Debtor &Creditor <strong>Law</strong> § 273-a was barred by CPLR § 214(2),which imposes a three-year statute <strong>of</strong> limitations on“an action to recover upon a liability, penalty or forfeiturecreated or imposed by statute.” We agree withthe district court, however, that the three-year periodgoverning liability created by a statute does not applyto an action by a judgment creditor to set aside afraudulent conveyance.[2][3] CPLR § 214(2) “does not apply to liabilitiesexisting at common law which have been recognizedor implemented by statute.” State v. Danny's Fran-© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
Page 5991 F.2d 31(Cite as: 991 F.2d 31)chise Sys., Inc., 131 A.D.2d 746, 746, 517 N.Y.S.2d157, 158 (2d Dept.1987), appeal dismissed, 70N.Y.2d 940, 524 N.Y.S.2d 672, 519 N.E.2d 618(1988). Rather, section 214(2) applies only when astatute creates a new liability that did not exist atcommon law and would not exist but for the statute.See Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Nelson, 67 N.Y.2d169, 174, 501 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315, 492 N.E.2d 386,388 (1986); Danny's Franchise Sys., 131 A.D.2d at746, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 158. Moreover, “ ‘the statutemust be essential to the cause <strong>of</strong> action’ [and].... thestatutory liability must truly be new.” Practice Commentaries,CPLR § 214:2, at 521 (quoting Bryden v.Wilson Memorial Hosp., 136 A.D.2d 843, 523N.Y.S.2d 686 (3d Dept.1988)). That the statutemerely enlarges the common-law scheme <strong>of</strong> liabilityor grants additional remedies is insufficient to bring itwithin CPLR § 214(2). State v. Cortelle Corp., 38N.Y.2d 83, 86-87, 378 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656-57, 341N.E.2d 223, 224-25 (1975); Danny's Franchise Sys.,131 A.D.2d at 747, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 159; State v.Bronxville Glen I Assocs., 181 A.D.2d 516, 581N.Y.S.2d 189, 190 (1st Dept.1992).Section 273-a provides:Every conveyance made without fair considerationwhen the person making it is a defendant in an actionfor money damages or a judgment in such anaction has been docketed against him, is fraudulentas to the plaintiff in that action without regard tothe actual intent <strong>of</strong> the defendant if, after finaljudgment for the plaintiff, the defendant fails tosatisfy the judgment.N.Y.Debtor & Creditor <strong>Law</strong> § 273-a.When Debtor & Creditor <strong>Law</strong> § 273-a was enacted in1961, the liability it imposed was not novel. Fraudulentconveyance actions were common in New Yorklong before 1961. See, e.g., Buttles v. Smith, 281N.Y. 226, 22 N.E.2d 350 (1939); Farmers' Loan &Trust Co. v. Meyer, 222 A.D. 123, 225 N.Y.S. 561(1st Dept.1927); *35West Shore Furniture Co. v.Murphy, 141 N.Y.S. 835 (Sup.Ct.Ulster County1913). Indeed, nearly four hundred years ago, theinfamous Star Chamber declared fraudulent a conveyanceby a debtor <strong>of</strong> all his goods and chattels toone creditor during the pendency <strong>of</strong> another creditor'saction. Twyne's Case, 76 Eng.Rep. 809 (Star Chamber1601); see also Hadlock v. Eric, 23 F.Supp. 692,693 (S.D.N.Y.1938) (“section 273 <strong>of</strong> the Debtor andCreditor <strong>Law</strong> does not itself create new liabilities butwas a codification <strong>of</strong> and the embodiment <strong>of</strong> existingpresumptions established by a long line <strong>of</strong> decisions<strong>of</strong> the courts <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> New York”). Section273-a simply fleshed out the meaning <strong>of</strong> a fraudulentconveyance by stigmatizing certain conveyancesmade during litigation. Thus, CPLR § 214(2) doesnot apply to actions under Debtor & Creditor <strong>Law</strong> §273-a.[4][5][6] We agree with the district court that actionsunder section 273-a are governed by the six-yearlimitations period <strong>of</strong> CPLR § 213(1). See Martin v.Martin, 29 A.D.2d 864, 865, 288 N.Y.S.2d 374, 376(2d Dept.1968), aff'd in relevant part, modified onother grounds, 23 N.Y.2d 858, 298 N.Y.S.2d 68, 245N.E.2d 801 (1969); RCA Corp. v. Tucker, 696F.Supp. 845, 857 n. 9 (E.D.N.Y.1988). An action toset aside a fraudulent conveyance under section 273-ais an action for constructive fraud. See Republic Ins.Co. v. Levy, 69 Misc.2d 453, 454, 329 N.Y.S.2d 918,922 (Sup.Ct.Rockland Cty.1972). Compare Debtor &Creditor <strong>Law</strong> §§ 276 (governing actual fraud) & 276-a (authorizing award <strong>of</strong> attorneys' fees for pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>actual fraud under § 276). And actions for constructive-ratherthan actual-fraud have long been subjectto the catch-all limitations period <strong>of</strong> CPLR § 213(1),see Dolmetta v. Uintah Nat'l Corp., 712 F.2d 15, 18(2d Cir.1983); Dybowski v. Dybowska, 146 A.D.2d604, 605, 536 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839 (2d Dept.1989), andits predecessor, Civ.Prac.Act § 53. See Hearn 45 St.Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139, 144, 27 N.E.2d 814,817 (1940); Buttles, 281 N.Y. at 236, 22 N.E.2d at353; McCabe v. Gelfand, 58 Misc.2d 497, 499, 295N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 (Sup.Ct.Kings County 1968). Seegenerally Samuel M. Hesson, The Statute <strong>of</strong> Limitationsin Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyancesand in Actions Against Directors by Creditors <strong>of</strong>Corporations, 32 Cornell L.Q. 222, 224-27 (1946);Note, Statutory Limitation for Fraud Actions, 13St.John's L.Rev. 114, 115-19 (1938).Fair ConsiderationKey Bank also argues that the district court erred byholding that Kinderhill's conveyance <strong>of</strong> the NewYork Property to KIC was not supported by fair consideration.In the eyes <strong>of</strong> Key Bank, the transfer toKIC instantly inflated the value <strong>of</strong> KIC shares heldby Kinderhill, thereby providing the requisite fair© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP45 Rockefeller
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BACKGROUND, THE TRUSTEE, AND STANDI
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Madoff who received fraudulent tran
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTIONTURNOVER AND A
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TENTH CAUSE OF ACTIONDISALLOWANCE O
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111. Mrs. Madoff benefited from the
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WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully
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