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780 N.Y.S.2d 409 Page 39 A.D.3d 553, 780 N.Y.S.2d 409, 2004 N.Y. Slip Op. 05710(Cite as: 9 A.D.3d 553, 780 N.Y.S.2d 409)A.D.2d 208, 213, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901 [1979], affd. 48N.Y.2d 954, 425 N.Y.S.2d 65, 401 N.E.2d 187[1979] ). Supreme Court resolved this disputed componentby first finding that Gregory was a MegaGroup insider with an ownership interest in MPL atthe time of the transfer, and then inferring a lack ofgood faith as a matter of law. While we agree withSupreme Court's premise that the transfer of corporateassets to an insider establishes a lack of goodfaith as a matter of law, we note that the principlerequires the transfer of assets either directly to theinsider or to an entity controlled by the insider (seeMatter of P.A. Bldg. Co. v. Silverman, 298 A.D.2d327, 328, 750 N.Y.S.2d 13 [2002]; Berner Truckingv. Brown, supra; Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co.v. Lauer's Furniture Acquisition, 226 A.D.2d 1056,1057, 641 N.Y.S.2d 947 [1996], lv. dismissed 88N.Y.2d 962, 647 N.Y.S.2d 715, 670 N.E.2d 1347[1996]; Farm Stores v. School Feeding Corp., 102A.D.2d 249, 254, 477 N.Y.S.2d 374 [1984], affd. inpart 64 N.Y.2d 1065, 489 N.Y.S.2d 877, 479 N.E.2d222 [1985] ). Thus, a corporate insider's participationin both the transferor and the transferee is not sufficientto resolve the issue as a matter of law unless theinsider controls the transferee. When the insider is thetransferee or controls the transferee, there can be nofactual dispute that the purpose of the transfer was toconfer on the insider a preference over other creditors(see Matter of Superior Leather Co. v. Lipman SplitCo., supra at 797, 496 N.Y.S.2d 845).thereof as granted the motion of respondent DianneHalton and Robert L. Halton for partial summaryjudgment; motion denied; and, as so modified, affirmed.SPAIN, J.P., CARPINELLO, MUGGLIN andLAHTINEN, JJ., concur.9 A.D.3d 553, 780 N.Y.S.2d 409, 2004 N.Y. SlipOp. 05710END OF DOCUMENT[5] While we agree with Supreme Court that Gregory'saffidavit *556 raises only feigned factual issuesdesigned to avoid the consequences of his earlierdeposition testimony admitting his interest in MPL atthe time of transfer (see Richter v. Collier, 5 A.D.3d1003, 1004, 773 N.Y.S.2d 645 [2004]; Martin v.Savage, 299 A.D.2d 903, 904, 750 N.Y.S.2d 684[2002] ), there is no evidence that his 40% interestwas a controlling one or that MPL was merely analter ego of either Gregory or Mega Group. Also,MPL offered evidence that Gregory did not effectivelycontrol MPL. This question of control is sufficientto raise a triable issue of fact as to whether therewas a shuffling of corporate assets that gave a preferenceto Gregory's interests over respondents' claim(see Rebh v. Rotterdam Ventures, 252 A.D.2d 609,611, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234 [1998] ).ORDERED that the order and judgment is modified,on the law, without costs, by reversing so much© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.