302 B.R. 760 Page 4302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 9(b), 28 U.S.C.A.[24] Fraudulent Conveyances 14186k14 Most Cited CasesBadges <strong>of</strong> fraud, such as court may consider underNew York law in deciding whether transfer wasmade with actual intent to defraud creditors, include:(1) lack or inadequacy <strong>of</strong> consideration; (2) family,friendship or close associate relationship betweenparties; (3) retention <strong>of</strong> possession, benefit or use <strong>of</strong>property in question by debtor; (4) financial condition<strong>of</strong> the party sought to be charged both before andafter transfer; (5) existence or cumulative effect <strong>of</strong>pattern or series <strong>of</strong> transactions, or course <strong>of</strong> conduct,after debt was incurred, financial difficulties began,or creditor suits were initiated or threatened; and (6)general chronology <strong>of</strong> events and transactions underinquiry. N.Y.McKinney's Debtor and Creditor <strong>Law</strong> §276.[25] Fraudulent Conveyances 16186k16 Most Cited CasesUnder New York law, while presence <strong>of</strong> any particularbadge <strong>of</strong> fraud is by no means prerequisite to findingthat transfer was made with actual intent to defraudcreditors, badges <strong>of</strong> fraud appropriately focuscourt's inquiry on circumstances that suggest thatconveyance was made with fraudulent intent, i.e.,with purpose <strong>of</strong> placing debtor's assets out <strong>of</strong> reach <strong>of</strong>creditors.N.Y.McKinney's Debtor and Creditor <strong>Law</strong> § 276.*764 Kramer Levin Naftalis Frankel LLP, New YorkCity, for Debtors.James C. McCarroll, Kramer, Levin, Naftalis &Frankel, LLP, New York City, for Trustee.Bingham McCutchen, New York City, Jonathan B.Alter, Bingham, McCutchen LLP, Hartford, CT, forCreditor Committee.Scott D. Corrigan, Peter Neil Wang, Freidman,Wang & Bleiberg, PC, New York City, for Plaintiff/Appellant.Michael R. Young, Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, LLP,New York City, for Defendant.Kelley Drye, Neil Matthew Merkl, Kelley, Drye &Warren, LLP, New York City, for Appellee.TRAGER, District Judge.Memorandum and OrderPlaintiff-Appellant Sharp International Corp.("Sharp") appeals an order <strong>of</strong> the Bankruptcy Courtfor the Eastern District <strong>of</strong> New York (Craig, J.), dismissingin its entirety an adversary complaint filed bySharp against its former secured lender, State StreetBank and Trust Company ("State Street"). The complaintasserts a claim against State Street under NewYork common law for aiding and abetting Sharp'sthree <strong>of</strong>ficers in breaching their fiduciary duties tothe company. Sharp further claims that a $12 millionpayment Sharp made to State Street in April 1999 insatisfaction <strong>of</strong> a valid antecedent debt is avoidable asa constructive and/or intentional fraudulent conveyancepursuant to New York Debtor & Creditor <strong>Law</strong>(the "D.C.L.") §§ 273-276. Lastly, Sharp asserts thatany claim State Street may subsequently raise byvirtue <strong>of</strong> its return <strong>of</strong> the $12 million payment--ifsuch relief were to be ordered-- should be equitablysubordinated to the claims <strong>of</strong> Sharp's other unsecuredcreditors.Background(1)Sharp is a closely-held New York corporation,which, at all times relevant to this case, was engagedprimarily in the business <strong>of</strong> importing, assemblingand distributing wrist watches, clocks, pens and mechanicalpencils. See Compl. 5, 9. This adversaryproceeding arises out <strong>of</strong> a massive fraud againstSharp and its creditors perpetuated by Sharp's former<strong>of</strong>ficers, Herbert, <strong>Law</strong>rence, and Bernard Spitz (the"Spitzes").In 1993, the Spitzes purchased 100 percent <strong>of</strong>Sharp's common stock. From then until October1999, the Spitzes served as Sharp's sole <strong>of</strong>ficers, withresponsibility *765 over Sharp's day-to-day affairs.[FN1] See id. 10. In January 1995, the Spitzes solda 13 percent ownership interest in Sharp to an outsideinvestor, Bohoradzaner, Inc. Pursuant to agreementsexecuted in connection with this sale, Bohoradzaner,Inc. had "the right to a seat on Sharp's Board <strong>of</strong> Directors,the right to inspect Sharp's books and records,the right to veto certain corporate transactions,and a variety <strong>of</strong> other corporate governance rights."Id. 11. Jaime Bohoradzaner, the principal <strong>of</strong> Bo-© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
302 B.R. 760 Page 5302 B.R. 760(Cite as: 302 B.R. 760)horadzaner, Inc., served as a member <strong>of</strong> Sharp'sBoard <strong>of</strong> Directors from January 1995 until October1999. See id. Sharp alleges that "[n]either Bohoradzaner,Inc. nor Mr. Bohoradzaner played anyrole in, or had any knowledge <strong>of</strong>, the fraud and embezzlementcommitted by the Spitzes." Id.FN1. Specifically, Bernard Spitz served asSharp's Chief Executive Officer, HerbertSpitz served as President, and <strong>Law</strong>renceSpitz was Chief Financial Officer. See id. 10.The Spitzes' fraud had two basic components. First,beginning some time prior to 1997 and continuinguntil October 1999, the Spitzes fraudulently inflatedSharp's reported sales and revenues and used thesefalsified financial statements "to raise increasinglylarge sums <strong>of</strong> money from a succession <strong>of</strong> banks andother lenders." [FN2] Id. 15. At the same time, theSpitzes looted Sharp <strong>of</strong> the funds they caused it t<strong>of</strong>raudulently raise, as well as other corporate funds.See id. 16. In 1998 and 1999 alone, the Spitzes stolemore than $44 million from Sharp, diverting thefunds to a variety <strong>of</strong> companies, most <strong>of</strong> which wereowned by or otherwise affiliated with the Spitzes, andwhich provided no consideration to Sharp in exchangefor the transfers. See id.FN2. So great was the scope <strong>of</strong> the fraudthat "[t]he great majority <strong>of</strong> Sharp's reportedaccounts receivable balances during fiscal1997, 1998, and 1999 was comprised <strong>of</strong> fictitioussales," including reported sales to fictitiouscustomers and fictitious sales to actualcustomers. Id. 13. The Spitzes reportedSharp's net sales to be $52.1 millionin 1997 (when its actual sales for that yearwere approximately $24 million), $80.2 millionin 1998 (when actual sales were approximately$21 million), and $118.1 millionin 1999 (when actual sales were approximately$19 million). See id. 14.State Street's relationship with Sharp (and theSpitzes) commenced in November 1996, when StateStreet approved a $20 million demand line <strong>of</strong> creditto Sharp--secured by Sharp's assets--to refinanceSharp's then-current debt with LaSalle Bank and tosupport Sharp's operations. See id. 17. The terms <strong>of</strong>State Street's loan to Sharp were formalized in aCredit Agreement and a Security Agreement, both <strong>of</strong>which were dated December 12, 1996. See id. 18.The $20 million credit limit notwithstanding, StateStreet permitted Sharp's indebtedness to rise to approximately$26 million in 1997. See id. 19. In July1998, the Spitzes raised $17.5 million through theissuance <strong>of</strong> subordinated notes to a group <strong>of</strong> investors(the "Noteholders"). See id. 15. Sharp subsequentlyused a portion <strong>of</strong> the July 1998 proceeds to pay downthe debt to State Street. Thus, by the fall <strong>of</strong> 1998, theState Street debt had been reduced to $15 million.See id. 19.Sharp alleges that State Street began to suspect thepossibility <strong>of</strong> the Spitzes' fraud some time during thesummer <strong>of</strong> 1998, when Sharp breached its loanagreement in numerous respects. In particular,Sharp failed and refused to provide State Streetwith borrowing base reports, detailed accounts receivableaged trial balances, and other documentation,as required by the Credit and Security Agreements,despite State Street's constant *766 requestsfor such information; Sharp failed and refused toimplement an accounting system that would generatemonthly financial statements, despite Sharp'sprior agreement to do so; and Sharp refused to utilizethe State Street lockbox account, throughwhich, pursuant to the parties' Agreements, Sharp'saccount receivables were required to flow.Id. 31. Moreover, based on the documentation thatSharp did furnish, State Street grew concerned thatSharp was growing at an "alarmingly rapid pace" andwas consuming a large amount <strong>of</strong> cash. Id. 32.Sharp contends that State Street's sensitivity to thiskind <strong>of</strong> behavior was "heightened" as a result <strong>of</strong> afraud it had discovered at another <strong>of</strong> its borrowers,PT Imports, with whom State Street developed alending relationship in 1993. See id. 21, 28. Duringthe summer <strong>of</strong> 1998, State Street determined thatPT Imports had "created fictitious accounts receivableand customers, had created fictitious purchaserecords, and had falsely identified vendors who didnot exist." Id. 25. State Street concluded this fraud"had directly caused it to lend large amounts <strong>of</strong>money to PT Imports." Id. Accordingly, in June1998, State Street commenced an action against PTImports in New York State court, seeking damages inexcess <strong>of</strong> $19 million. See id. 26. Like the loan toSharp, the PT Imports loan was made for the purpose<strong>of</strong> refinancing a debt to LaSalle Bank. See id. 17,© 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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FRAUDULENT TRANFERENCESRonald M. Te
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Nursing home case_ Transfer of pers
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Sections 548 and 544 work in concer
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U.S. Supreme CourtBFP v. Resolution
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example, from net 15 to COD; or cha
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Bankruptcy Code Section§ 548. Frau
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Ron Terenzi is a founding partner a