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Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing the World Bank Water Resources StrategyMajor recommendations are that stakeholdersshould be more closely involved in preparingand reviewing ESW task teams for major sector reportsand should include adequate representationof macro and sector economists to avoid the dialoguebeing restricted to technicians of the Bankand client. In reviewing a sewerage project in Indonesia,for example, QAG commented that thelimited results and impact of the study could haveprobably been achieved quicker, and at a muchlower cost, by organizing a workshop in Indonesiaat which each of the seven cities surveyed by thestudy could have provided a description of issuesthey face as they try to expand service. In contrast,the review of the Water Sector AdjustmentLoan environmental assessment is given highmarks for an outstanding effort to address this issuein a participatory fashion, while raising doubts asto whether this kind of approach was either replicableor affordable for the Bank.Country stakeholders (in Brazil and India) observedthat there seems to be an unwillingnessby the Bank to continually learn from evolvingimplementation lessons—process seemed moreimportant than substance once a project was approved.The staff focus was on meeting disbursementtargets and responding to directivesand mandates from headquarters that the stakeholderssaw as having little relevance to local issuesor concerns. Lack of continuity of Bank staffwas also seen as a problem (Chapter 5). Therewas frustration that Bank staff, because of thesepressures, could not take more time for nonlendingwork and for facilitating public policydebate on water issues.Detailed Guidelines Have Been LackingEven though Water Resources Policy Review andStrategy Formulation (FAO 1995) guidelineswere jointly prepared by the UNDP, FAO, andthe World Bank at the request of the Subcommitteeon Water Resources of the UN AdministrativeCommittee for Coordination, these wereonly modestly effective. There was no followthroughin the Bank (or elsewhere) to make theguidelines fully operational, based on the lessons.Nor was there a realistic assessment of the resourcesrequired to implement them throughlending and nonlending operations.Selectivity and Good ManagementAre ImportantThe theoretical underpinnings of comprehensivewater management are sound, but such a largetask cannot be accomplished everywhere atonce—or quickly. Selectivity is therefore important,as is recognition that the Bank’s projecthorizon of five to seven years is simply tooshort to carry out the reforms needed to establishcomprehensive management. The usual solution—aseries of projects—can work, but onlyif properly sequenced within the comprehensiveframework. China’s Tarim Basin II, the Brazil SecondWater Modernization, and the MoroccoWater Resource Management projects demonstrategood practices in this area. They need tobe adapted and adopted in other water-relatedsectors. It is also important to focus on doing afew things right to demonstrate new approachesthat work. While it is necessary to be comprehensive,it is not necessary to be complex.Seven Ways to Improve ResultsThe Bank has many options for improving performancein the water sector:• Establish ownership and leadership.• Find win-win solutions and opportunities.• Judge results, not plans.• Step up the country and sector dialogue.• Manage complexity and accept tradeoffs.• Use partnerships to build capacity.• Be patient—reform takes time.Establish Ownership and LeadershipMuch of the success of institutional reform isowed to an independent agency outside theconcerned ministries and agencies. In Mali andAlbania, the government ensured the agency’sindependence and freedom to reform. In Brazil,the Bank’s water programs are highly successfulin the state of Ceara because of the personalinterest of the governor and grassroots operationsand management. In India, the chief ministerof Andhra Pradesh pushed through anextensive reform program of the irrigation sector.But in other states and countries there arefew champions, and water sector reform ismired in political indifference and bureaucraticmalaise.32
Why It’s Difficult to Get Good ResultsFind Win-Win Opportunities and SolutionsThe Bank is in a unique position of being ableto see the macroeconomic and political conditionsthat provide opportunities for comprehensivereform. In all cases, the precursors towater reform were outside the water sector—andreform of water is typically second or third generation,following in many cases reform of thepower sector. Macroeconomic crises of the late1980s were the motivating force for irrigation reformin Mexico and for debates on water sectorreform in Australia, Chile, and India. In SouthAfrica, water sector reform has been part of reconstructionof the economy in the postapartheidera. A major change in Poland’senvironmental and water management, supportedby the Bank and other donors, was acceleratedby the ongoing EU accession process.Financial crisis drove water sector reform inBrazil, France, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Turkey, andthe United Kingdom, and more recently in thePhilippines Metro-Manila water concession. Inmany of these cases, water reform also benefitedfrom the synergy of political and economic liberalization.All too frequently, however, Bankwater staff promote reform when the enablingconditions are absent.Judge by Results, Not PlansWater development requires multisectoral cooperationand safeguards that can be costly toclients. In the Yemen Taiz Water Supply project,water supply staff pursued their quest for waterby administrative reallocation from rural to urbanuse—neglectful of insufficient groundwater—while agriculture and social sector staff, cognizantof the importance of water in the rural economyand local needs and customs, argued that amore socially inclusive approach was required.The compromise, a project with many social safeguardcomponents, is proving too complex toimplement effectively. Consequently, there is astandoff between the local landowner and theTaiz water supply agency. The key resourceissue of how to address the groundwater miningon which all livelihoods depend is still unresolved.Similar problems occurred in theTrinidad and Tobago Water Sector InstitutionalStrengthening project. Bank staff in differentsubsectors worked independently with limitedinteraction, sending mixed signals to the client.Frequent changes of task manager due to Bankreorganization caused significant problems forthe government after Bank delays led to theeventual cancellation of a $100 million complementaryinvestment.While the water strategy stresses the importanceof sound environmental and social assessmentand compliance with the Bank’ssafeguard policies (box 3.1), the borrower’scosts of compliance may be significant. Involuntaryresettlement is generally among the importantsocial safeguard issues in water projects.In a Bankwide review of projects that involvedresettlement, the average number of affectedpeople per project had declined from 30,500 to11,600 post-Strategy (Annex F). While a vastmajority of these are only affected by acquisitionof land, a much smaller number need to bephysically relocated. Resettlement action plansare agreed with the borrower prior to project approvalfor regular investment projects, though 16percent are finalized during implementation,due to the programmatic nature of projects. 8Given the need to construct dams to conserveas much water as possible for future demand andthe current lack of capacity to implement safeguardpolicies in some borrower countries, theBank faces significant technical and public relationschallenges in water sector development.The main lesson OED drew from its 1998 resettlementreview was that results rather thanplans should be the touchstone of quality management.9 The main lesson for water operationsis that there needs to be a clear shift from resettlementpolicy and planning to procedures andpractice. There is an urgent need for the Bankto review quality control procedures, includingthe adverse effects of water management, toensure that reviews are transparent and independent.More emphasis needs to be given tosectoral environmental assessment and movingupstream to help borrowers solve root safeguardproblems—institutions, governance, andknowledge gaps—before they get in the way ofdevelopment. There also is rising demand for takingmore explicit account of borrowing countries’policy and regulatory regimes and for making33
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WORLD BANK OPERATIONS EVALUATION DE
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OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENTENH
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Bridging Troubled Waters: Assessing
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AcknowledgmentsThis report examines
Page 10 and 11: ENGLISHFOREWORDThe comprehensiveapp
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Page 14 and 15: ForewordENGLISHand regional capacit
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Annexesdirectly with the poor and/o
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Annexesexisting informal and small-
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AnnexesT able E.1V ariables in Data
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AnnexesT able E.1V ariables in Data
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ANNEX F:RESETTLEMENT IN BANK WATER
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ANNEX G:WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
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AnnexesFigure G.1Staff Questionnair
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ANNEX H:THE DIFFICULTIES OF INTEGRA
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Annexesactivities. To mitigate thes
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