Occupation

K. Watkin – Use of force during occupation: law enforcement and conduct of hostilitiescontrol of Italian, Spanish, Polish, Ukrainian, and Salvadorian troops. 100 The USeffort to take control of Sunni-dominated Fallujah started during the occupation(April 2004) and ran until November 2004. Although unconfirmed, it was reportedthat the number of dead ‘exceeded 600, including insurgents and civilians, and otheraccounts said more than 1,000 had been wounded. 101 An attack on the city in April2004 against an estimated 500 insurgents 102 involved 150 air strikes and destroyedbetween 75 and 100 buildings. 103 Although carried out after the official end ofoccupation, the subsequent November 2004 operation, which was, in effect, asuccessful completion of the previous attempts to seize Fallujah, involved attacksagainst 1,000 ‘hard core and two thousand part-timers’, 104 incorporating 500 airstrikes, 14,000 artillery and shells, and 2,500 tank main gun rounds and significantlymore destruction. 105 The twenty-one-month struggle resulted in 151 Americantroops killed and more than 1,000 wounded. 106 The scope of combat highlights thehigh levels of violence that can occur when fighting organized armed groups. Thebattles in Iraqi cities such as Fallujah and Najaf reflected a shift away from thetraditional guerrilla operations in rural areas to ones carried out in urban terrain. 107Although primarily, but not exclusively, a Sunni-based insurgency, 108 theorganized groups engaged in combat with Coalition forces were diverse. One clashbetween American forces and locals in Fallujah, described as ‘more of a tribal warthan a resistance force’, resulted from what was perceived to be poor treatment ofthe tribes by the military forces. 109 In his assessment of the Iraqi insurgency, AhmedHashim has identified what he describes as a remarkable number of insurgentorganizations varying ‘widely in levels of skill, functional specialization, professionalism,number of personnel, modus operandi, targeting and longevity’. 110 Insurgentgroups included combat cells ranging from large and well-developed organizations,West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah, Bantam Dell, New York, 2005,pp. 61–62.100 P. Cockburn, above note 99, pp. 181–182; T. E. Ricks, above note 80, pp. 337–338.101 John F. Burns, ‘The struggle for Iraq: the occupation; troops hold fire for negotiations at 3 Iraqi cities’, inNew York Times, 12 April 2004, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/12/world/struggle-foriraq-occupation-troops-hold-fire-for-negotiations-3-iraqi-cities.html?pagewanted=print(last visitedFebruary 2012).102 B. West, above note 99, p. 256. However, see Thom Shanker and John Kifner, ‘The struggle for Iraq:troops; suited to guerrillas, a dusty town poses tricky perils’, inNew York Times, 25 April 2004, availableat: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/world/struggle-for-iraq-troops-suited-guerrillas-dusty-townposes-tricky-perils.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm(last visited February 2012), where it is indicated thatUnited States intelligence believed there were ‘2,000 hard-core insurgents, including 200 foreign fighters’.103 B. West, above note 99, p. 315.104 Ibid., p. 256.105 Ibid., pp. 315–316. It is estimated that 18,000 of Fallujah’s 39,000 buildings were damaged or destroyed.106 Ibid.107 Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors ofContemporary Combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 253–254.108 A. S. Hashim, above note 97, p. 60.109 Zaki Chehab, Inside the Resistance: The Iraqi Insurgency and the Future of the Middle East, Nation Books,New York, 2005, p. 18.110 A. S. Hashim, above note 97, p. 170.282