Occupation

K. Watkin – Use of force during occupation: law enforcement and conduct of hostilitiesbe dealt with as a potential crime against humanity. That offence has additionalcriteria for culpability relating to the act being widespread or systemic that could belimiting in its application. 273Finally, recognizing that human rights norms applicable to law enforcementin occupied territory are found within the body of IHL provides a moreholistic approach towards applying the law. This allows for easier integration andsocialization within the doctrine and training of military forces tasked withmaintaining public order, whether it is ordinary policing or countering the threatsposed by an insurgent force. Ultimately, respect for the broad range of legal rightsapplicable in wartime is enhanced, and greater protection is provided to the civilianpopulation.Resolving practical issuesIt is also important to be clear what the recognition of human-rights-based lawenforcement norms within humanitarian law will not do. It will not simplify theinterface between law enforcement and the conduct of hostilities during belligerentoccupation. These challenges remain the same whether human rights norms areapplied as a matter of international humanitarian law or human rights law. Thethreats to the security of the occupier and the inhabitants of the territory can beorganized, diverse, complex, and extremely violent, particularly because of theorganization of the armed resistance groups. Those threats can extend far beyondthose normally associated with law enforcement. In such situations, force used bysecurity forces is governed by legal norms linked to the threat being posed. Themaintenance of public order and safety cannot be effectively addressed by viewingthe situation as being exclusively one of law enforcement or the conduct ofhostilities, nor can such exclusivity exist in the application of the governing norms.Where the threat is from organized resistance movements meeting the legalcriteria for combatant status, from other involved organized armed groups, or fromcivilians taking a direct part in hostilities, the conduct of hostility norms governingthe use of force will apply. Attacks can only be directed against lawful militaryobjectives. 274 Where insecurity is caused by civilians not involved in the hostilitiesbut engaged in ‘riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and acts of a similarnature’, 275 then human-rights-based law enforcement norms govern the activities ofthe security forces. In practical terms, this division of application of norms is also273 A. Cassese, above note 200, p. 98; Cryer et al., above note 201, p. 233, where it is noted that ‘crimes againsthumanity require a context of widespread or systematic commission, whereas war crimes do not; a singleisolated act can constitute a war crime’. See also Darryl Robinson, ‘Defining “crimes against humanity” atthe Rome Conference’, inAmerican Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1, 1999, p. 48, who notesthat an accused can be criminally liable for a single inhumane act (such as murder) as long as it wascommitted as part of a broader attack.274 AP I, Arts. 48, 50, 51, 52(2), and 57. As Art. 57(2) states, everything feasible must be done to ensure thatattacks are not directed at civilians or civilian objects.275 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection ofVictims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of 8 June 1977, opened for signature 12310