Occupation

M. R. Hover – The occupation of Iraq: a military perspective on lessons learnedtwo agencies with different organizational cultures were not accustomed to workingwith one another, and did not want to. It was unfortunate, because the stakeswere so high. As time progressed however, the parties increased their inter-agencyco-operation and created a level of synergy, best illustrated by the Department ofState-led provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), prevalent in Iraq in the latterstages of military involvement there. 27ConclusionOperation Iraqi Freedom forever changed the US military, and the occupation in2003–2004 played a large role in its transformation. It is hard to argue that failedplanning, training, and inter-agency execution of the occupation did not have asignificant role in the development of the insurgency that erupted in late 2004 andcaused US involvement in Iraq to continue for seven more years. Poor strategicand operational planning for the occupation led to the failure of tactical units totrain for the tasks that would help them to maintain security and fulfil their otherresponsibilities as occupying forces. The military therefore squandered the initiativethat they had gained after quickly toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime. The military’ssubsequent acts or omissions alienated the Iraqi population and further contributedto the conditions for an insurgency. Once the occupation began, poor inter-agencyexecution – primarily between the CPA and the military – further exacerbated thedeclining situation. The enormous human and material cost of the war in Iraq wasa severe price to pay to learn a lesson, but it does appear that that lesson has beeninstitutionalized in policy and doctrine to avoid past mistakes in the future. It is nowup to current and future leaders to ensure that history does not repeat itself.27 Provincial reconstruction teams were ‘relatively small operational units comprised not just of diplomats,but military officers, development policy experts (from the U.S. Agency for International Development,the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in fields such as ruleof law, engineering, and oil industry operations) who work[ed] closely with Iraqi provincial leaders andthe Iraqi communities that they serve[d]. While PRTs dispense[d] money for reconstruction projects, thestrategic purpose of these civil–military field teams [was] both political and economic’. US Department ofState, ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/iz/c21830.htm(last visited February 2012).346