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Volume 94 Number 885 Spring 2012procedure ‘waged with justice not less than by force’. 92 His version of just wartradition had the basic premise that, to be just, war must have a just cause and that itwas necessary to pursue that cause:A just war implies that we have a just cause, and that it is necessary: for warimplies sufferance in some parties, and it is a principle of all human actionsthat, in order to be justified in inflicting sufferance of any kind, we must notonly be justified, but the evil must be necessary. 93A just cause was insufficient; circumstance must render it necessary to pursue it. 94As is often the case with just war doctrines, neither Lieber’s criteria nor his examplesof just causes produce a sufficiently close, objectively workable category. 95 Yet he didnot fall into the tradition’s most obvious snare, elegantly avoiding the issue ofobjective/subjective assessment of justness: ‘there are wars where the right is on bothsides’; in other words, ‘both sides in a war may be objectively right’. 96Restraints in war had little to do with the justice or injustice of the cause perse. Justice or injustice of cause was not the source of obligations towards the enemy,nor did it mandate inhumane treatment. Article 67 of the Lieber Code states that:The law of nations allows every sovereign government to make war uponanother sovereign state, and, therefore, admits of no rules or laws different fromthose of regular warfare, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, althoughthey may belong to the army of a government which the captor may consider asa wanton and unjust assailant.This statement on the equality of belligerents cannot, however, be construed asinsulating the manner of fighting from war’s causes. On the contrary, Lieber sawa direct nexus between the right to wage modern war and obligations concerningmeans and methods employed in its pursuit. For him, modern war wasinstrumental, ad bellum and in bello alike; its instrumental character was the basis forrestraints on both recourse to war and the manner of fighting. As Article 30 provides,[e]ver since the formation and coexistence of modern nations, and ever sincewars have become great national wars, war has come to be acknowledged not tobe its own end, but the means to obtain great ends of state, or to consist indefense against wrong; and no conventional restriction of the modes adopted toinjure the enemy is any longer admitted; but the law of war imposes manylimitations and restrictions on principles of justice, faith, and honor. 9792 F. Lieber, cited in R. R. Baxter, above note 5, p. 178.93 F. Lieber, above note 29, p. 635.94 See J. F. Childress, above note 27, p. 45.95 F. Lieber, above note 29, pp. 653–656, enumerating just causes.96 Lieber to Von Holtzendorff, 20 May 1872, in T. S. Perry, above note 43, p. 424; J. F. Childress, above note27, p. 45.97 F. Lieber, above note 76, § 14 (‘War being a physical contest, yet man remaining forever a moral and arational being, and peace being the ultimate object of war, the following four conditions result: ...b. Allmeans to injure the enemy so far as [they?] deprive him of power to injure us or to force him to submitto the conditions desired by us are allowed to be resorted to, but c. Only so far as necessary for thisobject ...’).97