Occupation

Volume 94 Number 885 Spring 2012Above all, it rationalized the modern law of war, embedding in its provisions theauthor’s distinct sense of humanity.Lieber’s sense of humanityLieber’s occasional allusions to ‘humanity’ in the Code and elsewhere often give riseto his appraisal as an early architect of the ‘humanity in war’ project. Yet, readingthe Code as a whole, in light of his other works, reveals a unique sense of humanitythat forms an integral part of an aggregate theory encompassing the individual, thenation-state, and international society. This sense of humanity compels a revision ofhow the Code (and the law of war) is historicized.Humanity as condition and as vocation: the individual, society,and the stateLieber’s essays reveal a dual sense of humanity: on the one hand, an observation onconditions of human nature from which emanates a theory of the individual,society, the state, and international society; on the other, a civilizational vocation towhich individuals and their organizations are subordinate. Lieber started with theindividual, but framed this discussion in societal and institutional contexts. Hisman 57 was a rational – hence an ethical and ‘jural’–being, who ‘consciously work[s]out his own perfection; that is, the development of his own humanity’. 58 Rationality,for Lieber, was a moral facility to distinguish between good and evil; as such, itattested to man’s humanity. Humanity expressed itself in the existence of humansociety. Society, embedded in the human nature (that is, in rationality), wastherefore a necessary attribute of humanity; it was also a necessary instrument forachieving the ‘great ends of humanity’ at individual and collective levels alike. 59Humanity, then, was also a vocation.Liberty was one of the highest ends of society; it stemmed from thecondition of humanity and fulfilled the vocation of humanity. 60 Lieber recognizedsome natural rights but these were neither predicated nor did they express ahumanist perception of the inherent dignity of the individual or a theologicalinterpretation of creation in god’s image. 61 Rather, Lieber was concerned with civilliberty, a necessary, natural attribute of man as a member of a jural polity. 62 Civilliberty consisted of protection against interference with the rights of individuals insociety. 63 The greatest danger to liberty was absolutism of any kind, ‘whether57 ‘Man’ and ‘mankind’ in this section reflect Lieber’s own usage.58 F. Lieber, above note 29, p. 63 (development).59 Ibid., pp. 3 (rationality) and 176–179 (society).60 Liberty is a condition of ‘free agency as a member of society [and] an ingredient of ...humanity’: ibid.,p. 205.61 F. Freidel, above note 30, pp. 152 ff; C. B. Robson, above note 54, passim.62 B. Röben, above note 33, p. 247.63 Francis Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-government, 1st edition, Lippincott & Grambo, Philadelphia,1853, Vol. 1, p. 34 (meaning of civil liberty).91