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LCVD for Ceramic NEWS Fibers<br />

AEROSPACE<br />

NTSB: SpaceShipTwo test program did not properly anticipate human error<br />

The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)<br />

reported, July 28, that it has determined the cause of the<br />

Oct. 31, 2014, in-flight breakup of the composites-intensive<br />

SpaceShipTwo (SS2) during a rocket- powered test flight,<br />

seriously injuring the pilot and killing the co- pilot. Built<br />

by Scaled Composites for Virgin Galactic (both based in<br />

(Mojave, CA, US) to provide passengers short excursions to<br />

the edge of space, SS2 broke up when its feather system,<br />

designed to pivot the tailboom structures upward to slow<br />

the vehicle during atmospheric reentry, and intended to<br />

be unlocked during the boost phase of flight at 1.4 Mach,<br />

was instead unlocked by the copilot at 0.8 Mach. Once<br />

unlocked, the loads imposed on the feather were sufficient<br />

to overcome the feather actuators, allowing the feather to<br />

deploy uncommanded, which resulted in the breakup.<br />

NTSB found that Scaled failed to consider the possibility<br />

that a test pilot could unlock the feather early or that this<br />

single -point human error could cause the feather to deploy<br />

uncommanded, and also failed to ensure that test pilots<br />

adequately understood the risks of unlocking the feather<br />

early, and that the only documented discussion with the<br />

pilots about the loads on the feather as the vehicle transitioned<br />

from subsonic to supersonic flight occurred more<br />

than three years before the accident. Further, the US Federal<br />

Aviation Admin. (FAA), responsible for evaluating Scaled’s<br />

experimental test flight permit applications, granted an<br />

initial permit, renewed it once, then recognized that Scaled’s<br />

hazard analysis did not meet the software and human-error<br />

requirements in FAA experimental permit regulations. The<br />

FAA then waived those hazard analysis requirements based<br />

on mitigations included in Scaled’s experimental permit<br />

application, but subsequently failed to ensure the mitigations<br />

in the waiver were implemented.<br />

Follow this link to the NTSB abstract |<br />

www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Pages/2015_spaceship2_BMG.aspx.<br />

Automated Tape Laying (ATL) /<br />

Automated Fiber Placement<br />

(AFP) Knowledge Center<br />

PRESENTED BY:<br />

AFP/ATL Process CapabilitiesMachine Programming and Simulation<br />

Evaluating Component Producability<br />

Comprehensive collection of technical content!<br />

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ATL / AFP today!<br />

CompositesWorld.com<br />

CompositesWorld.com<br />

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