Economic Diversification and Growth
71mK301zeG0
71mK301zeG0
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Figure 5.1: Natural Capital <strong>and</strong> Corruption<br />
Corruption perceptions index 2013<br />
Ug<strong>and</strong>a<br />
Natural capital as % of tangible capital 2005<br />
Figure 5.2: Corruption <strong>and</strong> Income<br />
Log GNI per capita 2012 (USD, ppp)<br />
oil management institutions before production begins.<br />
For instance, the absence of a National Oil Company<br />
could obscure the division of labor between the Ministry<br />
of Energy <strong>and</strong> the Ministry of Finance <strong>and</strong> could<br />
strengthen the influence of other institutions. Such problems<br />
would be difficult to correct at a later stage in an<br />
environment which could be dominated by rent-seeking<br />
behavior.<br />
ii. Close coordination between MFPED, Ministry of Energy,<br />
URA, the Bank of Ug<strong>and</strong>a <strong>and</strong> other institutions<br />
is vital for effective management of oil revenue. The<br />
development of a comprehensive capacity-building program<br />
also is of high priority.<br />
Source: Authors’ computations based on World Bank, World Development Indicators, updates of World Bank data (2006) <strong>and</strong> data from Transparency<br />
International.<br />
Note: Each country is represented by a bubble the size of which is proportional to the country’s population in 2012. Consequently China <strong>and</strong> India<br />
are easy to identify in the Figure.1. - “Natural Capital” goes beyond “Natural Resources”. This explains Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s very high share of natural capital as<br />
per the 2005 Figures which do not include oil (i.e. natural capital represents 84 percent of tangible capital).<br />
iii. Finally, transparency is critical. The Ministry of Finance<br />
<strong>and</strong> other public sector institutions should share<br />
information on the size <strong>and</strong> use of oil revenue with<br />
civil society organizations <strong>and</strong> the public at large.<br />
II. Improved Governance, Public Finance<br />
Management, Public Investment<br />
Performance, <strong>and</strong> Management of<br />
Expectations<br />
i. The role of the Petroleum Authority will be to monitor<br />
<strong>and</strong> regulate petroleum exploration, development <strong>and</strong><br />
production.<br />
ii. The National Oil Company (NOC) will deal with the<br />
commercial aspects of the oil industry. Its creation is<br />
underway. The existence of NOC is critical to shield the<br />
state from direct liability.<br />
5.10. Table 5.1 summarizes the oil <strong>and</strong> gas sector institutional<br />
structure, describes the functions of each institution<br />
<strong>and</strong> indicates in which areas reinforcement is needed.<br />
i. Despite progress made, the present institutional set-up<br />
is incomplete. The lack of clarity with respect to the<br />
respective roles of the Petroleum Authority, the Ministry<br />
of Energy, the National Oil Company <strong>and</strong> other<br />
institutions involved in oil management may affect the<br />
sound development of a promising oil sector. It is essential<br />
not only to clarify the responsibilities of each entity<br />
but also to accelerate the establishment of appropriate<br />
A. Governance, corruption <strong>and</strong> accountability<br />
5.11. Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s public sector management practices are<br />
broadly similar to what is found in most of the other<br />
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the latest<br />
World Governance Indicators data base, Ug<strong>and</strong>a’s scores<br />
are above the SSA average (see Table 5.2) but the country’s<br />
record is poor on fighting corruption <strong>and</strong> patronage.<br />
89