CONTENTS

politics first | Spotlight
September / October 2016 | www.politicsfirst.org.uk
Tom Brake
Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesman and Liberal Democrat MP for Carshalton and Wallington
Crispin Blunt
Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and Conservative MP for Reigate
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a long standing tradition
within the international community of being one of the premier
diplomatic services. In the past, the FCO has been the mouthpiece
through which Britain has shown leadership in times of turmoil, helping
contribute to the standing of Britain in the global arena. However, the
highly-regarded institution faces major challenges and changes in the
upcoming years.
Brexit has cast a shadow over the department. The creation of the
Department for Exiting the European Union and the Department for
International Trade further chips away at what one former top diplomat
described as the FCO’s fading global reach. Coupled with the cuts in
the last Parliament, and at a time when the Foreign Office is being asked
to take on a greater role in invigorating new trade deals, this means the
department is being stretched to its absolute limits.
In the wake of the recent Brexit vote, there is a widespread view
that top civil servants from various departments within Whitehall will
leave to join the DEEU (or DX, as recently appointed Chief Brexiteer
David Davis likes to call it). That will only contribute to the perception
of the Foreign Office being downgraded, raising questions over how an
institution whose funding is flat-lining and may be about to suffer the
brain-drain of its top civil servants, can be expected to modernise and
evolve to combat complex global issues, such as the refugee crisis,
the rise of Daesh and an expansionist Russia. Indeed, the FCO has set
itself the task of keeping the UK a major player on the world stage,
tackling threats to security and prosperity, protecting British interests,
and upholding British values. Any of those tasks, alone, would be a
challenge, and one has to question which will be given less priority as
we slowly trudge towards eventual Brexit.
This crisis of identity is not ring-fenced within the department, as
undoubtedly the three Brexiteers, namely Boris Johnson, David Davis
and Liam Fox, are likely to clash over not only over who gets the top
talent, but also over their own roles in future negotiations. Questions are
already being raised over who will be in charge, with Davis suggesting
that he will be able to pull rank over the other two Brexiteers, yet in an
official list his role was ranked below the Foreign Secretary in terms
of Cabinet seniority. Those internal feuds will detract from the FCO’s
ability to maintain its position within the global community, as the other
two departments seek to cement their value and status.
An area which will, undoubtedly, take more of a backseat going
forward is the promotion of human rights. This government has happily
dealt with human rights and economic development as separate issues.
They are not. In fact, the two are actually inextricably intertwined. There
are fundamental links between rights’ denial, impoverishment and
conflict, evidenced by the troubled Middle East. Prioritising human
rights, along with economic development, will be key to resolving the
issues within this region. Indeed, Tunisia is lighting the way for others
to follow.
However, if this Government’s track record is anything to go by, it
economic ties will continue to take precedent. That was most clearly
demonstrated in the ex-Chancellor’s recent visit to China, during which
he was described as “the first Western official in recent years who has
stressed more the region’s business potential instead of finding fault
over the human-rights issue.” With Boris Johnson as Foreign Secretary,
it is reasonable to assume that human rights will not move any higher
up the Foreign Secretary’s agenda.
If competition between Brexiteers was not deleterious enough for the
FCO, the cracks within the department have been widening for years.
The UK spends less per head on diplomacy than countries such as the
US, Germany, France, Australia and Canada, all countries that the UK
will want to do trade deals with. Although value for money is important,
services are under constant threat and vital skills are in worryingly short
supply. A report last year noted that only about a quarter, and falling,
of staff in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Central Asia had the
requisite language skills. That shrinking skill set, coupled with the
possibility of top civil servants being poached by rival departments and
more budget cuts, could truly diminish the role of the FCO.
Brexit does mean Brexit, but the Government must not allow UK
foreign policy to become completely consumed by it. The world has
not stopped spinning because we are planning on leaving the EU, the
war in Syria will not pause for the UK to trigger Article 50, nor will
refugees fleeing war-torn countries miraculously find a home. Chatham
House has suggested that spending 0.2 per cent of GDP on diplomacy
would help cement Britain and the FCO’s position in the world. If the
Government is serious about maintaining Britain’s global standing and
helping solve the issues which plague the world today, more must be
done to protect our most invaluable institution which makes it possible
for the UK to do so. Guaranteeing 0.2 per cent for diplomacy, and fully
committing to the human right agenda, would be a good start.
It is almost a tradition for former senior diplomats to appear before the
Foreign Affairs Committee and inform it, in sorrowful tones, that the
staff are doing their very best but that the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office is not what it once was and is not valued within Government,
that it has been cut to the bone, that diplomatic staff no longer have
the time to find out what is really going on in a country, and that core
skills and knowledge have been allowed to wither. No one could say
that was a picture of an office fit for service; and it is about time we
started listening.
What does “fit for service” actually entail? Our predecessor
Committee set out what the FCO depends upon in order to fulfil its
role. Firstly, it needs a corps of highly competent and motivated staff,
able to gather and analyse information from a wide range of sources
on attitudes to the UK and on threats and opportunities to the UK;
secondly, it needs to be able to command respect amongst opinionformers
in a foreign country and within international institutions, so
that it can carry influence; and thirdly, it needs an effective platform
from which to operate. The machine has to be able to operate fluently
and efficiently.
All of those elements depend, to some extent, on money. If you are
going to recruit the necessary calibre of staff, you should be able to
offer good prospects and good financial incentives. If you are going
to be respected by a host country, you will struggle if your mission
appears understaffed and underpowered by comparison to those of
other first-division countries. And an efficient machine needs regular
investment and maintenance.
Having been a Special Adviser over 20 years ago, my observation
is that the quality of staff is declining. It may be that I was more easily
impressed as a younger man, but undeniably the pressure under which
the staff work has massively increased. The Committee visits overseas
posts regularly as part of its work, and whilst we frequently enjoy the
benefit of the depth of knowledge amongst both UK-based staff and
locally engaged staff, they often seem very stretched. Diplomatic
and negotiating skills are being given greater prominence through
the Diplomatic Academy. Language skills, which were allowed to dip
to unacceptably low levels in recent years, are now showing signs
of recovering; and the network of overseas posts is still numerically
strong. But the posts are weaker: The Diplomatic Service headcount
has much reduced, particularly overseas.
The signs are overt of a department which is struggling to handle
multiple international crises and which is not taking a visible lead in
some of the key trouble spots. Germany marshalled the European
response to events in Ukraine; France is taking the initiative in
Palestine; and there is limited evidence of a distinct UK impact in the
political effort to resolve the situation in Syria. We would also like
to see the UK play more of a part in denying ISIL the funding which
sustains it.
When I became the Committee’s Chair in June 2015, the Spending
Review was looming. In our first report of the Parliament, we set out
how calamitous further cuts would be for the FCO, which had already
been stripped down, and we called for the FCO budget to be protected.
Thankfully, that recommendation was heard, and the settlement was
for funding to be maintained at existing levels in real terms. But the
FCO is going to be more constrained due to the need to make further
efficiency savings of £53 million. More significantly, the proportion of
FCO funding which is assigned to countries which qualify for Official
Development Assistance is set to climb: one witness told us that
“about 73 per cent” of FCO spending would qualify as ODA by 2020.
That suggests a serious imbalance for a Department which is likely,
for instance, to have to reinvest heavily in its bilateral representation in
Europe as a result of the vote to leave the EU.
The FCO is now facing extraordinary demands following the
referendum result. There is, as yet, no clarity about the boundaries
between the FCO and the two new Government departments, for
Exiting the EU and for International Trade. Much of the expertise
which will be needed in managing the withdrawal from the EU and
negotiating new international agreements, will have to be drawn from
the FCO; but what risks being overlooked is the huge diplomatic
effort required to signal the country’s continuing commitment
to an outward-looking, globally engaged foreign policy, and to
mitigate the reputational risk associated with withdrawal. That will
take dedication and professionalism, and the Committee believes
strongly that the Government should increase the funding available
to the FCO commensurate with the enormity of the task. Only then
can we be more confident that the FCO is truly fit for service.
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