THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

The Operational Impact of New Naval Technologies | 89
the desired reactions from the deception target. The attacker can also use so-called
logic bombs to incapacitate the opponent’s information system. Such a ‘bomb’ can lie
dormant until it is activated by some event, such as a specific date or a random number,
and then destroy or substantially damage the opponent’s information system. Another
deception method that can be used today is a conventional attack against an aspect of an
enemy’s information system, such as his computer network’s ‘server farms’ or telephone
switching facilities. The array of potential targets is enormous, and the more the enemy
relies on information technology, the greater his vulnerability to such attacks. 55 Hence,
the weaker side also has a significant ability to plan and execute deception by exploiting
the inherent vulnerabilities of sophisticated technology to even the most basic measures
of camouflage and concealment. Simple deceptions can be effective against certain
types of information attack, while far more sophisticated methods would be required to
counter the efforts of highly sophisticated intelligence organisations. 56
As in the past, traditional theatre-wide functions - specifically, operational command
structure, intelligence, command and control warfare, logistics, and protection - will
remain indispensable in ensuring the success of campaigns and major operations. The
new technological advances will significantly influence the way military forces are
organised for combat. Operational command echelons will be the most critical link for
planning, preparing, executing, and sustaining major operations and campaigns. At the
same time, technological dependence on modern command and control and information
systems also creates vulnerabilities and sources of disruption.
The new technological advances will substantially increase one’s ability to obtain
accurate, timely, and perhaps relevant intelligence regarding the enemy’s tangible
capabilities - both military and non-military. However, one’s ability to know, with any
degree of certainty, the enemy’s intentions or actions will not improve any time soon.
In the past, increases in the volume of information led to further decentralisation of
intelligence, because the lower command echelons did not have either the resources or
the time to digest the vast volume of information necessary for the commander to make
decisions.
Another serious problem that may defy solution is the ever-growing collection of all kinds
of information that cannot be either processed or transmitted in a timely manner. This
information overload can result when there is too much information for the commander
and his staff to timely process and place into the proper context. It can also result when
technical systems cannot quickly transmit relevant information to users. Among other
things, one’s commanders can be overwhelmed by a vast flow of information, especially
if they are not properly trained. 57 The greatest challenge that needs to be resolved is not
to overwhelm the user with vast volumes of raw data and unprocessed information. The
critical problem is sorting out relevant from unimportant information. 58 The situation is
even more serious if networks are used primarily to pass data instead of processing it
into information. In that case, the sheer amount of data that the diverse sources collect
and transmit to users will most likely overwhelm the processing capability of lower
command echelons.