THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

The Evolving Dynamic of Armed Maritime Crime and Terrorism in the Modern Era | 51
Maritime terrorism as a means of causing mass casualties
The spectre of mass casualty terrorism has emerged with increased clarity since the
attacks of 11 September 2001, which collectively killed nearly 3000 people. Although
most concern in this regard has focused on land-based targets, certain maritime assets
could also be vulnerable to such contingencies. One target that is often singled out as an
ideal venue for orchestrating attacks intended to maximise civilian casualties is cruise
ships. These vessels typically transport thousands of people with some of the larger ships
having passenger manifests upwards of 4000. 45 Moreover, because companies such as
Royal Caribbean, Carnival and Holland America largely cater to affluent American and
European tourists, they provide a high-prestige target precisely of the sort that current
transnational jihadist extremists wish to destroy.
Actually destroying a passenger liner would be an extremely tall undertaking, however,
as these types of vessel are constructed with safety as the foremost priority. Hulls are
double-lined and, in most cases, interiors are compartmentalised with largely (though
not fully) watertight systems in place. 46 Overcoming these safeguards would require, at
a minimum, several highly powerful bombs as well as a sophisticated understanding
of the structural integrity of the intended target - particularly in terms of being able to
identify locations where simultaneous explosions could be expected to cause the most
damage. As a result, most commentators generally agree that if a cruise ship were to be
the scene of a terrorist incident it would be an onboard attack against vacationers and/
or crew rather than an outright attempt to sink the ship itself. 47
Ferries constitute a different threat altogether. Although not as symbolic as cruise
liners, these vessels represent the ‘softest of the soft’ in terms of potential mass casualty
terrorism. Many of the commercial ships currently in operation move hundreds of
people in a single crossing. This is especially true in the developing world where ferries
are notorious for sailing at or well over designated capacity limits. As such they exhibit
the same ‘body-rich’ environment that cruise ships do. What sets ferries apart from their
‘tourist cousins’, however, is that they are far more susceptible to cataclysmic attack.
Several factors account for this inherent vulnerability. One major problem is that portside
security measures vary greatly at passenger terminals and even in developed littoral
states such as the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and US are not nearly as
extensive as those employed for cruise liners (much less aircraft). Indeed, the very need
to accommodate high volumes of embarking traffic in as efficient a manner as possible
necessarily precludes the latitude for carrying out concerted checks on baggage, cars,
trucks and people. 48 Indeed instituting even minimal precautionary measures could
have the effect of generating huge delays and backlogs. 49
Equally vetting of those working on-board ferries is ad-hoc and partial, reflecting the
seasonal and highly transient nature of these personnel. Background checks, to the extent
that they occur, are generally aimed at verifying past employers and rarely embrace
wider criminal investigations. Throughout much of Asia and Africa it is unlikely that
any consistent form of examination takes place, largely because owner/operators lack