THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

The Evolving Dynamic of Armed Maritime Crime and Terrorism in the Modern Era | 59
35 This point is directly taken up by Bruce Hoffman in his ‘The Contemporary Terrorist Mindset:
Targeting, Tactics and Likely Future Trends’, ciao Working Papers, October 1997, www.ciaonet.
org/wps/hob03/.
36 Indeed it took nearly a week before the 2002 bombing of the M/V Limburg was confirmed as a
terrorist attack.
37 For a discussion on this aspect of the terrorist phenomenon see Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism
and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic, Macmillan, London, 1996, Chapter 1.
38 The attack on SuperFerry 14, left 116 people dead and remains the most destructive maritime act
of violence in modern-day terrorism.
39 In 2013, an estimated 3.8 million barrels of oil a day passed through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
northwards to markets in Europe and the Americas and southwards to consumers in Asia.
‘Al-Qaeda Vows to Block Strategic Al-Mandeb Strait’, Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, 19
February 2010.
40 Ken Dilanian, ‘Al-Qaeda Wanted to Attack Tankers, Bin Laden Files Show’, Los Angeles Times, 21
May 2011.
41 See, for instance, ‘That It Should Come To This’, The Economist, 10 January 2015.
42 Saeed Al-Batati and Kareen Fahim, ‘War in Yemen is Allowing Qaeda Group to Expand’, The New
York Times, 16 April 2015.
43 Jeremy Wagstaff, ‘All at Sea: Global Shipping Fleet Exposed to Hacking Threat’, Reuters, 23 April
2014. Comments made during the 6 th Annual NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training
Center Conference, ‘Energy Security’, Crete, 2-4 June 2015.
44 Comments made during the 6 th Annual NMIOTC Conference, ‘Energy Security’.
45 The world’s two largest cruise ships, the Royal Caribbean’s Oasis of the Seas and Allure of the
Seas, are each able to hold up 6296 passengers.
46 It would be impossible to construct a cruise liner that has a fully compartmentalised watertight
system in place as the recreational and luxury-oriented nature of these vessels necessarily requires
an on-board configuration that is open and accessible (within the constraints of allowable
safety limits).
47 Interviews with maritime security analysts, London and Kuala Lumpur, September 2005.
48 In Britain, for instance, cars and coaches are inspected on a random, selective basis. Freight
vehicles are rarely, if ever checked. As one former defence intelligence official opined:
Ferries are their own worst enemies: [the industry is] designed to transport a high volume of
people as conveniently, cheaply and quickly as possible. Most operators simply do not have the
infrastructure - or willingness - to carry out a comprehensive regimen of security checks.
Author interview with former UK defence intelligence official, London, September 2005.
49 The Port of Dover on the English south coast provides a case in point. In the immediate aftermath
of the July 2005 London underground bombings, all motorists leaving the terminal for
Calais in northern France were subjected to a slightly more rigorous regime of pre-departure
scrutiny and examination. Although individual inspections and questions generally took no
more than a few minutes per vehicle, combined they served to create tailbacks that extended
over four miles. Interviews with UK Customs and Excise officials, London, September 2005.
50 Author interviews with maritime analysts and intelligence officials, Singapore, London, Amsterdam
and Washington DC, August and September 2005.
51 In the UK, for instance, the schedules and itineraries of all ferry companies operating out of the
country can be accessed via www.ferries.com.