THE FUTURE OF SEA POWER

The Great Game Goes to Sea | 33
Broadly speaking, when we step back and look at the trans-Pacific relationship, we see
that it is characterised by profound levels of strategic mistrust. A great deal of time and
energy is expended in fostering high-level dialogues between the United States and China,
but a long catalogue of irritants - computer hacking, espionage, human rights violations,
intellectual property theft, restrictions placed on American companies operating in
China, and Chinese expectations that the United States will extradite Chinese nationals
accused of absconding to the US with ill-gotten gains - militates against the creation of a
reassuring atmosphere of collaboration. 56 The upshot is that the doves are in retreat and
the hawks are in the ascendant. As a consequence, the United States is moving slowly
and steadily along the spectrum from engagement towards containment. Indeed, from
a Chinese perspective, a full-blown American policy of containment is already in place,
despite official denials to the contrary. When analysts in China look out at Asia, they
feel increasingly besieged, with American forces stationed at almost every point of the
compass around them. 57
Fierce policy debates about what to do about China are not, of course, limited to
the United States. There has been a muscular and informed debate on this issue for
many years in Australia. Australia’s overwhelming commercial dependence on China
is constantly set over and against the stern dictates of geostrategic reality. Should
Australia be continentalist or expeditionary in nature? How should Australia nuance
an increasingly problematic relationship with Beijing? And what does this mean for the
ADF posture in general, and the RAN force structure and deployment in particular? 58
These are questions of compelling national concern, as the price of iron ore sags, as
politicians argue over free trade agreements, and as the media focuses on the negative
features of a growing Chinese presence in Australia, such as Chinese ownership of
Australian farmland and real estate.
A Brittle Environment
It is hard to resist the conclusion that, despite repeated expressions of good faith, and
efforts at confidence-building, such as China’s inclusion in the 2014 RIMPAC exercise,
the maritime environment in the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly brittle and
problematic. Half a decade ago, Professor Desmond Ball pointed out that there was
inescapable evidence that a naval arms race had begun in Asian waters. There seems little
that has taken place in the interval that would argue to the contrary. 59 Chinese shipyards
continue to send more and more sophisticated naval vessels down the slipways. The
Indian Navy is attempting to do the same, though, arguably, with somewhat less success.
Japanese ‘destroyers’, which are indistinguishable from traditional helicopter carriers,
continue to grow in number, and Indonesia has articulated an ambitious maritime
program, the maritime axis doctrine, designed to enable it to exert a more commanding
presence in Southeast Asian waters. 60